linux-kernel - Re: [RFC V1 PATCH 0/3] selftests: KVM: sev: selftests for fd-based approach of supporting private memory

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Message-ID: <CAGtprH92PVtCDGrtwcvfrsKokFbYrqXqtH6D_aUrYXvHYyWpyQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Fri, 10 Jun 2022 14:01:41 -0700
From:   Vishal Annapurve <vannapurve@...gle.com>
To:     Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>
Cc:     x86 <x86@...nel.org>, kvm list <kvm@...r.kernel.org>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
        Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@...cent.com>,
        Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>,
        Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        shuah <shuah@...nel.org>, yang.zhong@...el.com,
        drjones@...hat.com, Ricardo Koller <ricarkol@...gle.com>,
        Aaron Lewis <aaronlewis@...gle.com>, wei.w.wang@...el.com,
        "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
        Hugh Dickins <hughd@...gle.com>,
        Jeff Layton <jlayton@...nel.org>,
        "J . Bruce Fields" <bfields@...ldses.org>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@...ux.intel.com>,
        Yu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@...ux.intel.com>,
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        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>,
        Marc Orr <marcorr@...gle.com>,
        Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@...gle.com>,
        Peter Gonda <pgonda@...gle.com>,
        "Nikunj A. Dadhania" <nikunj@....com>,
        Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
        Austin Diviness <diviness@...gle.com>, maz@...nel.org,
        dmatlack@...gle.com, axelrasmussen@...gle.com,
        maciej.szmigiero@...cle.com, Mingwei Zhang <mizhang@...gle.com>,
        bgardon@...gle.com
Subject: Re: [RFC V1 PATCH 0/3] selftests: KVM: sev: selftests for fd-based
 approach of supporting private memory

....
>
> I ended up adding a KVM_CAP_UNMAPPED_PRIVATE_MEM to distinguish between the
> 2 modes. With UPM-mode enabled it basically means KVM can/should enforce that
> all private guest pages are backed by private memslots, and enable a couple
> platform-specific hooks to handle MAP_GPA_RANGE, and queries from MMU on
> whether or not an NPT fault is for a private page or not. SEV uses these hooks
> to manage its encryption bitmap, and uses that bitmap as the authority on
> whether or not a page is encrypted. SNP uses GHCB page-state-change requests
> so MAP_GPA_RANGE is a no-op there, but uses the MMU hook to indicate whether a
> fault is private based on the page fault flags.
>
> When UPM-mode isn't enabled, MAP_GPA_RANGE just gets passed on to userspace
> as before, and platform-specific hooks above are no-ops. That's the mode
> your SEV self-tests ran in initially. I added a test that runs the
> PrivateMemoryPrivateAccess in UPM-mode, where the guest's OS memory is also
> backed by private memslot and the platform hooks are enabled, and things seem
> to still work okay there. I only added a UPM-mode test for the
> PrivateMemoryPrivateAccess one though so far. I suppose we'd want to make
> sure it works exactly as it did with UPM-mode disabled, but I don't see why
> it wouldn't.

Thanks Michael for the update. Yeah, using the bitmap to track
private/shared-ness of gfn ranges should be the better way to go as
compared to the limited approach I used to just track a single
contiguous pfn range.
I spent some time in getting the SEV/SEV-ES priv memfd selftests to
execute from private fd as well and ended up doing similar changes as
part of the github tree:
https://github.com/vishals4gh/linux/commits/sev_upm_selftests_rfc_v2.

>
> But probably worth having some discussion on how exactly we should define this
> mode, and whether that meshes with what TDX folks are planning.
>
> I've pushed my UPM-mode selftest additions here:
>   https://github.com/mdroth/linux/commits/sev_upm_selftests_rfc_v1_upmmode
>
> And the UPM SEV/SEV-SNP tree I'm running them against (DISCLAIMER: EXPERIMENTAL):
>   https://github.com/mdroth/linux/commits/pfdv6-on-snpv6-upm1
>

Thanks for the references here. This helps get a clear picture around
the status of priv memfd integration with Sev-SNP VMs and this work
will be the base of future SEV specific priv memfd selftest patches as
things get more stable.

I see usage of pwrite to populate initial private memory contents.
Does it make sense to have SEV_VM_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA handle the
private fd population as well?
I tried to prototype it via:
https://github.com/vishals4gh/linux/commit/c85ee15c8bf9d5d43be9a34898176e8230a3b680#
as I got this suggestion from Erdem Aktas(erdemaktas@...gle) while
discussing about executing guest code from private fd.
Apart from the aspects I might not be aware of, this can have
performance overhead depending on the initial Guest UEFI boot memory
requirements. But this can allow the userspace VMM to keep most of the
guest vm boot memory setup the same and
avoid changing the host kernel to allow private memfd writes from userspace.

Regards,
Vishal