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Date: Mon, 20 Jun 2022 23:06:51 +0000
From: Ashish Kalra <Ashish.Kalra@....com>
To: <x86@...nel.org>, <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
<kvm@...r.kernel.org>, <linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev>,
<linux-mm@...ck.org>, <linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org>
CC: <tglx@...utronix.de>, <mingo@...hat.com>, <jroedel@...e.de>,
<thomas.lendacky@....com>, <hpa@...or.com>, <ardb@...nel.org>,
<pbonzini@...hat.com>, <seanjc@...gle.com>, <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
<jmattson@...gle.com>, <luto@...nel.org>,
<dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>, <slp@...hat.com>,
<pgonda@...gle.com>, <peterz@...radead.org>,
<srinivas.pandruvada@...ux.intel.com>, <rientjes@...gle.com>,
<dovmurik@...ux.ibm.com>, <tobin@....com>, <bp@...en8.de>,
<michael.roth@....com>, <vbabka@...e.cz>, <kirill@...temov.name>,
<ak@...ux.intel.com>, <tony.luck@...el.com>, <marcorr@...gle.com>,
<sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com>,
<alpergun@...gle.com>, <dgilbert@...hat.com>, <jarkko@...nel.org>
Subject: [PATCH Part2 v6 21/49] KVM: SVM: Make AVIC backing, VMSA and VMCB memory allocation SNP safe
From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
Implement a workaround for an SNP erratum where the CPU will incorrectly
signal an RMP violation #PF if a hugepage (2mb or 1gb) collides with the
RMP entry of a VMCB, VMSA or AVIC backing page.
When SEV-SNP is globally enabled, the CPU marks the VMCB, VMSA, and AVIC
backing pages as "in-use" in the RMP after a successful VMRUN. This
is done for _all_ VMs, not just SNP-Active VMs.
If the hypervisor accesses an in-use page through a writable
translation, the CPU will throw an RMP violation #PF. On early SNP
hardware, if an in-use page is 2mb aligned and software accesses any
part of the associated 2mb region with a hupage, the CPU will
incorrectly treat the entire 2mb region as in-use and signal a spurious
RMP violation #PF.
The recommended is to not use the hugepage for the VMCB, VMSA or
AVIC backing page. Add a generic allocator that will ensure that the
page returns is not hugepage (2mb or 1gb) and is safe to be used when
SEV-SNP is enabled.
Co-developed-by: Marc Orr <marcorr@...gle.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Orr <marcorr@...gle.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h | 1 +
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 ++
arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c | 5 ++++-
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 16 ++++++++++++--
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 1 +
6 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
index da47f60a4650..a66292dae698 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
@@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ KVM_X86_OP(msr_filter_changed)
KVM_X86_OP(complete_emulated_msr)
KVM_X86_OP(vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector)
KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(vcpu_get_apicv_inhibit_reasons);
+KVM_X86_OP(alloc_apic_backing_page)
#undef KVM_X86_OP
#undef KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index c24a72ddc93b..0205e2944067 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -1512,6 +1512,8 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {
* Returns vCPU specific APICv inhibit reasons
*/
unsigned long (*vcpu_get_apicv_inhibit_reasons)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+
+ void *(*alloc_apic_backing_page)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
};
struct kvm_x86_nested_ops {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c b/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c
index 66b0eb0bda94..7c7fc6c4a7f9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c
@@ -2506,7 +2506,10 @@ int kvm_create_lapic(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int timer_advance_ns)
vcpu->arch.apic = apic;
- apic->regs = (void *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+ if (kvm_x86_ops.alloc_apic_backing_page)
+ apic->regs = static_call(kvm_x86_alloc_apic_backing_page)(vcpu);
+ else
+ apic->regs = (void *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
if (!apic->regs) {
printk(KERN_ERR "malloc apic regs error for vcpu %x\n",
vcpu->vcpu_id);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index b49c370d5ae9..93365996bd59 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -3030,3 +3030,38 @@ void sev_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector)
break;
}
}
+
+struct page *snp_safe_alloc_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ unsigned long pfn;
+ struct page *p;
+
+ if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP))
+ return alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO);
+
+ /*
+ * Allocate an SNP safe page to workaround the SNP erratum where
+ * the CPU will incorrectly signal an RMP violation #PF if a
+ * hugepage (2mb or 1gb) collides with the RMP entry of VMCB, VMSA
+ * or AVIC backing page. The recommeded workaround is to not use the
+ * hugepage.
+ *
+ * Allocate one extra page, use a page which is not 2mb aligned
+ * and free the other.
+ */
+ p = alloc_pages(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO, 1);
+ if (!p)
+ return NULL;
+
+ split_page(p, 1);
+
+ pfn = page_to_pfn(p);
+ if (IS_ALIGNED(__pfn_to_phys(pfn), PMD_SIZE)) {
+ pfn++;
+ __free_page(p);
+ } else {
+ __free_page(pfn_to_page(pfn + 1));
+ }
+
+ return pfn_to_page(pfn);
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index efc7623d0f90..b4bd64f94d3a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -1260,7 +1260,7 @@ static int svm_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
svm = to_svm(vcpu);
err = -ENOMEM;
- vmcb01_page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO);
+ vmcb01_page = snp_safe_alloc_page(vcpu);
if (!vmcb01_page)
goto out;
@@ -1269,7 +1269,7 @@ static int svm_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
* SEV-ES guests require a separate VMSA page used to contain
* the encrypted register state of the guest.
*/
- vmsa_page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO);
+ vmsa_page = snp_safe_alloc_page(vcpu);
if (!vmsa_page)
goto error_free_vmcb_page;
@@ -4598,6 +4598,16 @@ static int svm_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
return 0;
}
+static void *svm_alloc_apic_backing_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct page *page = snp_safe_alloc_page(vcpu);
+
+ if (!page)
+ return NULL;
+
+ return page_address(page);
+}
+
static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __initdata = {
.name = "kvm_amd",
@@ -4722,6 +4732,8 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __initdata = {
.vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector = svm_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector,
.vcpu_get_apicv_inhibit_reasons = avic_vcpu_get_apicv_inhibit_reasons,
+
+ .alloc_apic_backing_page = svm_alloc_apic_backing_page,
};
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
index 1f4a8bd09c9e..9672e25a338d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
@@ -659,6 +659,7 @@ void sev_es_vcpu_reset(struct vcpu_svm *svm);
void sev_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector);
void sev_es_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct sev_es_save_area *hostsa);
void sev_es_unmap_ghcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm);
+struct page *snp_safe_alloc_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
/* vmenter.S */
--
2.25.1
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