linux-kernel - [PATCH 4.9 114/264] random: make credit_entropy

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Message-Id: <20220623164347.294617279@linuxfoundation.org>
Date:   Thu, 23 Jun 2022 18:41:47 +0200
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org, Sultan Alsawaf <sultan@...neltoast.com>,
        Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...gle.com>,
        Dominik Brodowski <linux@...inikbrodowski.net>,
        "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4.9 114/264] random: make credit_entropy_bits() always safe

From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>

commit a49c010e61e1938be851f5e49ac219d49b704103 upstream.

This is called from various hwgenerator drivers, so rather than having
one "safe" version for userspace and one "unsafe" version for the
kernel, just make everything safe; the checks are cheap and sensible to
have anyway.

Reported-by: Sultan Alsawaf <sultan@...neltoast.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...gle.com>
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@...inikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@...c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/char/random.c |   29 +++++++++--------------------
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -448,18 +448,15 @@ static void process_random_ready_list(vo
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_list_lock, flags);
 }
 
-/*
- * Credit (or debit) the entropy store with n bits of entropy.
- * Use credit_entropy_bits_safe() if the value comes from userspace
- * or otherwise should be checked for extreme values.
- */
 static void credit_entropy_bits(int nbits)
 {
 	int entropy_count, orig;
 
-	if (!nbits)
+	if (nbits <= 0)
 		return;
 
+	nbits = min(nbits, POOL_BITS);
+
 	do {
 		orig = READ_ONCE(input_pool.entropy_count);
 		entropy_count = min(POOL_BITS, orig + nbits);
@@ -471,18 +468,6 @@ static void credit_entropy_bits(int nbit
 		crng_reseed(&primary_crng, true);
 }
 
-static int credit_entropy_bits_safe(int nbits)
-{
-	if (nbits < 0)
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	/* Cap the value to avoid overflows */
-	nbits = min(nbits, POOL_BITS);
-
-	credit_entropy_bits(nbits);
-	return 0;
-}
-
 /*********************************************************************
  *
  * CRNG using CHACHA20
@@ -1577,7 +1562,10 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f,
 			return -EPERM;
 		if (get_user(ent_count, p))
 			return -EFAULT;
-		return credit_entropy_bits_safe(ent_count);
+		if (ent_count < 0)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		credit_entropy_bits(ent_count);
+		return 0;
 	case RNDADDENTROPY:
 		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 			return -EPERM;
@@ -1590,7 +1578,8 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f,
 		retval = write_pool((const char __user *)p, size);
 		if (retval < 0)
 			return retval;
-		return credit_entropy_bits_safe(ent_count);
+		credit_entropy_bits(ent_count);
+		return 0;
 	case RNDZAPENTCNT:
 	case RNDCLEARPOOL:
 		/*