linux-kernel - [PATCH 4.19 019/234] random: Add a urandom_read

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Message-Id: <20220623164343.605934035@linuxfoundation.org>
Date:   Thu, 23 Jun 2022 18:41:26 +0200
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Theodore Tso <tytso@....edu>,
        "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4.19 019/234] random: Add a urandom_read_nowait() for random APIs that dont warn

From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>

commit c6f1deb158789abba02a7eba600747843eeb3a57 upstream.

/dev/random and getrandom() never warn.  Split the meat of
urandom_read() into urandom_read_nowarn() and leave the warning code
in urandom_read().

This has no effect on kernel behavior, but it makes subsequent
patches more straightforward.  It also makes the fact that
getrandom() never warns more obvious.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/c87ab200588de746431d9f916501ef11e5242b13.1577088521.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@...c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/char/random.c |   21 +++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -2025,11 +2025,22 @@ random_read(struct file *file, char __us
 }
 
 static ssize_t
+urandom_read_nowarn(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes,
+		    loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	nbytes = min_t(size_t, nbytes, INT_MAX >> (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3));
+	ret = extract_crng_user(buf, nbytes);
+	trace_urandom_read(8 * nbytes, 0, ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool));
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static ssize_t
 urandom_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos)
 {
 	unsigned long flags;
 	static int maxwarn = 10;
-	int ret;
 
 	if (!crng_ready() && maxwarn > 0) {
 		maxwarn--;
@@ -2041,10 +2052,8 @@ urandom_read(struct file *file, char __u
 		crng_init_cnt = 0;
 		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
 	}
-	nbytes = min_t(size_t, nbytes, INT_MAX >> (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3));
-	ret = extract_crng_user(buf, nbytes);
-	trace_urandom_read(8 * nbytes, 0, ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool));
-	return ret;
+
+	return urandom_read_nowarn(file, buf, nbytes, ppos);
 }
 
 static __poll_t
@@ -2204,7 +2213,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *
 		if (unlikely(ret))
 			return ret;
 	}
-	return urandom_read(NULL, buf, count, NULL);
+	return urandom_read_nowarn(NULL, buf, count, NULL);
 }
 
 /********************************************************************