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Message-Id: <165615350410470@kroah.com>
Date: Sat, 25 Jun 2022 12:38:25 +0200
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, akpm@...ux-foundation.org,
torvalds@...ux-foundation.org, stable@...r.kernel.org
Cc: lwn@....net, jslaby@...e.cz,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: Linux 4.19.249
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 1dea3d23fc4c..500032af0192 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -3697,6 +3697,12 @@
fully seed the kernel's CRNG. Default is controlled
by CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU.
+ random.trust_bootloader={on,off}
+ [KNL] Enable or disable trusting the use of a
+ seed passed by the bootloader (if available) to
+ fully seed the kernel's CRNG. Default is controlled
+ by CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER.
+
ras=option[,option,...] [KNL] RAS-specific options
cec_disable [X86]
diff --git a/Documentation/hwmon/hwmon-kernel-api.txt b/Documentation/hwmon/hwmon-kernel-api.txt
index 4981df157b04..eb7a78aebb38 100644
--- a/Documentation/hwmon/hwmon-kernel-api.txt
+++ b/Documentation/hwmon/hwmon-kernel-api.txt
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ hwmon_device_register_with_info is the most comprehensive and preferred means
to register a hardware monitoring device. It creates the standard sysfs
attributes in the hardware monitoring core, letting the driver focus on reading
from and writing to the chip instead of having to bother with sysfs attributes.
-The parent device parameter as well as the chip parameter must not be NULL. Its
+The parent device parameter cannot be NULL with non-NULL chip info. Its
parameters are described in more detail below.
devm_hwmon_device_register_with_info is similar to
diff --git a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
index 8bd3b0153959..db1676525ca3 100644
--- a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
+++ b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
@@ -821,9 +821,40 @@ The kernel command line parameter printk.devkmsg= overrides this and is
a one-time setting until next reboot: once set, it cannot be changed by
this sysctl interface anymore.
-==============================================================
+pty
+===
+
+See Documentation/filesystems/devpts.rst.
+
+
+random
+======
+
+This is a directory, with the following entries:
+
+* ``boot_id``: a UUID generated the first time this is retrieved, and
+ unvarying after that;
+
+* ``uuid``: a UUID generated every time this is retrieved (this can
+ thus be used to generate UUIDs at will);
+
+* ``entropy_avail``: the pool's entropy count, in bits;
+
+* ``poolsize``: the entropy pool size, in bits;
+
+* ``urandom_min_reseed_secs``: obsolete (used to determine the minimum
+ number of seconds between urandom pool reseeding). This file is
+ writable for compatibility purposes, but writing to it has no effect
+ on any RNG behavior;
+
+* ``write_wakeup_threshold``: when the entropy count drops below this
+ (as a number of bits), processes waiting to write to ``/dev/random``
+ are woken up. This file is writable for compatibility purposes, but
+ writing to it has no effect on any RNG behavior.
+
-randomize_va_space:
+randomize_va_space
+==================
This option can be used to select the type of process address
space randomization that is used in the system, for architectures
diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
index 1061db6fbc32..af0f322cf2f7 100644
--- a/MAINTAINERS
+++ b/MAINTAINERS
@@ -12239,6 +12239,7 @@ F: arch/mips/configs/generic/board-ranchu.config
RANDOM NUMBER DRIVER
M: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>
+M: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@...c4.com>
S: Maintained
F: drivers/char/random.c
diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index afb8b46398da..14ba089d5b01 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
VERSION = 4
PATCHLEVEL = 19
-SUBLEVEL = 248
+SUBLEVEL = 249
EXTRAVERSION =
NAME = "People's Front"
diff --git a/arch/alpha/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/alpha/include/asm/timex.h
index b565cc6f408e..f89798da8a14 100644
--- a/arch/alpha/include/asm/timex.h
+++ b/arch/alpha/include/asm/timex.h
@@ -28,5 +28,6 @@ static inline cycles_t get_cycles (void)
__asm__ __volatile__ ("rpcc %0" : "=r"(ret));
return ret;
}
+#define get_cycles get_cycles
#endif
diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/timex.h
index f6fcc67ef06e..c06d38f0df8e 100644
--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/timex.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/timex.h
@@ -14,5 +14,6 @@
typedef unsigned long cycles_t;
#define get_cycles() ({ cycles_t c; read_current_timer(&c) ? 0 : c; })
+#define random_get_entropy() (((unsigned long)get_cycles()) ?: random_get_entropy_fallback())
#endif
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/ftrace.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/ftrace.c
index b6618391be8c..4254d7808def 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/ftrace.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/ftrace.c
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ int ftrace_make_call(struct dyn_ftrace *rec, unsigned long addr)
{
unsigned long pc = rec->ip;
u32 old, new;
- long offset = (long)pc - (long)addr;
+ long offset = (long)addr - (long)pc;
if (offset < -SZ_128M || offset >= SZ_128M) {
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_MODULE_PLTS
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ int ftrace_make_nop(struct module *mod, struct dyn_ftrace *rec,
unsigned long pc = rec->ip;
bool validate = true;
u32 old = 0, new;
- long offset = (long)pc - (long)addr;
+ long offset = (long)addr - (long)pc;
if (offset < -SZ_128M || offset >= SZ_128M) {
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_MODULE_PLTS
diff --git a/arch/ia64/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/ia64/include/asm/timex.h
index 869a3ac6bf23..7ccc077a60be 100644
--- a/arch/ia64/include/asm/timex.h
+++ b/arch/ia64/include/asm/timex.h
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ get_cycles (void)
ret = ia64_getreg(_IA64_REG_AR_ITC);
return ret;
}
+#define get_cycles get_cycles
extern void ia64_cpu_local_tick (void);
extern unsigned long long ia64_native_sched_clock (void);
diff --git a/arch/m68k/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/m68k/include/asm/timex.h
index 6a21d9358280..f4a7a340f4ca 100644
--- a/arch/m68k/include/asm/timex.h
+++ b/arch/m68k/include/asm/timex.h
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ static inline unsigned long random_get_entropy(void)
{
if (mach_random_get_entropy)
return mach_random_get_entropy();
- return 0;
+ return random_get_entropy_fallback();
}
#define random_get_entropy random_get_entropy
diff --git a/arch/mips/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/mips/include/asm/timex.h
index 8026baf46e72..2e107886f97a 100644
--- a/arch/mips/include/asm/timex.h
+++ b/arch/mips/include/asm/timex.h
@@ -76,25 +76,24 @@ static inline cycles_t get_cycles(void)
else
return 0; /* no usable counter */
}
+#define get_cycles get_cycles
/*
* Like get_cycles - but where c0_count is not available we desperately
* use c0_random in an attempt to get at least a little bit of entropy.
- *
- * R6000 and R6000A neither have a count register nor a random register.
- * That leaves no entropy source in the CPU itself.
*/
static inline unsigned long random_get_entropy(void)
{
- unsigned int prid = read_c0_prid();
- unsigned int imp = prid & PRID_IMP_MASK;
+ unsigned int c0_random;
- if (can_use_mips_counter(prid))
+ if (can_use_mips_counter(read_c0_prid()))
return read_c0_count();
- else if (likely(imp != PRID_IMP_R6000 && imp != PRID_IMP_R6000A))
- return read_c0_random();
+
+ if (cpu_has_3kex)
+ c0_random = (read_c0_random() >> 8) & 0x3f;
else
- return 0; /* no usable register */
+ c0_random = read_c0_random() & 0x3f;
+ return (random_get_entropy_fallback() << 6) | (0x3f - c0_random);
}
#define random_get_entropy random_get_entropy
diff --git a/arch/nios2/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/nios2/include/asm/timex.h
index 2f2abb28ec2f..9c9b50599ea3 100644
--- a/arch/nios2/include/asm/timex.h
+++ b/arch/nios2/include/asm/timex.h
@@ -20,5 +20,8 @@
typedef unsigned long cycles_t;
extern cycles_t get_cycles(void);
+#define get_cycles get_cycles
+
+#define random_get_entropy() (((unsigned long)get_cycles()) ?: random_get_entropy_fallback())
#endif
diff --git a/arch/parisc/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/parisc/include/asm/timex.h
index 45537cd4d1d3..1cd2bd3eef33 100644
--- a/arch/parisc/include/asm/timex.h
+++ b/arch/parisc/include/asm/timex.h
@@ -12,9 +12,10 @@
typedef unsigned long cycles_t;
-static inline cycles_t get_cycles (void)
+static inline cycles_t get_cycles(void)
{
return mfctl(16);
}
+#define get_cycles get_cycles
#endif
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/archrandom.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/archrandom.h
index a09595f00cab..f0f16b4fc5ea 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/archrandom.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/archrandom.h
@@ -6,27 +6,28 @@
#include <asm/machdep.h>
-static inline int arch_get_random_long(unsigned long *v)
+static inline bool arch_get_random_long(unsigned long *v)
{
- return 0;
+ return false;
}
-static inline int arch_get_random_int(unsigned int *v)
+static inline bool arch_get_random_int(unsigned int *v)
{
- return 0;
+ return false;
}
-static inline int arch_get_random_seed_long(unsigned long *v)
+static inline bool arch_get_random_seed_long(unsigned long *v)
{
if (ppc_md.get_random_seed)
return ppc_md.get_random_seed(v);
- return 0;
+ return false;
}
-static inline int arch_get_random_seed_int(unsigned int *v)
+
+static inline bool arch_get_random_seed_int(unsigned int *v)
{
unsigned long val;
- int rc;
+ bool rc;
rc = arch_get_random_seed_long(&val);
if (rc)
@@ -34,16 +35,6 @@ static inline int arch_get_random_seed_int(unsigned int *v)
return rc;
}
-
-static inline int arch_has_random(void)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static inline int arch_has_random_seed(void)
-{
- return !!ppc_md.get_random_seed;
-}
#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM */
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_POWERNV
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/ppc-opcode.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/ppc-opcode.h
index d9d5391b2af6..d0d3dab56225 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/ppc-opcode.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/ppc-opcode.h
@@ -207,6 +207,7 @@
#define PPC_INST_ICBT 0x7c00002c
#define PPC_INST_ICSWX 0x7c00032d
#define PPC_INST_ICSWEPX 0x7c00076d
+#define PPC_INST_DSSALL 0x7e00066c
#define PPC_INST_ISEL 0x7c00001e
#define PPC_INST_ISEL_MASK 0xfc00003e
#define PPC_INST_LDARX 0x7c0000a8
@@ -424,6 +425,7 @@
__PPC_RA(a) | __PPC_RB(b))
#define PPC_DCBZL(a, b) stringify_in_c(.long PPC_INST_DCBZL | \
__PPC_RA(a) | __PPC_RB(b))
+#define PPC_DSSALL stringify_in_c(.long PPC_INST_DSSALL)
#define PPC_LQARX(t, a, b, eh) stringify_in_c(.long PPC_INST_LQARX | \
___PPC_RT(t) | ___PPC_RA(a) | \
___PPC_RB(b) | __PPC_EH(eh))
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/timex.h
index 926b9f91a3ef..7401d6a684c5 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/timex.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/timex.h
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ static inline cycles_t get_cycles(void)
return ret;
#endif
}
+#define get_cycles get_cycles
#endif /* __KERNEL__ */
#endif /* _ASM_POWERPC_TIMEX_H */
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/idle_6xx.S b/arch/powerpc/kernel/idle_6xx.S
index ff026c9d3cab..75de66acc3d1 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/idle_6xx.S
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/idle_6xx.S
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ BEGIN_FTR_SECTION
END_FTR_SECTION_IFCLR(CPU_FTR_NO_DPM)
mtspr SPRN_HID0,r4
BEGIN_FTR_SECTION
- DSSALL
+ PPC_DSSALL
sync
END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_ALTIVEC)
CURRENT_THREAD_INFO(r9, r1)
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/l2cr_6xx.S b/arch/powerpc/kernel/l2cr_6xx.S
index 6e7dbb7d527c..9d4b42d115cd 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/l2cr_6xx.S
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/l2cr_6xx.S
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ END_FTR_SECTION_IFCLR(CPU_FTR_L2CR)
/* Stop DST streams */
BEGIN_FTR_SECTION
- DSSALL
+ PPC_DSSALL
sync
END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_ALTIVEC)
@@ -305,7 +305,7 @@ END_FTR_SECTION_IFCLR(CPU_FTR_L3CR)
isync
/* Stop DST streams */
- DSSALL
+ PPC_DSSALL
sync
/* Get the current enable bit of the L3CR into r4 */
@@ -414,7 +414,7 @@ END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_L3CR)
_GLOBAL(__flush_disable_L1)
/* Stop pending alitvec streams and memory accesses */
BEGIN_FTR_SECTION
- DSSALL
+ PPC_DSSALL
END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_ALTIVEC)
sync
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c
index 02b69a68139c..56c33285b1df 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c
@@ -2017,12 +2017,12 @@ unsigned long get_wchan(struct task_struct *p)
return 0;
do {
- sp = *(unsigned long *)sp;
+ sp = READ_ONCE_NOCHECK(*(unsigned long *)sp);
if (!validate_sp(sp, p, STACK_FRAME_OVERHEAD) ||
p->state == TASK_RUNNING)
return 0;
if (count > 0) {
- ip = ((unsigned long *)sp)[STACK_FRAME_LR_SAVE];
+ ip = READ_ONCE_NOCHECK(((unsigned long *)sp)[STACK_FRAME_LR_SAVE]);
if (!in_sched_functions(ip))
return ip;
}
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/swsusp_32.S b/arch/powerpc/kernel/swsusp_32.S
index cbdf86228eaa..54c44aea338c 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/swsusp_32.S
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/swsusp_32.S
@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ _GLOBAL(swsusp_arch_resume)
#ifdef CONFIG_ALTIVEC
/* Stop pending alitvec streams and memory accesses */
BEGIN_FTR_SECTION
- DSSALL
+ PPC_DSSALL
END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_ALTIVEC)
#endif
sync
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/swsusp_asm64.S b/arch/powerpc/kernel/swsusp_asm64.S
index f83bf6f72cb0..0af06f3dbb25 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/swsusp_asm64.S
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/swsusp_asm64.S
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ END_FW_FTR_SECTION_IFCLR(FW_FEATURE_LPAR)
_GLOBAL(swsusp_arch_resume)
/* Stop pending alitvec streams and memory accesses */
BEGIN_FTR_SECTION
- DSSALL
+ PPC_DSSALL
END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_ALTIVEC)
sync
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/mm/mmu_context.c b/arch/powerpc/mm/mmu_context.c
index f84e14f23e50..78a638ccc70f 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/mm/mmu_context.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/mm/mmu_context.c
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next,
* context
*/
if (cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_ALTIVEC))
- asm volatile ("dssall");
+ asm volatile (PPC_DSSALL);
if (new_on_cpu)
radix_kvm_prefetch_workaround(next);
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powermac/cache.S b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powermac/cache.S
index 27862feee4a5..0dde4a7a6016 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powermac/cache.S
+++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powermac/cache.S
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ flush_disable_75x:
/* Stop DST streams */
BEGIN_FTR_SECTION
- DSSALL
+ PPC_DSSALL
sync
END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_ALTIVEC)
@@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ flush_disable_745x:
isync
/* Stop prefetch streams */
- DSSALL
+ PPC_DSSALL
sync
/* Disable L2 prefetching */
diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/processor.h
index c23578a37b44..fdcc34b4f65b 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/processor.h
+++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/processor.h
@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@
#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
+#include <asm/barrier.h>
+
struct task_struct;
struct pt_regs;
diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/archrandom.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/archrandom.h
index c67b82dfa558..9a6835137a16 100644
--- a/arch/s390/include/asm/archrandom.h
+++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/archrandom.h
@@ -21,18 +21,6 @@ extern atomic64_t s390_arch_random_counter;
bool s390_arch_random_generate(u8 *buf, unsigned int nbytes);
-static inline bool arch_has_random(void)
-{
- return false;
-}
-
-static inline bool arch_has_random_seed(void)
-{
- if (static_branch_likely(&s390_arch_random_available))
- return true;
- return false;
-}
-
static inline bool arch_get_random_long(unsigned long *v)
{
return false;
diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/timex.h
index b6a4ce9dafaf..99a7e028232d 100644
--- a/arch/s390/include/asm/timex.h
+++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/timex.h
@@ -177,6 +177,7 @@ static inline cycles_t get_cycles(void)
{
return (cycles_t) get_tod_clock() >> 2;
}
+#define get_cycles get_cycles
int get_phys_clock(unsigned long *clock);
void init_cpu_timer(void);
diff --git a/arch/s390/mm/pgtable.c b/arch/s390/mm/pgtable.c
index 4354ac607750..9f3903089869 100644
--- a/arch/s390/mm/pgtable.c
+++ b/arch/s390/mm/pgtable.c
@@ -716,7 +716,7 @@ void ptep_zap_key(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr, pte_t *ptep)
pgste_val(pgste) |= PGSTE_GR_BIT | PGSTE_GC_BIT;
ptev = pte_val(*ptep);
if (!(ptev & _PAGE_INVALID) && (ptev & _PAGE_WRITE))
- page_set_storage_key(ptev & PAGE_MASK, PAGE_DEFAULT_KEY, 1);
+ page_set_storage_key(ptev & PAGE_MASK, PAGE_DEFAULT_KEY, 0);
pgste_set_unlock(ptep, pgste);
preempt_enable();
}
diff --git a/arch/sparc/include/asm/timex_32.h b/arch/sparc/include/asm/timex_32.h
index 542915b46209..f86326a6f89e 100644
--- a/arch/sparc/include/asm/timex_32.h
+++ b/arch/sparc/include/asm/timex_32.h
@@ -9,8 +9,6 @@
#define CLOCK_TICK_RATE 1193180 /* Underlying HZ */
-/* XXX Maybe do something better at some point... -DaveM */
-typedef unsigned long cycles_t;
-#define get_cycles() (0)
+#include <asm-generic/timex.h>
#endif
diff --git a/arch/um/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/um/include/asm/timex.h
index e392a9a5bc9b..9f27176adb26 100644
--- a/arch/um/include/asm/timex.h
+++ b/arch/um/include/asm/timex.h
@@ -2,13 +2,8 @@
#ifndef __UM_TIMEX_H
#define __UM_TIMEX_H
-typedef unsigned long cycles_t;
-
-static inline cycles_t get_cycles (void)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
#define CLOCK_TICK_RATE (HZ)
+#include <asm-generic/timex.h>
+
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/archrandom.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/archrandom.h
index 3ac991d81e74..4d3cac3c9b25 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/archrandom.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/archrandom.h
@@ -86,10 +86,6 @@ static inline bool rdseed_int(unsigned int *v)
return ok;
}
-/* Conditional execution based on CPU type */
-#define arch_has_random() static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDRAND)
-#define arch_has_random_seed() static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDSEED)
-
/*
* These are the generic interfaces; they must not be declared if the
* stubs in <linux/random.h> are to be invoked,
@@ -99,22 +95,22 @@ static inline bool rdseed_int(unsigned int *v)
static inline bool arch_get_random_long(unsigned long *v)
{
- return arch_has_random() ? rdrand_long(v) : false;
+ return static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDRAND) ? rdrand_long(v) : false;
}
static inline bool arch_get_random_int(unsigned int *v)
{
- return arch_has_random() ? rdrand_int(v) : false;
+ return static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDRAND) ? rdrand_int(v) : false;
}
static inline bool arch_get_random_seed_long(unsigned long *v)
{
- return arch_has_random_seed() ? rdseed_long(v) : false;
+ return static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDSEED) ? rdseed_long(v) : false;
}
static inline bool arch_get_random_seed_int(unsigned int *v)
{
- return arch_has_random_seed() ? rdseed_int(v) : false;
+ return static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDSEED) ? rdseed_int(v) : false;
}
extern void x86_init_rdrand(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/timex.h
index a4a8b1b16c0c..956e4145311b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/timex.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/timex.h
@@ -5,6 +5,15 @@
#include <asm/processor.h>
#include <asm/tsc.h>
+static inline unsigned long random_get_entropy(void)
+{
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_TSC) &&
+ !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_TSC))
+ return random_get_entropy_fallback();
+ return rdtsc();
+}
+#define random_get_entropy random_get_entropy
+
/* Assume we use the PIT time source for the clock tick */
#define CLOCK_TICK_RATE PIT_TICK_RATE
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/tsc.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/tsc.h
index eb5bbfeccb66..196cf01f58fd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/tsc.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/tsc.h
@@ -22,13 +22,12 @@ extern void disable_TSC(void);
static inline cycles_t get_cycles(void)
{
-#ifndef CONFIG_X86_TSC
- if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_TSC))
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_TSC) &&
+ !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_TSC))
return 0;
-#endif
-
return rdtsc();
}
+#define get_cycles get_cycles
extern struct system_counterval_t convert_art_to_tsc(u64 art);
extern struct system_counterval_t convert_art_ns_to_tsc(u64 art_ns);
diff --git a/arch/xtensa/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/xtensa/include/asm/timex.h
index f9b389d4e973..d866bc847d8d 100644
--- a/arch/xtensa/include/asm/timex.h
+++ b/arch/xtensa/include/asm/timex.h
@@ -30,10 +30,6 @@
extern unsigned long ccount_freq;
-typedef unsigned long long cycles_t;
-
-#define get_cycles() (0)
-
void local_timer_setup(unsigned cpu);
/*
@@ -69,4 +65,6 @@ static inline void set_linux_timer (unsigned long ccompare)
WSR_CCOMPARE(LINUX_TIMER, ccompare);
}
+#include <asm-generic/timex.h>
+
#endif /* _XTENSA_TIMEX_H */
diff --git a/certs/blacklist_hashes.c b/certs/blacklist_hashes.c
index 344892337be0..d5961aa3d338 100644
--- a/certs/blacklist_hashes.c
+++ b/certs/blacklist_hashes.c
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
#include "blacklist.h"
-const char __initdata *const blacklist_hashes[] = {
+const char __initconst *const blacklist_hashes[] = {
#include CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST
, NULL
};
diff --git a/crypto/drbg.c b/crypto/drbg.c
index bc52d9562611..c8c56763dfde 100644
--- a/crypto/drbg.c
+++ b/crypto/drbg.c
@@ -219,6 +219,57 @@ static inline unsigned short drbg_sec_strength(drbg_flag_t flags)
}
}
+/*
+ * FIPS 140-2 continuous self test for the noise source
+ * The test is performed on the noise source input data. Thus, the function
+ * implicitly knows the size of the buffer to be equal to the security
+ * strength.
