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Message-ID: <20220614004121.GA1618227@hori.linux.bs1.fc.nec.co.jp>
Date:   Tue, 14 Jun 2022 00:41:31 +0000
From:   HORIGUCHI NAOYA(堀口 直也) 
        <naoya.horiguchi@....com>
To:     zhenwei pi <pizhenwei@...edance.com>
CC:     "akpm@...ux-foundation.org" <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        "linux-mm@...ck.org" <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
        "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: Re: [PATCH v3 1/1] mm/memory-failure: don't allow to unpoison hw
 corrupted page

On Tue, Jun 14, 2022 at 08:22:10AM +0800, zhenwei pi wrote:
> 
> 
> On 6/10/22 20:12, David Hildenbrand wrote:
> > On 10.06.22 13:46, zhenwei pi wrote:
> > > Currently unpoison_memory(unsigned long pfn) is designed for soft
> > > poison(hwpoison-inject) only. Since 17fae1294ad9d, the KPTE gets
> > > cleared on a x86 platform once hardware memory corrupts.
> > > 
> > > Unpoisoning a hardware corrupted page puts page back buddy only,
> > > the kernel has a chance to access the page with *NOT PRESENT* KPTE.
> > > This leads BUG during accessing on the corrupted KPTE.
> > > 
> > > Do not allow to unpoison hardware corrupted page in unpoison_memory() to
> > > avoid BUG like this:
> > > 
> > >   Unpoison: Software-unpoisoned page 0x61234
> > >   BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff888061234000
> > >   #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
> > >   #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
> > >   PGD 2c01067 P4D 2c01067 PUD 107267063 PMD 10382b063 PTE 800fffff9edcb062
> > >   Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
> > >   CPU: 4 PID: 26551 Comm: stress Kdump: loaded Tainted: G   M       OE     5.18.0.bm.1-amd64 #7
> > >   Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996) ...
> > >   RIP: 0010:clear_page_erms+0x7/0x10
> > >   Code: ...
> > >   RSP: 0000:ffffc90001107bc8 EFLAGS: 00010246
> > >   RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000901 RCX: 0000000000001000
> > >   RDX: ffffea0001848d00 RSI: ffffea0001848d40 RDI: ffff888061234000
> > >   RBP: ffffea0001848d00 R08: 0000000000000901 R09: 0000000000001276
> > >   R10: 0000000000000003 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000001
> > >   R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000140dca R15: 0000000000000001
> > >   FS:  00007fd8b2333740(0000) GS:ffff88813fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
> > >   CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
> > >   CR2: ffff888061234000 CR3: 00000001023d2005 CR4: 0000000000770ee0
> > >   DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
> > >   DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
> > >   PKRU: 55555554
> > >   Call Trace:
> > >    <TASK>
> > >    prep_new_page+0x151/0x170
> > >    get_page_from_freelist+0xca0/0xe20
> > >    ? sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0xab/0xc0
> > >    ? asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1b/0x20
> > >    __alloc_pages+0x17e/0x340
> > >    __folio_alloc+0x17/0x40
> > >    vma_alloc_folio+0x84/0x280
> > >    __handle_mm_fault+0x8d4/0xeb0
> > >    handle_mm_fault+0xd5/0x2a0
> > >    do_user_addr_fault+0x1d0/0x680
> > >    ? kvm_read_and_reset_apf_flags+0x3b/0x50
> > >    exc_page_fault+0x78/0x170
> > >    asm_exc_page_fault+0x27/0x30
> > > 
> > > Fixes: 847ce401df392 ("HWPOISON: Add unpoisoning support")
> > > Fixes: 17fae1294ad9d ("x86/{mce,mm}: Unmap the entire page if the whole page is affected and poisoned")
> > > Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@....com>
> > > Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>
> > > Signed-off-by: zhenwei pi <pizhenwei@...edance.com>
> > > ---
> > >   mm/memory-failure.c | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > >   1 file changed, 59 insertions(+)
> > > 
> > > diff --git a/mm/memory-failure.c b/mm/memory-failure.c
> > > index b85661cbdc4a..3124f428302c 100644
> > > --- a/mm/memory-failure.c
> > > +++ b/mm/memory-failure.c
> > > @@ -2068,6 +2068,58 @@ static int __init memory_failure_init(void)
> > >   }
> > >   core_initcall(memory_failure_init);
> > > +/*
> > > + * Unpoisoning a hardware corrupted page with *NOT PRESENT* KPTE leads panic.
> > > + * Test a page is valid in the kernel mapping.
> > > + */
> > > +static bool kmap_valid(struct page *page)
> > > +{
> > > +	unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)page_to_virt(page);
> > > +	pgd_t *pgd;
> > > +	p4d_t *p4d;
> > > +	pud_t *pud;
> > > +	pmd_t *pmd;
> > > +	pte_t *pte;
> > > +
> > > +	pgd = pgd_offset_k(addr);
> > > +	if (pgd_none(*pgd))
> > > +		return false;
> > > +	if (pgd_leaf(*pgd))
> > > +		return true;
> > > +	if (pgd_bad(*pgd))
> > > +		return false;
> > > +
> > > +	p4d = p4d_offset(pgd, addr);
> > > +	if (p4d_none(*p4d))
> > > +		return false;
> > > +	if (p4d_leaf(*p4d))
> > > +		return true;
> > > +	if (p4d_bad(*p4d))
> > > +		return false;
> > > +
> > > +	pud = pud_offset(p4d, addr);
> > > +	if (pud_none(*pud))
> > > +		return false;
> > > +	if (pud_leaf(*pud))
> > > +		return true;
> > > +	if (pud_bad(*pud))
> > > +		return false;
> > > +
> > > +	pmd = pmd_offset(pud, addr);
> > > +	if (pmd_none(*pmd))
> > > +		return false;
> > > +	if (pmd_leaf(*pmd))
> > > +		return true;
> > > +	if (pmd_bad(*pmd))
> > > +		return false;
> > > +
> > > +	pte = pte_offset_map(pmd, addr);
> > > +	if (pte_none(*pte) || !pte_present(*pte))
> > > +		return false;
> > > +
> > > +	return true;
> > > +}
> > > +
> > >   #define unpoison_pr_info(fmt, pfn, rs)			\
> > >   ({							\
> > >   	if (__ratelimit(rs))				\
> > > @@ -2109,6 +2161,13 @@ int unpoison_memory(unsigned long pfn)
> > >   		goto unlock_mutex;
> > >   	}
> > > +	if (!kmap_valid(page)) {
> > > +		unpoison_pr_info("Unpoison: Page was hardware poisoned %#lx\n",
> > > +				 pfn, &unpoison_rs);
> > > +		ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
> > > +		goto unlock_mutex;
> > > +	}
> > > +
> > >   	if (page_count(page) > 1) {
> > >   		unpoison_pr_info("Unpoison: Someone grabs the hwpoison page %#lx\n",
> > >   				 pfn, &unpoison_rs);
> > 
> > I really prefer just disabling the unpoisioning mechanism in case there
> > is a real hw injected error.
> > 
> 
> Hi, Naoya & Andrew
> 
> What is your opinion?

Disabling unpoison when a real HW error happens is fine to me.  When you
write the patch, could you add a few sentences about the new behavior to
the unpoison-pfn section in Documentation/vm/hwpoison.rst?

Thanks,
Naoya Horiguchi

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