linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] hamradio: 6pack: fix array-index-out-of-bounds in decode_std

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Message-ID: <62319ec578f469ff2c39aa6559fd945ba937726c.camel@redhat.com>
Date:   Tue, 14 Jun 2022 13:07:44 +0200
From:   Paolo Abeni <pabeni@...hat.com>
To:     Xu Jia <xujia39@...wei.com>, linux-hams@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     ajk@...nets.uni-bremen.de, davem@...emloft.net, kuba@...nel.org,
        netdev@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] hamradio: 6pack: fix array-index-out-of-bounds in
 decode_std_command()

On Mon, 2022-06-13 at 17:25 +0800, Xu Jia wrote:
> Hulk Robot reports incorrect sp->rx_count_cooked value in decode_std_command().
> This should be caused by the subtracting from sp->rx_count_cooked before.
> It seems that sp->rx_count_cooked value is changed to 0, which bypassed the
> previous judgment.
> sp->rx_count_cooked is a shared variable but is not protected by a lock.

It's not clear to me how multiple process could access it concurrently,
could you please elaborate more?

> The same applies to sp->rx_count. This patch adds a lock to fix the bug.
> 
> The fail log is shown below:
> =======================================================================
> UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c:925:31
> index 400 is out of range for type 'unsigned char [400]'
> CPU: 3 PID: 7433 Comm: kworker/u10:1 Not tainted 5.18.0-rc5-00163-g4b97bac0756a #2
> Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
> Workqueue: events_unbound flush_to_ldisc
> Call Trace:
>  <TASK>
>  dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134
>  ubsan_epilogue+0xb/0x50
>  __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds.cold+0x62/0x6c
>  sixpack_receive_buf+0xfda/0x1330
>  tty_ldisc_receive_buf+0x13e/0x180
>  tty_port_default_receive_buf+0x6d/0xa0
>  flush_to_ldisc+0x213/0x3f0
>  process_one_work+0x98f/0x1620
>  worker_thread+0x665/0x1080
>  kthread+0x2e9/0x3a0
>  ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
>  ...
> 
> Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@...wei.com>
> Signed-off-by: Xu Jia <xujia39@...wei.com>
> ---
>  drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c | 5 +++++
>  1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c b/drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c
> index 45c3c4a..194f22f 100644
> --- a/drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c
> +++ b/drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c
> @@ -100,6 +100,8 @@ struct sixpack {
>  	unsigned int		rx_count;
>  	unsigned int		rx_count_cooked;
>  
> +	spinlock_t		rxlock;
> +
>  	int			mtu;		/* Our mtu (to spot changes!) */
>  	int			buffsize;       /* Max buffers sizes */
>  
> @@ -565,6 +567,7 @@ static int sixpack_open(struct tty_struct *tty)
>  	sp->dev = dev;
>  
>  	spin_lock_init(&sp->lock);
> +	spin_lock_init(&sp->rxlock);
>  	refcount_set(&sp->refcnt, 1);
>  	init_completion(&sp->dead);
>  
> @@ -913,6 +916,7 @@ static void decode_std_command(struct sixpack *sp, unsigned char cmd)
>  			sp->led_state = 0x60;
>  			/* fill trailing bytes with zeroes */
>  			sp->tty->ops->write(sp->tty, &sp->led_state, 1);
> +			spin_lock(&sp->rxlock);
>  			rest = sp->rx_count;
>  			if (rest != 0)
>  				 for (i = rest; i <= 3; i++)
> @@ -930,6 +934,7 @@ static void decode_std_command(struct sixpack *sp, unsigned char cmd)
>  				sp_bump(sp, 0);
>  			}
>  			sp->rx_count_cooked = 0;
> +			spin_unlock(&sp->rxlock);

It looks like 'sp->rx_count' and 'sp->rx_count_cooked' are touched also
in decode_data(). Do we need to protect such accesses, too?

Thanks!

Paolo