linux-kernel - [PATCH 4.9 167/264] random: treat bootloader trust toggle the same way as cpu trust toggle

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Message-Id: <20220623164348.789663299@linuxfoundation.org>
Date:   Thu, 23 Jun 2022 18:42:40 +0200
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org, Theodore Tso <tytso@....edu>,
        Graham Christensen <graham@...hamc.com>,
        Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>,
        Dominik Brodowski <linux@...inikbrodowski.net>,
        "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4.9 167/264] random: treat bootloader trust toggle the same way as cpu trust toggle

From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>

commit d97c68d178fbf8aaaf21b69b446f2dfb13909316 upstream.

If CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU is set, the RNG initializes using RDRAND.
But, the user can disable (or enable) this behavior by setting
`random.trust_cpu=0/1` on the kernel command line. This allows system
builders to do reasonable things while avoiding howls from tinfoil
hatters. (Or vice versa.)

CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is basically the same thing, but regards
the seed passed via EFI or device tree, which might come from RDRAND or
a TPM or somewhere else. In order to allow distros to more easily enable
this while avoiding those same howls (or vice versa), this commit adds
the corresponding `random.trust_bootloader=0/1` toggle.

Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>
Cc: Graham Christensen <graham@...hamc.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@...inikbrodowski.net>
Link: https://github.com/NixOS/nixpkgs/pull/165355
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@...c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
 Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt |    6 ++++++
 drivers/char/Kconfig                |    3 ++-
 drivers/char/random.c               |    8 +++++++-
 3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -3583,6 +3583,12 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes
 			fully seed the kernel's CRNG. Default is controlled
 			by CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU.
 
+	random.trust_bootloader={on,off}
+			[KNL] Enable or disable trusting the use of a
+			seed passed by the bootloader (if available) to
+			fully seed the kernel's CRNG. Default is controlled
+			by CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER.
+
 	rcu_nocbs=	[KNL]
 			The argument is a cpu list, as described above.
 
--- a/drivers/char/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/char/Kconfig
@@ -617,4 +617,5 @@ config RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER
 	device randomness. Say Y here to assume the entropy provided by the
 	booloader is trustworthy so it will be added to the kernel's entropy
 	pool. Otherwise, say N here so it will be regarded as device input that
-	only mixes the entropy pool.
\ No newline at end of file
+	only mixes the entropy pool. This can also be configured at boot with
+	"random.trust_bootloader=on/off".
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -941,11 +941,17 @@ static bool drain_entropy(void *buf, siz
  **********************************************************************/
 
 static bool trust_cpu __ro_after_init = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU);
+static bool trust_bootloader __ro_after_init = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER);
 static int __init parse_trust_cpu(char *arg)
 {
 	return kstrtobool(arg, &trust_cpu);
 }
+static int __init parse_trust_bootloader(char *arg)
+{
+	return kstrtobool(arg, &trust_bootloader);
+}
 early_param("random.trust_cpu", parse_trust_cpu);
+early_param("random.trust_bootloader", parse_trust_bootloader);
 
 /*
  * The first collection of entropy occurs at system boot while interrupts
@@ -1153,7 +1159,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_hwgenerator_random
  */
 void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size)
 {
-	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER))
+	if (trust_bootloader)
 		add_hwgenerator_randomness(buf, size, size * 8);
 	else
 		add_device_randomness(buf, size);