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Message-ID: <CAA03e5FgfVQbz=pvMeBpOHENe5Rf_7UvE3iAqcgm=9nmwGEEBw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 23 Jun 2022 13:48:31 -0700
From: Marc Orr <marcorr@...gle.com>
To: Ashish Kalra <Ashish.Kalra@....com>
Cc: x86 <x86@...nel.org>, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
kvm list <kvm@...r.kernel.org>, linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev,
linux-mm@...ck.org,
Linux Crypto Mailing List <linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Joerg Roedel <jroedel@...e.de>,
"Lendacky, Thomas" <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Sergio Lopez <slp@...hat.com>, Peter Gonda <pgonda@...gle.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@...ux.intel.com>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
Dov Murik <dovmurik@...ux.ibm.com>,
Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <tobin@....com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
"Roth, Michael" <michael.roth@....com>,
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>,
"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill@...temov.name>,
Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
Tony Luck <tony.luck@...el.com>,
Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy
<sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com>,
Alper Gun <alpergun@...gle.com>,
"Dr . David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@...hat.com>, jarkko@...nel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH Part2 v6 03/49] x86/sev: Add the host SEV-SNP
initialization support
On Mon, Jun 20, 2022 at 4:02 PM Ashish Kalra <Ashish.Kalra@....com> wrote:
>
> From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
>
> The memory integrity guarantees of SEV-SNP are enforced through a new
> structure called the Reverse Map Table (RMP). The RMP is a single data
> structure shared across the system that contains one entry for every 4K
> page of DRAM that may be used by SEV-SNP VMs. The goal of RMP is to
> track the owner of each page of memory. Pages of memory can be owned by
> the hypervisor, owned by a specific VM or owned by the AMD-SP. See APM2
> section 15.36.3 for more detail on RMP.
>
> The RMP table is used to enforce access control to memory. The table itself
> is not directly writable by the software. New CPU instructions (RMPUPDATE,
> PVALIDATE, RMPADJUST) are used to manipulate the RMP entries.
>
> Based on the platform configuration, the BIOS reserves the memory used
> for the RMP table. The start and end address of the RMP table must be
> queried by reading the RMP_BASE and RMP_END MSRs. If the RMP_BASE and
> RMP_END are not set then disable the SEV-SNP feature.
>
> The SEV-SNP feature is enabled only after the RMP table is successfully
> initialized.
>
> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 8 +-
> arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 6 +
> arch/x86/kernel/sev.c | 144 +++++++++++++++++++++++
> 3 files changed, 157 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
> index 36369e76cc63..c1be3091a383 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
> @@ -68,6 +68,12 @@
> # define DISABLE_TDX_GUEST (1 << (X86_FEATURE_TDX_GUEST & 31))
> #endif
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
> +# define DISABLE_SEV_SNP 0
> +#else
> +# define DISABLE_SEV_SNP (1 << (X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP & 31))
> +#endif
> +
> /*
> * Make sure to add features to the correct mask
> */
> @@ -91,7 +97,7 @@
> DISABLE_ENQCMD)
> #define DISABLED_MASK17 0
> #define DISABLED_MASK18 0
> -#define DISABLED_MASK19 0
> +#define DISABLED_MASK19 (DISABLE_SEV_SNP)
> #define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 20)
>
> #endif /* _ASM_X86_DISABLED_FEATURES_H */
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
> index 9e2e7185fc1d..57a8280e283a 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
> @@ -507,6 +507,8 @@
> #define MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED_BIT)
> #define MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_ENABLED BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_ENABLED_BIT)
> #define MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED_BIT)
> +#define MSR_AMD64_RMP_BASE 0xc0010132
> +#define MSR_AMD64_RMP_END 0xc0010133
>
> #define MSR_AMD64_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL 0xc001011f
>
> @@ -581,6 +583,10 @@
> #define MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG 0xc0010010
> #define MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT_BIT 23
> #define MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT_BIT)
> +#define MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_EN_BIT 24
> +#define MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_EN BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_EN_BIT)
> +#define MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_VMPL_EN_BIT 25
> +#define MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_VMPL_EN BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_VMPL_EN_BIT)
nit: The alignment here looks off. The rest of the file left-aligns
the macro definition column under a comment header. The bad alignment
can be viewed on the github version of this patch:
https://github.com/AMDESE/linux/commit/5101daef92f448c046207b701c0c420b1fce3eaf
> #define MSR_K8_INT_PENDING_MSG 0xc0010055
> /* C1E active bits in int pending message */
> #define K8_INTP_C1E_ACTIVE_MASK 0x18000000
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
> index f01f4550e2c6..3a233b5d47c5 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
> @@ -22,6 +22,8 @@
> #include <linux/efi.h>
> #include <linux/platform_device.h>
> #include <linux/io.h>
> +#include <linux/cpumask.h>
> +#include <linux/iommu.h>
>
> #include <asm/cpu_entry_area.h>
> #include <asm/stacktrace.h>
> @@ -38,6 +40,7 @@
> #include <asm/apic.h>
> #include <asm/cpuid.h>
> #include <asm/cmdline.h>
> +#include <asm/iommu.h>
>
> #define DR7_RESET_VALUE 0x400
>
> @@ -57,6 +60,12 @@
> #define AP_INIT_CR0_DEFAULT 0x60000010
> #define AP_INIT_MXCSR_DEFAULT 0x1f80
>
> +/*
> + * The first 16KB from the RMP_BASE is used by the processor for the
> + * bookkeeping, the range need to be added during the RMP entry lookup.
