linux-kernel - [PATCH 5.4 08/11] tcp: increase source port perturb table to 2^16

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Message-Id: <20220623164321.442250829@linuxfoundation.org>
Date:   Thu, 23 Jun 2022 18:45:12 +0200
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org, Moshe Kol <moshe.kol@...l.huji.ac.il>,
        Yossi Gilad <yossi.gilad@...l.huji.ac.il>,
        Amit Klein <aksecurity@...il.com>,
        Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>, Willy Tarreau <w@....eu>,
        Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>,
        Ben Hutchings <ben@...adent.org.uk>
Subject: [PATCH 5.4 08/11] tcp: increase source port perturb table to 2^16

From: Willy Tarreau <w@....eu>

commit 4c2c8f03a5ab7cb04ec64724d7d176d00bcc91e5 upstream.

Moshe Kol, Amit Klein, and Yossi Gilad reported being able to accurately
identify a client by forcing it to emit only 40 times more connections
than there are entries in the table_perturb[] table. The previous two
improvements consisting in resalting the secret every 10s and adding
randomness to each port selection only slightly improved the situation,
and the current value of 2^8 was too small as it's not very difficult
to make a client emit 10k connections in less than 10 seconds.

Thus we're increasing the perturb table from 2^8 to 2^16 so that the
same precision now requires 2.6M connections, which is more difficult in
this time frame and harder to hide as a background activity. The impact
is that the table now uses 256 kB instead of 1 kB, which could mostly
affect devices making frequent outgoing connections. However such
components usually target a small set of destinations (load balancers,
database clients, perf assessment tools), and in practice only a few
entries will be visited, like before.

A live test at 1 million connections per second showed no performance
difference from the previous value.

Reported-by: Moshe Kol <moshe.kol@...l.huji.ac.il>
Reported-by: Yossi Gilad <yossi.gilad@...l.huji.ac.il>
Reported-by: Amit Klein <aksecurity@...il.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@....eu>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@...adent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
 net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c |    9 +++++----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c
@@ -675,11 +675,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(inet_unhash);
  * Note that we use 32bit integers (vs RFC 'short integers')
  * because 2^16 is not a multiple of num_ephemeral and this
  * property might be used by clever attacker.
- * RFC claims using TABLE_LENGTH=10 buckets gives an improvement,
- * we use 256 instead to really give more isolation and
- * privacy, this only consumes 1 KB of kernel memory.
+ * RFC claims using TABLE_LENGTH=10 buckets gives an improvement, though
+ * attacks were since demonstrated, thus we use 65536 instead to really
+ * give more isolation and privacy, at the expense of 256kB of kernel
+ * memory.
  */
-#define INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT 8
+#define INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT 16
 #define INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SIZE (1 << INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT)
 static u32 *table_perturb;