+ *
+ * Note, this function disregards the nonce trailing the entropy data during
+ * initial seeding.
+ *
+ * drbg->drbg_mutex must have been taken.
+ *
+ * @drbg DRBG handle
+ * @entropy buffer of seed data to be checked
+ *
+ * return:
+ * 0 on success
+ * -EAGAIN on when the CTRNG is not yet primed
+ * < 0 on error
+ */
+static int drbg_fips_continuous_test(struct drbg_state *drbg,
+ const unsigned char *entropy)
+{
+ unsigned short entropylen = drbg_sec_strength(drbg->core->flags);
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* skip test if we test the overall system */
+ if (list_empty(&drbg->test_data.list))
+ return 0;
+ /* only perform test in FIPS mode */
+ if (!fips_enabled)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!drbg->fips_primed) {
+ /* Priming of FIPS test */
+ memcpy(drbg->prev, entropy, entropylen);
+ drbg->fips_primed = true;
+ /* priming: another round is needed */
+ return -EAGAIN;
+ }
+ ret = memcmp(drbg->prev, entropy, entropylen);
+ if (!ret)
+ panic("DRBG continuous self test failed\n");
+ memcpy(drbg->prev, entropy, entropylen);
+
+ /* the test shall pass when the two values are not equal */
+ return 0;
+}
+
/*
* Convert an integer into a byte representation of this integer.
* The byte representation is big-endian
@@ -984,55 +1035,79 @@ static const struct drbg_state_ops drbg_hash_ops = {
******************************************************************/
static inline int __drbg_seed(struct drbg_state *drbg, struct list_head *seed,
- int reseed)
+ int reseed, enum drbg_seed_state new_seed_state)
{
int ret = drbg->d_ops->update(drbg, seed, reseed);
if (ret)
return ret;
- drbg->seeded = true;
+ drbg->seeded = new_seed_state;
/* 10.1.1.2 / 10.1.1.3 step 5 */
drbg->reseed_ctr = 1;
+ switch (drbg->seeded) {
+ case DRBG_SEED_STATE_UNSEEDED:
+ /* Impossible, but handle it to silence compiler warnings. */
+ case DRBG_SEED_STATE_PARTIAL:
+ /*
+ * Require frequent reseeds until the seed source is
+ * fully initialized.
+ */
+ drbg->reseed_threshold = 50;
+ break;
+
+ case DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL:
+ /*
+ * Seed source has become fully initialized, frequent
+ * reseeds no longer required.
+ */
+ drbg->reseed_threshold = drbg_max_requests(drbg);
+ break;
+ }
+
return ret;
}
-static void drbg_async_seed(struct work_struct *work)
+static inline int drbg_get_random_bytes(struct drbg_state *drbg,
+ unsigned char *entropy,
+ unsigned int entropylen)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ do {
+ get_random_bytes(entropy, entropylen);
+ ret = drbg_fips_continuous_test(drbg, entropy);
+ if (ret && ret != -EAGAIN)
+ return ret;
+ } while (ret);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int drbg_seed_from_random(struct drbg_state *drbg)
{
struct drbg_string data;
LIST_HEAD(seedlist);
- struct drbg_state *drbg = container_of(work, struct drbg_state,
- seed_work);
unsigned int entropylen = drbg_sec_strength(drbg->core->flags);
unsigned char entropy[32];
+ int ret;
BUG_ON(!entropylen);
BUG_ON(entropylen > sizeof(entropy));
- get_random_bytes(entropy, entropylen);
drbg_string_fill(&data, entropy, entropylen);
list_add_tail(&data.list, &seedlist);
- mutex_lock(&drbg->drbg_mutex);
-
- /* If nonblocking pool is initialized, deactivate Jitter RNG */
- crypto_free_rng(drbg->jent);
- drbg->jent = NULL;
-
- /* Set seeded to false so that if __drbg_seed fails the
- * next generate call will trigger a reseed.
- */
- drbg->seeded = false;
-
- __drbg_seed(drbg, &seedlist, true);
-
- if (drbg->seeded)
- drbg->reseed_threshold = drbg_max_requests(drbg);
+ ret = drbg_get_random_bytes(drbg, entropy, entropylen);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
- mutex_unlock(&drbg->drbg_mutex);
+ ret = __drbg_seed(drbg, &seedlist, true, DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL);
+out:
memzero_explicit(entropy, entropylen);
+ return ret;
}
/*
@@ -1054,6 +1129,7 @@ static int drbg_seed(struct drbg_state *drbg, struct drbg_string *pers,
unsigned int entropylen = drbg_sec_strength(drbg->core->flags);
struct drbg_string data1;
LIST_HEAD(seedlist);
+ enum drbg_seed_state new_seed_state = DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL;
/* 9.1 / 9.2 / 9.3.1 step 3 */
if (pers && pers->len > (drbg_max_addtl(drbg))) {
@@ -1081,7 +1157,12 @@ static int drbg_seed(struct drbg_state *drbg, struct drbg_string *pers,
BUG_ON((entropylen * 2) > sizeof(entropy));
/* Get seed from in-kernel /dev/urandom */
- get_random_bytes(entropy, entropylen);
+ if (!rng_is_initialized())
+ new_seed_state = DRBG_SEED_STATE_PARTIAL;
+
+ ret = drbg_get_random_bytes(drbg, entropy, entropylen);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
if (!drbg->jent) {
drbg_string_fill(&data1, entropy, entropylen);
@@ -1094,7 +1175,23 @@ static int drbg_seed(struct drbg_state *drbg, struct drbg_string *pers,
entropylen);
if (ret) {
pr_devel("DRBG: jent failed with %d\n", ret);
- return ret;
+
+ /*
+ * Do not treat the transient failure of the
+ * Jitter RNG as an error that needs to be
+ * reported. The combined number of the
+ * maximum reseed threshold times the maximum
+ * number of Jitter RNG transient errors is
+ * less than the reseed threshold required by
+ * SP800-90A allowing us to treat the
+ * transient errors as such.
+ *
+ * However, we mandate that at least the first
+ * seeding operation must succeed with the
+ * Jitter RNG.
+ */
+ if (!reseed || ret != -EAGAIN)
+ goto out;
}
drbg_string_fill(&data1, entropy, entropylen * 2);
@@ -1119,8 +1216,9 @@ static int drbg_seed(struct drbg_state *drbg, struct drbg_string *pers,
memset(drbg->C, 0, drbg_statelen(drbg));
}
- ret = __drbg_seed(drbg, &seedlist, reseed);
+ ret = __drbg_seed(drbg, &seedlist, reseed, new_seed_state);
+out:
memzero_explicit(entropy, entropylen * 2);
return ret;
@@ -1142,6 +1240,11 @@ static inline void drbg_dealloc_state(struct drbg_state *drbg)
drbg->reseed_ctr = 0;
drbg->d_ops = NULL;
drbg->core = NULL;
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS)) {
+ kzfree(drbg->prev);
+ drbg->prev = NULL;
+ drbg->fips_primed = false;
+ }
}
/*
@@ -1211,6 +1314,14 @@ static inline int drbg_alloc_state(struct drbg_state *drbg)
drbg->scratchpad = PTR_ALIGN(drbg->scratchpadbuf, ret + 1);
}
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS)) {
+ drbg->prev = kzalloc(drbg_sec_strength(drbg->core->flags),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!drbg->prev)
+ goto fini;
+ drbg->fips_primed = false;
+ }
+
return 0;
fini:
@@ -1283,19 +1394,25 @@ static int drbg_generate(struct drbg_state *drbg,
* here. The spec is a bit convoluted here, we make it simpler.
*/
if (drbg->reseed_threshold < drbg->reseed_ctr)
- drbg->seeded = false;
+ drbg->seeded = DRBG_SEED_STATE_UNSEEDED;
- if (drbg->pr || !drbg->seeded) {
+ if (drbg->pr || drbg->seeded == DRBG_SEED_STATE_UNSEEDED) {
pr_devel("DRBG: reseeding before generation (prediction "
"resistance: %s, state %s)\n",
drbg->pr ? "true" : "false",
- drbg->seeded ? "seeded" : "unseeded");
+ (drbg->seeded == DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL ?
+ "seeded" : "unseeded"));
/* 9.3.1 steps 7.1 through 7.3 */
len = drbg_seed(drbg, addtl, true);
if (len)
goto err;
/* 9.3.1 step 7.4 */
addtl = NULL;
+ } else if (rng_is_initialized() &&
+ drbg->seeded == DRBG_SEED_STATE_PARTIAL) {
+ len = drbg_seed_from_random(drbg);
+ if (len)
+ goto err;
}
if (addtl && 0 < addtl->len)
@@ -1388,51 +1505,15 @@ static int drbg_generate_long(struct drbg_state *drbg,
return 0;
}
-static void drbg_schedule_async_seed(struct random_ready_callback *rdy)
-{
- struct drbg_state *drbg = container_of(rdy, struct drbg_state,
- random_ready);
-
- schedule_work(&drbg->seed_work);
-}
-
static int drbg_prepare_hrng(struct drbg_state *drbg)
{
- int err;
-
/* We do not need an HRNG in test mode. */
if (list_empty(&drbg->test_data.list))
return 0;
- INIT_WORK(&drbg->seed_work, drbg_async_seed);
-
- drbg->random_ready.owner = THIS_MODULE;
- drbg->random_ready.func = drbg_schedule_async_seed;
-
- err = add_random_ready_callback(&drbg->random_ready);
-
- switch (err) {
- case 0:
- break;
-
- case -EALREADY:
- err = 0;
- /* fall through */
-
- default:
- drbg->random_ready.func = NULL;
- return err;
- }
-
drbg->jent = crypto_alloc_rng("jitterentropy_rng", 0, 0);
- /*
- * Require frequent reseeds until the seed source is fully
- * initialized.
- */
- drbg->reseed_threshold = 50;
-
- return err;
+ return 0;
}
/*
@@ -1475,7 +1556,7 @@ static int drbg_instantiate(struct drbg_state *drbg, struct drbg_string *pers,
if (!drbg->core) {
drbg->core = &drbg_cores[coreref];
drbg->pr = pr;
- drbg->seeded = false;
+ drbg->seeded = DRBG_SEED_STATE_UNSEEDED;
drbg->reseed_threshold = drbg_max_requests(drbg);
ret = drbg_alloc_state(drbg);
@@ -1526,12 +1607,9 @@ static int drbg_instantiate(struct drbg_state *drbg, struct drbg_string *pers,
*/
static int drbg_uninstantiate(struct drbg_state *drbg)
{
- if (drbg->random_ready.func) {
- del_random_ready_callback(&drbg->random_ready);
- cancel_work_sync(&drbg->seed_work);
+ if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(drbg->jent))
crypto_free_rng(drbg->jent);
- drbg->jent = NULL;
- }
+ drbg->jent = NULL;
if (drbg->d_ops)
drbg->d_ops->crypto_fini(drbg);
diff --git a/drivers/ata/libata-core.c b/drivers/ata/libata-core.c
index 0c10d9557754..b0dea0702c74 100644
--- a/drivers/ata/libata-core.c
+++ b/drivers/ata/libata-core.c
@@ -6253,7 +6253,7 @@ struct ata_host *ata_host_alloc_pinfo(struct device *dev,
const struct ata_port_info * const * ppi,
int n_ports)
{
- const struct ata_port_info *pi;
+ const struct ata_port_info *pi = &ata_dummy_port_info;
struct ata_host *host;
int i, j;
@@ -6261,7 +6261,7 @@ struct ata_host *ata_host_alloc_pinfo(struct device *dev,
if (!host)
return NULL;
- for (i = 0, j = 0, pi = NULL; i < host->n_ports; i++) {
+ for (i = 0, j = 0; i < host->n_ports; i++) {
struct ata_port *ap = host->ports[i];
if (ppi[j])
diff --git a/drivers/char/Kconfig b/drivers/char/Kconfig
index 1df9cb8e659e..f55c9bbd58fb 100644
--- a/drivers/char/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/char/Kconfig
@@ -552,19 +552,41 @@ config ADI
and SSM (Silicon Secured Memory). Intended consumers of this
driver include crash and makedumpfile.
-endmenu
-
config RANDOM_TRUST_CPU
- bool "Trust the CPU manufacturer to initialize Linux's CRNG"
- depends on X86 || S390 || PPC
- default n
+ bool "Initialize RNG using CPU RNG instructions"
+ default y
+ depends on ARCH_RANDOM
help
- Assume that CPU manufacturer (e.g., Intel or AMD for RDSEED or
- RDRAND, IBM for the S390 and Power PC architectures) is trustworthy
- for the purposes of initializing Linux's CRNG. Since this is not
- something that can be independently audited, this amounts to trusting
- that CPU manufacturer (perhaps with the insistence or mandate
- of a Nation State's intelligence or law enforcement agencies)
- has not installed a hidden back door to compromise the CPU's
- random number generation facilities. This can also be configured
- at boot with "random.trust_cpu=on/off".
+ Initialize the RNG using random numbers supplied by the CPU's
+ RNG instructions (e.g. RDRAND), if supported and available. These
+ random numbers are never used directly, but are rather hashed into
+ the main input pool, and this happens regardless of whether or not
+ this option is enabled. Instead, this option controls whether the
+ they are credited and hence can initialize the RNG. Additionally,
+ other sources of randomness are always used, regardless of this
+ setting. Enabling this implies trusting that the CPU can supply high
+ quality and non-backdoored random numbers.
+
+ Say Y here unless you have reason to mistrust your CPU or believe
+ its RNG facilities may be faulty. This may also be configured at
+ boot time with "random.trust_cpu=on/off".
+
+config RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER
+ bool "Initialize RNG using bootloader-supplied seed"
+ default y
+ help
+ Initialize the RNG using a seed supplied by the bootloader or boot
+ environment (e.g. EFI or a bootloader-generated device tree). This
+ seed is not used directly, but is rather hashed into the main input
+ pool, and this happens regardless of whether or not this option is
+ enabled. Instead, this option controls whether the seed is credited
+ and hence can initialize the RNG. Additionally, other sources of
+ randomness are always used, regardless of this setting. Enabling
+ this implies trusting that the bootloader can supply high quality and
+ non-backdoored seeds.
+
+ Say Y here unless you have reason to mistrust your bootloader or
+ believe its RNG facilities may be faulty. This may also be configured
+ at boot time with "random.trust_bootloader=on/off".
+
+endmenu
diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c b/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c
index 0ef7cb0448e8..c9757fa2d308 100644
--- a/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c
+++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/hw_random.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/kthread.h>
#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index 112734378146..55b23104fe33 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -1,242 +1,29 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0 OR BSD-3-Clause)
/*
- * random.c -- A strong random number generator
- *
- * Copyright (C) 2017 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@...c4.com>. All
- * Rights Reserved.
- *
+ * Copyright (C) 2017-2022 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@...c4.com>. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright Matt Mackall <mpm@...enic.com>, 2003, 2004, 2005
- *
- * Copyright Theodore Ts'o, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999. All
- * rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety,
- * including the disclaimer of warranties.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
- * products derived from this software without specific prior
- * written permission.
- *
- * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of
- * the GNU General Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL are
- * required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions. (This clause is
- * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and
- * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.)
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
- * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ALL OF
- * WHICH ARE HEREBY DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE
- * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
- * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT
- * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
- * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
- * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE
- * USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF NOT ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
- * DAMAGE.
+ * Copyright Theodore Ts'o, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This driver produces cryptographically secure pseudorandom data. It is divided
+ * into roughly six sections, each with a section header:
+ *
+ * - Initialization and readiness waiting.
+ * - Fast key erasure RNG, the "crng".
+ * - Entropy accumulation and extraction routines.
+ * - Entropy collection routines.
+ * - Userspace reader/writer interfaces.
+ * - Sysctl interface.
+ *
+ * The high level overview is that there is one input pool, into which
+ * various pieces of data are hashed. Prior to initialization, some of that
+ * data is then "credited" as having a certain number of bits of entropy.
+ * When enough bits of entropy are available, the hash is finalized and
+ * handed as a key to a stream cipher that expands it indefinitely for
+ * various consumers. This key is periodically refreshed as the various
+ * entropy collectors, described below, add data to the input pool.
*/
-/*
- * (now, with legal B.S. out of the way.....)
- *
- * This routine gathers environmental noise from device drivers, etc.,
- * and returns good random numbers, suitable for cryptographic use.
- * Besides the obvious cryptographic uses, these numbers are also good
- * for seeding TCP sequence numbers, and other places where it is
- * desirable to have numbers which are not only random, but hard to
- * predict by an attacker.
- *
- * Theory of operation
- * ===================
- *
- * Computers are very predictable devices. Hence it is extremely hard
- * to produce truly random numbers on a computer --- as opposed to
- * pseudo-random numbers, which can easily generated by using a
- * algorithm. Unfortunately, it is very easy for attackers to guess
- * the sequence of pseudo-random number generators, and for some
- * applications this is not acceptable. So instead, we must try to
- * gather "environmental noise" from the computer's environment, which
- * must be hard for outside attackers to observe, and use that to
- * generate random numbers. In a Unix environment, this is best done
- * from inside the kernel.
- *
- * Sources of randomness from the environment include inter-keyboard
- * timings, inter-interrupt timings from some interrupts, and other
- * events which are both (a) non-deterministic and (b) hard for an
- * outside observer to measure. Randomness from these sources are
- * added to an "entropy pool", which is mixed using a CRC-like function.
- * This is not cryptographically strong, but it is adequate assuming
- * the randomness is not chosen maliciously, and it is fast enough that
- * the overhead of doing it on every interrupt is very reasonable.
- * As random bytes are mixed into the entropy pool, the routines keep
- * an *estimate* of how many bits of randomness have been stored into
- * the random number generator's internal state.
- *
- * When random bytes are desired, they are obtained by taking the SHA
- * hash of the contents of the "entropy pool". The SHA hash avoids
- * exposing the internal state of the entropy pool. It is believed to
- * be computationally infeasible to derive any useful information
- * about the input of SHA from its output. Even if it is possible to
- * analyze SHA in some clever way, as long as the amount of data
- * returned from the generator is less than the inherent entropy in
- * the pool, the output data is totally unpredictable. For this
- * reason, the routine decreases its internal estimate of how many
- * bits of "true randomness" are contained in the entropy pool as it
- * outputs random numbers.
- *
- * If this estimate goes to zero, the routine can still generate
- * random numbers; however, an attacker may (at least in theory) be
- * able to infer the future output of the generator from prior
- * outputs. This requires successful cryptanalysis of SHA, which is
- * not believed to be feasible, but there is a remote possibility.
- * Nonetheless, these numbers should be useful for the vast majority
- * of purposes.
- *
- * Exported interfaces ---- output
- * ===============================
- *
- * There are three exported interfaces; the first is one designed to
- * be used from within the kernel:
- *
- * void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);
- *
- * This interface will return the requested number of random bytes,
- * and place it in the requested buffer.
- *
- * The two other interfaces are two character devices /dev/random and
- * /dev/urandom. /dev/random is suitable for use when very high
- * quality randomness is desired (for example, for key generation or
- * one-time pads), as it will only return a maximum of the number of
- * bits of randomness (as estimated by the random number generator)
- * contained in the entropy pool.
- *
- * The /dev/urandom device does not have this limit, and will return
- * as many bytes as are requested. As more and more random bytes are
- * requested without giving time for the entropy pool to recharge,
- * this will result in random numbers that are merely cryptographically
- * strong. For many applications, however, this is acceptable.
- *
- * Exported interfaces ---- input
- * ==============================
- *
- * The current exported interfaces for gathering environmental noise
- * from the devices are:
- *
- * void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, unsigned int size);
- * void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
- * unsigned int value);
- * void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags);
- * void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk);
- *
- * add_device_randomness() is for adding data to the random pool that
- * is likely to differ between two devices (or possibly even per boot).
