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Date: Thu, 16 Jun 2022 13:36:02 +0200
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, akpm@...ux-foundation.org,
torvalds@...ux-foundation.org, stable@...r.kernel.org
Cc: lwn@....net, jslaby@...e.cz,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: Linux 4.9.319
diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
index a5225df4a070..22c078d1a23b 100644
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
@@ -361,6 +361,7 @@ What: /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/srbds
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/itlb_multihit
+ /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mmio_stale_data
Date: January 2018
Contact: Linux kernel mailing list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Description: Information about CPU vulnerabilities
diff --git a/Documentation/hw-vuln/index.rst b/Documentation/hw-vuln/index.rst
index 74466ba80167..608afc966776 100644
--- a/Documentation/hw-vuln/index.rst
+++ b/Documentation/hw-vuln/index.rst
@@ -15,3 +15,4 @@ are configurable at compile, boot or run time.
tsx_async_abort
multihit
special-register-buffer-data-sampling
+ processor_mmio_stale_data
diff --git a/Documentation/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.rst b/Documentation/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..9393c50b5afc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,246 @@
+=========================================
+Processor MMIO Stale Data Vulnerabilities
+=========================================
+
+Processor MMIO Stale Data Vulnerabilities are a class of memory-mapped I/O
+(MMIO) vulnerabilities that can expose data. The sequences of operations for
+exposing data range from simple to very complex. Because most of the
+vulnerabilities require the attacker to have access to MMIO, many environments
+are not affected. System environments using virtualization where MMIO access is
+provided to untrusted guests may need mitigation. These vulnerabilities are
+not transient execution attacks. However, these vulnerabilities may propagate
+stale data into core fill buffers where the data can subsequently be inferred
+by an unmitigated transient execution attack. Mitigation for these
+vulnerabilities includes a combination of microcode update and software
+changes, depending on the platform and usage model. Some of these mitigations
+are similar to those used to mitigate Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS) or
+those used to mitigate Special Register Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS).
+
+Data Propagators
+================
+Propagators are operations that result in stale data being copied or moved from
+one microarchitectural buffer or register to another. Processor MMIO Stale Data
+Vulnerabilities are operations that may result in stale data being directly
+read into an architectural, software-visible state or sampled from a buffer or
+register.
+
+Fill Buffer Stale Data Propagator (FBSDP)
+-----------------------------------------
+Stale data may propagate from fill buffers (FB) into the non-coherent portion
+of the uncore on some non-coherent writes. Fill buffer propagation by itself
+does not make stale data architecturally visible. Stale data must be propagated
+to a location where it is subject to reading or sampling.
+
+Sideband Stale Data Propagator (SSDP)
+-------------------------------------
+The sideband stale data propagator (SSDP) is limited to the client (including
+Intel Xeon server E3) uncore implementation. The sideband response buffer is
+shared by all client cores. For non-coherent reads that go to sideband
+destinations, the uncore logic returns 64 bytes of data to the core, including
+both requested data and unrequested stale data, from a transaction buffer and
+the sideband response buffer. As a result, stale data from the sideband
+response and transaction buffers may now reside in a core fill buffer.
+
+Primary Stale Data Propagator (PSDP)
+------------------------------------
+The primary stale data propagator (PSDP) is limited to the client (including
+Intel Xeon server E3) uncore implementation. Similar to the sideband response
+buffer, the primary response buffer is shared by all client cores. For some
+processors, MMIO primary reads will return 64 bytes of data to the core fill
+buffer including both requested data and unrequested stale data. This is
+similar to the sideband stale data propagator.
+
+Vulnerabilities
+===============
+Device Register Partial Write (DRPW) (CVE-2022-21166)
+-----------------------------------------------------
+Some endpoint MMIO registers incorrectly handle writes that are smaller than
+the register size. Instead of aborting the write or only copying the correct
+subset of bytes (for example, 2 bytes for a 2-byte write), more bytes than
+specified by the write transaction may be written to the register. On
+processors affected by FBSDP, this may expose stale data from the fill buffers
+of the core that created the write transaction.
+
+Shared Buffers Data Sampling (SBDS) (CVE-2022-21125)
+----------------------------------------------------
+After propagators may have moved data around the uncore and copied stale data
+into client core fill buffers, processors affected by MFBDS can leak data from
+the fill buffer. It is limited to the client (including Intel Xeon server E3)
+uncore implementation.
+
+Shared Buffers Data Read (SBDR) (CVE-2022-21123)
+------------------------------------------------
+It is similar to Shared Buffer Data Sampling (SBDS) except that the data is
+directly read into the architectural software-visible state. It is limited to
+the client (including Intel Xeon server E3) uncore implementation.
