linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v2] mm/kfence: select random number before taking raw lock

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Message-ID: <YqHqlC9gvYl2vAiE@elver.google.com>
Date:   Thu, 9 Jun 2022 14:41:56 +0200
From:   Marco Elver <elver@...gle.com>
To:     "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc:     linux-mm@...ck.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        kasan-dev@...glegroups.com,
        John Ogness <john.ogness@...utronix.de>,
        Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>,
        Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>,
        Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@...ux-m68k.org>,
        Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@...der.be>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] mm/kfence: select random number before taking raw lock

On Thu, Jun 09, 2022 at 02:33PM +0200, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
> The RNG uses vanilla spinlocks, not raw spinlocks, so kfence should pick
> its random numbers before taking its raw spinlocks. This also has the
> nice effect of doing less work inside the lock. It should fix a splat
> that Geert saw with CONFIG_PROVE_RAW_LOCK_NESTING:
> 
>      dump_backtrace.part.0+0x98/0xc0
>      show_stack+0x14/0x28
>      dump_stack_lvl+0xac/0xec
>      dump_stack+0x14/0x2c
>      __lock_acquire+0x388/0x10a0
>      lock_acquire+0x190/0x2c0
>      _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x6c/0x94
>      crng_make_state+0x148/0x1e4
>      _get_random_bytes.part.0+0x4c/0xe8
>      get_random_u32+0x4c/0x140
>      __kfence_alloc+0x460/0x5c4
>      kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x194/0x1dc
>      __kthread_create_on_node+0x5c/0x1a8
>      kthread_create_on_node+0x58/0x7c
>      printk_start_kthread.part.0+0x34/0xa8
>      printk_activate_kthreads+0x4c/0x54
>      do_one_initcall+0xec/0x278
>      kernel_init_freeable+0x11c/0x214
>      kernel_init+0x24/0x124
>      ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
> 
> Cc: John Ogness <john.ogness@...utronix.de>
> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>
> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@...gle.com>
> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>
> Reported-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@...ux-m68k.org>
> Tested-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@...der.be>
> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@...c4.com>

Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@...gle.com>

Thank you.

> ---
> Changes v1->v2:
> - Make the bools const to help compiler elide branch when possible,
>   suggested by Marco.
> 
>  mm/kfence/core.c | 7 +++++--
>  1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/mm/kfence/core.c b/mm/kfence/core.c
> index 4e7cd4c8e687..4b5e5a3d3a63 100644
> --- a/mm/kfence/core.c
> +++ b/mm/kfence/core.c
> @@ -360,6 +360,9 @@ static void *kfence_guarded_alloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, size_t size, gfp_t g
>  	unsigned long flags;
>  	struct slab *slab;
>  	void *addr;
> +	const bool random_right_allocate = prandom_u32_max(2);
> +	const bool random_fault = CONFIG_KFENCE_STRESS_TEST_FAULTS &&
> +				  !prandom_u32_max(CONFIG_KFENCE_STRESS_TEST_FAULTS);
>  
>  	/* Try to obtain a free object. */
>  	raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&kfence_freelist_lock, flags);
> @@ -404,7 +407,7 @@ static void *kfence_guarded_alloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, size_t size, gfp_t g
>  	 * is that the out-of-bounds accesses detected are deterministic for
>  	 * such allocations.
>  	 */
> -	if (prandom_u32_max(2)) {
> +	if (random_right_allocate) {
>  		/* Allocate on the "right" side, re-calculate address. */
>  		meta->addr += PAGE_SIZE - size;
>  		meta->addr = ALIGN_DOWN(meta->addr, cache->align);
> @@ -444,7 +447,7 @@ static void *kfence_guarded_alloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, size_t size, gfp_t g
>  	if (cache->ctor)
>  		cache->ctor(addr);
>  
> -	if (CONFIG_KFENCE_STRESS_TEST_FAULTS && !prandom_u32_max(CONFIG_KFENCE_STRESS_TEST_FAULTS))
> +	if (random_fault)
>  		kfence_protect(meta->addr); /* Random "faults" by protecting the object. */
>  
>  	atomic_long_inc(&counters[KFENCE_COUNTER_ALLOCATED]);
> -- 
> 2.35.1
>