- * This would be things like MAC addresses or serial numbers, or the
- * read-out of the RTC. This does *not* add any actual entropy to the
- * pool, but it initializes the pool to different values for devices
- * that might otherwise be identical and have very little entropy
- * available to them (particularly common in the embedded world).
- *
- * add_input_randomness() uses the input layer interrupt timing, as well as
- * the event type information from the hardware.
- *
- * add_interrupt_randomness() uses the interrupt timing as random
- * inputs to the entropy pool. Using the cycle counters and the irq source
- * as inputs, it feeds the randomness roughly once a second.
- *
- * add_disk_randomness() uses what amounts to the seek time of block
- * layer request events, on a per-disk_devt basis, as input to the
- * entropy pool. Note that high-speed solid state drives with very low
- * seek times do not make for good sources of entropy, as their seek
- * times are usually fairly consistent.
- *
- * All of these routines try to estimate how many bits of randomness a
- * particular randomness source. They do this by keeping track of the
- * first and second order deltas of the event timings.
- *
- * Ensuring unpredictability at system startup
- * ============================================
- *
- * When any operating system starts up, it will go through a sequence
- * of actions that are fairly predictable by an adversary, especially
- * if the start-up does not involve interaction with a human operator.
- * This reduces the actual number of bits of unpredictability in the
- * entropy pool below the value in entropy_count. In order to
- * counteract this effect, it helps to carry information in the
- * entropy pool across shut-downs and start-ups. To do this, put the
- * following lines an appropriate script which is run during the boot
- * sequence:
- *
- * echo "Initializing random number generator..."
- * random_seed=/var/run/random-seed
- * # Carry a random seed from start-up to start-up
- * # Load and then save the whole entropy pool
- * if [ -f $random_seed ]; then
- * cat $random_seed >/dev/urandom
- * else
- * touch $random_seed
- * fi
- * chmod 600 $random_seed
- * dd if=/dev/urandom of=$random_seed count=1 bs=512
- *
- * and the following lines in an appropriate script which is run as
- * the system is shutdown:
- *
- * # Carry a random seed from shut-down to start-up
- * # Save the whole entropy pool
- * echo "Saving random seed..."
- * random_seed=/var/run/random-seed
- * touch $random_seed
- * chmod 600 $random_seed
- * dd if=/dev/urandom of=$random_seed count=1 bs=512
- *
- * For example, on most modern systems using the System V init
- * scripts, such code fragments would be found in
- * /etc/rc.d/init.d/random. On older Linux systems, the correct script
- * location might be in /etc/rcb.d/rc.local or /etc/rc.d/rc.0.
- *
- * Effectively, these commands cause the contents of the entropy pool
- * to be saved at shut-down time and reloaded into the entropy pool at
- * start-up. (The 'dd' in the addition to the bootup script is to
- * make sure that /etc/random-seed is different for every start-up,
- * even if the system crashes without executing rc.0.) Even with
- * complete knowledge of the start-up activities, predicting the state
- * of the entropy pool requires knowledge of the previous history of
- * the system.
- *
- * Configuring the /dev/random driver under Linux
- * ==============================================
- *
- * The /dev/random driver under Linux uses minor numbers 8 and 9 of
- * the /dev/mem major number (#1). So if your system does not have
- * /dev/random and /dev/urandom created already, they can be created
- * by using the commands:
- *
- * mknod /dev/random c 1 8
- * mknod /dev/urandom c 1 9
- *
- * Acknowledgements:
- * =================
- *
- * Ideas for constructing this random number generator were derived
- * from Pretty Good Privacy's random number generator, and from private
- * discussions with Phil Karn. Colin Plumb provided a faster random
- * number generator, which speed up the mixing function of the entropy
- * pool, taken from PGPfone. Dale Worley has also contributed many
- * useful ideas and suggestions to improve this driver.
- *
- * Any flaws in the design are solely my responsibility, and should
- * not be attributed to the Phil, Colin, or any of authors of PGP.
- *
- * Further background information on this topic may be obtained from
- * RFC 1750, "Randomness Recommendations for Security", by Donald
- * Eastlake, Steve Crocker, and Jeff Schiller.
- */
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
#include <linux/utsname.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
@@ -256,8 +43,6 @@
#include <linux/spinlock.h>
#include <linux/kthread.h>
#include <linux/percpu.h>
-#include <linux/cryptohash.h>
-#include <linux/fips.h>
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
#include <linux/workqueue.h>
#include <linux/irq.h>
@@ -265,1636 +50,1067 @@
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <linux/completion.h>
#include <linux/uuid.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/siphash.h>
+#include <linux/uio.h>
#include <crypto/chacha20.h>
-
+#include <crypto/blake2s.h>
#include <asm/processor.h>
-#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <asm/irq.h>
#include <asm/irq_regs.h>
#include <asm/io.h>
-#define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
-#include <trace/events/random.h>
-
-/* #define ADD_INTERRUPT_BENCH */
+/*********************************************************************
+ *
+ * Initialization and readiness waiting.
+ *
+ * Much of the RNG infrastructure is devoted to various dependencies
+ * being able to wait until the RNG has collected enough entropy and
+ * is ready for safe consumption.
+ *
+ *********************************************************************/
/*
- * Configuration information
+ * crng_init is protected by base_crng->lock, and only increases
+ * its value (from empty->early->ready).
*/
-#define INPUT_POOL_SHIFT 12
-#define INPUT_POOL_WORDS (1 << (INPUT_POOL_SHIFT-5))
-#define OUTPUT_POOL_SHIFT 10
-#define OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS (1 << (OUTPUT_POOL_SHIFT-5))
-#define SEC_XFER_SIZE 512
-#define EXTRACT_SIZE 10
-
+static enum {
+ CRNG_EMPTY = 0, /* Little to no entropy collected */
+ CRNG_EARLY = 1, /* At least POOL_EARLY_BITS collected */
+ CRNG_READY = 2 /* Fully initialized with POOL_READY_BITS collected */
+} crng_init __read_mostly = CRNG_EMPTY;
+#define crng_ready() (likely(crng_init >= CRNG_READY))
+/* Various types of waiters for crng_init->CRNG_READY transition. */
+static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(crng_init_wait);
+static struct fasync_struct *fasync;
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(random_ready_chain_lock);
+static RAW_NOTIFIER_HEAD(random_ready_chain);
-#define LONGS(x) (((x) + sizeof(unsigned long) - 1)/sizeof(unsigned long))
+/* Control how we warn userspace. */
+static struct ratelimit_state urandom_warning =
+ RATELIMIT_STATE_INIT("warn_urandom_randomness", HZ, 3);
+static int ratelimit_disable __read_mostly =
+ IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM);
+module_param_named(ratelimit_disable, ratelimit_disable, int, 0644);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(ratelimit_disable, "Disable random ratelimit suppression");
/*
- * To allow fractional bits to be tracked, the entropy_count field is
- * denominated in units of 1/8th bits.
+ * Returns whether or not the input pool has been seeded and thus guaranteed
+ * to supply cryptographically secure random numbers. This applies to: the
+ * /dev/urandom device, the get_random_bytes function, and the get_random_{u32,
+ * ,u64,int,long} family of functions.
*
- * 2*(ENTROPY_SHIFT + log2(poolbits)) must <= 31, or the multiply in
- * credit_entropy_bits() needs to be 64 bits wide.
+ * Returns: true if the input pool has been seeded.
+ * false if the input pool has not been seeded.
*/
-#define ENTROPY_SHIFT 3
-#define ENTROPY_BITS(r) ((r)->entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT)
+bool rng_is_initialized(void)
+{
+ return crng_ready();
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(rng_is_initialized);
-/*
- * The minimum number of bits of entropy before we wake up a read on
- * /dev/random. Should be enough to do a significant reseed.
- */
-static int random_read_wakeup_bits = 64;
+/* Used by wait_for_random_bytes(), and considered an entropy collector, below. */
+static void try_to_generate_entropy(void);
/*
- * If the entropy count falls under this number of bits, then we
- * should wake up processes which are selecting or polling on write
- * access to /dev/random.
+ * Wait for the input pool to be seeded and thus guaranteed to supply
+ * cryptographically secure random numbers. This applies to: the /dev/urandom
+ * device, the get_random_bytes function, and the get_random_{u32,u64,int,long}
+ * family of functions. Using any of these functions without first calling
+ * this function forfeits the guarantee of security.
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 if the input pool has been seeded.
+ * -ERESTARTSYS if the function was interrupted by a signal.
*/
-static int random_write_wakeup_bits = 28 * OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS;
+int wait_for_random_bytes(void)
+{
+ while (!crng_ready()) {
+ int ret;
+
+ try_to_generate_entropy();
+ ret = wait_event_interruptible_timeout(crng_init_wait, crng_ready(), HZ);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret > 0 ? 0 : ret;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(wait_for_random_bytes);
/*
- * Originally, we used a primitive polynomial of degree .poolwords
- * over GF(2). The taps for various sizes are defined below. They
- * were chosen to be evenly spaced except for the last tap, which is 1
- * to get the twisting happening as fast as possible.
- *
- * For the purposes of better mixing, we use the CRC-32 polynomial as
- * well to make a (modified) twisted Generalized Feedback Shift
- * Register. (See M. Matsumoto & Y. Kurita, 1992. Twisted GFSR
- * generators. ACM Transactions on Modeling and Computer Simulation
- * 2(3):179-194. Also see M. Matsumoto & Y. Kurita, 1994. Twisted
- * GFSR generators II. ACM Transactions on Modeling and Computer
- * Simulation 4:254-266)
- *
- * Thanks to Colin Plumb for suggesting this.
- *
- * The mixing operation is much less sensitive than the output hash,
- * where we use SHA-1. All that we want of mixing operation is that
- * it be a good non-cryptographic hash; i.e. it not produce collisions
- * when fed "random" data of the sort we expect to see. As long as
- * the pool state differs for different inputs, we have preserved the
- * input entropy and done a good job. The fact that an intelligent
- * attacker can construct inputs that will produce controlled
- * alterations to the pool's state is not important because we don't
- * consider such inputs to contribute any randomness. The only
- * property we need with respect to them is that the attacker can't
- * increase his/her knowledge of the pool's state. Since all
- * additions are reversible (knowing the final state and the input,
- * you can reconstruct the initial state), if an attacker has any
- * uncertainty about the initial state, he/she can only shuffle that
- * uncertainty about, but never cause any collisions (which would
- * decrease the uncertainty).
+ * Add a callback function that will be invoked when the input
+ * pool is initialised.
*
- * Our mixing functions were analyzed by Lacharme, Roeck, Strubel, and
- * Videau in their paper, "The Linux Pseudorandom Number Generator
- * Revisited" (see: http://eprint.iacr.org/2012/251.pdf). In their
- * paper, they point out that we are not using a true Twisted GFSR,
- * since Matsumoto & Kurita used a trinomial feedback polynomial (that
- * is, with only three taps, instead of the six that we are using).
- * As a result, the resulting polynomial is neither primitive nor
- * irreducible, and hence does not have a maximal period over
- * GF(2**32). They suggest a slight change to the generator
- * polynomial which improves the resulting TGFSR polynomial to be
- * irreducible, which we have made here.
+ * returns: 0 if callback is successfully added
+ * -EALREADY if pool is already initialised (callback not called)
*/
-static struct poolinfo {
- int poolbitshift, poolwords, poolbytes, poolbits, poolfracbits;
-#define S(x) ilog2(x)+5, (x), (x)*4, (x)*32, (x) << (ENTROPY_SHIFT+5)
- int tap1, tap2, tap3, tap4, tap5;
-} poolinfo_table[] = {
- /* was: x^128 + x^103 + x^76 + x^51 +x^25 + x + 1 */
- /* x^128 + x^104 + x^76 + x^51 +x^25 + x + 1 */
- { S(128), 104, 76, 51, 25, 1 },
- /* was: x^32 + x^26 + x^20 + x^14 + x^7 + x + 1 */
- /* x^32 + x^26 + x^19 + x^14 + x^7 + x + 1 */
- { S(32), 26, 19, 14, 7, 1 },
-#if 0
- /* x^2048 + x^1638 + x^1231 + x^819 + x^411 + x + 1 -- 115 */
- { S(2048), 1638, 1231, 819, 411, 1 },
-
- /* x^1024 + x^817 + x^615 + x^412 + x^204 + x + 1 -- 290 */
- { S(1024), 817, 615, 412, 204, 1 },
-
- /* x^1024 + x^819 + x^616 + x^410 + x^207 + x^2 + 1 -- 115 */
- { S(1024), 819, 616, 410, 207, 2 },
-
- /* x^512 + x^411 + x^308 + x^208 + x^104 + x + 1 -- 225 */
- { S(512), 411, 308, 208, 104, 1 },
-
- /* x^512 + x^409 + x^307 + x^206 + x^102 + x^2 + 1 -- 95 */
- { S(512), 409, 307, 206, 102, 2 },
- /* x^512 + x^409 + x^309 + x^205 + x^103 + x^2 + 1 -- 95 */
- { S(512), 409, 309, 205, 103, 2 },
-
- /* x^256 + x^205 + x^155 + x^101 + x^52 + x + 1 -- 125 */
- { S(256), 205, 155, 101, 52, 1 },
-
- /* x^128 + x^103 + x^78 + x^51 + x^27 + x^2 + 1 -- 70 */
- { S(128), 103, 78, 51, 27, 2 },
-
- /* x^64 + x^52 + x^39 + x^26 + x^14 + x + 1 -- 15 */
- { S(64), 52, 39, 26, 14, 1 },
-#endif
-};
+int __cold register_random_ready_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb)
+{
+ unsigned long flags;
+ int ret = -EALREADY;
+
+ if (crng_ready())
+ return ret;
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_chain_lock, flags);
+ if (!crng_ready())
+ ret = raw_notifier_chain_register(&random_ready_chain, nb);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_chain_lock, flags);
+ return ret;
+}
/*
- * Static global variables
+ * Delete a previously registered readiness callback function.
*/
-static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(random_read_wait);
-static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(random_write_wait);
-static struct fasync_struct *fasync;
-
-static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(random_ready_list_lock);
-static LIST_HEAD(random_ready_list);
+int __cold unregister_random_ready_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb)
+{
+ unsigned long flags;
+ int ret;
-struct crng_state {
- __u32 state[16];
- unsigned long init_time;
- spinlock_t lock;
-};
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_chain_lock, flags);
+ ret = raw_notifier_chain_unregister(&random_ready_chain, nb);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_chain_lock, flags);
+ return ret;
+}
-struct crng_state primary_crng = {
- .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(primary_crng.lock),
-};
+static void __cold process_random_ready_list(void)
+{
+ unsigned long flags;
-/*
- * crng_init = 0 --> Uninitialized
- * 1 --> Initialized
- * 2 --> Initialized from input_pool
- *
- * crng_init is protected by primary_crng->lock, and only increases
- * its value (from 0->1->2).
- */
-static int crng_init = 0;
-#define crng_ready() (likely(crng_init > 1))
-static int crng_init_cnt = 0;
-static unsigned long crng_global_init_time = 0;
-#define CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH (2*CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE)
-static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng,
- __u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE]);
-static void _crng_backtrack_protect(struct crng_state *crng,
- __u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE], int used);
-static void process_random_ready_list(void);
-static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);
-
-static struct ratelimit_state unseeded_warning =
- RATELIMIT_STATE_INIT("warn_unseeded_randomness", HZ, 3);
-static struct ratelimit_state urandom_warning =
- RATELIMIT_STATE_INIT("warn_urandom_randomness", HZ, 3);
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_chain_lock, flags);
+ raw_notifier_call_chain(&random_ready_chain, 0, NULL);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_chain_lock, flags);
+}
-static int ratelimit_disable __read_mostly;
+#define warn_unseeded_randomness() \
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM) && !crng_ready()) \
+ pr_notice("%s called from %pS with crng_init=%d\n", \
+ __func__, (void *)_RET_IP_, crng_init)
-module_param_named(ratelimit_disable, ratelimit_disable, int, 0644);
-MODULE_PARM_DESC(ratelimit_disable, "Disable random ratelimit suppression");
-/**********************************************************************
+/*********************************************************************
*
- * OS independent entropy store. Here are the functions which handle
- * storing entropy in an entropy pool.
+ * Fast key erasure RNG, the "crng".
*
- **********************************************************************/
+ * These functions expand entropy from the entropy extractor into
+ * long streams for external consumption using the "fast key erasure"
+ * RNG described at <https://blog.cr.yp.to/20170723-random.html>.
+ *
+ * There are a few exported interfaces for use by other drivers:
+ *
+ * void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t len)
+ * u32 get_random_u32()
+ * u64 get_random_u64()
+ * unsigned int get_random_int()
+ * unsigned long get_random_long()
+ *
+ * These interfaces will return the requested number of random bytes
+ * into the given buffer or as a return value. This is equivalent to
+ * a read from /dev/urandom. The u32, u64, int, and long family of
+ * functions may be higher performance for one-off random integers,
+ * because they do a bit of buffering and do not invoke reseeding
+ * until the buffer is emptied.
+ *
+ *********************************************************************/
-struct entropy_store;
-struct entropy_store {
- /* read-only data: */
- const struct poolinfo *poolinfo;
- __u32 *pool;
- const char *name;
- struct entropy_store *pull;
- struct work_struct push_work;
-
- /* read-write data: */
- unsigned long last_pulled;
- spinlock_t lock;
- unsigned short add_ptr;
- unsigned short input_rotate;
- int entropy_count;
- int entropy_total;
- unsigned int initialized:1;
- unsigned int last_data_init:1;
- __u8 last_data[EXTRACT_SIZE];
+enum {
+ CRNG_RESEED_START_INTERVAL = HZ,
+ CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL = 60 * HZ
};
-static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf,
- size_t nbytes, int min, int rsvd);
-static ssize_t _extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf,
- size_t nbytes, int fips);
-
-static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, struct entropy_store *r);
-static void push_to_pool(struct work_struct *work);
-static __u32 input_pool_data[INPUT_POOL_WORDS] __latent_entropy;
-static __u32 blocking_pool_data[OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS] __latent_entropy;
-
-static struct entropy_store input_pool = {
- .poolinfo = &poolinfo_table[0],
- .name = "input",
- .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(input_pool.lock),
- .pool = input_pool_data
+static struct {
+ u8 key[CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE] __aligned(__alignof__(long));
+ unsigned long birth;
+ unsigned long generation;
+ spinlock_t lock;
+} base_crng = {
+ .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(base_crng.lock)
};
-static struct entropy_store blocking_pool = {
- .poolinfo = &poolinfo_table[1],
- .name = "blocking",
- .pull = &input_pool,
- .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(blocking_pool.lock),
- .pool = blocking_pool_data,
- .push_work = __WORK_INITIALIZER(blocking_pool.push_work,
- push_to_pool),
+struct crng {
+ u8 key[CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE];
+ unsigned long generation;
};
-static __u32 const twist_table[8] = {
- 0x00000000, 0x3b6e20c8, 0x76dc4190, 0x4db26158,
- 0xedb88320, 0xd6d6a3e8, 0x9b64c2b0, 0xa00ae278 };
-
-/*
- * This function adds bytes into the entropy "pool". It does not
- * update the entropy estimate. The caller should call
- * credit_entropy_bits if this is appropriate.
- *
- * The pool is stirred with a primitive polynomial of the appropriate
- * degree, and then twisted. We twist by three bits at a time because
- * it's cheap to do so and helps slightly in the expected case where
- * the entropy is concentrated in the low-order bits.
- */
-static void _mix_pool_bytes(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in,
- int nbytes)
-{
- unsigned long i, tap1, tap2, tap3, tap4, tap5;
- int input_rotate;
- int wordmask = r->poolinfo->poolwords - 1;
- const char *bytes = in;
- __u32 w;
-
- tap1 = r->poolinfo->tap1;
- tap2 = r->poolinfo->tap2;
- tap3 = r->poolinfo->tap3;
- tap4 = r->poolinfo->tap4;
- tap5 = r->poolinfo->tap5;
-
- input_rotate = r->input_rotate;
- i = r->add_ptr;
-
- /* mix one byte at a time to simplify size handling and churn faster */
- while (nbytes--) {
- w = rol32(*bytes++, input_rotate);
- i = (i - 1) & wordmask;
-
- /* XOR in the various taps */
- w ^= r->pool[i];
- w ^= r->pool[(i + tap1) & wordmask];
- w ^= r->pool[(i + tap2) & wordmask];
- w ^= r->pool[(i + tap3) & wordmask];
- w ^= r->pool[(i + tap4) & wordmask];
- w ^= r->pool[(i + tap5) & wordmask];
-
- /* Mix the result back in with a twist */
- r->pool[i] = (w >> 3) ^ twist_table[w & 7];
-
- /*
- * Normally, we add 7 bits of rotation to the pool.
- * At the beginning of the pool, add an extra 7 bits
- * rotation, so that successive passes spread the
- * input bits across the pool evenly.