+
+Affected Processors
+===================
+Not all the CPUs are affected by all the variants. For instance, most
+processors for the server market (excluding Intel Xeon E3 processors) are
+impacted by only Device Register Partial Write (DRPW).
+
+Below is the list of affected Intel processors [#f1]_:
+
+ =================== ============ =========
+ Common name Family_Model Steppings
+ =================== ============ =========
+ HASWELL_X 06_3FH 2,4
+ SKYLAKE_L 06_4EH 3
+ BROADWELL_X 06_4FH All
+ SKYLAKE_X 06_55H 3,4,6,7,11
+ BROADWELL_D 06_56H 3,4,5
+ SKYLAKE 06_5EH 3
+ ICELAKE_X 06_6AH 4,5,6
+ ICELAKE_D 06_6CH 1
+ ICELAKE_L 06_7EH 5
+ ATOM_TREMONT_D 06_86H All
+ LAKEFIELD 06_8AH 1
+ KABYLAKE_L 06_8EH 9 to 12
+ ATOM_TREMONT 06_96H 1
+ ATOM_TREMONT_L 06_9CH 0
+ KABYLAKE 06_9EH 9 to 13
+ COMETLAKE 06_A5H 2,3,5
+ COMETLAKE_L 06_A6H 0,1
+ ROCKETLAKE 06_A7H 1
+ =================== ============ =========
+
+If a CPU is in the affected processor list, but not affected by a variant, it
+is indicated by new bits in MSR IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES. As described in a later
+section, mitigation largely remains the same for all the variants, i.e. to
+clear the CPU fill buffers via VERW instruction.
+
+New bits in MSRs
+================
+Newer processors and microcode update on existing affected processors added new
+bits to IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR. These bits can be used to enumerate
+specific variants of Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities and mitigation
+capability.
+
+MSR IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES
+--------------------------
+Bit 13 - SBDR_SSDP_NO - When set, processor is not affected by either the
+ Shared Buffers Data Read (SBDR) vulnerability or the sideband stale
+ data propagator (SSDP).
+Bit 14 - FBSDP_NO - When set, processor is not affected by the Fill Buffer
+ Stale Data Propagator (FBSDP).
+Bit 15 - PSDP_NO - When set, processor is not affected by Primary Stale Data
+ Propagator (PSDP).
+Bit 17 - FB_CLEAR - When set, VERW instruction will overwrite CPU fill buffer
+ values as part of MD_CLEAR operations. Processors that do not
+ enumerate MDS_NO (meaning they are affected by MDS) but that do
+ enumerate support for both L1D_FLUSH and MD_CLEAR implicitly enumerate
+ FB_CLEAR as part of their MD_CLEAR support.
+Bit 18 - FB_CLEAR_CTRL - Processor supports read and write to MSR
+ IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL[FB_CLEAR_DIS]. On such processors, the FB_CLEAR_DIS
+ bit can be set to cause the VERW instruction to not perform the
+ FB_CLEAR action. Not all processors that support FB_CLEAR will support
+ FB_CLEAR_CTRL.
+
+MSR IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL
+---------------------
+Bit 3 - FB_CLEAR_DIS - When set, VERW instruction does not perform the FB_CLEAR
+action. This may be useful to reduce the performance impact of FB_CLEAR in
+cases where system software deems it warranted (for example, when performance
+is more critical, or the untrusted software has no MMIO access). Note that
+FB_CLEAR_DIS has no impact on enumeration (for example, it does not change
+FB_CLEAR or MD_CLEAR enumeration) and it may not be supported on all processors
+that enumerate FB_CLEAR.
+
+Mitigation
+==========
+Like MDS, all variants of Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities have the
+same mitigation strategy to force the CPU to clear the affected buffers before
+an attacker can extract the secrets.
+
+This is achieved by using the otherwise unused and obsolete VERW instruction in
+combination with a microcode update. The microcode clears the affected CPU
+buffers when the VERW instruction is executed.
+
+Kernel reuses the MDS function to invoke the buffer clearing:
+
+ mds_clear_cpu_buffers()
+
+On MDS affected CPUs, the kernel already invokes CPU buffer clear on
+kernel/userspace, hypervisor/guest and C-state (idle) transitions. No
+additional mitigation is needed on such CPUs.
+
+For CPUs not affected by MDS or TAA, mitigation is needed only for the attacker
+with MMIO capability. Therefore, VERW is not required for kernel/userspace. For
+virtualization case, VERW is only needed at VMENTER for a guest with MMIO
+capability.
