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Message-Id: <20220623164347.266546242@linuxfoundation.org>
Date:   Thu, 23 Jun 2022 18:41:46 +0200
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org, Theodore Tso <tytso@....edu>,
        Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>,
        Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...gle.com>,
        Dominik Brodowski <linux@...inikbrodowski.net>,
        "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4.9 113/264] random: always wake up entropy writers after extraction

From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>

commit 489c7fc44b5740d377e8cfdbf0851036e493af00 upstream.

Now that POOL_BITS == POOL_MIN_BITS, we must unconditionally wake up
entropy writers after every extraction. Therefore there's no point of
write_wakeup_threshold, so we can move it to the dustbin of unused
compatibility sysctls. While we're at it, we can fix a small comparison
where we were waking up after <= min rather than < min.

Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>
Suggested-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...gle.com>
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@...inikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@...c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
 Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt |   44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 drivers/char/random.c           |   36 ++++++++++++--------------------
 2 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)

--- a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
+++ b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
@@ -777,9 +777,49 @@ The kernel command line parameter printk
 a one-time setting until next reboot: once set, it cannot be changed by
 this sysctl interface anymore.
 
-==============================================================
+pty
+===
 
-randomize_va_space:
+See Documentation/filesystems/devpts.rst.
+
+
+random
+======
+
+This is a directory, with the following entries:
+
+* ``boot_id``: a UUID generated the first time this is retrieved, and
+  unvarying after that;
+
+* ``entropy_avail``: the pool's entropy count, in bits;
+
+* ``poolsize``: the entropy pool size, in bits;
+
+* ``urandom_min_reseed_secs``: obsolete (used to determine the minimum
+  number of seconds between urandom pool reseeding). This file is
+  writable for compatibility purposes, but writing to it has no effect
+  on any RNG behavior.
+
+* ``uuid``: a UUID generated every time this is retrieved (this can
+  thus be used to generate UUIDs at will);
+
+* ``write_wakeup_threshold``: when the entropy count drops below this
+  (as a number of bits), processes waiting to write to ``/dev/random``
+  are woken up. This file is writable for compatibility purposes, but
+  writing to it has no effect on any RNG behavior.
+
+If ``drivers/char/random.c`` is built with ``ADD_INTERRUPT_BENCH``
+defined, these additional entries are present:
+
+* ``add_interrupt_avg_cycles``: the average number of cycles between
+  interrupts used to feed the pool;
+
+* ``add_interrupt_avg_deviation``: the standard deviation seen on the
+  number of cycles between interrupts used to feed the pool.
+
+
+randomize_va_space
+==================
 
 This option can be used to select the type of process address
 space randomization that is used in the system, for architectures
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -297,12 +297,6 @@ enum {
  */
 static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(random_write_wait);
 static struct fasync_struct *fasync;
-/*
- * If the entropy count falls under this number of bits, then we
- * should wake up processes which are selecting or polling on write
- * access to /dev/random.
- */
-static int random_write_wakeup_bits = POOL_MIN_BITS;
 
 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(random_ready_list_lock);
 static LIST_HEAD(random_ready_list);
@@ -790,10 +784,8 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_stat
 				return;
 		} while (cmpxchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, entropy_count, 0) != entropy_count);
 		extract_entropy(buf.key, sizeof(buf.key));
-		if (random_write_wakeup_bits) {
-			wake_up_interruptible(&random_write_wait);
-			kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_OUT);
-		}
+		wake_up_interruptible(&random_write_wait);
+		kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_OUT);
 	} else {
 		_extract_crng(&primary_crng, buf.block);
 		_crng_backtrack_protect(&primary_crng, buf.block,
@@ -1522,7 +1514,7 @@ static unsigned int random_poll(struct f
 	mask = 0;
 	if (crng_ready())
 		mask |= POLLIN | POLLRDNORM;
-	if (input_pool.entropy_count < random_write_wakeup_bits)
+	if (input_pool.entropy_count < POOL_MIN_BITS)
 		mask |= POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM;
 	return mask;
 }
@@ -1607,7 +1599,10 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f,
 		 */
 		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 			return -EPERM;
-		input_pool.entropy_count = 0;
+		if (xchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, 0)) {
+			wake_up_interruptible(&random_write_wait);
+			kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_OUT);
+		}
 		return 0;
 	case RNDRESEEDCRNG:
 		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
@@ -1682,9 +1677,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *
 
 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
 
-static int min_write_thresh;
-static int max_write_thresh = POOL_BITS;
 static int random_min_urandom_seed = 60;
+static int random_write_wakeup_bits = POOL_MIN_BITS;
+static int sysctl_poolsize = POOL_BITS;
 static char sysctl_bootid[16];
 
 /*
@@ -1723,7 +1718,6 @@ static int proc_do_uuid(struct ctl_table
 	return proc_dostring(&fake_table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
 }
 
-static int sysctl_poolsize = POOL_BITS;
 extern struct ctl_table random_table[];
 struct ctl_table random_table[] = {
 	{
@@ -1745,9 +1739,7 @@ struct ctl_table random_table[] = {
 		.data		= &random_write_wakeup_bits,
 		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
 		.mode		= 0644,
-		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec_minmax,
-		.extra1		= &min_write_thresh,
-		.extra2		= &max_write_thresh,
+		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec,
 	},
 	{
 		.procname	= "urandom_min_reseed_secs",
@@ -1928,13 +1920,13 @@ void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const ch
 	}
 
 	/* Throttle writing if we're above the trickle threshold.
-	 * We'll be woken up again once below random_write_wakeup_thresh,
-	 * when the calling thread is about to terminate, or once
-	 * CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL has lapsed.
+	 * We'll be woken up again once below POOL_MIN_BITS, when
+	 * the calling thread is about to terminate, or once
+	 * CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL has elapsed.
 	 */
 	wait_event_interruptible_timeout(random_write_wait,
 			!system_wq || kthread_should_stop() ||
-			input_pool.entropy_count <= random_write_wakeup_bits,
+			input_pool.entropy_count < POOL_MIN_BITS,
 			CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL);
 	mix_pool_bytes(buffer, count);
 	credit_entropy_bits(entropy);


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