| lists.openwall.net | lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC | |
|
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
| ||
|
Message-Id: <20220620124740.504525232@linuxfoundation.org>
Date: Mon, 20 Jun 2022 14:49:32 +0200
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
stable@...r.kernel.org,
Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@...utronix.de>,
Dominik Brodowski <linux@...inikbrodowski.net>,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...gle.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Jonathan Neuschäfer <j.neuschaefer@....net>,
"Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>
Subject: [PATCH 5.4 071/240] random: remove batched entropy locking
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>
commit 77760fd7f7ae3dfd03668204e708d1568d75447d upstream.
Rather than use spinlocks to protect batched entropy, we can instead
disable interrupts locally, since we're dealing with per-cpu data, and
manage resets with a basic generation counter. At the same time, we
can't quite do this on PREEMPT_RT, where we still want spinlocks-as-
mutexes semantics. So we use a local_lock_t, which provides the right
behavior for each. Because this is a per-cpu lock, that generation
counter is still doing the necessary CPU-to-CPU communication.
This should improve performance a bit. It will also fix the linked splat
that Jonathan received with a PROVE_RAW_LOCK_NESTING=y.
Reviewed-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@...utronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@...inikbrodowski.net>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...gle.com>
Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Reported-by: Jonathan Neuschäfer <j.neuschaefer@....net>
Tested-by: Jonathan Neuschäfer <j.neuschaefer@....net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/YfMa0QgsjCVdRAvJ@latitude/
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@...c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/char/random.c | 58 +++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------------
1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -1721,13 +1721,15 @@ struct ctl_table random_table[] = {
};
#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
+static atomic_t batch_generation = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
+
struct batched_entropy {
union {
u64 entropy_u64[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u64)];
u32 entropy_u32[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)];
};
unsigned int position;
- spinlock_t batch_lock;
+ int generation;
};
/*
@@ -1738,9 +1740,7 @@ struct batched_entropy {
* wait_for_random_bytes() should be called and return 0 at least once at any
* point prior.
*/
-static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u64) = {
- .batch_lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(batched_entropy_u64.lock),
-};
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u64);
u64 get_random_u64(void)
{
@@ -1748,67 +1748,63 @@ u64 get_random_u64(void)
unsigned long flags;
struct batched_entropy *batch;
static void *previous;
+ int next_gen;
warn_unseeded_randomness(&previous);
+ local_irq_save(flags);
batch = raw_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u64);
- spin_lock_irqsave(&batch->batch_lock, flags);
- if (batch->position % ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u64) == 0) {
+
+ next_gen = atomic_read(&batch_generation);
+ if (batch->position % ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u64) == 0 ||
+ next_gen != batch->generation) {
extract_crng((u8 *)batch->entropy_u64);
batch->position = 0;
+ batch->generation = next_gen;
}
+
ret = batch->entropy_u64[batch->position++];
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&batch->batch_lock, flags);
+ local_irq_restore(flags);
return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_u64);
-static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u32) = {
- .batch_lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(batched_entropy_u32.lock),
-};
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u32);
+
u32 get_random_u32(void)
{
u32 ret;
unsigned long flags;
struct batched_entropy *batch;
static void *previous;
+ int next_gen;
warn_unseeded_randomness(&previous);
+ local_irq_save(flags);
batch = raw_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u32);
- spin_lock_irqsave(&batch->batch_lock, flags);
- if (batch->position % ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u32) == 0) {
+
+ next_gen = atomic_read(&batch_generation);
+ if (batch->position % ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u32) == 0 ||
+ next_gen != batch->generation) {
extract_crng((u8 *)batch->entropy_u32);
batch->position = 0;
+ batch->generation = next_gen;
}
+
ret = batch->entropy_u32[batch->position++];
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&batch->batch_lock, flags);
+ local_irq_restore(flags);
return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_u32);
/* It's important to invalidate all potential batched entropy that might
* be stored before the crng is initialized, which we can do lazily by
- * simply resetting the counter to zero so that it's re-extracted on the
- * next usage. */
+ * bumping the generation counter.
+ */
static void invalidate_batched_entropy(void)
{
- int cpu;
- unsigned long flags;
-
- for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
- struct batched_entropy *batched_entropy;
-
- batched_entropy = per_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u32, cpu);
- spin_lock_irqsave(&batched_entropy->batch_lock, flags);
- batched_entropy->position = 0;
- spin_unlock(&batched_entropy->batch_lock);
-
- batched_entropy = per_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u64, cpu);
- spin_lock(&batched_entropy->batch_lock);
- batched_entropy->position = 0;
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&batched_entropy->batch_lock, flags);
- }
+ atomic_inc(&batch_generation);
}
/**
Powered by blists - more mailing lists