+
+Mitigation points
+-----------------
+Return to user space
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+Same mitigation as MDS when affected by MDS/TAA, otherwise no mitigation
+needed.
+
+C-State transition
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+Control register writes by CPU during C-state transition can propagate data
+from fill buffer to uncore buffers. Execute VERW before C-state transition to
+clear CPU fill buffers.
+
+Guest entry point
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+Same mitigation as MDS when processor is also affected by MDS/TAA, otherwise
+execute VERW at VMENTER only for MMIO capable guests. On CPUs not affected by
+MDS/TAA, guest without MMIO access cannot extract secrets using Processor MMIO
+Stale Data vulnerabilities, so there is no need to execute VERW for such guests.
+
+Mitigation control on the kernel command line
+---------------------------------------------
+The kernel command line allows to control the Processor MMIO Stale Data
+mitigations at boot time with the option "mmio_stale_data=". The valid
+arguments for this option are:
+
+ ========== =================================================================
+ full If the CPU is vulnerable, enable mitigation; CPU buffer clearing
+ on exit to userspace and when entering a VM. Idle transitions are
+ protected as well. It does not automatically disable SMT.
+ full,nosmt Same as full, with SMT disabled on vulnerable CPUs. This is the
+ complete mitigation.
+ off Disables mitigation completely.
+ ========== =================================================================
+
+If the CPU is affected and mmio_stale_data=off is not supplied on the kernel
+command line, then the kernel selects the appropriate mitigation.
+
+Mitigation status information
+-----------------------------
+The Linux kernel provides a sysfs interface to enumerate the current
+vulnerability status of the system: whether the system is vulnerable, and
+which mitigations are active. The relevant sysfs file is:
+
+ /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mmio_stale_data
+
+The possible values in this file are:
+
+ .. list-table::
+
+ * - 'Not affected'
+ - The processor is not vulnerable
+ * - 'Vulnerable'
+ - The processor is vulnerable, but no mitigation enabled
+ * - 'Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode'
+ - The processor is vulnerable, but microcode is not updated. The
+ mitigation is enabled on a best effort basis.
+ * - 'Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers'
+ - The processor is vulnerable and the CPU buffer clearing mitigation is
+ enabled.
+
+If the processor is vulnerable then the following information is appended to
+the above information:
+
+ ======================== ===========================================
+ 'SMT vulnerable' SMT is enabled
+ 'SMT disabled' SMT is disabled
+ 'SMT Host state unknown' Kernel runs in a VM, Host SMT state unknown
+ ======================== ===========================================
+
+References
+----------
+.. [#f1] Affected Processors
+ https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/topic-technology/software-security-guidance/processors-affected-consolidated-product-cpu-model.html
diff --git a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
index f2b10986ab88..97c0ff0787ea 100644
--- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -2520,6 +2520,7 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted.
kvm.nx_huge_pages=off [X86]
no_entry_flush [PPC]
no_uaccess_flush [PPC]
+ mmio_stale_data=off [X86]
Exceptions:
This does not have any effect on
@@ -2541,6 +2542,7 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted.
Equivalent to: l1tf=flush,nosmt [X86]
mds=full,nosmt [X86]
tsx_async_abort=full,nosmt [X86]
+ mmio_stale_data=full,nosmt [X86]
mminit_loglevel=
[KNL] When CONFIG_DEBUG_MEMORY_INIT is set, this
@@ -2550,6 +2552,40 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted.
log everything. Information is printed at KERN_DEBUG
so loglevel=8 may also need to be specified.
+ mmio_stale_data=
+ [X86,INTEL] Control mitigation for the Processor
+ MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities.
+
+ Processor MMIO Stale Data is a class of
+ vulnerabilities that may expose data after an MMIO
+ operation. Exposed data could originate or end in
+ the same CPU buffers as affected by MDS and TAA.
+ Therefore, similar to MDS and TAA, the mitigation
+ is to clear the affected CPU buffers.
+
+ This parameter controls the mitigation. The
+ options are:
+
+ full - Enable mitigation on vulnerable CPUs
+
+ full,nosmt - Enable mitigation and disable SMT on
+ vulnerable CPUs.
+
+ off - Unconditionally disable mitigation
+
+ On MDS or TAA affected machines,
+ mmio_stale_data=off can be prevented by an active
+ MDS or TAA mitigation as these vulnerabilities are
+ mitigated with the same mechanism so in order to
+ disable this mitigation, you need to specify
+ mds=off and tsx_async_abort=off too.
+
+ Not specifying this option is equivalent to
+ mmio_stale_data=full.
