linux-kernel - [PATCH v5] x86/mce: Check for writes ignored in MCA

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Message-ID: <20220610192515.98540-1-Smita.KoralahalliChannabasappa@amd.com>
Date:   Fri, 10 Jun 2022 19:25:15 +0000
From:   Smita Koralahalli <Smita.KoralahalliChannabasappa@....com>
To:     <x86@...nel.org>, <linux-edac@...r.kernel.org>,
        <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
CC:     Tony Luck <tony.luck@...el.com>, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        "Yazen Ghannam" <yazen.ghannam@....com>,
        Smita Koralahalli <Smita.KoralahalliChannabasappa@....com>
Subject: [PATCH v5] x86/mce: Check for writes ignored in MCA_STATUS register

According to Section 2.1.16.3 under HWCR[McStatusWrEn] in "PPR for AMD
Family 19h, Model 01h, Revision B1 Processors - 55898 Rev 0.35 - Feb 5,
2021", the status register may sometimes enforce write ignored behavior
independent of the value of HWCR[McStatusWrEn] depending on the platform
settings.

Hence, evaluate for writes ignored for MCA_STATUS to determine if hardware
error injection is possible. Perform this evaluation early during module
init and store the result in the static "hw_injection_possible" variable.
Query this variable for subsequent error injections and limit checking for
MCA_STATUS only once on driver init.

Avoid exporting mce_flags into modules and check for smca feature from
'X86_FEATURE_SMCA' flag directly.

Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206537
Signed-off-by: Smita Koralahalli <Smita.KoralahalliChannabasappa@....com>
---
Link:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220214233640.70510-2-Smita.KoralahalliChannabasappa@amd.com
v2:
	msr_ops -> mca_msr_reg().
	simulation -> injection.
	pr_info() -> pr_err().
	Aligned on ",".
v3:
	Removed "x86/mce: Use mca_msr_reg() in prepare_msrs()" patch.
	and made changes on the existing MCx_{STATUS, ADDR, MISC} macros.
v4:
	Simplified the code by just checking for writes ignored behavior in
	MCA_STATUS register.
	Introduced prepare_mca_status() and performed writes ignored checks
	inside the function.
	Rephrased error message.
v5:
	Evaluated for writes ignored early and only once during module init.
	Introduced "hw_injection_possible" variable to store the result of
	writes ignored behavior of MCA_STATUS. This variable is checked
	before performing subsequent hw error injections.
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/inject.c   | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/internal.h |  2 +-
 2 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/inject.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/inject.c
index 5fbd7ffb3233..ac5582691530 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/inject.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/inject.c
@@ -33,6 +33,8 @@
 
 #include "internal.h"
 
+static bool hw_injection_possible = true;
+
 /*
  * Collect all the MCi_XXX settings
  */
@@ -339,6 +341,8 @@ static int __set_inj(const char *buf)
 
 	for (i = 0; i < N_INJ_TYPES; i++) {
 		if (!strncmp(flags_options[i], buf, strlen(flags_options[i]))) {
+			if (i > SW_INJ && !hw_injection_possible)
+				continue;
 			inj_type = i;
 			return 0;
 		}
@@ -376,7 +380,11 @@ static ssize_t flags_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *ubuf,
 
 	err = __set_inj(__buf);
 	if (err) {
-		pr_err("%s: Invalid flags value: %s\n", __func__, __buf);
+		pr_err("%s: Invalid flags value: %s: %s\n", __func__,
+			(!hw_injection_possible
+			  ? " (SW-only injection possible on this platform)"
+			  : ""),
+		       __buf);
 		return err;
 	}
 
@@ -501,6 +509,8 @@ static void do_inject(void)
 	unsigned int cpu = i_mce.extcpu;
 	u8 b = i_mce.bank;
 
+	pr_info("Using '%s' error injection method", flags_options[inj_type]);
+
 	i_mce.tsc = rdtsc_ordered();
 
 	i_mce.status |= MCI_STATUS_VAL;
@@ -717,11 +727,49 @@ static void __init debugfs_init(void)
 				    &i_mce, dfs_fls[i].fops);
 }
 
+static void check_hw_inj_possible(void)
+{
+	u8 bank;
+
+	/*
+	 * This behavior exists only on SMCA systems though its not directly
+	 * related to SMCA.
+	 */
+	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SMCA))
+		return;
+
+	get_cpu();
+
+	for (bank = 0; bank < MAX_NR_BANKS; ++bank) {
+		u64 status = MCI_STATUS_VAL, ipid;
+
+		rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_SMCA_MCx_IPID(bank), ipid);
+
+		if (!ipid)
+			continue;
+
+		wrmsrl(mca_msr_reg(bank, MCA_STATUS), status);
+		rdmsrl(mca_msr_reg(bank, MCA_STATUS), status);
+
+		if (!status) {
+			hw_injection_possible = false;
+			pr_warn("Platform does not allow error injection, try using APEI EINJ instead.\n");
+		}
+
+		/* Exit after the check for first available MCA bank */
+		break;
+	}
+
+	put_cpu();
+}
+
 static int __init inject_init(void)
 {
 	if (!alloc_cpumask_var(&mce_inject_cpumask, GFP_KERNEL))
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
+	check_hw_inj_possible();
+
 	debugfs_init();
 
 	register_nmi_handler(NMI_LOCAL, mce_raise_notify, 0, "mce_notify");
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/internal.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/internal.h
index 4ae0e603f7fa..7e03f5b7f6bd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/internal.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/internal.h
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ noinstr u64 mce_rdmsrl(u32 msr);
 
 static __always_inline u32 mca_msr_reg(int bank, enum mca_msr reg)
 {
-	if (mce_flags.smca) {
+	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SMCA)) {
 		switch (reg) {
 		case MCA_CTL:	 return MSR_AMD64_SMCA_MCx_CTL(bank);
 		case MCA_ADDR:	 return MSR_AMD64_SMCA_MCx_ADDR(bank);
-- 
2.17.1