lists.openwall.net   lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  linux-hardening  linux-cve-announce  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
 
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-Id: <20220623164344.809487453@linuxfoundation.org>
Date:   Thu, 23 Jun 2022 18:40:19 +0200
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org, Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...gle.com>,
        Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
        "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4.9 026/264] crypto: chacha20 - Fix keystream alignment for chacha20_block()

From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...gle.com>

commit 9f480faec58cd6197a007ea1dcac6b7c3daf1139 upstream.

When chacha20_block() outputs the keystream block, it uses 'u32' stores
directly.  However, the callers (crypto/chacha20_generic.c and
drivers/char/random.c) declare the keystream buffer as a 'u8' array,
which is not guaranteed to have the needed alignment.

Fix it by having both callers declare the keystream as a 'u32' array.
For now this is preferable to switching over to the unaligned access
macros because chacha20_block() is only being used in cases where we can
easily control the alignment (stack buffers).

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...gle.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@...c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
 crypto/chacha20_generic.c |    6 +++---
 drivers/char/random.c     |   24 ++++++++++++------------
 include/crypto/chacha20.h |    3 ++-
 lib/chacha20.c            |    2 +-
 4 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)

--- a/crypto/chacha20_generic.c
+++ b/crypto/chacha20_generic.c
@@ -23,20 +23,20 @@ static inline u32 le32_to_cpuvp(const vo
 static void chacha20_docrypt(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
 			     unsigned int bytes)
 {
-	u8 stream[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE];
+	u32 stream[CHACHA20_BLOCK_WORDS];
 
 	if (dst != src)
 		memcpy(dst, src, bytes);
 
 	while (bytes >= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE) {
 		chacha20_block(state, stream);
-		crypto_xor(dst, stream, CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		crypto_xor(dst, (const u8 *)stream, CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE);
 		bytes -= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE;
 		dst += CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE;
 	}
 	if (bytes) {
 		chacha20_block(state, stream);
-		crypto_xor(dst, stream, bytes);
+		crypto_xor(dst, (const u8 *)stream, bytes);
 	}
 }
 
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -434,9 +434,9 @@ static int crng_init_cnt = 0;
 static unsigned long crng_global_init_time = 0;
 #define CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH (2*CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE)
 static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng,
-			  __u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE]);
+			  __u32 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_WORDS]);
 static void _crng_backtrack_protect(struct crng_state *crng,
-				    __u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE], int used);
+				    __u32 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_WORDS], int used);
 static void process_random_ready_list(void);
 static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);
 
@@ -981,7 +981,7 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_stat
 	unsigned long	flags;
 	int		i, num;
 	union {
-		__u8	block[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE];
+		__u32	block[CHACHA20_BLOCK_WORDS];
 		__u32	key[8];
 	} buf;
 
@@ -1029,7 +1029,7 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_stat
 }
 
 static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng,
-			  __u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE])
+			  __u32 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_WORDS])
 {
 	unsigned long v, flags, init_time;
 
@@ -1049,7 +1049,7 @@ static void _extract_crng(struct crng_st
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crng->lock, flags);
 }
 
-static void extract_crng(__u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE])
+static void extract_crng(__u32 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_WORDS])
 {
 	_extract_crng(select_crng(), out);
 }
@@ -1059,7 +1059,7 @@ static void extract_crng(__u8 out[CHACHA
  * enough) to mutate the CRNG key to provide backtracking protection.
  */
 static void _crng_backtrack_protect(struct crng_state *crng,
-				    __u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE], int used)
+				    __u32 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_WORDS], int used)
 {
 	unsigned long	flags;
 	__u32		*s, *d;
@@ -1071,14 +1071,14 @@ static void _crng_backtrack_protect(stru
 		used = 0;
 	}
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&crng->lock, flags);
-	s = (__u32 *) &tmp[used];
+	s = &tmp[used / sizeof(__u32)];
 	d = &crng->state[4];
 	for (i=0; i < 8; i++)
 		*d++ ^= *s++;
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crng->lock, flags);
 }
 
-static void crng_backtrack_protect(__u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE], int used)
+static void crng_backtrack_protect(__u32 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_WORDS], int used)
 {
 	_crng_backtrack_protect(select_crng(), tmp, used);
 }
@@ -1086,7 +1086,7 @@ static void crng_backtrack_protect(__u8
 static ssize_t extract_crng_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes)
 {
 	ssize_t ret = 0, i = CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE;
-	__u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE];
+	__u32 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_WORDS];
 	int large_request = (nbytes > 256);
 
 	while (nbytes) {
@@ -1672,7 +1672,7 @@ static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(co
  */
 static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes)
 {
-	__u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE];
+	__u32 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_WORDS];
 
 	trace_get_random_bytes(nbytes, _RET_IP_);
 
@@ -2273,7 +2273,7 @@ u64 get_random_u64(void)
 	batch = raw_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u64);
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&batch->batch_lock, flags);
 	if (batch->position % ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u64) == 0) {
-		extract_crng((u8 *)batch->entropy_u64);
+		extract_crng((__u32 *)batch->entropy_u64);
 		batch->position = 0;
 	}
 	ret = batch->entropy_u64[batch->position++];
@@ -2297,7 +2297,7 @@ u32 get_random_u32(void)
 	batch = raw_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u32);
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&batch->batch_lock, flags);
 	if (batch->position % ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u32) == 0) {
-		extract_crng((u8 *)batch->entropy_u32);
+		extract_crng(batch->entropy_u32);
 		batch->position = 0;
 	}
 	ret = batch->entropy_u32[batch->position++];
--- a/include/crypto/chacha20.h
+++ b/include/crypto/chacha20.h
@@ -11,12 +11,13 @@
 #define CHACHA20_IV_SIZE	16
 #define CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE	32
 #define CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE	64
+#define CHACHA20_BLOCK_WORDS	(CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32))
 
 struct chacha20_ctx {
 	u32 key[8];
 };
 
-void chacha20_block(u32 *state, void *stream);
+void chacha20_block(u32 *state, u32 *stream);
 void crypto_chacha20_init(u32 *state, struct chacha20_ctx *ctx, u8 *iv);
 int crypto_chacha20_setkey(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *key,
 			   unsigned int keysize);
--- a/lib/chacha20.c
+++ b/lib/chacha20.c
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ static inline u32 rotl32(u32 v, u8 n)
 	return (v << n) | (v >> (sizeof(v) * 8 - n));
 }
 
-extern void chacha20_block(u32 *state, void *stream)
+void chacha20_block(u32 *state, u32 *stream)
 {
 	u32 x[16], *out = stream;
 	int i;


Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Powered by Openwall GNU/*/Linux Powered by OpenVZ