+
+ For details see:
+ Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.rst
+
module.sig_enforce
[KNL] When CONFIG_MODULE_SIG is set, this means that
modules without (valid) signatures will fail to load.
diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index 46bea19a6c96..bf4a7b0fe8e7 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
VERSION = 4
PATCHLEVEL = 9
-SUBLEVEL = 318
+SUBLEVEL = 319
EXTRAVERSION =
NAME = Roaring Lionus
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index 5b197248d546..910304aec2e6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -362,5 +362,6 @@
#define X86_BUG_TAA X86_BUG(22) /* CPU is affected by TSX Async Abort(TAA) */
#define X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT X86_BUG(23) /* CPU may incur MCE during certain page attribute changes */
#define X86_BUG_SRBDS X86_BUG(24) /* CPU may leak RNG bits if not mitigated */
+#define X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA X86_BUG(25) /* CPU is affected by Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities */
#endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h
index 74ee597beb3e..8b6c01774ca2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h
@@ -9,6 +9,10 @@
*
* Things ending in "2" are usually because we have no better
* name for them. There's no processor called "SILVERMONT2".
+ *
+ * While adding a new CPUID for a new microarchitecture, add a new
+ * group to keep logically sorted out in chronological order. Within
+ * that group keep the CPUID for the variants sorted by model number.
*/
#define INTEL_FAM6_CORE_YONAH 0x0E
@@ -48,6 +52,24 @@
#define INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE 0x8E
#define INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP 0x9E
+#define INTEL_FAM6_CANNONLAKE_MOBILE 0x66
+
+#define INTEL_FAM6_ICELAKE_X 0x6A
+#define INTEL_FAM6_ICELAKE_XEON_D 0x6C
+#define INTEL_FAM6_ICELAKE_DESKTOP 0x7D
+#define INTEL_FAM6_ICELAKE_MOBILE 0x7E
+
+#define INTEL_FAM6_COMETLAKE 0xA5
+#define INTEL_FAM6_COMETLAKE_L 0xA6
+
+#define INTEL_FAM6_ROCKETLAKE 0xA7
+
+/* Hybrid Core/Atom Processors */
+
+#define INTEL_FAM6_LAKEFIELD 0x8A
+#define INTEL_FAM6_ALDERLAKE 0x97
+#define INTEL_FAM6_ALDERLAKE_L 0x9A
+
/* "Small Core" Processors (Atom) */
#define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_BONNELL 0x1C /* Diamondville, Pineview */
@@ -67,7 +89,10 @@
#define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GOLDMONT 0x5C /* Apollo Lake */
#define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GOLDMONT_X 0x5F /* Denverton */
#define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS 0x7A /* Gemini Lake */
+
#define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_TREMONT_X 0x86 /* Jacobsville */
+#define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_TREMONT 0x96 /* Elkhart Lake */
+#define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_TREMONT_L 0x9C /* Jasper Lake */
/* Xeon Phi */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
index 1fdea3c334e7..5131146e1bd8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -89,6 +89,30 @@
* Not susceptible to
* TSX Async Abort (TAA) vulnerabilities.
*/
+#define ARCH_CAP_SBDR_SSDP_NO BIT(13) /*
+ * Not susceptible to SBDR and SSDP
+ * variants of Processor MMIO stale data
+ * vulnerabilities.
+ */
+#define ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO BIT(14) /*
+ * Not susceptible to FBSDP variant of
+ * Processor MMIO stale data
+ * vulnerabilities.
+ */
+#define ARCH_CAP_PSDP_NO BIT(15) /*
+ * Not susceptible to PSDP variant of
+ * Processor MMIO stale data
+ * vulnerabilities.
+ */
+#define ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR BIT(17) /*
+ * VERW clears CPU fill buffer
+ * even on MDS_NO CPUs.
+ */
+#define ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR_CTRL BIT(18) /*
+ * MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL[FB_CLEAR_DIS]
+ * bit available to control VERW
+ * behavior.
