linux-kernel - [PATCH v5 20/37] KVM: nVMX: hyper-v: Enable L2 TLB flush

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Message-Id: <20220527155546.1528910-21-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Date:   Fri, 27 May 2022 17:55:29 +0200
From:   Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>
To:     kvm@...r.kernel.org, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
Cc:     Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
        Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@...hat.com>,
        Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@...cent.com>,
        Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>,
        Michael Kelley <mikelley@...rosoft.com>,
        Siddharth Chandrasekaran <sidcha@...zon.de>,
        Yuan Yao <yuan.yao@...ux.intel.com>,
        linux-hyperv@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v5 20/37] KVM: nVMX: hyper-v: Enable L2 TLB flush

Enable L2 TLB flush feature on nVMX when:
- Enlightened VMCS is in use.
- The feature flag is enabled in eVMCS.
- The feature flag is enabled in partition assist page.

Perform synthetic vmexit to L1 after processing TLB flush call upon
request (HV_VMX_SYNTHETIC_EXIT_REASON_TRAP_AFTER_FLUSH).

Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@...hat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/evmcs.c  | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/evmcs.h  | 10 ++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 46 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/evmcs.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/evmcs.c
index 805afc170b5b..7c537a4f602e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/evmcs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/evmcs.c
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
 #include "../hyperv.h"
 #include "../cpuid.h"
 #include "evmcs.h"
+#include "nested.h"
 #include "vmcs.h"
 #include "vmx.h"
 #include "trace.h"
@@ -440,6 +441,25 @@ int nested_enable_evmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 	return 0;
 }
 
+bool nested_evmcs_l2_tlb_flush_enabled(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	struct hv_enlightened_vmcs *evmcs = vmx->nested.hv_evmcs;
+	struct hv_vp_assist_page assist_page;
+
+	if (!evmcs)
+		return false;
+
+	if (!evmcs->hv_enlightenments_control.nested_flush_hypercall)
+		return false;
+
+	if (unlikely(!kvm_hv_get_assist_page(vcpu, &assist_page)))
+		return false;
+
+	return assist_page.nested_control.features.directhypercall;
+}
+
 void vmx_hv_inject_synthetic_vmexit_post_tlb_flush(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
+	nested_vmx_vmexit(vcpu, HV_VMX_SYNTHETIC_EXIT_REASON_TRAP_AFTER_FLUSH, 0, 0);
 }
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/evmcs.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/evmcs.h
index 584741b85eb6..be34b68b3f02 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/evmcs.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/evmcs.h
@@ -66,6 +66,15 @@ DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(enable_evmcs);
 #define EVMCS1_UNSUPPORTED_VMENTRY_CTRL (VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL)
 #define EVMCS1_UNSUPPORTED_VMFUNC (VMX_VMFUNC_EPTP_SWITCHING)
 
+/*
+ * Note, Hyper-V isn't actually stealing bit 28 from Intel, just abusing it by
+ * pairing it with architecturally impossible exit reasons.  Bit 28 is set only
+ * on SMI exits to a SMI transfer monitor (STM) and if and only if a MTF VM-Exit
+ * is pending.  I.e. it will never be set by hardware for non-SMI exits (there
+ * are only three), nor will it ever be set unless the VMM is an STM.
+ */
+#define HV_VMX_SYNTHETIC_EXIT_REASON_TRAP_AFTER_FLUSH 0x10000031
+
 struct evmcs_field {
 	u16 offset;
 	u16 clean_field;
@@ -245,6 +254,7 @@ int nested_enable_evmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 			uint16_t *vmcs_version);
 void nested_evmcs_filter_control_msr(u32 msr_index, u64 *pdata);
 int nested_evmcs_check_controls(struct vmcs12 *vmcs12);
+bool nested_evmcs_l2_tlb_flush_enabled(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 void vmx_hv_inject_synthetic_vmexit_post_tlb_flush(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 
 #endif /* __KVM_X86_VMX_EVMCS_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
index 5c311b2cb52e..742c250ea056 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
@@ -1170,6 +1170,17 @@ static void nested_vmx_transition_tlb_flush(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 {
 	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
 
+	/*
+	 * KVM_REQ_HV_TLB_FLUSH flushes entries from either L1's VP_ID or
+	 * L2's VP_ID upon request from the guest. Make sure we check for
+	 * pending entries for the case when the request got misplaced (e.g.
+	 * a transition from L2->L1 happened while processing L2 TLB flush
+	 * request or vice versa). kvm_hv_vcpu_flush_tlb() will not flush
+	 * anything if there are no requests in the corresponding buffer.
+	 */
+	if (to_hv_vcpu(vcpu))
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_HV_TLB_FLUSH, vcpu);
+
 	/*
 	 * If vmcs12 doesn't use VPID, L1 expects linear and combined mappings
 	 * for *all* contexts to be flushed on VM-Enter/VM-Exit, i.e. it's a
@@ -6002,6 +6013,11 @@ static bool nested_vmx_l0_wants_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 		 * Handle L2's bus locks in L0 directly.
 		 */
 		return true;
+	case EXIT_REASON_VMCALL:
+		/* Hyper-V L2 TLB flush hypercall is handled by L0 */
+		return guest_hv_cpuid_has_l2_tlb_flush(vcpu) &&
+			nested_evmcs_l2_tlb_flush_enabled(vcpu) &&
+			kvm_hv_is_tlb_flush_hcall(vcpu);
 	default:
 		break;
 	}
-- 
2.35.3