- */
- input_rotate = (input_rotate + (i ? 7 : 14)) & 31;
- }
-
- r->input_rotate = input_rotate;
- r->add_ptr = i;
-}
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct crng, crngs) = {
+ .generation = ULONG_MAX
+};
-static void __mix_pool_bytes(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in,
- int nbytes)
-{
- trace_mix_pool_bytes_nolock(r->name, nbytes, _RET_IP_);
- _mix_pool_bytes(r, in, nbytes);
-}
+/* Used by crng_reseed() and crng_make_state() to extract a new seed from the input pool. */
+static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t len);
-static void mix_pool_bytes(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in,
- int nbytes)
+/* This extracts a new crng key from the input pool. */
+static void crng_reseed(void)
{
unsigned long flags;
+ unsigned long next_gen;
+ u8 key[CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE];
- trace_mix_pool_bytes(r->name, nbytes, _RET_IP_);
- spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags);
- _mix_pool_bytes(r, in, nbytes);
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags);
-}
+ extract_entropy(key, sizeof(key));
-struct fast_pool {
- __u32 pool[4];
- unsigned long last;
- unsigned short reg_idx;
- unsigned char count;
-};
+ /*
+ * We copy the new key into the base_crng, overwriting the old one,
+ * and update the generation counter. We avoid hitting ULONG_MAX,
+ * because the per-cpu crngs are initialized to ULONG_MAX, so this
+ * forces new CPUs that come online to always initialize.
+ */
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags);
+ memcpy(base_crng.key, key, sizeof(base_crng.key));
+ next_gen = base_crng.generation + 1;
+ if (next_gen == ULONG_MAX)
+ ++next_gen;
+ WRITE_ONCE(base_crng.generation, next_gen);
+ WRITE_ONCE(base_crng.birth, jiffies);
+ if (!crng_ready())
+ crng_init = CRNG_READY;
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags);
+ memzero_explicit(key, sizeof(key));
+}
/*
- * This is a fast mixing routine used by the interrupt randomness
- * collector. It's hardcoded for an 128 bit pool and assumes that any
- * locks that might be needed are taken by the caller.
+ * This generates a ChaCha block using the provided key, and then
+ * immediately overwites that key with half the block. It returns
+ * the resultant ChaCha state to the user, along with the second
+ * half of the block containing 32 bytes of random data that may
+ * be used; random_data_len may not be greater than 32.
+ *
+ * The returned ChaCha state contains within it a copy of the old
+ * key value, at index 4, so the state should always be zeroed out
+ * immediately after using in order to maintain forward secrecy.
+ * If the state cannot be erased in a timely manner, then it is
+ * safer to set the random_data parameter to &chacha_state[4] so
+ * that this function overwrites it before returning.
*/
-static void fast_mix(struct fast_pool *f)
+static void crng_fast_key_erasure(u8 key[CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE],
+ u32 chacha_state[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)],
+ u8 *random_data, size_t random_data_len)
{
- __u32 a = f->pool[0], b = f->pool[1];
- __u32 c = f->pool[2], d = f->pool[3];
+ u8 first_block[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE];
- a += b; c += d;
- b = rol32(b, 6); d = rol32(d, 27);
- d ^= a; b ^= c;
+ BUG_ON(random_data_len > 32);
- a += b; c += d;
- b = rol32(b, 16); d = rol32(d, 14);
- d ^= a; b ^= c;
+ chacha_init_consts(chacha_state);
+ memcpy(&chacha_state[4], key, CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE);
+ memset(&chacha_state[12], 0, sizeof(u32) * 4);
+ chacha20_block(chacha_state, first_block);
- a += b; c += d;
- b = rol32(b, 6); d = rol32(d, 27);
- d ^= a; b ^= c;
-
- a += b; c += d;
- b = rol32(b, 16); d = rol32(d, 14);
- d ^= a; b ^= c;
-
- f->pool[0] = a; f->pool[1] = b;
- f->pool[2] = c; f->pool[3] = d;
- f->count++;
+ memcpy(key, first_block, CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE);
+ memcpy(random_data, first_block + CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE, random_data_len);
+ memzero_explicit(first_block, sizeof(first_block));
}
-static void process_random_ready_list(void)
-{
- unsigned long flags;
- struct random_ready_callback *rdy, *tmp;
-
- spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_list_lock, flags);
- list_for_each_entry_safe(rdy, tmp, &random_ready_list, list) {
- struct module *owner = rdy->owner;
-
- list_del_init(&rdy->list);
- rdy->func(rdy);
- module_put(owner);
+/*
+ * Return whether the crng seed is considered to be sufficiently old
+ * that a reseeding is needed. This happens if the last reseeding
+ * was CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL ago, or during early boot, at an interval
+ * proportional to the uptime.
+ */
+static bool crng_has_old_seed(void)
+{
+ static bool early_boot = true;
+ unsigned long interval = CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL;
+
+ if (unlikely(READ_ONCE(early_boot))) {
+ time64_t uptime = ktime_get_seconds();
+ if (uptime >= CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL / HZ * 2)
+ WRITE_ONCE(early_boot, false);
+ else
+ interval = max_t(unsigned int, CRNG_RESEED_START_INTERVAL,
+ (unsigned int)uptime / 2 * HZ);
}
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_list_lock, flags);
+ return time_is_before_jiffies(READ_ONCE(base_crng.birth) + interval);
}
/*
- * Credit (or debit) the entropy store with n bits of entropy.
- * Use credit_entropy_bits_safe() if the value comes from userspace
- * or otherwise should be checked for extreme values.
+ * This function returns a ChaCha state that you may use for generating
+ * random data. It also returns up to 32 bytes on its own of random data
+ * that may be used; random_data_len may not be greater than 32.
*/
-static void credit_entropy_bits(struct entropy_store *r, int nbits)
+static void crng_make_state(u32 chacha_state[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)],
+ u8 *random_data, size_t random_data_len)
{
- int entropy_count, orig;
- const int pool_size = r->poolinfo->poolfracbits;
- int nfrac = nbits << ENTROPY_SHIFT;
-
- if (!nbits)
- return;
+ unsigned long flags;
+ struct crng *crng;
-retry:
- entropy_count = orig = READ_ONCE(r->entropy_count);
- if (nfrac < 0) {
- /* Debit */
- entropy_count += nfrac;
- } else {
- /*
- * Credit: we have to account for the possibility of
- * overwriting already present entropy. Even in the
- * ideal case of pure Shannon entropy, new contributions
- * approach the full value asymptotically:
- *
- * entropy <- entropy + (pool_size - entropy) *
- * (1 - exp(-add_entropy/pool_size))
- *
- * For add_entropy <= pool_size/2 then
- * (1 - exp(-add_entropy/pool_size)) >=
- * (add_entropy/pool_size)*0.7869...
- * so we can approximate the exponential with
- * 3/4*add_entropy/pool_size and still be on the
- * safe side by adding at most pool_size/2 at a time.
- *
- * The use of pool_size-2 in the while statement is to
- * prevent rounding artifacts from making the loop
- * arbitrarily long; this limits the loop to log2(pool_size)*2
- * turns no matter how large nbits is.
- */
- int pnfrac = nfrac;
- const int s = r->poolinfo->poolbitshift + ENTROPY_SHIFT + 2;
- /* The +2 corresponds to the /4 in the denominator */
-
- do {
- unsigned int anfrac = min(pnfrac, pool_size/2);
- unsigned int add =
- ((pool_size - entropy_count)*anfrac*3) >> s;
-
- entropy_count += add;
- pnfrac -= anfrac;
- } while (unlikely(entropy_count < pool_size-2 && pnfrac));
- }
+ BUG_ON(random_data_len > 32);
- if (unlikely(entropy_count < 0)) {
- pr_warn("random: negative entropy/overflow: pool %s count %d\n",
- r->name, entropy_count);
- WARN_ON(1);
- entropy_count = 0;
- } else if (entropy_count > pool_size)
- entropy_count = pool_size;
- if (cmpxchg(&r->entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig)
- goto retry;
-
- r->entropy_total += nbits;
- if (!r->initialized && r->entropy_total > 128) {
- r->initialized = 1;
- r->entropy_total = 0;
+ /*
+ * For the fast path, we check whether we're ready, unlocked first, and
+ * then re-check once locked later. In the case where we're really not
+ * ready, we do fast key erasure with the base_crng directly, extracting
+ * when crng_init is CRNG_EMPTY.
+ */
+ if (!crng_ready()) {
+ bool ready;
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags);
+ ready = crng_ready();
+ if (!ready) {
+ if (crng_init == CRNG_EMPTY)
+ extract_entropy(base_crng.key, sizeof(base_crng.key));
+ crng_fast_key_erasure(base_crng.key, chacha_state,
+ random_data, random_data_len);
+ }
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags);
+ if (!ready)
+ return;
}
- trace_credit_entropy_bits(r->name, nbits,
- entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT,
- r->entropy_total, _RET_IP_);
-
- if (r == &input_pool) {
- int entropy_bits = entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT;
+ /*
+ * If the base_crng is old enough, we reseed, which in turn bumps the
+ * generation counter that we check below.
+ */
+ if (unlikely(crng_has_old_seed()))
+ crng_reseed();
- if (crng_init < 2 && entropy_bits >= 128) {
- crng_reseed(&primary_crng, r);
- entropy_bits = r->entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT;
- }
+ local_irq_save(flags);
+ crng = raw_cpu_ptr(&crngs);
- /* should we wake readers? */
- if (entropy_bits >= random_read_wakeup_bits &&
- wq_has_sleeper(&random_read_wait)) {
- wake_up_interruptible(&random_read_wait);
- kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
- }
- /* If the input pool is getting full, send some
- * entropy to the blocking pool until it is 75% full.
- */
- if (entropy_bits > random_write_wakeup_bits &&
- r->initialized &&
- r->entropy_total >= 2*random_read_wakeup_bits) {
- struct entropy_store *other = &blocking_pool;
-
- if (other->entropy_count <=
- 3 * other->poolinfo->poolfracbits / 4) {
- schedule_work(&other->push_work);
- r->entropy_total = 0;
- }
- }
+ /*
+ * If our per-cpu crng is older than the base_crng, then it means
+ * somebody reseeded the base_crng. In that case, we do fast key
+ * erasure on the base_crng, and use its output as the new key
+ * for our per-cpu crng. This brings us up to date with base_crng.
+ */
+ if (unlikely(crng->generation != READ_ONCE(base_crng.generation))) {
+ spin_lock(&base_crng.lock);
+ crng_fast_key_erasure(base_crng.key, chacha_state,
+ crng->key, sizeof(crng->key));
+ crng->generation = base_crng.generation;
+ spin_unlock(&base_crng.lock);
}
+
+ /*
+ * Finally, when we've made it this far, our per-cpu crng has an up
+ * to date key, and we can do fast key erasure with it to produce
+ * some random data and a ChaCha state for the caller. All other
+ * branches of this function are "unlikely", so most of the time we
+ * should wind up here immediately.
+ */
+ crng_fast_key_erasure(crng->key, chacha_state, random_data, random_data_len);
+ local_irq_restore(flags);
}
-static int credit_entropy_bits_safe(struct entropy_store *r, int nbits)
+static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t len)
{
- const int nbits_max = r->poolinfo->poolwords * 32;
-
- if (nbits < 0)
- return -EINVAL;
+ u32 chacha_state[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)];
+ u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ size_t first_block_len;
- /* Cap the value to avoid overflows */
- nbits = min(nbits, nbits_max);
+ if (!len)
+ return;
- credit_entropy_bits(r, nbits);
- return 0;
-}
+ first_block_len = min_t(size_t, 32, len);
+ crng_make_state(chacha_state, buf, first_block_len);
+ len -= first_block_len;
+ buf += first_block_len;
-/*********************************************************************
- *
- * CRNG using CHACHA20
- *
- *********************************************************************/
+ while (len) {
+ if (len < CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+ chacha20_block(chacha_state, tmp);
+ memcpy(buf, tmp, len);
+ memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
+ break;
+ }
-#define CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL (300*HZ)
+ chacha20_block(chacha_state, buf);
+ if (unlikely(chacha_state[12] == 0))
+ ++chacha_state[13];
+ len -= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ buf += CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ }
-static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(crng_init_wait);
+ memzero_explicit(chacha_state, sizeof(chacha_state));
+}
-#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
/*
- * Hack to deal with crazy userspace progams when they are all trying
- * to access /dev/urandom in parallel. The programs are almost
- * certainly doing something terribly wrong, but we'll work around
- * their brain damage.
+ * This function is the exported kernel interface. It returns some
+ * number of good random numbers, suitable for key generation, seeding
+ * TCP sequence numbers, etc. It does not rely on the hardware random
+ * number generator. For random bytes direct from the hardware RNG
+ * (when available), use get_random_bytes_arch(). In order to ensure
+ * that the randomness provided by this function is okay, the function
+ * wait_for_random_bytes() should be called and return 0 at least once
+ * at any point prior.
*/
-static struct crng_state **crng_node_pool __read_mostly;
-#endif
-
-static void invalidate_batched_entropy(void);
-static void numa_crng_init(void);
-
-static bool trust_cpu __ro_after_init = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU);
-static int __init parse_trust_cpu(char *arg)
+void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t len)
{
- return kstrtobool(arg, &trust_cpu);
+ warn_unseeded_randomness();
+ _get_random_bytes(buf, len);
}
-early_param("random.trust_cpu", parse_trust_cpu);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes);
-static void crng_initialize(struct crng_state *crng)
+static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(struct iov_iter *iter)
{
- int i;
- int arch_init = 1;
- unsigned long rv;
-
- memcpy(&crng->state[0], "expand 32-byte k", 16);
- if (crng == &primary_crng)
- _extract_entropy(&input_pool, &crng->state[4],
- sizeof(__u32) * 12, 0);
- else
- _get_random_bytes(&crng->state[4], sizeof(__u32) * 12);
- for (i = 4; i < 16; i++) {
- if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) &&
- !arch_get_random_long(&rv)) {
- rv = random_get_entropy();
- arch_init = 0;
- }
- crng->state[i] ^= rv;
- }
- if (trust_cpu && arch_init && crng == &primary_crng) {
- invalidate_batched_entropy();
- numa_crng_init();
- crng_init = 2;
- pr_notice("random: crng done (trusting CPU's manufacturer)\n");
- }
- crng->init_time = jiffies - CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL - 1;
-}
+ u32 chacha_state[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)];
+ u8 block[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ size_t ret = 0, copied;
-#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
-static void do_numa_crng_init(struct work_struct *work)
-{
- int i;
- struct crng_state *crng;
- struct crng_state **pool;
-
- pool = kcalloc(nr_node_ids, sizeof(*pool), GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOFAIL);
- for_each_online_node(i) {
- crng = kmalloc_node(sizeof(struct crng_state),
- GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOFAIL, i);
- spin_lock_init(&crng->lock);
- crng_initialize(crng);
- pool[i] = crng;
- }
- /* pairs with READ_ONCE() in select_crng() */
- if (cmpxchg_release(&crng_node_pool, NULL, pool) != NULL) {
- for_each_node(i)
- kfree(pool[i]);
- kfree(pool);
- }
-}
+ if (unlikely(!iov_iter_count(iter)))
+ return 0;
-static DECLARE_WORK(numa_crng_init_work, do_numa_crng_init);
+ /*
+ * Immediately overwrite the ChaCha key at index 4 with random
+ * bytes, in case userspace causes copy_to_user() below to sleep
+ * forever, so that we still retain forward secrecy in that case.
+ */
+ crng_make_state(chacha_state, (u8 *)&chacha_state[4], CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE);
+ /*
+ * However, if we're doing a read of len <= 32, we don't need to
+ * use chacha_state after, so we can simply return those bytes to
+ * the user directly.
+ */
+ if (iov_iter_count(iter) <= CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE) {
+ ret = copy_to_iter(&chacha_state[4], CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE, iter);
+ goto out_zero_chacha;
+ }
-static void numa_crng_init(void)
-{
- schedule_work(&numa_crng_init_work);
-}
+ for (;;) {
+ chacha20_block(chacha_state, block);
+ if (unlikely(chacha_state[12] == 0))
+ ++chacha_state[13];
-static struct crng_state *select_crng(void)
-{
- struct crng_state **pool;
- int nid = numa_node_id();
+ copied = copy_to_iter(block, sizeof(block), iter);
+ ret += copied;
+ if (!iov_iter_count(iter) || copied != sizeof(block))
+ break;
- /* pairs with cmpxchg_release() in do_numa_crng_init() */
- pool = READ_ONCE(crng_node_pool);
- if (pool && pool[nid])
- return pool[nid];
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(PAGE_SIZE % sizeof(block) != 0);
+ if (ret % PAGE_SIZE == 0) {
+ if (signal_pending(current))
+ break;
+ cond_resched();
+ }
+ }
- return &primary_crng;
+ memzero_explicit(block, sizeof(block));
+out_zero_chacha:
+ memzero_explicit(chacha_state, sizeof(chacha_state));
+ return ret ? ret : -EFAULT;
}
-#else
-static void numa_crng_init(void) {}
-static struct crng_state *select_crng(void)
+/*
+ * Batched entropy returns random integers. The quality of the random
+ * number is good as /dev/urandom. In order to ensure that the randomness
+ * provided by this function is okay, the function wait_for_random_bytes()
+ * should be called and return 0 at least once at any point prior.
+ */
+
+#define DEFINE_BATCHED_ENTROPY(type) \
+struct batch_ ##type { \
+ /* \
+ * We make this 1.5x a ChaCha block, so that we get the \
+ * remaining 32 bytes from fast key erasure, plus one full \
+ * block from the detached ChaCha state. We can increase \
+ * the size of this later if needed so long as we keep the \
+ * formula of (integer_blocks + 0.5) * CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE. \
+ */ \
+ type entropy[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE * 3 / (2 * sizeof(type))]; \
+ unsigned long generation; \
+ unsigned int position; \
+}; \
+ \
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batch_ ##type, batched_entropy_ ##type) = { \
+ .position = UINT_MAX \
+}; \
+ \
+type get_random_ ##type(void) \
+{ \
+ type ret; \
+ unsigned long flags; \
+ struct batch_ ##type *batch; \
+ unsigned long next_gen; \
+ \
+ warn_unseeded_randomness(); \
+ \
+ if (!crng_ready()) { \
+ _get_random_bytes(&ret, sizeof(ret)); \
+ return ret; \
+ } \
+ \
+ local_irq_save(flags); \
+ batch = raw_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_##type); \
+ \
+ next_gen = READ_ONCE(base_crng.generation); \
+ if (batch->position >= ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy) || \
+ next_gen != batch->generation) { \
+ _get_random_bytes(batch->entropy, sizeof(batch->entropy)); \
+ batch->position = 0; \
+ batch->generation = next_gen; \
+ } \
+ \
+ ret = batch->entropy[batch->position]; \
+ batch->entropy[batch->position] = 0; \
+ ++batch->position; \
+ local_irq_restore(flags); \
+ return ret; \
+} \
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_ ##type);
+
+DEFINE_BATCHED_ENTROPY(u64)
+DEFINE_BATCHED_ENTROPY(u32)
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+/*
+ * This function is called when the CPU is coming up, with entry
+ * CPUHP_RANDOM_PREPARE, which comes before CPUHP_WORKQUEUE_PREP.
+ */
+int __cold random_prepare_cpu(unsigned int cpu)
{
- return &primary_crng;
+ /*
+ * When the cpu comes back online, immediately invalidate both
+ * the per-cpu crng and all batches, so that we serve fresh
+ * randomness.
+ */
+ per_cpu_ptr(&crngs, cpu)->generation = ULONG_MAX;
+ per_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u32, cpu)->position = UINT_MAX;
+ per_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u64, cpu)->position = UINT_MAX;
+ return 0;
}
#endif
/*
- * crng_fast_load() can be called by code in the interrupt service
- * path. So we can't afford to dilly-dally.
+ * This function will use the architecture-specific hardware random
+ * number generator if it is available. It is not recommended for
+ * use. Use get_random_bytes() instead. It returns the number of
+ * bytes filled in.
*/
-static int crng_fast_load(const char *cp, size_t len)
+size_t __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, size_t len)
{
- unsigned long flags;
- char *p;
+ size_t left = len;
+ u8 *p = buf;
- if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags))
- return 0;
- if (crng_init != 0) {
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
- return 0;
- }
- p = (unsigned char *) &primary_crng.state[4];
- while (len > 0 && crng_init_cnt < CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) {
- p[crng_init_cnt % CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE] ^= *cp;
- cp++; crng_init_cnt++; len--;
- }
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
- if (crng_init_cnt >= CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) {
- invalidate_batched_entropy();
- crng_init = 1;
- wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait);
- pr_notice("random: fast init done\n");
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-/*
- * crng_slow_load() is called by add_device_randomness, which has two
- * attributes. (1) We can't trust the buffer passed to it is
- * guaranteed to be unpredictable (so it might not have any entropy at
- * all), and (2) it doesn't have the performance constraints of
- * crng_fast_load().