+ */
#define MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD 0x0000010b
#define L1D_FLUSH BIT(0) /*
@@ -106,6 +130,7 @@
/* SRBDS support */
#define MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL 0x00000123
#define RNGDS_MITG_DIS BIT(0)
+#define FB_CLEAR_DIS BIT(3) /* CPU Fill buffer clear disable */
#define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS 0x00000174
#define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP 0x00000175
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index 19829b00e4fe..8a618fbf569f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -323,6 +323,8 @@ DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_always_ibpb);
DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_user_clear);
DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_idle_clear);
+DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mmio_stale_data_clear);
+
#include <asm/segment.h>
/**
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 94aa0206b1f9..b4416df41d63 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -39,8 +39,10 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void);
-static void __init mds_print_mitigation(void);
+static void __init md_clear_update_mitigation(void);
+static void __init md_clear_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init mmio_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void);
/* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR that always has to be preserved. */
@@ -75,6 +77,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mds_user_clear);
DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_idle_clear);
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mds_idle_clear);
+/* Controls CPU Fill buffer clear before KVM guest MMIO accesses */
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mmio_stale_data_clear);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mmio_stale_data_clear);
+
void __init check_bugs(void)
{
identify_boot_cpu();
@@ -107,16 +113,9 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
spectre_v2_select_mitigation();
ssb_select_mitigation();
l1tf_select_mitigation();
- mds_select_mitigation();
- taa_select_mitigation();
+ md_clear_select_mitigation();
srbds_select_mitigation();
- /*
- * As MDS and TAA mitigations are inter-related, print MDS
- * mitigation until after TAA mitigation selection is done.
- */
- mds_print_mitigation();
-
arch_smt_update();
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
@@ -256,14 +255,6 @@ static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void)
}
}
-static void __init mds_print_mitigation(void)
-{
- if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS) || cpu_mitigations_off())
- return;
-
- pr_info("%s\n", mds_strings[mds_mitigation]);
-}
-
static int __init mds_cmdline(char *str)
{
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS))
@@ -311,7 +302,7 @@ static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void)
/* TSX previously disabled by tsx=off */
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM)) {
taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLED;
- goto out;
+ return;
}
if (cpu_mitigations_off()) {
@@ -325,7 +316,7 @@ static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void)
*/
if (taa_mitigation == TAA_MITIGATION_OFF &&
mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_OFF)
- goto out;
+ return;
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR))
taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_VERW;
@@ -357,18 +348,6 @@ static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void)
if (taa_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt())
cpu_smt_disable(false);
-
- /*
- * Update MDS mitigation, if necessary, as the mds_user_clear is
- * now enabled for TAA mitigation.
- */
- if (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_OFF &&
- boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS)) {
- mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
- mds_select_mitigation();
- }
-out:
- pr_info("%s\n", taa_strings[taa_mitigation]);
}
static int __init tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline(char *str)
@@ -392,6 +371,151 @@ static int __init tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline(char *str)
}
early_param("tsx_async_abort", tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline);
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "MMIO Stale Data: " fmt
+
+enum mmio_mitigations {
+ MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF,
+ MMIO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED,
+ MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW,
+};
+
+/* Default mitigation for Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities */
+static enum mmio_mitigations mmio_mitigation __ro_after_init = MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW;
+static bool mmio_nosmt __ro_after_init = false;
+
+static const char * const mmio_strings[] = {
+ [MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF] = "Vulnerable",
+ [MMIO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED] = "Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode",
+ [MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW] = "Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers",
+};
+
+static void __init mmio_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+ u64 ia32_cap;
+
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA) ||
+ cpu_mitigations_off()) {
+ mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (mmio_mitigation == MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF)
+ return;
+
+ ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
+
+ /*
+ * Enable CPU buffer clear mitigation for host and VMM, if also affected
+ * by MDS or TAA. Otherwise, enable mitigation for VMM only.
+ */
+ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS) || (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA) &&
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM)))
+ static_branch_enable(&mds_user_clear);
+ else
+ static_branch_enable(&mmio_stale_data_clear);
+
+ /*
+ * If Processor-MMIO-Stale-Data bug is present and Fill Buffer data can
+ * be propagated to uncore buffers, clearing the Fill buffers on idle
+ * is required irrespective of SMT state.
+ */
+ if (!(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO))
+ static_branch_enable(&mds_idle_clear);
+
+ /*
+ * Check if the system has the right microcode.
+ *
+ * CPU Fill buffer clear mitigation is enumerated by either an explicit
+ * FB_CLEAR or by the presence of both MD_CLEAR and L1D_FLUSH on MDS
+ * affected systems.
+ */
+ if ((ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR) ||
+ (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR) &&
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FLUSH_L1D) &&
+ !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO)))
+ mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW;
+ else
+ mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED;
+
+ if (mmio_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt())
+ cpu_smt_disable(false);
+}
+
+static int __init mmio_stale_data_parse_cmdline(char *str)
+{
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!str)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!strcmp(str, "off")) {
+ mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF;
+ } else if (!strcmp(str, "full")) {
+ mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW;
+ } else if (!strcmp(str, "full,nosmt")) {
+ mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW;
+ mmio_nosmt = true;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+early_param("mmio_stale_data", mmio_stale_data_parse_cmdline);
+
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "" fmt
+
+static void __init md_clear_update_mitigation(void)
+{
+ if (cpu_mitigations_off())
+ return;
+
+ if (!static_key_enabled(&mds_user_clear))
+ goto out;
+
+ /*
+ * mds_user_clear is now enabled. Update MDS, TAA and MMIO Stale Data
+ * mitigation, if necessary.
