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Message-ID: <20220525055149.f4nqx2ocnh3pqnpr@riteshh-domain>
Date: Wed, 25 May 2022 11:21:49 +0530
From: Ritesh Harjani <ritesh.list@...il.com>
To: Vaibhav Jain <vaibhav@...ux.ibm.com>
Cc: linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org, devicetree@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
"Aneesh Kumar K . V" <aneesh.kumar@...ux.ibm.com>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>,
Frank Rowand <frowand.list@...il.com>,
Prakhar Srivastava <prsriva@...ux.microsoft.com>,
Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@...ux.microsoft.com>,
Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@...ux.ibm.com>,
Rob Herring <robh@...nel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] of: check previous kernel's ima-kexec-buffer against
memory bounds
Just a minor nit which I noticed.
On 22/05/24 11:20AM, Vaibhav Jain wrote:
> Presently ima_get_kexec_buffer() doesn't check if the previous kernel's
> ima-kexec-buffer lies outside the addressable memory range. This can result
> in a kernel panic if the new kernel is booted with 'mem=X' arg and the
> ima-kexec-buffer was allocated beyond that range by the previous kernel.
> The panic is usually of the form below:
>
> $ sudo kexec --initrd initrd vmlinux --append='mem=16G'
>
> <snip>
> BUG: Unable to handle kernel data access on read at 0xc000c01fff7f0000
> Faulting instruction address: 0xc000000000837974
> Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
> <snip>
> NIP [c000000000837974] ima_restore_measurement_list+0x94/0x6c0
> LR [c00000000083b55c] ima_load_kexec_buffer+0xac/0x160
> Call Trace:
> [c00000000371fa80] [c00000000083b55c] ima_load_kexec_buffer+0xac/0x160
> [c00000000371fb00] [c0000000020512c4] ima_init+0x80/0x108
> [c00000000371fb70] [c0000000020514dc] init_ima+0x4c/0x120
> [c00000000371fbf0] [c000000000012240] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x2c0
> [c00000000371fcc0] [c000000002004ad0] kernel_init_freeable+0x344/0x3ec
> [c00000000371fda0] [c0000000000128a4] kernel_init+0x34/0x1b0
> [c00000000371fe10] [c00000000000ce64] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x64
> Instruction dump:
> f92100b8 f92100c0 90e10090 910100a0 4182050c 282a0017 3bc00000 40810330
> 7c0802a6 fb610198 7c9b2378 f80101d0 <a1240000> 2c090001 40820614 e9240010
> ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
>
> Fix this issue by checking returned PFN range of previous kernel's
> ima-kexec-buffer with pfn_valid to ensure correct memory bounds.
>
> Fixes: 467d27824920 ("powerpc: ima: get the kexec buffer passed by the previous kernel")
> Cc: Frank Rowand <frowand.list@...il.com>
> Cc: Prakhar Srivastava <prsriva@...ux.microsoft.com>
> Cc: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@...ux.microsoft.com>
> Cc: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@...ux.ibm.com>
> Cc: Rob Herring <robh@...nel.org>
> Signed-off-by: Vaibhav Jain <vaibhav@...ux.ibm.com>
>
> ---
> Changelog
> ==========
>
> v2:
> * Instead of using memblock to determine the valid bounds use pfn_valid() to do
> so since memblock may not be available late after the kernel init. [ Mpe ]
> * Changed the patch prefix from 'powerpc' to 'of' [ Mpe ]
> * Updated the 'Fixes' tag to point to correct commit that introduced this
> function. [ Rob ]
> * Fixed some whitespace/tab issues in the patch description [ Rob ]
> * Added another check for checking ig 'tmp_size' for ima-kexec-buffer is > 0
> ---
> drivers/of/kexec.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/of/kexec.c b/drivers/of/kexec.c
> index 8d374cc552be..879e984fe901 100644
> --- a/drivers/of/kexec.c
> +++ b/drivers/of/kexec.c
> @@ -126,6 +126,7 @@ int ima_get_kexec_buffer(void **addr, size_t *size)
> {
> int ret, len;
> unsigned long tmp_addr;
> + unsigned int start_pfn, end_pfn;
^^^ Shouldn't this be unsigned long?
-ritesh
> size_t tmp_size;
> const void *prop;
>
> @@ -140,6 +141,22 @@ int ima_get_kexec_buffer(void **addr, size_t *size)
> if (ret)
> return ret;
>
> + /* Do some sanity on the returned size for the ima-kexec buffer */
> + if (!tmp_size)
> + return -ENOENT;
> +
> + /*
> + * Calculate the PFNs for the buffer and ensure
> + * they are with in addressable memory.
> + */
> + start_pfn = PHYS_PFN(tmp_addr);
> + end_pfn = PHYS_PFN(tmp_addr + tmp_size - 1);
> + if (!pfn_valid(start_pfn) || !pfn_valid(end_pfn)) {
> + pr_warn("IMA buffer at 0x%lx, size = 0x%zx beyond memory\n",
> + tmp_addr, tmp_size);
> + return -EINVAL;
> + }
> +
> *addr = __va(tmp_addr);
> *size = tmp_size;
>
> --
> 2.35.1
>
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