- *
- * So we do something more comprehensive which is guaranteed to touch
- * all of the primary_crng's state, and which uses a LFSR with a
- * period of 255 as part of the mixing algorithm. Finally, we do
- * *not* advance crng_init_cnt since buffer we may get may be something
- * like a fixed DMI table (for example), which might very well be
- * unique to the machine, but is otherwise unvarying.
- */
-static int crng_slow_load(const char *cp, size_t len)
-{
- unsigned long flags;
- static unsigned char lfsr = 1;
- unsigned char tmp;
- unsigned i, max = CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE;
- const char * src_buf = cp;
- char * dest_buf = (char *) &primary_crng.state[4];
-
- if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags))
- return 0;
- if (crng_init != 0) {
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
- return 0;
- }
- if (len > max)
- max = len;
-
- for (i = 0; i < max ; i++) {
- tmp = lfsr;
- lfsr >>= 1;
- if (tmp & 1)
- lfsr ^= 0xE1;
- tmp = dest_buf[i % CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE];
- dest_buf[i % CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE] ^= src_buf[i % len] ^ lfsr;
- lfsr += (tmp << 3) | (tmp >> 5);
- }
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
- return 1;
-}
-
-static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, struct entropy_store *r)
-{
- unsigned long flags;
- int i, num;
- union {
- __u8 block[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE];
- __u32 key[8];
- } buf;
-
- if (r) {
- num = extract_entropy(r, &buf, 32, 16, 0);
- if (num == 0)
- return;
- } else {
- _extract_crng(&primary_crng, buf.block);
- _crng_backtrack_protect(&primary_crng, buf.block,
- CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE);
- }
- spin_lock_irqsave(&crng->lock, flags);
- for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
- unsigned long rv;
- if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) &&
- !arch_get_random_long(&rv))
- rv = random_get_entropy();
- crng->state[i+4] ^= buf.key[i] ^ rv;
- }
- memzero_explicit(&buf, sizeof(buf));
- WRITE_ONCE(crng->init_time, jiffies);
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crng->lock, flags);
- if (crng == &primary_crng && crng_init < 2) {
- invalidate_batched_entropy();
- numa_crng_init();
- crng_init = 2;
- process_random_ready_list();
- wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait);
- pr_notice("random: crng init done\n");
- if (unseeded_warning.missed) {
- pr_notice("random: %d get_random_xx warning(s) missed "
- "due to ratelimiting\n",
- unseeded_warning.missed);
- unseeded_warning.missed = 0;
- }
- if (urandom_warning.missed) {
- pr_notice("random: %d urandom warning(s) missed "
- "due to ratelimiting\n",
- urandom_warning.missed);
- urandom_warning.missed = 0;
- }
- }
-}
-
-static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng,
- __u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE])
-{
- unsigned long v, flags, init_time;
-
- if (crng_ready()) {
- init_time = READ_ONCE(crng->init_time);
- if (time_after(READ_ONCE(crng_global_init_time), init_time) ||
- time_after(jiffies, init_time + CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL))
- crng_reseed(crng, crng == &primary_crng ?
- &input_pool : NULL);
- }
- spin_lock_irqsave(&crng->lock, flags);
- if (arch_get_random_long(&v))
- crng->state[14] ^= v;
- chacha20_block(&crng->state[0], out);
- if (crng->state[12] == 0)
- crng->state[13]++;
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crng->lock, flags);
-}
-
-static void extract_crng(__u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE])
-{
- _extract_crng(select_crng(), out);
-}
-
-/*
- * Use the leftover bytes from the CRNG block output (if there is
- * enough) to mutate the CRNG key to provide backtracking protection.
- */
-static void _crng_backtrack_protect(struct crng_state *crng,
- __u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE], int used)
-{
- unsigned long flags;
- __u32 *s, *d;
- int i;
-
- used = round_up(used, sizeof(__u32));
- if (used + CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE > CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE) {
- extract_crng(tmp);
- used = 0;
- }
- spin_lock_irqsave(&crng->lock, flags);
- s = (__u32 *) &tmp[used];
- d = &crng->state[4];
- for (i=0; i < 8; i++)
- *d++ ^= *s++;
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crng->lock, flags);
-}
-
-static void crng_backtrack_protect(__u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE], int used)
-{
- _crng_backtrack_protect(select_crng(), tmp, used);
-}
-
-static ssize_t extract_crng_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes)
-{
- ssize_t ret = 0, i = CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE;
- __u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(4);
- int large_request = (nbytes > 256);
-
- while (nbytes) {
- if (large_request && need_resched()) {
- if (signal_pending(current)) {
- if (ret == 0)
- ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
- break;
- }
- schedule();
- }
+ while (left) {
+ unsigned long v;
+ size_t block_len = min_t(size_t, left, sizeof(unsigned long));
- extract_crng(tmp);
- i = min_t(int, nbytes, CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE);
- if (copy_to_user(buf, tmp, i)) {
- ret = -EFAULT;
+ if (!arch_get_random_long(&v))
break;
- }
- nbytes -= i;
- buf += i;
- ret += i;
+ memcpy(p, &v, block_len);
+ p += block_len;
+ left -= block_len;
}
- crng_backtrack_protect(tmp, i);
-
- /* Wipe data just written to memory */
- memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
- return ret;
+ return len - left;
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes_arch);
-/*********************************************************************
+/**********************************************************************
*
- * Entropy input management
+ * Entropy accumulation and extraction routines.
*
- *********************************************************************/
+ * Callers may add entropy via:
+ *
+ * static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *buf, size_t len)
+ *
+ * After which, if added entropy should be credited:
+ *
+ * static void credit_init_bits(size_t bits)
+ *
+ * Finally, extract entropy via:
+ *
+ * static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t len)
+ *
+ **********************************************************************/
-/* There is one of these per entropy source */
-struct timer_rand_state {
- cycles_t last_time;
- long last_delta, last_delta2;
+enum {
+ POOL_BITS = BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE * 8,
+ POOL_READY_BITS = POOL_BITS, /* When crng_init->CRNG_READY */
+ POOL_EARLY_BITS = POOL_READY_BITS / 2 /* When crng_init->CRNG_EARLY */
+};
+
+static struct {
+ struct blake2s_state hash;
+ spinlock_t lock;
+ unsigned int init_bits;
+} input_pool = {
+ .hash.h = { BLAKE2S_IV0 ^ (0x01010000 | BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE),
+ BLAKE2S_IV1, BLAKE2S_IV2, BLAKE2S_IV3, BLAKE2S_IV4,
+ BLAKE2S_IV5, BLAKE2S_IV6, BLAKE2S_IV7 },
+ .hash.outlen = BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE,
+ .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(input_pool.lock),
};
-#define INIT_TIMER_RAND_STATE { INITIAL_JIFFIES, };
+static void _mix_pool_bytes(const void *buf, size_t len)
+{
+ blake2s_update(&input_pool.hash, buf, len);
+}
/*
- * Add device- or boot-specific data to the input pool to help
- * initialize it.
- *
- * None of this adds any entropy; it is meant to avoid the problem of
- * the entropy pool having similar initial state across largely
- * identical devices.
+ * This function adds bytes into the input pool. It does not
+ * update the initialization bit counter; the caller should call
+ * credit_init_bits if this is appropriate.
*/
-void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, unsigned int size)
+static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *buf, size_t len)
{
- unsigned long time = random_get_entropy() ^ jiffies;
unsigned long flags;
- if (!crng_ready() && size)
- crng_slow_load(buf, size);
-
- trace_add_device_randomness(size, _RET_IP_);
spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
- _mix_pool_bytes(&input_pool, buf, size);
- _mix_pool_bytes(&input_pool, &time, sizeof(time));
+ _mix_pool_bytes(buf, len);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags);
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_device_randomness);
-
-static struct timer_rand_state input_timer_state = INIT_TIMER_RAND_STATE;
/*
- * This function adds entropy to the entropy "pool" by using timing
- * delays. It uses the timer_rand_state structure to make an estimate
- * of how many bits of entropy this call has added to the pool.
- *
- * The number "num" is also added to the pool - it should somehow describe
- * the type of event which just happened. This is currently 0-255 for
- * keyboard scan codes, and 256 upwards for interrupts.
- *
+ * This is an HKDF-like construction for using the hashed collected entropy
+ * as a PRF key, that's then expanded block-by-block.
*/
-static void add_timer_randomness(struct timer_rand_state *state, unsigned num)
+static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t len)
{
- struct entropy_store *r;
+ unsigned long flags;
+ u8 seed[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE], next_key[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE];
struct {
- long jiffies;
- unsigned cycles;
- unsigned num;
- } sample;
- long delta, delta2, delta3;
-
- sample.jiffies = jiffies;
- sample.cycles = random_get_entropy();
- sample.num = num;
- r = &input_pool;
- mix_pool_bytes(r, &sample, sizeof(sample));
-
- /*
- * Calculate number of bits of randomness we probably added.
- * We take into account the first, second and third-order deltas
- * in order to make our estimate.
- */
- delta = sample.jiffies - READ_ONCE(state->last_time);
- WRITE_ONCE(state->last_time, sample.jiffies);
-
- delta2 = delta - READ_ONCE(state->last_delta);
- WRITE_ONCE(state->last_delta, delta);
-
- delta3 = delta2 - READ_ONCE(state->last_delta2);
- WRITE_ONCE(state->last_delta2, delta2);
-
- if (delta < 0)
- delta = -delta;
- if (delta2 < 0)
- delta2 = -delta2;
- if (delta3 < 0)
- delta3 = -delta3;
- if (delta > delta2)
- delta = delta2;
- if (delta > delta3)
- delta = delta3;
-
- /*
- * delta is now minimum absolute delta.
- * Round down by 1 bit on general principles,
- * and limit entropy entimate to 12 bits.
- */
- credit_entropy_bits(r, min_t(int, fls(delta>>1), 11));
-}
-
-void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
- unsigned int value)
-{
- static unsigned char last_value;
-
- /* ignore autorepeat and the like */
- if (value == last_value)
- return;
+ unsigned long rdseed[32 / sizeof(long)];
+ size_t counter;
+ } block;
+ size_t i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(block.rdseed); ++i) {
+ if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&block.rdseed[i]) &&
+ !arch_get_random_long(&block.rdseed[i]))
+ block.rdseed[i] = random_get_entropy();
+ }
- last_value = value;
- add_timer_randomness(&input_timer_state,
- (type << 4) ^ code ^ (code >> 4) ^ value);
- trace_add_input_randomness(ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool));
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_input_randomness);
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
-static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct fast_pool, irq_randomness);
+ /* seed = HASHPRF(last_key, entropy_input) */
+ blake2s_final(&input_pool.hash, seed);
-#ifdef ADD_INTERRUPT_BENCH
-static unsigned long avg_cycles, avg_deviation;
+ /* next_key = HASHPRF(seed, RDSEED || 0) */
+ block.counter = 0;
+ blake2s(next_key, (u8 *)&block, seed, sizeof(next_key), sizeof(block), sizeof(seed));
+ blake2s_init_key(&input_pool.hash, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE, next_key, sizeof(next_key));
-#define AVG_SHIFT 8 /* Exponential average factor k=1/256 */
-#define FIXED_1_2 (1 << (AVG_SHIFT-1))
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags);
+ memzero_explicit(next_key, sizeof(next_key));
+
+ while (len) {
+ i = min_t(size_t, len, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
+ /* output = HASHPRF(seed, RDSEED || ++counter) */
+ ++block.counter;
+ blake2s(buf, (u8 *)&block, seed, i, sizeof(block), sizeof(seed));
+ len -= i;
+ buf += i;
+ }
-static void add_interrupt_bench(cycles_t start)
-{
- long delta = random_get_entropy() - start;
-
- /* Use a weighted moving average */
- delta = delta - ((avg_cycles + FIXED_1_2) >> AVG_SHIFT);
- avg_cycles += delta;
- /* And average deviation */
- delta = abs(delta) - ((avg_deviation + FIXED_1_2) >> AVG_SHIFT);
- avg_deviation += delta;
+ memzero_explicit(seed, sizeof(seed));
+ memzero_explicit(&block, sizeof(block));
}
-#else
-#define add_interrupt_bench(x)
-#endif
-static __u32 get_reg(struct fast_pool *f, struct pt_regs *regs)
-{
- __u32 *ptr = (__u32 *) regs;
- unsigned int idx;
-
- if (regs == NULL)
- return 0;
- idx = READ_ONCE(f->reg_idx);
- if (idx >= sizeof(struct pt_regs) / sizeof(__u32))
- idx = 0;
- ptr += idx++;
- WRITE_ONCE(f->reg_idx, idx);
- return *ptr;
-}
+#define credit_init_bits(bits) if (!crng_ready()) _credit_init_bits(bits)
-void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags)
+static void __cold _credit_init_bits(size_t bits)
{
- struct entropy_store *r;
- struct fast_pool *fast_pool = this_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness);
- struct pt_regs *regs = get_irq_regs();
- unsigned long now = jiffies;
- cycles_t cycles = random_get_entropy();
- __u32 c_high, j_high;
- __u64 ip;
- unsigned long seed;
- int credit = 0;
-
- if (cycles == 0)
- cycles = get_reg(fast_pool, regs);
- c_high = (sizeof(cycles) > 4) ? cycles >> 32 : 0;
- j_high = (sizeof(now) > 4) ? now >> 32 : 0;
- fast_pool->pool[0] ^= cycles ^ j_high ^ irq;
- fast_pool->pool[1] ^= now ^ c_high;
- ip = regs ? instruction_pointer(regs) : _RET_IP_;
- fast_pool->pool[2] ^= ip;
- fast_pool->pool[3] ^= (sizeof(ip) > 4) ? ip >> 32 :
- get_reg(fast_pool, regs);
-
- fast_mix(fast_pool);
- add_interrupt_bench(cycles);
-
- if (unlikely(crng_init == 0)) {
- if ((fast_pool->count >= 64) &&
- crng_fast_load((char *) fast_pool->pool,
- sizeof(fast_pool->pool))) {
- fast_pool->count = 0;
- fast_pool->last = now;
- }
- return;
- }
+ unsigned int new, orig, add;
+ unsigned long flags;
- if ((fast_pool->count < 64) &&
- !time_after(now, fast_pool->last + HZ))
+ if (!bits)
return;
- r = &input_pool;
- if (!spin_trylock(&r->lock))
- return;
+ add = min_t(size_t, bits, POOL_BITS);
- fast_pool->last = now;
- __mix_pool_bytes(r, &fast_pool->pool, sizeof(fast_pool->pool));
+ do {
+ orig = READ_ONCE(input_pool.init_bits);
+ new = min_t(unsigned int, POOL_BITS, orig + add);
+ } while (cmpxchg(&input_pool.init_bits, orig, new) != orig);
- /*
- * If we have architectural seed generator, produce a seed and
- * add it to the pool. For the sake of paranoia don't let the
- * architectural seed generator dominate the input from the
- * interrupt noise.
- */
- if (arch_get_random_seed_long(&seed)) {
- __mix_pool_bytes(r, &seed, sizeof(seed));
- credit = 1;
+ if (orig < POOL_READY_BITS && new >= POOL_READY_BITS) {
+ crng_reseed(); /* Sets crng_init to CRNG_READY under base_crng.lock. */
+ process_random_ready_list();
+ wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait);
+ kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
+ pr_notice("crng init done\n");
+ if (urandom_warning.missed)
+ pr_notice("%d urandom warning(s) missed due to ratelimiting\n",
+ urandom_warning.missed);
+ } else if (orig < POOL_EARLY_BITS && new >= POOL_EARLY_BITS) {
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags);
+ /* Check if crng_init is CRNG_EMPTY, to avoid race with crng_reseed(). */
+ if (crng_init == CRNG_EMPTY) {
+ extract_entropy(base_crng.key, sizeof(base_crng.key));
+ crng_init = CRNG_EARLY;
+ }
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags);
}
- spin_unlock(&r->lock);
-
- fast_pool->count = 0;
-
- /* award one bit for the contents of the fast pool */
- credit_entropy_bits(r, credit + 1);
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_interrupt_randomness);
-#ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK
-void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk)
-{
- if (!disk || !disk->random)
- return;
- /* first major is 1, so we get >= 0x200 here */
- add_timer_randomness(disk->random, 0x100 + disk_devt(disk));
- trace_add_disk_randomness(disk_devt(disk), ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool));
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_disk_randomness);
-#endif
-/*********************************************************************
+/**********************************************************************
*
- * Entropy extraction routines
+ * Entropy collection routines.
*
- *********************************************************************/
-
-/*
- * This utility inline function is responsible for transferring entropy
- * from the primary pool to the secondary extraction pool. We make
- * sure we pull enough for a 'catastrophic reseed'.
- */
-static void _xfer_secondary_pool(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes);
-static void xfer_secondary_pool(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes)
-{
- if (!r->pull ||
- r->entropy_count >= (nbytes << (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3)) ||
- r->entropy_count > r->poolinfo->poolfracbits)
- return;
-
- _xfer_secondary_pool(r, nbytes);
-}
+ * The following exported functions are used for pushing entropy into
+ * the above entropy accumulation routines:
+ *
+ * void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len);
+ * void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len, size_t entropy);
+ * void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len);
+ * void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq);
+ * void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, unsigned int value);
+ * void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk);
+ *
+ * add_device_randomness() adds data to the input pool that
+ * is likely to differ between two devices (or possibly even per boot).
+ * This would be things like MAC addresses or serial numbers, or the
+ * read-out of the RTC. This does *not* credit any actual entropy to
+ * the pool, but it initializes the pool to different values for devices
+ * that might otherwise be identical and have very little entropy
+ * available to them (particularly common in the embedded world).
+ *
+ * add_hwgenerator_randomness() is for true hardware RNGs, and will credit
+ * entropy as specified by the caller. If the entropy pool is full it will
+ * block until more entropy is needed.
+ *
+ * add_bootloader_randomness() is called by bootloader drivers, such as EFI
+ * and device tree, and credits its input depending on whether or not the
+ * configuration option CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is set.
+ *
+ * add_interrupt_randomness() uses the interrupt timing as random
+ * inputs to the entropy pool. Using the cycle counters and the irq source
+ * as inputs, it feeds the input pool roughly once a second or after 64
+ * interrupts, crediting 1 bit of entropy for whichever comes first.
+ *
+ * add_input_randomness() uses the input layer interrupt timing, as well
+ * as the event type information from the hardware.
+ *
+ * add_disk_randomness() uses what amounts to the seek time of block
+ * layer request events, on a per-disk_devt basis, as input to the
+ * entropy pool. Note that high-speed solid state drives with very low
+ * seek times do not make for good sources of entropy, as their seek
+ * times are usually fairly consistent.
+ *
+ * The last two routines try to estimate how many bits of entropy
+ * to credit. They do this by keeping track of the first and second
+ * order deltas of the event timings.
+ *
+ **********************************************************************/
-static void _xfer_secondary_pool(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes)
+static bool trust_cpu __initdata = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU);
+static bool trust_bootloader __initdata = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER);
+static int __init parse_trust_cpu(char *arg)
{
- __u32 tmp[OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS];
-
- int bytes = nbytes;
-
- /* pull at least as much as a wakeup */
- bytes = max_t(int, bytes, random_read_wakeup_bits / 8);
- /* but never more than the buffer size */
- bytes = min_t(int, bytes, sizeof(tmp));
-
- trace_xfer_secondary_pool(r->name, bytes * 8, nbytes * 8,
- ENTROPY_BITS(r), ENTROPY_BITS(r->pull));
- bytes = extract_entropy(r->pull, tmp, bytes,
- random_read_wakeup_bits / 8, 0);
- mix_pool_bytes(r, tmp, bytes);
- credit_entropy_bits(r, bytes*8);
+ return kstrtobool(arg, &trust_cpu);
}
-
-/*
- * Used as a workqueue function so that when the input pool is getting
- * full, we can "spill over" some entropy to the output pools. That
- * way the output pools can store some of the excess entropy instead
- * of letting it go to waste.
- */
-static void push_to_pool(struct work_struct *work)
+static int __init parse_trust_bootloader(char *arg)
{
- struct entropy_store *r = container_of(work, struct entropy_store,
- push_work);
- BUG_ON(!r);
- _xfer_secondary_pool(r, random_read_wakeup_bits/8);
- trace_push_to_pool(r->name, r->entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT,
- r->pull->entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT);
+ return kstrtobool(arg, &trust_bootloader);
}
+early_param("random.trust_cpu", parse_trust_cpu);
+early_param("random.trust_bootloader", parse_trust_bootloader);
/*
- * This function decides how many bytes to actually take from the
- * given pool, and also debits the entropy count accordingly.
+ * The first collection of entropy occurs at system boot while interrupts
+ * are still turned off. Here we push in latent entropy, RDSEED, a timestamp,
+ * utsname(), and the command line. Depending on the above configuration knob,
+ * RDSEED may be considered sufficient for initialization. Note that much
+ * earlier setup may already have pushed entropy into the input pool by the
+ * time we get here.