+ */
+ if (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_OFF &&
+ boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS)) {
+ mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
+ mds_select_mitigation();
+ }
+ if (taa_mitigation == TAA_MITIGATION_OFF &&
+ boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA)) {
+ taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_VERW;
+ taa_select_mitigation();
+ }
+ if (mmio_mitigation == MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF &&
+ boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA)) {
+ mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW;
+ mmio_select_mitigation();
+ }
+out:
+ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS))
+ pr_info("MDS: %s\n", mds_strings[mds_mitigation]);
+ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA))
+ pr_info("TAA: %s\n", taa_strings[taa_mitigation]);
+ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA))
+ pr_info("MMIO Stale Data: %s\n", mmio_strings[mmio_mitigation]);
+}
+
+static void __init md_clear_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+ mds_select_mitigation();
+ taa_select_mitigation();
+ mmio_select_mitigation();
+
+ /*
+ * As MDS, TAA and MMIO Stale Data mitigations are inter-related, update
+ * and print their mitigation after MDS, TAA and MMIO Stale Data
+ * mitigation selection is done.
+ */
+ md_clear_update_mitigation();
+}
+
#undef pr_fmt
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "SRBDS: " fmt
@@ -453,11 +577,13 @@ static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void)
return;
/*
- * Check to see if this is one of the MDS_NO systems supporting
- * TSX that are only exposed to SRBDS when TSX is enabled.
+ * Check to see if this is one of the MDS_NO systems supporting TSX that
+ * are only exposed to SRBDS when TSX is enabled or when CPU is affected
+ * by Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerability.
*/
ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
- if ((ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM))
+ if ((ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM) &&
+ !boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA))
srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_TSX_OFF;
else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR;
@@ -1065,6 +1191,8 @@ static void update_indir_branch_cond(void)
/* Update the static key controlling the MDS CPU buffer clear in idle */
static void update_mds_branch_idle(void)
{
+ u64 ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
+
/*
* Enable the idle clearing if SMT is active on CPUs which are
* affected only by MSBDS and not any other MDS variant.
@@ -1076,14 +1204,17 @@ static void update_mds_branch_idle(void)
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY))
return;
- if (sched_smt_active())
+ if (sched_smt_active()) {
static_branch_enable(&mds_idle_clear);
- else
+ } else if (mmio_mitigation == MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF ||
+ (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO)) {
static_branch_disable(&mds_idle_clear);
+ }
}
#define MDS_MSG_SMT "MDS CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.html for more details.\n"
#define TAA_MSG_SMT "TAA CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.html for more details.\n"
+#define MMIO_MSG_SMT "MMIO Stale Data CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.html for more details.\n"
void arch_smt_update(void)
{
@@ -1128,6 +1259,16 @@ void arch_smt_update(void)
break;
}
+ switch (mmio_mitigation) {
+ case MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW:
+ case MMIO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED:
+ if (sched_smt_active())
+ pr_warn_once(MMIO_MSG_SMT);
+ break;
+ case MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF:
+ break;
+ }
+
mutex_unlock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
}
@@ -1681,6 +1822,20 @@ static ssize_t tsx_async_abort_show_state(char *buf)
sched_smt_active() ? "vulnerable" : "disabled");
}
+static ssize_t mmio_stale_data_show_state(char *buf)
+{
+ if (mmio_mitigation == MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF)
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", mmio_strings[mmio_mitigation]);
+
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) {
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s; SMT Host state unknown\n",
+ mmio_strings[mmio_mitigation]);
+ }
+
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s; SMT %s\n", mmio_strings[mmio_mitigation],
+ sched_smt_active() ? "vulnerable" : "disabled");
+}
+
static char *stibp_state(void)
{
if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled))
@@ -1778,6 +1933,9 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr
case X86_BUG_SRBDS:
return srbds_show_state(buf);
+ case X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA:
+ return mmio_stale_data_show_state(buf);
+
default:
break;
}
@@ -1829,4 +1987,9 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_srbds(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *
{
return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_SRBDS);
}
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_mmio_stale_data(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA);
+}
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index ff3253b9a879..48843fc76695 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -962,18 +962,42 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = {
X86_FEATURE_ANY, issues)
#define SRBDS BIT(0)
+/* CPU is affected by X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA */
+#define MMIO BIT(1)
+/* CPU is affected by Shared Buffers Data Sampling (SBDS), a variant of X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA */
+#define MMIO_SBDS BIT(2)
static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = {
