linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] KVM: x86: preserve interrupt shadow across SMM entries

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Date:   Wed, 08 Jun 2022 11:52:08 +0300
From:   Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@...hat.com>
To:     Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
Cc:     kvm@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
        Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>,
        Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@...cent.com>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] KVM: x86: preserve interrupt shadow across SMM entries

On Tue, 2022-06-07 at 19:22 +0000, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Tue, Jun 07, 2022, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> > On 6/7/22 17:16, Maxim Levitsky wrote:
> > > If the #SMI happens while the vCPU is in the interrupt shadow,
> > > (after STI or MOV SS),
> > > we must both clear it to avoid VM entry failure on VMX,
> > > due to consistency check vs EFLAGS.IF which is cleared on SMM entries,
> > > and restore it on RSM so that #SMI is transparent to the non SMM code.
> > > 
> > > To support migration, reuse upper 4 bits of
> > > 'kvm_vcpu_events.interrupt.shadow' to store the smm interrupt shadow.
> > > 
> > > This was lightly tested with a linux guest and smm load script,
> > > and a unit test will be soon developed to test this better.
> > > 
> > > For discussion: there are other ways to fix this issue:
> > > 
> > > 1. The SMM shadow can be stored in SMRAM at some unused
> > > offset, this will allow to avoid changes to kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_vcpu_events
> > 
> > Yes, that would be better (and would not require a new cap).
> 
> At one point do we chalk up SMM emulation as a failed experiment and deprecate
> support?  There are most definitely more bugs lurking in KVM's handling of
> save/restore across SMI+RSM.

I also kind of agree that SMM was kind of a mistake but these days VMs with secure
boot use it, so we can't stop supporting this.

So do you also agree that I write the interrupt shadow to smram?

Best regards,
	Maxim Levitsky

> 
> > > 2. #SMI can instead be blocked while the interrupt shadow is active,
> > > which might even be what the real CPU does, however since neither VMX
> > > nor SVM support SMM window handling, this will involve single stepping
> > > the guest like it is currently done on SVM for the NMI window in some cases.
> 
> FWIW, blocking SMI in STI/MOVSS shadows is explicitly allowed by the Intel SDM.
> IIRC, modern Intel CPUs block SMIs in MOVSS shadows but not STI shadows.
>