> + */
> +#define RMPTABLE_CPU_BOOKKEEPING_SZ 0x4000
> +
> /* For early boot hypervisor communication in SEV-ES enabled guests */
> static struct ghcb boot_ghcb_page __bss_decrypted __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
>
> @@ -69,6 +78,10 @@ static struct ghcb *boot_ghcb __section(".data");
> /* Bitmap of SEV features supported by the hypervisor */
> static u64 sev_hv_features __ro_after_init;
>
> +static unsigned long rmptable_start __ro_after_init;
> +static unsigned long rmptable_end __ro_after_init;
> +
> +
> /* #VC handler runtime per-CPU data */
> struct sev_es_runtime_data {
> struct ghcb ghcb_page;
> @@ -2218,3 +2231,134 @@ static int __init snp_init_platform_device(void)
> return 0;
> }
> device_initcall(snp_init_platform_device);
> +
> +#undef pr_fmt
> +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "SEV-SNP: " fmt
> +
> +static int __snp_enable(unsigned int cpu)
> +{
> + u64 val;
> +
> + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP))
> + return 0;
> +
> + rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG, val);
> +
> + val |= MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_EN;
> + val |= MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_VMPL_EN;
> +
> + wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG, val);
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static __init void snp_enable(void *arg)
> +{
> + __snp_enable(smp_processor_id());
> +}
> +
> +static bool get_rmptable_info(u64 *start, u64 *len)
> +{
> + u64 calc_rmp_sz, rmp_sz, rmp_base, rmp_end, nr_pages;
> +
> + rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_RMP_BASE, rmp_base);
> + rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_RMP_END, rmp_end);
> +
> + if (!rmp_base || !rmp_end) {
> + pr_info("Memory for the RMP table has not been reserved by BIOS\n");
> + return false;
> + }
> +
> + rmp_sz = rmp_end - rmp_base + 1;
> +
> + /*
> + * Calculate the amount the memory that must be reserved by the BIOS to
> + * address the full system RAM. The reserved memory should also cover the
> + * RMP table itself.
> + *
> + * See PPR Family 19h Model 01h, Revision B1 section 2.1.4.2 for more
> + * information on memory requirement.
> + */
> + nr_pages = totalram_pages();
> + calc_rmp_sz = (((rmp_sz >> PAGE_SHIFT) + nr_pages) << 4) + RMPTABLE_CPU_BOOKKEEPING_SZ;
> +
> + if (calc_rmp_sz > rmp_sz) {
> + pr_info("Memory reserved for the RMP table does not cover full system RAM (expected 0x%llx got 0x%llx)\n",
> + calc_rmp_sz, rmp_sz);
> + return false;
> + }
> +
> + *start = rmp_base;
> + *len = rmp_sz;
> +
> + pr_info("RMP table physical address 0x%016llx - 0x%016llx\n", rmp_base, rmp_end);
> +
> + return true;
> +}
> +
> +static __init int __snp_rmptable_init(void)
> +{
> + u64 rmp_base, sz;
> + void *start;
> + u64 val;
> +
> + if (!get_rmptable_info(&rmp_base, &sz))
> + return 1;
> +
> + start = memremap(rmp_base, sz, MEMREMAP_WB);
> + if (!start) {
> + pr_err("Failed to map RMP table 0x%llx+0x%llx\n", rmp_base, sz);
> + return 1;
> + }
> +
> + /*
> + * Check if SEV-SNP is already enabled, this can happen if we are coming from
> + * kexec boot.
> + */
> + rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG, val);
> + if (val & MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_EN)
> + goto skip_enable;
> +
> + /* Initialize the RMP table to zero */
> + memset(start, 0, sz);
> +
> + /* Flush the caches to ensure that data is written before SNP is enabled. */
> + wbinvd_on_all_cpus();
> +
> + /* Enable SNP on all CPUs. */
> + on_each_cpu(snp_enable, NULL, 1);
> +
> +skip_enable:
> + rmptable_start = (unsigned long)start;
> + rmptable_end = rmptable_start + sz;
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static int __init snp_rmptable_init(void)
> +{
> + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP))
> + return 0;
> +
> + if (!iommu_sev_snp_supported())
> + goto nosnp;
> +
> + if (__snp_rmptable_init())
> + goto nosnp;
> +
> + cpuhp_setup_state(CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN, "x86/rmptable_init:online", __snp_enable, NULL);
> +
> + return 0;
> +
> +nosnp:
> + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP);
> + return 1;
Seems odd that we're returning 1 here, rather than 0. I tried to
figure out how the initcall return values are used and failed. My
impression was 0 means success and a negative number means failure.
But maybe this is normal.
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * This must be called after the PCI subsystem. This is because before enabling
> + * the SNP feature we need to ensure that IOMMU supports the SEV-SNP feature.
> + * The iommu_sev_snp_support() is used for checking the feature, and it is
> + * available after subsys_initcall().
> + */
> +fs_initcall(snp_rmptable_init);
> --
> 2.25.1
>
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