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(IVYBRIDGE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_CORE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_ULT, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_GT3E, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_X, BIT(2) | BIT(4), MMIO),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_XEON_D,X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x5), MMIO),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_GT3E, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_CORE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_MOBILE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x3), SRBDS | MMIO),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_MOBILE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_X, BIT(3) | BIT(4) | BIT(6) |
+ BIT(7) | BIT(0xB), MMIO),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_DESKTOP, X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x3), SRBDS | MMIO),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_DESKTOP, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_MOBILE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0xC), SRBDS),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_DESKTOP,X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0xD), SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_MOBILE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x9, 0xC), SRBDS | MMIO),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_MOBILE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x8), SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_DESKTOP,X86_STEPPINGS(0x9, 0xD), SRBDS | MMIO),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_DESKTOP,X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x8), SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_MOBILE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x5, 0x5), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_XEON_D, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_X, X86_STEPPINGS(0x4, 0x6), MMIO),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE, BIT(2) | BIT(3) | BIT(5), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0), MMIO),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(LAKEFIELD, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ROCKETLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
{}
};
@@ -994,6 +1018,13 @@ u64 x86_read_arch_cap_msr(void)
return ia32_cap;
}
+static bool arch_cap_mmio_immune(u64 ia32_cap)
+{
+ return (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO &&
+ ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PSDP_NO &&
+ ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SBDR_SSDP_NO);
+}
+
static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
u64 ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
@@ -1045,12 +1076,27 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
/*
* SRBDS affects CPUs which support RDRAND or RDSEED and are listed
* in the vulnerability blacklist.
+ *
+ * Some of the implications and mitigation of Shared Buffers Data
+ * Sampling (SBDS) are similar to SRBDS. Give SBDS same treatment as
+ * SRBDS.
*/
if ((cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_RDRAND) ||
cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_RDSEED)) &&
- cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, SRBDS))
+ cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, SRBDS | MMIO_SBDS))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SRBDS);
+ /*
+ * Processor MMIO Stale Data bug enumeration
+ *
+ * Affected CPU list is generally enough to enumerate the vulnerability,
+ * but for virtualization case check for ARCH_CAP MSR bits also, VMM may
+ * not want the guest to enumerate the bug.
+ */
+ if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, MMIO) &&
+ !arch_cap_mmio_immune(ia32_cap))
+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA);
+
if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN))
return;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
index 622e5a7eb7db..c287fcc310b3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
@@ -211,6 +211,9 @@ static const struct {
#define L1D_CACHE_ORDER 4
static void *vmx_l1d_flush_pages;
+/* Control for disabling CPU Fill buffer clear */
+static bool __read_mostly vmx_fb_clear_ctrl_available;
+
static int vmx_setup_l1d_flush(enum vmx_l1d_flush_state l1tf)
{
struct page *page;
@@ -794,6 +797,8 @@ struct vcpu_vmx {
*/
u64 msr_ia32_feature_control;
u64 msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits;
+ u64 msr_ia32_mcu_opt_ctrl;
+ bool disable_fb_clear;
};
enum segment_cache_field {
@@ -1573,6 +1578,60 @@ static inline void __invept(unsigned long ext, u64 eptp, gpa_t gpa)
: : "a" (&operand), "c" (ext) : "cc", "memory");
}
+static void vmx_setup_fb_clear_ctrl(void)
+{
+ u64 msr;
+
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES) &&
+ !boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS) &&
+ !boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA)) {
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, msr);
+ if (msr & ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR_CTRL)
+ vmx_fb_clear_ctrl_available = true;
+ }
+}
+
+static __always_inline void vmx_disable_fb_clear(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+ u64 msr;
+
+ if (!vmx->disable_fb_clear)
+ return;
+
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, msr);
+ msr |= FB_CLEAR_DIS;
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, msr);
+ /* Cache the MSR value to avoid reading it later */
+ vmx->msr_ia32_mcu_opt_ctrl = msr;
+}
+
+static __always_inline void vmx_enable_fb_clear(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+ if (!vmx->disable_fb_clear)
+ return;
+
+ vmx->msr_ia32_mcu_opt_ctrl &= ~FB_CLEAR_DIS;
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, vmx->msr_ia32_mcu_opt_ctrl);
+}
+
+static void vmx_update_fb_clear_dis(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+ vmx->disable_fb_clear = vmx_fb_clear_ctrl_available;
+
+ /*
+ * If guest will not execute VERW, there is no need to set FB_CLEAR_DIS
+ * at VMEntry. Skip the MSR read/write when a guest has no use case to
+ * execute VERW.
