linux-kernel - [PATCH 5.4 063/240] random: access primary_pool directly rather than through pointer

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Message-Id: <20220620124740.181296930@linuxfoundation.org>
Date:   Mon, 20 Jun 2022 14:49:24 +0200
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org,
        Dominik Brodowski <linux@...inikbrodowski.net>,
        "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>
Subject: [PATCH 5.4 063/240] random: access primary_pool directly rather than through pointer

From: Dominik Brodowski <linux@...inikbrodowski.net>

commit ebf7606388732ecf2821ca21087e9446cb4a5b57 upstream.

Both crng_initialize_primary() and crng_init_try_arch_early() are
only called for the primary_pool. Accessing it directly instead of
through a function parameter simplifies the code.

Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@...inikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@...c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/char/random.c |   14 +++++++-------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -762,7 +762,7 @@ static bool crng_init_try_arch(struct cr
 	return arch_init;
 }
 
-static bool __init crng_init_try_arch_early(struct crng_state *crng)
+static bool __init crng_init_try_arch_early(void)
 {
 	int i;
 	bool arch_init = true;
@@ -774,7 +774,7 @@ static bool __init crng_init_try_arch_ea
 			rv = random_get_entropy();
 			arch_init = false;
 		}
-		crng->state[i] ^= rv;
+		primary_crng.state[i] ^= rv;
 	}
 
 	return arch_init;
@@ -788,16 +788,16 @@ static void crng_initialize_secondary(st
 	crng->init_time = jiffies - CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL - 1;
 }
 
-static void __init crng_initialize_primary(struct crng_state *crng)
+static void __init crng_initialize_primary(void)
 {
-	_extract_entropy(&crng->state[4], sizeof(u32) * 12);
-	if (crng_init_try_arch_early(crng) && trust_cpu && crng_init < 2) {
+	_extract_entropy(&primary_crng.state[4], sizeof(u32) * 12);
+	if (crng_init_try_arch_early() && trust_cpu && crng_init < 2) {
 		invalidate_batched_entropy();
 		numa_crng_init();
 		crng_init = 2;
 		pr_notice("crng init done (trusting CPU's manufacturer)\n");
 	}
-	crng->init_time = jiffies - CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL - 1;
+	primary_crng.init_time = jiffies - CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL - 1;
 }
 
 static void crng_finalize_init(struct crng_state *crng)
@@ -1698,7 +1698,7 @@ int __init rand_initialize(void)
 	init_std_data();
 	if (crng_need_final_init)
 		crng_finalize_init(&primary_crng);
-	crng_initialize_primary(&primary_crng);
+	crng_initialize_primary();
 	crng_global_init_time = jiffies;
 	if (ratelimit_disable) {
 		urandom_warning.interval = 0;