linux-kernel - [PATCH 5.15 133/145] random: credit architectural init the exact amount

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Message-Id: <20220527084906.597596494@linuxfoundation.org>
Date:   Fri, 27 May 2022 10:50:34 +0200
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org,
        Dominik Brodowski <linux@...inikbrodowski.net>,
        "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>
Subject: [PATCH 5.15 133/145] random: credit architectural init the exact amount

From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>

commit 12e45a2a6308105469968951e6d563e8f4fea187 upstream.

RDRAND and RDSEED can fail sometimes, which is fine. We currently
initialize the RNG with 512 bits of RDRAND/RDSEED. We only need 256 bits
of those to succeed in order to initialize the RNG. Instead of the
current "all or nothing" approach, actually credit these contributions
the amount that is actually contributed.

Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@...inikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@...c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/char/random.c |   12 ++++++------
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -896,9 +896,8 @@ early_param("random.trust_bootloader", p
  */
 int __init random_init(const char *command_line)
 {
-	size_t i;
 	ktime_t now = ktime_get_real();
-	bool arch_init = true;
+	unsigned int i, arch_bytes;
 	unsigned long rv;
 
 #if defined(LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN)
@@ -906,11 +905,12 @@ int __init random_init(const char *comma
 	_mix_pool_bytes(compiletime_seed, sizeof(compiletime_seed));
 #endif
 
-	for (i = 0; i < BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; i += sizeof(rv)) {
+	for (i = 0, arch_bytes = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE;
+	     i < BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; i += sizeof(rv)) {
 		if (!arch_get_random_seed_long_early(&rv) &&
 		    !arch_get_random_long_early(&rv)) {
 			rv = random_get_entropy();
-			arch_init = false;
+			arch_bytes -= sizeof(rv);
 		}
 		_mix_pool_bytes(&rv, sizeof(rv));
 	}
@@ -921,8 +921,8 @@ int __init random_init(const char *comma
 
 	if (crng_ready())
 		crng_reseed();
-	else if (arch_init && trust_cpu)
-		credit_init_bits(BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE * 8);
+	else if (trust_cpu)
+		credit_init_bits(arch_bytes * 8);
 
 	return 0;
 }