+ */
+ if ((vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR) ||
+ ((vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO) &&
+ (vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_TAA_NO) &&
+ (vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_PSDP_NO) &&
+ (vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO) &&
+ (vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_SBDR_SSDP_NO)))
+ vmx->disable_fb_clear = false;
+}
+
static struct shared_msr_entry *find_msr_entry(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 msr)
{
int i;
@@ -3407,9 +3466,13 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
}
break;
}
- ret = kvm_set_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info);
+ ret = kvm_set_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info);
}
+ /* FB_CLEAR may have changed, also update the FB_CLEAR_DIS behavior */
+ if (msr_index == MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES)
+ vmx_update_fb_clear_dis(vcpu, vmx);
+
return ret;
}
@@ -5544,6 +5607,8 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
update_exception_bitmap(vcpu);
vpid_sync_context(vmx->vpid);
+
+ vmx_update_fb_clear_dis(vcpu, vmx);
}
/*
@@ -9177,6 +9242,11 @@ static void __noclone vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
vmx_l1d_flush(vcpu);
else if (static_branch_unlikely(&mds_user_clear))
mds_clear_cpu_buffers();
+ else if (static_branch_unlikely(&mmio_stale_data_clear) &&
+ kvm_arch_has_assigned_device(vcpu->kvm))
+ mds_clear_cpu_buffers();
+
+ vmx_disable_fb_clear(vmx);
asm(
/* Store host registers */
@@ -9295,6 +9365,8 @@ static void __noclone vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
#endif
);
+ vmx_enable_fb_clear(vmx);
+
/*
* We do not use IBRS in the kernel. If this vCPU has used the
* SPEC_CTRL MSR it may have left it on; save the value and
@@ -11879,8 +11951,11 @@ static int __init vmx_init(void)
}
}
+ vmx_setup_fb_clear_ctrl();
+
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&per_cpu(loaded_vmcss_on_cpu, cpu));
+
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&per_cpu(blocked_vcpu_on_cpu, cpu));
spin_lock_init(&per_cpu(blocked_vcpu_on_cpu_lock, cpu));
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index c0f7e746722d..78c1838b9fff 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -1090,6 +1090,10 @@ u64 kvm_get_arch_capabilities(void)
/* KVM does not emulate MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL. */
data &= ~ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR;
+
+ /* Guests don't need to know "Fill buffer clear control" exists */
+ data &= ~ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR_CTRL;
+
return data;
}
diff --git a/drivers/base/cpu.c b/drivers/base/cpu.c
index 100850398dd3..88f89a38588a 100644
--- a/drivers/base/cpu.c
+++ b/drivers/base/cpu.c
@@ -556,6 +556,12 @@ ssize_t __weak cpu_show_srbds(struct device *dev,
return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
}
+ssize_t __weak cpu_show_mmio_stale_data(struct device *dev,
+ struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "Not affected\n");
+}
+
static DEVICE_ATTR(meltdown, 0444, cpu_show_meltdown, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v1, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v1, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v2, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v2, NULL);
@@ -565,6 +571,7 @@ static DEVICE_ATTR(mds, 0444, cpu_show_mds, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(tsx_async_abort, 0444, cpu_show_tsx_async_abort, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(itlb_multihit, 0444, cpu_show_itlb_multihit, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(srbds, 0444, cpu_show_srbds, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(mmio_stale_data, 0444, cpu_show_mmio_stale_data, NULL);
static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = {
&dev_attr_meltdown.attr,
@@ -576,6 +583,7 @@ static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = {
&dev_attr_tsx_async_abort.attr,
&dev_attr_itlb_multihit.attr,
&dev_attr_srbds.attr,
+ &dev_attr_mmio_stale_data.attr,
NULL
};
diff --git a/include/linux/cpu.h b/include/linux/cpu.h
index e19bbc38a722..6c1cb1f1bd4b 100644
--- a/include/linux/cpu.h
+++ b/include/linux/cpu.h
@@ -61,6 +61,10 @@ extern ssize_t cpu_show_tsx_async_abort(struct device *dev,
char *buf);
extern ssize_t cpu_show_itlb_multihit(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf);
+extern ssize_t cpu_show_srbds(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf);
+extern ssize_t cpu_show_mmio_stale_data(struct device *dev,
+ struct device_attribute *attr,
+ char *buf);
extern __printf(4, 5)
struct device *cpu_device_create(struct device *parent, void *drvdata,
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