*/
-static size_t account(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes, int min,
- int reserved)
+int __init random_init(const char *command_line)
{
- int entropy_count, orig, have_bytes;
- size_t ibytes, nfrac;
-
- BUG_ON(r->entropy_count > r->poolinfo->poolfracbits);
-
- /* Can we pull enough? */
-retry:
- entropy_count = orig = READ_ONCE(r->entropy_count);
- ibytes = nbytes;
- /* never pull more than available */
- have_bytes = entropy_count >> (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3);
-
- if ((have_bytes -= reserved) < 0)
- have_bytes = 0;
- ibytes = min_t(size_t, ibytes, have_bytes);
- if (ibytes < min)
- ibytes = 0;
-
- if (unlikely(entropy_count < 0)) {
- pr_warn("random: negative entropy count: pool %s count %d\n",
- r->name, entropy_count);
- WARN_ON(1);
- entropy_count = 0;
- }
- nfrac = ibytes << (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3);
- if ((size_t) entropy_count > nfrac)
- entropy_count -= nfrac;
- else
- entropy_count = 0;
+ ktime_t now = ktime_get_real();
+ unsigned int i, arch_bits;
+ unsigned long entropy;
- if (cmpxchg(&r->entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig)
- goto retry;
+#if defined(LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN)
+ static const u8 compiletime_seed[BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE] __initconst __latent_entropy;
+ _mix_pool_bytes(compiletime_seed, sizeof(compiletime_seed));
+#endif
- trace_debit_entropy(r->name, 8 * ibytes);
- if (ibytes &&
- (r->entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT) < random_write_wakeup_bits) {
- wake_up_interruptible(&random_write_wait);
- kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_OUT);
+ for (i = 0, arch_bits = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE * 8;
+ i < BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; i += sizeof(entropy)) {
+ if (!arch_get_random_seed_long_early(&entropy) &&
+ !arch_get_random_long_early(&entropy)) {
+ entropy = random_get_entropy();
+ arch_bits -= sizeof(entropy) * 8;
+ }
+ _mix_pool_bytes(&entropy, sizeof(entropy));
}
+ _mix_pool_bytes(&now, sizeof(now));
+ _mix_pool_bytes(utsname(), sizeof(*(utsname())));
+ _mix_pool_bytes(command_line, strlen(command_line));
+ add_latent_entropy();
- return ibytes;
+ if (crng_ready())
+ crng_reseed();
+ else if (trust_cpu)
+ _credit_init_bits(arch_bits);
+
+ return 0;
}
/*
- * This function does the actual extraction for extract_entropy and
- * extract_entropy_user.
+ * Add device- or boot-specific data to the input pool to help
+ * initialize it.
*
- * Note: we assume that .poolwords is a multiple of 16 words.
+ * None of this adds any entropy; it is meant to avoid the problem of
+ * the entropy pool having similar initial state across largely
+ * identical devices.
*/
-static void extract_buf(struct entropy_store *r, __u8 *out)
-{
- int i;
- union {
- __u32 w[5];
- unsigned long l[LONGS(20)];
- } hash;
- __u32 workspace[SHA_WORKSPACE_WORDS];
- unsigned long flags;
-
- /*
- * If we have an architectural hardware random number
- * generator, use it for SHA's initial vector
- */
- sha_init(hash.w);
- for (i = 0; i < LONGS(20); i++) {
- unsigned long v;
- if (!arch_get_random_long(&v))
- break;
- hash.l[i] = v;
- }
-
- /* Generate a hash across the pool, 16 words (512 bits) at a time */
- spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags);
- for (i = 0; i < r->poolinfo->poolwords; i += 16)
- sha_transform(hash.w, (__u8 *)(r->pool + i), workspace);
-
- /*
- * We mix the hash back into the pool to prevent backtracking
- * attacks (where the attacker knows the state of the pool
- * plus the current outputs, and attempts to find previous
- * ouputs), unless the hash function can be inverted. By
- * mixing at least a SHA1 worth of hash data back, we make
- * brute-forcing the feedback as hard as brute-forcing the
- * hash.
- */
- __mix_pool_bytes(r, hash.w, sizeof(hash.w));
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags);
-
- memzero_explicit(workspace, sizeof(workspace));
-
- /*
- * In case the hash function has some recognizable output
- * pattern, we fold it in half. Thus, we always feed back
- * twice as much data as we output.
- */
- hash.w[0] ^= hash.w[3];
- hash.w[1] ^= hash.w[4];
- hash.w[2] ^= rol32(hash.w[2], 16);
-
- memcpy(out, &hash, EXTRACT_SIZE);
- memzero_explicit(&hash, sizeof(hash));
-}
-
-static ssize_t _extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf,
- size_t nbytes, int fips)
+void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len)
{
- ssize_t ret = 0, i;
- __u8 tmp[EXTRACT_SIZE];
+ unsigned long entropy = random_get_entropy();
unsigned long flags;
- while (nbytes) {
- extract_buf(r, tmp);
-
- if (fips) {
- spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags);
- if (!memcmp(tmp, r->last_data, EXTRACT_SIZE))
- panic("Hardware RNG duplicated output!\n");
- memcpy(r->last_data, tmp, EXTRACT_SIZE);
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags);
- }
- i = min_t(int, nbytes, EXTRACT_SIZE);
- memcpy(buf, tmp, i);
- nbytes -= i;
- buf += i;
- ret += i;
- }
-
- /* Wipe data just returned from memory */
- memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
-
- return ret;
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
+ _mix_pool_bytes(&entropy, sizeof(entropy));
+ _mix_pool_bytes(buf, len);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags);
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_device_randomness);
/*
- * This function extracts randomness from the "entropy pool", and
- * returns it in a buffer.
- *
- * The min parameter specifies the minimum amount we can pull before
- * failing to avoid races that defeat catastrophic reseeding while the
- * reserved parameter indicates how much entropy we must leave in the
- * pool after each pull to avoid starving other readers.
+ * Interface for in-kernel drivers of true hardware RNGs.
+ * Those devices may produce endless random bits and will be throttled
+ * when our pool is full.
*/
-static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf,
- size_t nbytes, int min, int reserved)
+void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len, size_t entropy)
{
- __u8 tmp[EXTRACT_SIZE];
- unsigned long flags;
+ mix_pool_bytes(buf, len);
+ credit_init_bits(entropy);
- /* if last_data isn't primed, we need EXTRACT_SIZE extra bytes */
- if (fips_enabled) {
- spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags);
- if (!r->last_data_init) {
- r->last_data_init = 1;
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags);
- trace_extract_entropy(r->name, EXTRACT_SIZE,
- ENTROPY_BITS(r), _RET_IP_);
- xfer_secondary_pool(r, EXTRACT_SIZE);
- extract_buf(r, tmp);
- spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags);
- memcpy(r->last_data, tmp, EXTRACT_SIZE);
- }
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags);
- }
-
- trace_extract_entropy(r->name, nbytes, ENTROPY_BITS(r), _RET_IP_);
- xfer_secondary_pool(r, nbytes);
- nbytes = account(r, nbytes, min, reserved);
-
- return _extract_entropy(r, buf, nbytes, fips_enabled);
+ /*
+ * Throttle writing to once every CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL, unless
+ * we're not yet initialized.
+ */
+ if (!kthread_should_stop() && crng_ready())
+ schedule_timeout_interruptible(CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL);
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_hwgenerator_randomness);
/*
- * This function extracts randomness from the "entropy pool", and
- * returns it in a userspace buffer.
+ * Handle random seed passed by bootloader, and credit it if
+ * CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is set.
*/
-static ssize_t extract_entropy_user(struct entropy_store *r, void __user *buf,
- size_t nbytes)
+void __init add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len)
{
- ssize_t ret = 0, i;
- __u8 tmp[EXTRACT_SIZE];
- int large_request = (nbytes > 256);
-
- trace_extract_entropy_user(r->name, nbytes, ENTROPY_BITS(r), _RET_IP_);
- xfer_secondary_pool(r, nbytes);
- nbytes = account(r, nbytes, 0, 0);
-
- while (nbytes) {
- if (large_request && need_resched()) {
- if (signal_pending(current)) {
- if (ret == 0)
- ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
- break;
- }
- schedule();
- }
-
- extract_buf(r, tmp);
- i = min_t(int, nbytes, EXTRACT_SIZE);
- if (copy_to_user(buf, tmp, i)) {
- ret = -EFAULT;
- break;
- }
-
- nbytes -= i;
- buf += i;
- ret += i;
- }
-
- /* Wipe data just returned from memory */
- memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
-
- return ret;
+ mix_pool_bytes(buf, len);
+ if (trust_bootloader)
+ credit_init_bits(len * 8);
}
-#define warn_unseeded_randomness(previous) \
- _warn_unseeded_randomness(__func__, (void *) _RET_IP_, (previous))
+struct fast_pool {
+ struct work_struct mix;
+ unsigned long pool[4];
+ unsigned long last;
+ unsigned int count;
+};
-static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(const char *func_name, void *caller,
- void **previous)
-{
-#ifdef CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM
- const bool print_once = false;
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct fast_pool, irq_randomness) = {
+#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
+#define FASTMIX_PERM SIPHASH_PERMUTATION
+ .pool = { SIPHASH_CONST_0, SIPHASH_CONST_1, SIPHASH_CONST_2, SIPHASH_CONST_3 }
#else
- static bool print_once __read_mostly;
-#endif
-
- if (print_once ||
- crng_ready() ||
- (previous && (caller == READ_ONCE(*previous))))
- return;
- WRITE_ONCE(*previous, caller);
-#ifndef CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM
- print_once = true;
+#define FASTMIX_PERM HSIPHASH_PERMUTATION
+ .pool = { HSIPHASH_CONST_0, HSIPHASH_CONST_1, HSIPHASH_CONST_2, HSIPHASH_CONST_3 }
#endif
- if (__ratelimit(&unseeded_warning))
- pr_notice("random: %s called from %pS with crng_init=%d\n",
- func_name, caller, crng_init);
-}
+};
/*
- * This function is the exported kernel interface. It returns some
- * number of good random numbers, suitable for key generation, seeding
- * TCP sequence numbers, etc. It does not rely on the hardware random
- * number generator. For random bytes direct from the hardware RNG
- * (when available), use get_random_bytes_arch(). In order to ensure
- * that the randomness provided by this function is okay, the function
- * wait_for_random_bytes() should be called and return 0 at least once
- * at any point prior.
+ * This is [Half]SipHash-1-x, starting from an empty key. Because
+ * the key is fixed, it assumes that its inputs are non-malicious,
+ * and therefore this has no security on its own. s represents the
+ * four-word SipHash state, while v represents a two-word input.
*/
-static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes)
-{
- __u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(4);
-
- trace_get_random_bytes(nbytes, _RET_IP_);
-
- while (nbytes >= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE) {
- extract_crng(buf);
- buf += CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE;
- nbytes -= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE;
- }
-
- if (nbytes > 0) {
- extract_crng(tmp);
- memcpy(buf, tmp, nbytes);
- crng_backtrack_protect(tmp, nbytes);
- } else
- crng_backtrack_protect(tmp, CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE);
- memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
-}
-
-void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes)
+static void fast_mix(unsigned long s[4], unsigned long v1, unsigned long v2)
{
- static void *previous;
-
- warn_unseeded_randomness(&previous);
- _get_random_bytes(buf, nbytes);
+ s[3] ^= v1;
+ FASTMIX_PERM(s[0], s[1], s[2], s[3]);
+ s[0] ^= v1;
+ s[3] ^= v2;
+ FASTMIX_PERM(s[0], s[1], s[2], s[3]);
+ s[0] ^= v2;
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes);
-
+#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
/*
- * Each time the timer fires, we expect that we got an unpredictable
- * jump in the cycle counter. Even if the timer is running on another
- * CPU, the timer activity will be touching the stack of the CPU that is
- * generating entropy..
- *
- * Note that we don't re-arm the timer in the timer itself - we are
- * happy to be scheduled away, since that just makes the load more
- * complex, but we do not want the timer to keep ticking unless the
- * entropy loop is running.
- *
- * So the re-arming always happens in the entropy loop itself.
+ * This function is called when the CPU has just come online, with
+ * entry CPUHP_AP_RANDOM_ONLINE, just after CPUHP_AP_WORKQUEUE_ONLINE.
*/
-static void entropy_timer(struct timer_list *t)
+int __cold random_online_cpu(unsigned int cpu)
{
- credit_entropy_bits(&input_pool, 1);
+ /*
+ * During CPU shutdown and before CPU onlining, add_interrupt_
+ * randomness() may schedule mix_interrupt_randomness(), and
+ * set the MIX_INFLIGHT flag. However, because the worker can
+ * be scheduled on a different CPU during this period, that
+ * flag will never be cleared. For that reason, we zero out
+ * the flag here, which runs just after workqueues are onlined
+ * for the CPU again. This also has the effect of setting the
+ * irq randomness count to zero so that new accumulated irqs
+ * are fresh.
+ */
+ per_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness, cpu)->count = 0;
+ return 0;
}
+#endif
-/*
- * If we have an actual cycle counter, see if we can
- * generate enough entropy with timing noise
- */
-static void try_to_generate_entropy(void)
+static void mix_interrupt_randomness(struct work_struct *work)
{
- struct {
- unsigned long now;
- struct timer_list timer;
- } stack;
-
- stack.now = random_get_entropy();
+ struct fast_pool *fast_pool = container_of(work, struct fast_pool, mix);
+ /*
+ * The size of the copied stack pool is explicitly 2 longs so that we
+ * only ever ingest half of the siphash output each time, retaining
+ * the other half as the next "key" that carries over. The entropy is
+ * supposed to be sufficiently dispersed between bits so on average
+ * we don't wind up "losing" some.
+ */
+ unsigned long pool[2];
+ unsigned int count;
- /* Slow counter - or none. Don't even bother */
- if (stack.now == random_get_entropy())
+ /* Check to see if we're running on the wrong CPU due to hotplug. */
+ local_irq_disable();
+ if (fast_pool != this_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness)) {
+ local_irq_enable();
return;
-
- timer_setup_on_stack(&stack.timer, entropy_timer, 0);
- while (!crng_ready()) {
- if (!timer_pending(&stack.timer))
- mod_timer(&stack.timer, jiffies+1);
- mix_pool_bytes(&input_pool, &stack.now, sizeof(stack.now));
- schedule();
- stack.now = random_get_entropy();
}
- del_timer_sync(&stack.timer);
- destroy_timer_on_stack(&stack.timer);
- mix_pool_bytes(&input_pool, &stack.now, sizeof(stack.now));
-}
-
-/*
- * Wait for the urandom pool to be seeded and thus guaranteed to supply
- * cryptographically secure random numbers. This applies to: the /dev/urandom
- * device, the get_random_bytes function, and the get_random_{u32,u64,int,long}
- * family of functions. Using any of these functions without first calling
- * this function forfeits the guarantee of security.
- *
- * Returns: 0 if the urandom pool has been seeded.
- * -ERESTARTSYS if the function was interrupted by a signal.
- */
-int wait_for_random_bytes(void)
-{
- if (likely(crng_ready()))
- return 0;
-
- do {
- int ret;
- ret = wait_event_interruptible_timeout(crng_init_wait, crng_ready(), HZ);
- if (ret)
- return ret > 0 ? 0 : ret;
+ /*
+ * Copy the pool to the stack so that the mixer always has a
+ * consistent view, before we reenable irqs again.
+ */
+ memcpy(pool, fast_pool->pool, sizeof(pool));
+ count = fast_pool->count;
+ fast_pool->count = 0;
+ fast_pool->last = jiffies;
+ local_irq_enable();
- try_to_generate_entropy();
- } while (!crng_ready());
+ mix_pool_bytes(pool, sizeof(pool));
+ credit_init_bits(max(1u, (count & U16_MAX) / 64));
- return 0;
+ memzero_explicit(pool, sizeof(pool));
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(wait_for_random_bytes);
-/*
- * Returns whether or not the urandom pool has been seeded and thus guaranteed
- * to supply cryptographically secure random numbers. This applies to: the
- * /dev/urandom device, the get_random_bytes function, and the get_random_{u32,
- * ,u64,int,long} family of functions.
- *
- * Returns: true if the urandom pool has been seeded.
- * false if the urandom pool has not been seeded.
- */
-bool rng_is_initialized(void)
+void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq)
{
- return crng_ready();
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(rng_is_initialized);
+ enum { MIX_INFLIGHT = 1U << 31 };
+ unsigned long entropy = random_get_entropy();
+ struct fast_pool *fast_pool = this_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness);
+ struct pt_regs *regs = get_irq_regs();
+ unsigned int new_count;
-/*
- * Add a callback function that will be invoked when the nonblocking
- * pool is initialised.
- *
- * returns: 0 if callback is successfully added
- * -EALREADY if pool is already initialised (callback not called)
- * -ENOENT if module for callback is not alive
- */
-int add_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy)
-{
- struct module *owner;
- unsigned long flags;
- int err = -EALREADY;
-
- if (crng_ready())
- return err;
-
- owner = rdy->owner;
- if (!try_module_get(owner))
- return -ENOENT;
-
- spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_list_lock, flags);
- if (crng_ready())
- goto out;
-
- owner = NULL;
-
- list_add(&rdy->list, &random_ready_list);
- err = 0;
+ fast_mix(fast_pool->pool, entropy,
+ (regs ? instruction_pointer(regs) : _RET_IP_) ^ swab(irq));
+ new_count = ++fast_pool->count;
-out:
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_list_lock, flags);
+ if (new_count & MIX_INFLIGHT)
+ return;
- module_put(owner);
+ if (new_count < 64 && !time_is_before_jiffies(fast_pool->last + HZ))
+ return;
- return err;
+ if (unlikely(!fast_pool->mix.func))
+ INIT_WORK(&fast_pool->mix, mix_interrupt_randomness);
+ fast_pool->count |= MIX_INFLIGHT;
+ queue_work_on(raw_smp_processor_id(), system_highpri_wq, &fast_pool->mix);
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_random_ready_callback);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_interrupt_randomness);
+
+/* There is one of these per entropy source */
+struct timer_rand_state {
+ unsigned long last_time;
+ long last_delta, last_delta2;
+};
/*
- * Delete a previously registered readiness callback function.
+ * This function adds entropy to the entropy "pool" by using timing
+ * delays. It uses the timer_rand_state structure to make an estimate
+ * of how many bits of entropy this call has added to the pool. The
+ * value "num" is also added to the pool; it should somehow describe
+ * the type of event that just happened.
*/
-void del_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy)
+static void add_timer_randomness(struct timer_rand_state *state, unsigned int num)
{
- unsigned long flags;
- struct module *owner = NULL;
+ unsigned long entropy = random_get_entropy(), now = jiffies, flags;
+ long delta, delta2, delta3;
+ unsigned int bits;
- spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_list_lock, flags);
- if (!list_empty(&rdy->list)) {
- list_del_init(&rdy->list);
- owner = rdy->owner;
+ /*
+ * If we're in a hard IRQ, add_interrupt_randomness() will be called
+ * sometime after, so mix into the fast pool.
+ */
+ if (in_irq()) {
+ fast_mix(this_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness)->pool, entropy, num);
+ } else {
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
+ _mix_pool_bytes(&entropy, sizeof(entropy));
+ _mix_pool_bytes(&num, sizeof(num));
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags);
}
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_list_lock, flags);
- module_put(owner);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(del_random_ready_callback);
+ if (crng_ready())
+ return;
-/*
- * This function will use the architecture-specific hardware random
- * number generator if it is available. The arch-specific hw RNG will
- * almost certainly be faster than what we can do in software, but it
- * is impossible to verify that it is implemented securely (as
- * opposed, to, say, the AES encryption of a sequence number using a
- * key known by the NSA). So it's useful if we need the speed, but
- * only if we're willing to trust the hardware manufacturer not to
- * have put in a back door.
- *
- * Return number of bytes filled in.
- */
-int __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes)
-{
- int left = nbytes;
- char *p = buf;
+ /*
+ * Calculate number of bits of randomness we probably added.
+ * We take into account the first, second and third-order deltas
+ * in order to make our estimate.
+ */
+ delta = now - READ_ONCE(state->last_time);
+ WRITE_ONCE(state->last_time, now);
- trace_get_random_bytes_arch(left, _RET_IP_);
- while (left) {
- unsigned long v;
- int chunk = min_t(int, left, sizeof(unsigned long));
+ delta2 = delta - READ_ONCE(state->last_delta);
+ WRITE_ONCE(state->last_delta, delta);
- if (!arch_get_random_long(&v))
- break;
+ delta3 = delta2 - READ_ONCE(state->last_delta2);
+ WRITE_ONCE(state->last_delta2, delta2);
- memcpy(p, &v, chunk);
- p += chunk;
- left -= chunk;
- }
+ if (delta < 0)
+ delta = -delta;
+ if (delta2 < 0)
+ delta2 = -delta2;
+ if (delta3 < 0)
+ delta3 = -delta3;
+ if (delta > delta2)
+ delta = delta2;
+ if (delta > delta3)
+ delta = delta3;
- return nbytes - left;
+ /*
+ * delta is now minimum absolute delta. Round down by 1 bit
+ * on general principles, and limit entropy estimate to 11 bits.
