linux-kernel - [PATCH 13/19] KVM: VMX: Add a synthetic MSR to allow userspace VMM to access GUEST

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Message-Id: <20220616084643.19564-14-weijiang.yang@intel.com>
Date:   Thu, 16 Jun 2022 04:46:37 -0400
From:   Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>
To:     pbonzini@...hat.com, seanjc@...gle.com, x86@...nel.org,
        kvm@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com
Cc:     weijiang.yang@...el.com,
        Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>
Subject: [PATCH 13/19] KVM: VMX: Add a synthetic MSR to allow userspace VMM to access GUEST_SSP

Introduce a host-only synthetic MSR, MSR_KVM_GUEST_SSP so that the VMM
can read/write the guest's SSP, e.g. to migrate CET state.  Use a
synthetic MSR, e.g. as opposed to a VCPU_REG_, as GUEST_SSP is subject
to the same consistency checks as the PL*_SSP MSRs, i.e. can share code.

Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h |  1 +
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c               | 15 ++++++++++++---
 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h
index 6e64b27b2c1e..7af465e4e0bd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@
 #define MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_INT	0x4b564d06
 #define MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_ACK	0x4b564d07
 #define MSR_KVM_MIGRATION_CONTROL	0x4b564d08
+#define MSR_KVM_GUEST_SSP	0x4b564d09
 
 struct kvm_steal_time {
 	__u64 steal;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index d1f2ffa07576..fc1229f23987 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -1780,7 +1780,8 @@ static bool cet_is_msr_accessible(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 	    !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_IBT))
 		return false;
 
-	if (msr->index == MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP &&
+	if ((msr->index == MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP ||
+	     msr->index == MSR_KVM_GUEST_SSP) &&
 	    !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
 		return false;
 
@@ -1928,9 +1929,13 @@ static int vmx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
 		break;
 	case MSR_IA32_U_CET:
 	case MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP:
+	case MSR_KVM_GUEST_SSP:
 		if (!cet_is_msr_accessible(vcpu, msr_info))
 			return 1;
-		kvm_get_xsave_msr(msr_info);
+		if (msr_info->index == MSR_KVM_GUEST_SSP)
+			msr_info->data = vmcs_readl(GUEST_SSP);
+		else
+			kvm_get_xsave_msr(msr_info);
 		break;
 	case MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR:
 		msr_info->data = vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL);
@@ -2273,12 +2278,16 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
 		kvm_set_xsave_msr(msr_info);
 		break;
 	case MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP:
+	case MSR_KVM_GUEST_SSP:
 		if (!cet_is_msr_accessible(vcpu, msr_info))
 			return 1;
 		if ((data & GENMASK(2, 0)) ||
 		    is_noncanonical_address(data, vcpu))
 			return 1;
-		kvm_set_xsave_msr(msr_info);
+		if (msr_index == MSR_KVM_GUEST_SSP)
+			vmcs_writel(GUEST_SSP, data);
+		else
+			kvm_set_xsave_msr(msr_info);
 		break;
 	case MSR_IA32_PERF_CAPABILITIES:
 		if (data && !vcpu_to_pmu(vcpu)->version)
-- 
2.27.0