linux-kernel - [PATCH 5.18 151/879] fs: hold writers when changing mounts idmapping

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Date:   Tue,  7 Jun 2022 18:54:29 +0200
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org,
        Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@...italocean.com>,
        Christoph Hellwig <hch@....de>,
        Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
        linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
        "Christian Brauner (Microsoft)" <brauner@...nel.org>,
        Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 5.18 151/879] fs: hold writers when changing mounts idmapping

From: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@...ntu.com>

[ Upstream commit e1bbcd277a53e08d619ffeec56c5c9287f2bf42f ]

Hold writers when changing a mount's idmapping to make it more robust.

The vfs layer takes care to retrieve the idmapping of a mount once
ensuring that the idmapping used for vfs permission checking is
identical to the idmapping passed down to the filesystem.

For ioctl codepaths the filesystem itself is responsible for taking the
idmapping into account if they need to. While all filesystems with
FS_ALLOW_IDMAP raised take the same precautions as the vfs we should
enforce it explicitly by making sure there are no active writers on the
relevant mount while changing the idmapping.

This is similar to turning a mount ro with the difference that in
contrast to turning a mount ro changing the idmapping can only ever be
done once while a mount can transition between ro and rw as much as it
wants.

This is a minor user-visible change. But it is extremely unlikely to
matter. The caller must've created a detached mount via OPEN_TREE_CLONE
and then handed that O_PATH fd to another process or thread which then
must've gotten a writable fd for that mount and started creating files
in there while the caller is still changing mount properties. While not
impossible it will be an extremely rare corner-case and should in
general be considered a bug in the application. Consider making a mount
MOUNT_ATTR_NOEXEC or MOUNT_ATTR_NODEV while allowing someone else to
perform lookups or exec'ing in parallel by handing them a copy of the
OPEN_TREE_CLONE fd or another fd beneath that mount.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220510095840.152264-1-brauner@kernel.org
Cc: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@...italocean.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@....de>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@...nel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org>
---
 fs/namespace.c | 5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
index afe2b64b14f1..41461f55c039 100644
--- a/fs/namespace.c
+++ b/fs/namespace.c
@@ -4026,8 +4026,9 @@ static int can_idmap_mount(const struct mount_kattr *kattr, struct mount *mnt)
 static inline bool mnt_allow_writers(const struct mount_kattr *kattr,
 				     const struct mount *mnt)
 {
-	return !(kattr->attr_set & MNT_READONLY) ||
-	       (mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_READONLY);
+	return (!(kattr->attr_set & MNT_READONLY) ||
+		(mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_READONLY)) &&
+	       !kattr->mnt_userns;
 }

 static int mount_setattr_prepare(struct mount_kattr *kattr, struct mount *mnt)
-- 
2.35.1