+ */
+ bits = min(fls(delta >> 1), 11);
+
+ /*
+ * As mentioned above, if we're in a hard IRQ, add_interrupt_randomness()
+ * will run after this, which uses a different crediting scheme of 1 bit
+ * per every 64 interrupts. In order to let that function do accounting
+ * close to the one in this function, we credit a full 64/64 bit per bit,
+ * and then subtract one to account for the extra one added.
+ */
+ if (in_irq())
+ this_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness)->count += max(1u, bits * 64) - 1;
+ else
+ _credit_init_bits(bits);
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes_arch);
-/*
- * init_std_data - initialize pool with system data
- *
- * @r: pool to initialize
- *
- * This function clears the pool's entropy count and mixes some system
- * data into the pool to prepare it for use. The pool is not cleared
- * as that can only decrease the entropy in the pool.
- */
-static void init_std_data(struct entropy_store *r)
+void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, unsigned int value)
{
- int i;
- ktime_t now = ktime_get_real();
- unsigned long rv;
-
- r->last_pulled = jiffies;
- mix_pool_bytes(r, &now, sizeof(now));
- for (i = r->poolinfo->poolbytes; i > 0; i -= sizeof(rv)) {
- if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) &&
- !arch_get_random_long(&rv))
- rv = random_get_entropy();
- mix_pool_bytes(r, &rv, sizeof(rv));
- }
- mix_pool_bytes(r, utsname(), sizeof(*(utsname())));
+ static unsigned char last_value;
+ static struct timer_rand_state input_timer_state = { INITIAL_JIFFIES };
+
+ /* Ignore autorepeat and the like. */
+ if (value == last_value)
+ return;
+
+ last_value = value;
+ add_timer_randomness(&input_timer_state,
+ (type << 4) ^ code ^ (code >> 4) ^ value);
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_input_randomness);
-/*
- * Note that setup_arch() may call add_device_randomness()
- * long before we get here. This allows seeding of the pools
- * with some platform dependent data very early in the boot
- * process. But it limits our options here. We must use
- * statically allocated structures that already have all
- * initializations complete at compile time. We should also
- * take care not to overwrite the precious per platform data
- * we were given.
- */
-static int rand_initialize(void)
+#ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK
+void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk)
{
- init_std_data(&input_pool);
- init_std_data(&blocking_pool);
- crng_initialize(&primary_crng);
- crng_global_init_time = jiffies;
- if (ratelimit_disable) {
- urandom_warning.interval = 0;
- unseeded_warning.interval = 0;
- }
- return 0;
+ if (!disk || !disk->random)
+ return;
+ /* First major is 1, so we get >= 0x200 here. */
+ add_timer_randomness(disk->random, 0x100 + disk_devt(disk));
}
-early_initcall(rand_initialize);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_disk_randomness);
-#ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK
-void rand_initialize_disk(struct gendisk *disk)
+void __cold rand_initialize_disk(struct gendisk *disk)
{
struct timer_rand_state *state;
@@ -1910,134 +1126,189 @@ void rand_initialize_disk(struct gendisk *disk)
}
#endif
-static ssize_t
-_random_read(int nonblock, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes)
+/*
+ * Each time the timer fires, we expect that we got an unpredictable
+ * jump in the cycle counter. Even if the timer is running on another
+ * CPU, the timer activity will be touching the stack of the CPU that is
+ * generating entropy..
+ *
+ * Note that we don't re-arm the timer in the timer itself - we are
+ * happy to be scheduled away, since that just makes the load more
+ * complex, but we do not want the timer to keep ticking unless the
+ * entropy loop is running.
+ *
+ * So the re-arming always happens in the entropy loop itself.
+ */
+static void __cold entropy_timer(struct timer_list *t)
{
- ssize_t n;
+ credit_init_bits(1);
+}
- if (nbytes == 0)
- return 0;
+/*
+ * If we have an actual cycle counter, see if we can
+ * generate enough entropy with timing noise
+ */
+static void __cold try_to_generate_entropy(void)
+{
+ struct {
+ unsigned long entropy;
+ struct timer_list timer;
+ } stack;
- nbytes = min_t(size_t, nbytes, SEC_XFER_SIZE);
- while (1) {
- n = extract_entropy_user(&blocking_pool, buf, nbytes);
- if (n < 0)
- return n;
- trace_random_read(n*8, (nbytes-n)*8,
- ENTROPY_BITS(&blocking_pool),
- ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool));
- if (n > 0)
- return n;
-
- /* Pool is (near) empty. Maybe wait and retry. */
- if (nonblock)
- return -EAGAIN;
+ stack.entropy = random_get_entropy();
+
+ /* Slow counter - or none. Don't even bother */
+ if (stack.entropy == random_get_entropy())
+ return;
- wait_event_interruptible(random_read_wait,
- ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool) >=
- random_read_wakeup_bits);
- if (signal_pending(current))
- return -ERESTARTSYS;
+ timer_setup_on_stack(&stack.timer, entropy_timer, 0);
+ while (!crng_ready() && !signal_pending(current)) {
+ if (!timer_pending(&stack.timer))
+ mod_timer(&stack.timer, jiffies + 1);
+ mix_pool_bytes(&stack.entropy, sizeof(stack.entropy));
+ schedule();
+ stack.entropy = random_get_entropy();
}
-}
-static ssize_t
-random_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos)
-{
- return _random_read(file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK, buf, nbytes);
+ del_timer_sync(&stack.timer);
+ destroy_timer_on_stack(&stack.timer);
+ mix_pool_bytes(&stack.entropy, sizeof(stack.entropy));
}
-static ssize_t
-urandom_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos)
+
+/**********************************************************************
+ *
+ * Userspace reader/writer interfaces.
+ *
+ * getrandom(2) is the primary modern interface into the RNG and should
+ * be used in preference to anything else.
+ *
+ * Reading from /dev/random has the same functionality as calling
+ * getrandom(2) with flags=0. In earlier versions, however, it had
+ * vastly different semantics and should therefore be avoided, to
+ * prevent backwards compatibility issues.
+ *
+ * Reading from /dev/urandom has the same functionality as calling
+ * getrandom(2) with flags=GRND_INSECURE. Because it does not block
+ * waiting for the RNG to be ready, it should not be used.
+ *
+ * Writing to either /dev/random or /dev/urandom adds entropy to
+ * the input pool but does not credit it.
+ *
+ * Polling on /dev/random indicates when the RNG is initialized, on
+ * the read side, and when it wants new entropy, on the write side.
+ *
+ * Both /dev/random and /dev/urandom have the same set of ioctls for
+ * adding entropy, getting the entropy count, zeroing the count, and
+ * reseeding the crng.
+ *
+ **********************************************************************/
+
+SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, ubuf, size_t, len, unsigned int, flags)
{
- unsigned long flags;
- static int maxwarn = 10;
+ struct iov_iter iter;
+ struct iovec iov;
int ret;
- if (!crng_ready() && maxwarn > 0) {
- maxwarn--;
- if (__ratelimit(&urandom_warning))
- printk(KERN_NOTICE "random: %s: uninitialized "
- "urandom read (%zd bytes read)\n",
- current->comm, nbytes);
- spin_lock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
- crng_init_cnt = 0;
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
+ if (flags & ~(GRND_NONBLOCK | GRND_RANDOM | GRND_INSECURE))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /*
+ * Requesting insecure and blocking randomness at the same time makes
+ * no sense.
+ */
+ if ((flags & (GRND_INSECURE | GRND_RANDOM)) == (GRND_INSECURE | GRND_RANDOM))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!crng_ready() && !(flags & GRND_INSECURE)) {
+ if (flags & GRND_NONBLOCK)
+ return -EAGAIN;
+ ret = wait_for_random_bytes();
+ if (unlikely(ret))
+ return ret;
}
- nbytes = min_t(size_t, nbytes, INT_MAX >> (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3));
- ret = extract_crng_user(buf, nbytes);
- trace_urandom_read(8 * nbytes, 0, ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool));
- return ret;
+
+ ret = import_single_range(READ, ubuf, len, &iov, &iter);
+ if (unlikely(ret))
+ return ret;
+ return get_random_bytes_user(&iter);
}
-static __poll_t
-random_poll(struct file *file, poll_table * wait)
+static __poll_t random_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
{
- __poll_t mask;
-
- poll_wait(file, &random_read_wait, wait);
- poll_wait(file, &random_write_wait, wait);
- mask = 0;
- if (ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool) >= random_read_wakeup_bits)
- mask |= EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM;
- if (ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool) < random_write_wakeup_bits)
- mask |= EPOLLOUT | EPOLLWRNORM;
- return mask;
+ poll_wait(file, &crng_init_wait, wait);
+ return crng_ready() ? EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM : EPOLLOUT | EPOLLWRNORM;
}
-static int
-write_pool(struct entropy_store *r, const char __user *buffer, size_t count)
+static ssize_t write_pool_user(struct iov_iter *iter)
{
- size_t bytes;
- __u32 t, buf[16];
- const char __user *p = buffer;
+ u8 block[BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ ssize_t ret = 0;
+ size_t copied;
- while (count > 0) {
- int b, i = 0;
+ if (unlikely(!iov_iter_count(iter)))
+ return 0;
- bytes = min(count, sizeof(buf));
- if (copy_from_user(&buf, p, bytes))
- return -EFAULT;
+ for (;;) {
+ copied = copy_from_iter(block, sizeof(block), iter);
+ ret += copied;
+ mix_pool_bytes(block, copied);
+ if (!iov_iter_count(iter) || copied != sizeof(block))
+ break;
- for (b = bytes ; b > 0 ; b -= sizeof(__u32), i++) {
- if (!arch_get_random_int(&t))
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(PAGE_SIZE % sizeof(block) != 0);
+ if (ret % PAGE_SIZE == 0) {
+ if (signal_pending(current))
break;
- buf[i] ^= t;
+ cond_resched();
}
+ }
+
+ memzero_explicit(block, sizeof(block));
+ return ret ? ret : -EFAULT;
+}
+
+static ssize_t random_write_iter(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct iov_iter *iter)
+{
+ return write_pool_user(iter);
+}
- count -= bytes;
- p += bytes;
+static ssize_t urandom_read_iter(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct iov_iter *iter)
+{
+ static int maxwarn = 10;
- mix_pool_bytes(r, buf, bytes);
- cond_resched();
+ if (!crng_ready()) {
+ if (!ratelimit_disable && maxwarn <= 0)
+ ++urandom_warning.missed;
+ else if (ratelimit_disable || __ratelimit(&urandom_warning)) {
+ --maxwarn;
+ pr_notice("%s: uninitialized urandom read (%zu bytes read)\n",
+ current->comm, iov_iter_count(iter));
+ }
}
- return 0;
+ return get_random_bytes_user(iter);
}
-static ssize_t random_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer,
- size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+static ssize_t random_read_iter(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct iov_iter *iter)
{
- size_t ret;
+ int ret;
- ret = write_pool(&input_pool, buffer, count);
- if (ret)
+ ret = wait_for_random_bytes();
+ if (ret != 0)
return ret;
-
- return (ssize_t)count;
+ return get_random_bytes_user(iter);
}
static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
- int size, ent_count;
int __user *p = (int __user *)arg;
- int retval;
+ int ent_count;
switch (cmd) {
case RNDGETENTCNT:
- /* inherently racy, no point locking */
- ent_count = ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool);
- if (put_user(ent_count, p))
+ /* Inherently racy, no point locking. */
+ if (put_user(input_pool.init_bits, p))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
case RNDADDTOENTCNT:
@@ -2045,39 +1316,48 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
return -EPERM;
if (get_user(ent_count, p))
return -EFAULT;
- return credit_entropy_bits_safe(&input_pool, ent_count);
- case RNDADDENTROPY:
+ if (ent_count < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ credit_init_bits(ent_count);
+ return 0;
+ case RNDADDENTROPY: {
+ struct iov_iter iter;
+ struct iovec iov;
+ ssize_t ret;
+ int len;
+
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (get_user(ent_count, p++))
return -EFAULT;
if (ent_count < 0)
return -EINVAL;
- if (get_user(size, p++))
+ if (get_user(len, p++))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ ret = import_single_range(WRITE, p, len, &iov, &iter);
+ if (unlikely(ret))
+ return ret;
+ ret = write_pool_user(&iter);
+ if (unlikely(ret < 0))
+ return ret;
+ /* Since we're crediting, enforce that it was all written into the pool. */
+ if (unlikely(ret != len))
return -EFAULT;
- retval = write_pool(&input_pool, (const char __user *)p,
- size);
- if (retval < 0)
- return retval;
- return credit_entropy_bits_safe(&input_pool, ent_count);
+ credit_init_bits(ent_count);
+ return 0;
+ }
case RNDZAPENTCNT:
case RNDCLEARPOOL:
- /*
- * Clear the entropy pool counters. We no longer clear
- * the entropy pool, as that's silly.
- */
+ /* No longer has any effect. */
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
- input_pool.entropy_count = 0;
- blocking_pool.entropy_count = 0;
return 0;
case RNDRESEEDCRNG:
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
- if (crng_init < 2)
+ if (!crng_ready())
return -ENODATA;
- crng_reseed(&primary_crng, &input_pool);
- WRITE_ONCE(crng_global_init_time, jiffies - 1);
+ crng_reseed();
return 0;
default:
return -EINVAL;
@@ -2090,49 +1370,54 @@ static int random_fasync(int fd, struct file *filp, int on)
}
const struct file_operations random_fops = {
- .read = random_read,
- .write = random_write,
- .poll = random_poll,
+ .read_iter = random_read_iter,
+ .write_iter = random_write_iter,
+ .poll = random_poll,
.unlocked_ioctl = random_ioctl,
.fasync = random_fasync,
.llseek = noop_llseek,
+ .splice_read = generic_file_splice_read,
+ .splice_write = iter_file_splice_write,
};
const struct file_operations urandom_fops = {
- .read = urandom_read,
- .write = random_write,
+ .read_iter = urandom_read_iter,
+ .write_iter = random_write_iter,
.unlocked_ioctl = random_ioctl,
.fasync = random_fasync,
.llseek = noop_llseek,
+ .splice_read = generic_file_splice_read,
+ .splice_write = iter_file_splice_write,
};
-SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count,
- unsigned int, flags)
-{
- int ret;
-
- if (flags & ~(GRND_NONBLOCK|GRND_RANDOM))
- return -EINVAL;
-
- if (count > INT_MAX)
- count = INT_MAX;
-
- if (flags & GRND_RANDOM)
- return _random_read(flags & GRND_NONBLOCK, buf, count);
-
- if (!crng_ready()) {
- if (flags & GRND_NONBLOCK)
- return -EAGAIN;
- ret = wait_for_random_bytes();
- if (unlikely(ret))
- return ret;
- }
- return urandom_read(NULL, buf, count, NULL);
-}
/********************************************************************
*
- * Sysctl interface
+ * Sysctl interface.
+ *
+ * These are partly unused legacy knobs with dummy values to not break
+ * userspace and partly still useful things. They are usually accessible
+ * in /proc/sys/kernel/random/ and are as follows:
+ *
+ * - boot_id - a UUID representing the current boot.
+ *
+ * - uuid - a random UUID, different each time the file is read.
+ *
+ * - poolsize - the number of bits of entropy that the input pool can
+ * hold, tied to the POOL_BITS constant.
+ *
+ * - entropy_avail - the number of bits of entropy currently in the
+ * input pool. Always <= poolsize.
+ *
+ * - write_wakeup_threshold - the amount of entropy in the input pool
+ * below which write polls to /dev/random will unblock, requesting
+ * more entropy, tied to the POOL_READY_BITS constant. It is writable
+ * to avoid breaking old userspaces, but writing to it does not
+ * change any behavior of the RNG.
+ *
+ * - urandom_min_reseed_secs - fixed to the value CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL.
+ * It is writable to avoid breaking old userspaces, but writing
+ * to it does not change any behavior of the RNG.
*
********************************************************************/
@@ -2140,26 +1425,28 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count,
#include <linux/sysctl.h>
-static int min_read_thresh = 8, min_write_thresh;
-static int max_read_thresh = OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS * 32;
-static int max_write_thresh = INPUT_POOL_WORDS * 32;
-static int random_min_urandom_seed = 60;
-static char sysctl_bootid[16];
+static int sysctl_random_min_urandom_seed = CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL / HZ;
+static int sysctl_random_write_wakeup_bits = POOL_READY_BITS;
+static int sysctl_poolsize = POOL_BITS;
+static u8 sysctl_bootid[UUID_SIZE];
/*
* This function is used to return both the bootid UUID, and random
- * UUID. The difference is in whether table->data is NULL; if it is,
+ * UUID. The difference is in whether table->data is NULL; if it is,
* then a new UUID is generated and returned to the user.
- *
- * If the user accesses this via the proc interface, the UUID will be
- * returned as an ASCII string in the standard UUID format; if via the
- * sysctl system call, as 16 bytes of binary data.
*/
-static int proc_do_uuid(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
- void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
-{
- struct ctl_table fake_table;
- unsigned char buf[64], tmp_uuid[16], *uuid;
+static int proc_do_uuid(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void __user *buf,
+ size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ u8 tmp_uuid[UUID_SIZE], *uuid;
+ char uuid_string[UUID_STRING_LEN + 1];
+ struct ctl_table fake_table = {
+ .data = uuid_string,
+ .maxlen = UUID_STRING_LEN
+ };
+
+ if (write)
+ return -EPERM;
uuid = table->data;
if (!uuid) {
@@ -2174,32 +1461,17 @@ static int proc_do_uuid(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
spin_unlock(&bootid_spinlock);
}
- sprintf(buf, "%pU", uuid);
-
- fake_table.data = buf;
- fake_table.maxlen = sizeof(buf);
-
- return proc_dostring(&fake_table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
+ snprintf(uuid_string, sizeof(uuid_string), "%pU", uuid);
+ return proc_dostring(&fake_table, 0, buf, lenp, ppos);
}
-/*
- * Return entropy available scaled to integral bits
- */
-static int proc_do_entropy(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
- void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
+/* The same as proc_dointvec, but writes don't change anything. */
+static int proc_do_rointvec(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void __user *buf,
+ size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
{
- struct ctl_table fake_table;
- int entropy_count;
-
- entropy_count = *(int *)table->data >> ENTROPY_SHIFT;
-
- fake_table.data = &entropy_count;
- fake_table.maxlen = sizeof(entropy_count);
-
- return proc_dointvec(&fake_table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
+ return write ? 0 : proc_dointvec(table, 0, buf, lenp, ppos);
}
-static int sysctl_poolsize = INPUT_POOL_WORDS * 32;
extern struct ctl_table random_table[];
struct ctl_table random_table[] = {
{
@@ -2211,213 +1483,36 @@ struct ctl_table random_table[] = {
},
{
.procname = "entropy_avail",
+ .data = &input_pool.init_bits,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0444,
- .proc_handler = proc_do_entropy,
- .data = &input_pool.entropy_count,
- },
- {
- .procname = "read_wakeup_threshold",
- .data = &random_read_wakeup_bits,
- .maxlen = sizeof(int),
- .mode = 0644,
- .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
- .extra1 = &min_read_thresh,
- .extra2 = &max_read_thresh,
+ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
},
{
.procname = "write_wakeup_threshold",
- .data = &random_write_wakeup_bits,
+ .data = &sysctl_random_write_wakeup_bits,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
- .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
- .extra1 = &min_write_thresh,
- .extra2 = &max_write_thresh,
+ .proc_handler = proc_do_rointvec,
},
{
.procname = "urandom_min_reseed_secs",
- .data = &random_min_urandom_seed,
+ .data = &sysctl_random_min_urandom_seed,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
- .proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
+ .proc_handler = proc_do_rointvec,
},
{
.procname = "boot_id",
.data = &sysctl_bootid,
- .maxlen = 16,
.mode = 0444,
.proc_handler = proc_do_uuid,
},
{
.procname = "uuid",
- .maxlen = 16,
.mode = 0444,
.proc_handler = proc_do_uuid,
},
-#ifdef ADD_INTERRUPT_BENCH
- {
- .procname = "add_interrupt_avg_cycles",
- .data = &avg_cycles,
- .maxlen = sizeof(avg_cycles),
- .mode = 0444,
- .proc_handler = proc_doulongvec_minmax,
- },
- {
- .procname = "add_interrupt_avg_deviation",
- .data = &avg_deviation,
- .maxlen = sizeof(avg_deviation),
- .mode = 0444,
- .proc_handler = proc_doulongvec_minmax,
- },
-#endif
{ }
};
-#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
-
-struct batched_entropy {
- union {
- u64 entropy_u64[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u64)];
- u32 entropy_u32[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)];
- };
- unsigned int position;
- spinlock_t batch_lock;
-};
-
-/*
- * Get a random word for internal kernel use only. The quality of the random
- * number is good as /dev/urandom, but there is no backtrack protection, with
- * the goal of being quite fast and not depleting entropy. In order to ensure
- * that the randomness provided by this function is okay, the function
- * wait_for_random_bytes() should be called and return 0 at least once at any
- * point prior.
- */
-static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u64) = {
- .batch_lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(batched_entropy_u64.lock),
-};
-
-u64 get_random_u64(void)
-{
- u64 ret;
- unsigned long flags;
- struct batched_entropy *batch;
- static void *previous;
-
- warn_unseeded_randomness(&previous);
-
- batch = raw_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u64);
- spin_lock_irqsave(&batch->batch_lock, flags);
- if (batch->position % ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u64) == 0) {
- extract_crng((u8 *)batch->entropy_u64);
- batch->position = 0;
- }
- ret = batch->entropy_u64[batch->position++];
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&batch->batch_lock, flags);
- return ret;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_u64);
-
-static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u32) = {
- .batch_lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(batched_entropy_u32.lock),
-};
-u32 get_random_u32(void)
-{
- u32 ret;
- unsigned long flags;
- struct batched_entropy *batch;
- static void *previous;
-
- warn_unseeded_randomness(&previous);
-
- batch = raw_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u32);
- spin_lock_irqsave(&batch->batch_lock, flags);
- if (batch->position % ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u32) == 0) {
- extract_crng((u8 *)batch->entropy_u32);
- batch->position = 0;
- }
- ret = batch->entropy_u32[batch->position++];
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&batch->batch_lock, flags);
- return ret;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_u32);
-
-/* It's important to invalidate all potential batched entropy that might
- * be stored before the crng is initialized, which we can do lazily by
- * simply resetting the counter to zero so that it's re-extracted on the
- * next usage. */
-static void invalidate_batched_entropy(void)
-{
- int cpu;
- unsigned long flags;
-
- for_each_possible_cpu (cpu) {
- struct batched_entropy *batched_entropy;
-
- batched_entropy = per_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u32, cpu);
- spin_lock_irqsave(&batched_entropy->batch_lock, flags);
- batched_entropy->position = 0;
- spin_unlock(&batched_entropy->batch_lock);
-
- batched_entropy = per_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u64, cpu);
- spin_lock(&batched_entropy->batch_lock);
- batched_entropy->position = 0;
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&batched_entropy->batch_lock, flags);
- }
-}
-
-/**
- * randomize_page - Generate a random, page aligned address
- * @start: The smallest acceptable address the caller will take.
- * @range: The size of the area, starting at @start, within which the
- * random address must fall.
- *
- * If @start + @range would overflow, @range is capped.
- *
- * NOTE: Historical use of randomize_range, which this replaces, presumed that
- * @start was already page aligned. We now align it regardless.
- *
- * Return: A page aligned address within [start, start + range). On error,
- * @start is returned.
- */
-unsigned long
-randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range)
-{
- if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(start)) {
- range -= PAGE_ALIGN(start) - start;
- start = PAGE_ALIGN(start);
- }
-
- if (start > ULONG_MAX - range)
- range = ULONG_MAX - start;
-
- range >>= PAGE_SHIFT;
-
- if (range == 0)
- return start;
-
- return start + (get_random_long() % range << PAGE_SHIFT);
-}
-
-/* Interface for in-kernel drivers of true hardware RNGs.
- * Those devices may produce endless random bits and will be throttled
- * when our pool is full.
- */
-void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const char *buffer, size_t count,
- size_t entropy)
-{
- struct entropy_store *poolp = &input_pool;
-
- if (unlikely(crng_init == 0)) {
- crng_fast_load(buffer, count);
- return;
- }
-
- /* Suspend writing if we're above the trickle threshold.
- * We'll be woken up again once below random_write_wakeup_thresh,
- * or when the calling thread is about to terminate.
- */
- wait_event_interruptible(random_write_wait, kthread_should_stop() ||
- ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool) <= random_write_wakeup_bits);
- mix_pool_bytes(poolp, buffer, count);
- credit_entropy_bits(poolp, entropy);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_hwgenerator_randomness);
+#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
diff --git a/drivers/hv/hv.c b/drivers/hv/hv.c
index 12bc9fa21111..08bcefca313d 100644
--- a/drivers/hv/hv.c
+++ b/drivers/hv/hv.c
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ static void hv_stimer0_isr(void)
hv_cpu = this_cpu_ptr(hv_context.cpu_context);
hv_cpu->clk_evt->event_handler(hv_cpu->clk_evt);
- add_interrupt_randomness(stimer0_vector, 0);
+ add_interrupt_randomness(stimer0_vector);
}
static int hv_ce_set_next_event(unsigned long delta,
diff --git a/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c b/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c
index 0c17743b4a65..fca092cfe200 100644
--- a/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c
+++ b/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c
@@ -1146,7 +1146,7 @@ static void vmbus_isr(void)
tasklet_schedule(&hv_cpu->msg_dpc);
}
- add_interrupt_randomness(HYPERVISOR_CALLBACK_VECTOR, 0);
+ add_interrupt_randomness(HYPERVISOR_CALLBACK_VECTOR);
}
/*
diff --git a/drivers/hwmon/hwmon.c b/drivers/hwmon/hwmon.c
index fb82d8ee0dd6..c4051a3e63c2 100644
--- a/drivers/hwmon/hwmon.c
+++ b/drivers/hwmon/hwmon.c
@@ -695,12 +695,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(hwmon_device_register_with_groups);
/**
* hwmon_device_register_with_info - register w/ hwmon
- * @dev: the parent device (mandatory)
- * @name: hwmon name attribute (mandatory)
- * @drvdata: driver data to attach to created device (optional)
- * @chip: pointer to hwmon chip information (mandatory)
+ * @dev: the parent device
+ * @name: hwmon name attribute
+ * @drvdata: driver data to attach to created device
+ * @chip: pointer to hwmon chip information
* @extra_groups: pointer to list of additional non-standard attribute groups
- * (optional)
*
* hwmon_device_unregister() must be called when the device is no
* longer needed.
@@ -713,10 +712,13 @@ hwmon_device_register_with_info(struct device *dev, const char *name,
const struct hwmon_chip_info *chip,
const struct attribute_group **extra_groups)
{
- if (!dev || !name || !chip)
+ if (!name)
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+ if (chip && (!chip->ops || !chip->ops->is_visible || !chip->info))
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
- if (!chip->ops || !chip->ops->is_visible || !chip->info)
+ if (chip && !dev)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
return __hwmon_device_register(dev, name, drvdata, chip, extra_groups);
diff --git a/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-realview.c b/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-realview.c
index b4c1924f0255..38fab02ffe9d 100644
--- a/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-realview.c
+++ b/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-realview.c
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ realview_gic_of_init(struct device_node *node, struct device_node *parent)
/* The PB11MPCore GIC needs to be configured in the syscon */
map = syscon_node_to_regmap(np);
+ of_node_put(np);
if (!IS_ERR(map)) {
/* new irq mode with no DCC */
regmap_write(map, REALVIEW_SYS_LOCK_OFFSET,
diff --git a/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c b/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c
index 05b9a4cdc8fd..8d8b8d192e2e 100644
--- a/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c
+++ b/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c
@@ -1205,12 +1205,15 @@ static void __init gic_populate_ppi_partitions(struct device_node *gic_node)
continue;
cpu = of_cpu_node_to_id(cpu_node);
- if (WARN_ON(cpu < 0))
+ if (WARN_ON(cpu < 0)) {
+ of_node_put(cpu_node);
continue;
+ }
pr_cont("%pOF[%d] ", cpu_node, cpu);
cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, &part->mask);
+ of_node_put(cpu_node);
}
pr_cont("}\n");
diff --git a/drivers/misc/atmel-ssc.c b/drivers/misc/atmel-ssc.c
index f9caf233e2cc..48521861beb5 100644
--- a/drivers/misc/atmel-ssc.c
+++ b/drivers/misc/atmel-ssc.c
@@ -235,9 +235,9 @@ static int ssc_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
clk_disable_unprepare(ssc->clk);
ssc->irq = platform_get_irq(pdev, 0);
- if (!ssc->irq) {
+ if (ssc->irq < 0) {
dev_dbg(&pdev->dev, "could not get irq\n");
- return -ENXIO;
+ return ssc->irq;
}
mutex_lock(&user_lock);
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bgmac-bcma.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bgmac-bcma.c
index 6fe074c1588b..77de92eb08b2 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bgmac-bcma.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bgmac-bcma.c
@@ -323,7 +323,6 @@ static void bgmac_remove(struct bcma_device *core)
bcma_mdio_mii_unregister(bgmac->mii_bus);
bgmac_enet_remove(bgmac);
bcma_set_drvdata(core, NULL);
- kfree(bgmac);
}
static struct bcma_driver bgmac_bcma_driver = {
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_ethtool.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_ethtool.c
index 5242d3dfeb22..6a70e62836f8 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_ethtool.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_ethtool.c
@@ -2195,15 +2195,16 @@ static void i40e_diag_test(struct net_device *netdev,
set_bit(__I40E_TESTING, pf->state);
+ if (test_bit(__I40E_RESET_RECOVERY_PENDING, pf->state) ||
+ test_bit(__I40E_RESET_INTR_RECEIVED, pf->state)) {
+ dev_warn(&pf->pdev->dev,
+ "Cannot start offline testing when PF is in reset state.\n");
+ goto skip_ol_tests;
+ }
+
if (i40e_active_vfs(pf) || i40e_active_vmdqs(pf)) {
dev_warn(&pf->pdev->dev,
"Please take active VFs and Netqueues offline and restart the adapter before running NIC diagnostics\n");
- data[I40E_ETH_TEST_REG] = 1;
- data[I40E_ETH_TEST_EEPROM] = 1;
- data[I40E_ETH_TEST_INTR] = 1;
- data[I40E_ETH_TEST_LINK] = 1;
- eth_test->flags |= ETH_TEST_FL_FAILED;
- clear_bit(__I40E_TESTING, pf->state);
goto skip_ol_tests;
}
@@ -2250,9 +2251,17 @@ static void i40e_diag_test(struct net_device *netdev,
data[I40E_ETH_TEST_INTR] = 0;
}
-skip_ol_tests:
-
netif_info(pf, drv, netdev, "testing finished\n");
+ return;
+
+skip_ol_tests:
+ data[I40E_ETH_TEST_REG] = 1;
+ data[I40E_ETH_TEST_EEPROM] = 1;
+ data[I40E_ETH_TEST_INTR] = 1;
+ data[I40E_ETH_TEST_LINK] = 1;
+ eth_test->flags |= ETH_TEST_FL_FAILED;
+ clear_bit(__I40E_TESTING, pf->state);
+ netif_info(pf, drv, netdev, "testing failed\n");
}
static void i40e_get_wol(struct net_device *netdev,
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c
index 21ea0cdea666..3615c6533cf4 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c
@@ -7508,6 +7508,11 @@ static int i40e_configure_clsflower(struct i40e_vsi *vsi,
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
+ if (!tc) {
+ dev_err(&pf->pdev->dev, "Unable to add filter because of invalid destination");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
if (test_bit(__I40E_RESET_RECOVERY_PENDING, pf->state) ||
test_bit(__I40E_RESET_INTR_RECEIVED, pf->state))
return -EBUSY;
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mediatek/mtk_eth_soc.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mediatek/mtk_eth_soc.c
index f2eaf8c13cc2..53cff913abf0 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mediatek/mtk_eth_soc.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mediatek/mtk_eth_soc.c
@@ -597,6 +597,17 @@ static inline void mtk_rx_get_desc(struct mtk_rx_dma *rxd,
rxd->rxd4 = READ_ONCE(dma_rxd->rxd4);
}
+static void *mtk_max_lro_buf_alloc(gfp_t gfp_mask)
+{
+ unsigned int size = mtk_max_frag_size(MTK_MAX_LRO_RX_LENGTH);
+ unsigned long data;
+
+ data = __get_free_pages(gfp_mask | __GFP_COMP | __GFP_NOWARN,
+ get_order(size));
+
+ return (void *)data;
+}
+
/* the qdma core needs scratch memory to be setup */
static int mtk_init_fq_dma(struct mtk_eth *eth)
{
@@ -1005,7 +1016,10 @@ static int mtk_poll_rx(struct napi_struct *napi, int budget,
goto release_desc;
/* alloc new buffer */
- new_data = napi_alloc_frag(ring->frag_size);
+ if (ring->frag_size <= PAGE_SIZE)
+ new_data = napi_alloc_frag(ring->frag_size);
+ else
+ new_data = mtk_max_lro_buf_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC);
if (unlikely(!new_data)) {
netdev->stats.rx_dropped++;
goto release_desc;
@@ -1312,7 +1326,10 @@ static int mtk_rx_alloc(struct mtk_eth *eth, int ring_no, int rx_flag)
return -ENOMEM;
for (i = 0; i < rx_dma_size; i++) {
- ring->data[i] = netdev_alloc_frag(ring->frag_size);
+ if (ring->frag_size <= PAGE_SIZE)
+ ring->data[i] = netdev_alloc_frag(ring->frag_size);
+ else
+ ring->data[i] = mtk_max_lro_buf_alloc(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ring->data[i])
return -ENOMEM;
}
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_cnt.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_cnt.h
index 81465e267b10..b7eb3674e285 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_cnt.h
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_cnt.h
@@ -7,8 +7,8 @@
#include "spectrum.h"
enum mlxsw_sp_counter_sub_pool_id {
- MLXSW_SP_COUNTER_SUB_POOL_FLOW,
MLXSW_SP_COUNTER_SUB_POOL_RIF,
+ MLXSW_SP_COUNTER_SUB_POOL_FLOW,
};
int mlxsw_sp_counter_alloc(struct mlxsw_sp *mlxsw_sp,
diff --git a/drivers/nfc/nfcmrvl/usb.c b/drivers/nfc/nfcmrvl/usb.c
index 888e298f610b..f26986eb53f1 100644
--- a/drivers/nfc/nfcmrvl/usb.c
+++ b/drivers/nfc/nfcmrvl/usb.c
@@ -401,13 +401,25 @@ static void nfcmrvl_play_deferred(struct nfcmrvl_usb_drv_data *drv_data)
int err;
while ((urb = usb_get_from_anchor(&drv_data->deferred))) {
+ usb_anchor_urb(urb, &drv_data->tx_anchor);
+
err = usb_submit_urb(urb, GFP_ATOMIC);
- if (err)
+ if (err) {
+ kfree(urb->setup_packet);
+ usb_unanchor_urb(urb);
+ usb_free_urb(urb);
break;
+ }
drv_data->tx_in_flight++;
+ usb_free_urb(urb);
+ }
+
+ /* Cleanup the rest deferred urbs. */
+ while ((urb = usb_get_from_anchor(&drv_data->deferred))) {
+ kfree(urb->setup_packet);
+ usb_free_urb(urb);
}
- usb_scuttle_anchored_urbs(&drv_data->deferred);
}
static int nfcmrvl_resume(struct usb_interface *intf)
diff --git a/drivers/of/fdt.c b/drivers/of/fdt.c
index 1eb6af6439ad..2e9ea7f1e719 100644
--- a/drivers/of/fdt.c
+++ b/drivers/of/fdt.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
#include <linux/debugfs.h>
#include <linux/serial_core.h>
#include <linux/sysfs.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
#include <asm/setup.h> /* for COMMAND_LINE_SIZE */
#include <asm/page.h>
@@ -1077,6 +1078,7 @@ int __init early_init_dt_scan_chosen(unsigned long node, const char *uname,
{
int l;
const char *p;
+ const void *rng_seed;
pr_debug("search \"chosen\", depth: %d, uname: %s\n", depth, uname);
@@ -1111,6 +1113,14 @@ int __init early_init_dt_scan_chosen(unsigned long node, const char *uname,
pr_debug("Command line is: %s\n", (char*)data);
+ rng_seed = of_get_flat_dt_prop(node, "rng-seed", &l);
+ if (rng_seed && l > 0) {
+ add_bootloader_randomness(rng_seed, l);
+
+ /* try to clear seed so it won't be found. */
+ fdt_nop_property(initial_boot_params, node, "rng-seed");
+ }
+
/* break now */
return 1;
}
@@ -1213,8 +1223,6 @@ bool __init early_init_dt_verify(void *params)
/* Setup flat device-tree pointer */
initial_boot_params = params;
- of_fdt_crc32 = crc32_be(~0, initial_boot_params,
- fdt_totalsize(initial_boot_params));
return true;
}
@@ -1240,6 +1248,8 @@ bool __init early_init_dt_scan(void *params)
return false;
early_init_dt_scan_nodes();
+ of_fdt_crc32 = crc32_be(~0, initial_boot_params,
+ fdt_totalsize(initial_boot_params));
return true;
}
diff --git a/drivers/scsi/ipr.c b/drivers/scsi/ipr.c
index 1b04a8223eb0..c6cde552b995 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/ipr.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/ipr.c
@@ -9783,7 +9783,7 @@ static int ipr_alloc_mem(struct ipr_ioa_cfg *ioa_cfg)
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ioa_cfg->hrrq[i].host_rrq) {
- while (--i > 0)
+ while (--i >= 0)
dma_free_coherent(&pdev->dev,
sizeof(u32) * ioa_cfg->hrrq[i].size,
ioa_cfg->hrrq[i].host_rrq,
@@ -10056,7 +10056,7 @@ static int ipr_request_other_msi_irqs(struct ipr_ioa_cfg *ioa_cfg,
ioa_cfg->vectors_info[i].desc,
&ioa_cfg->hrrq[i]);
if (rc) {
- while (--i >= 0)
+ while (--i > 0)
free_irq(pci_irq_vector(pdev, i),
&ioa_cfg->hrrq[i]);
return rc;
diff --git a/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_nportdisc.c b/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_nportdisc.c
index 9442fb30e7cd..f666518d84b0 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_nportdisc.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_nportdisc.c
@@ -662,7 +662,8 @@ lpfc_rcv_logo(struct lpfc_vport *vport, struct lpfc_nodelist *ndlp,
else
lpfc_els_rsp_acc(vport, ELS_CMD_ACC, cmdiocb, ndlp, NULL);
if (ndlp->nlp_DID == Fabric_DID) {
- if (vport->port_state <= LPFC_FDISC)
+ if (vport->port_state <= LPFC_FDISC ||
+ vport->fc_flag & FC_PT2PT)
goto out;
lpfc_linkdown_port(vport);
spin_lock_irq(shost->host_lock);
diff --git a/drivers/scsi/pmcraid.c b/drivers/scsi/pmcraid.c
index 4e86994e10e8..6e96229c58e0 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/pmcraid.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/pmcraid.c
@@ -4559,7 +4559,7 @@ pmcraid_register_interrupt_handler(struct pmcraid_instance *pinstance)
return 0;
out_unwind:
- while (--i > 0)
+ while (--i >= 0)
free_irq(pci_irq_vector(pdev, i), &pinstance->hrrq_vector[i]);
pci_free_irq_vectors(pdev);
return rc;
diff --git a/drivers/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.h b/drivers/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.h
index 75966d3f326e..d87c12324c03 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.h
+++ b/drivers/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.h
@@ -333,8 +333,8 @@ struct PVSCSIRingReqDesc {
u8 tag;
u8 bus;
u8 target;
- u8 vcpuHint;
- u8 unused[59];
+ u16 vcpuHint;
+ u8 unused[58];
} __packed;
/*
diff --git a/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/vmk80xx.c b/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/vmk80xx.c
index 7769eadfaf61..ccc65cfc519f 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/vmk80xx.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/vmk80xx.c
@@ -685,7 +685,7 @@ static int vmk80xx_alloc_usb_buffers(struct comedi_device *dev)
if (!devpriv->usb_rx_buf)
return -ENOMEM;
- size = max(usb_endpoint_maxp(devpriv->ep_rx), MIN_BUF_SIZE);
+ size = max(usb_endpoint_maxp(devpriv->ep_tx), MIN_BUF_SIZE);
devpriv->usb_tx_buf = kzalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!devpriv->usb_tx_buf)
return -ENOMEM;
diff --git a/drivers/tty/goldfish.c b/drivers/tty/goldfish.c
index abc84d84f638..9180ca5e4dcd 100644
--- a/drivers/tty/goldfish.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/goldfish.c
@@ -428,7 +428,7 @@ static int goldfish_tty_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)
tty_unregister_device(goldfish_tty_driver, qtty->console.index);
iounmap(qtty->base);
qtty->base = NULL;
- free_irq(qtty->irq, pdev);
+ free_irq(qtty->irq, qtty);
tty_port_destroy(&qtty->port);
goldfish_tty_current_line_count--;
if (goldfish_tty_current_line_count == 0)
diff --git a/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c b/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c
index 34687c354f5e..5a2e67a8ddc7 100644
--- a/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c
@@ -1522,6 +1522,8 @@ static inline void __stop_tx(struct uart_8250_port *p)
if (em485) {
unsigned char lsr = serial_in(p, UART_LSR);
+ p->lsr_saved_flags |= lsr & LSR_SAVE_FLAGS;
+
/*
* To provide required timeing and allow FIFO transfer,
* __stop_tx_rs485() must be called only when both FIFO and
diff --git a/drivers/usb/dwc2/hcd.c b/drivers/usb/dwc2/hcd.c
index 22c4d554865e..cfda88318583 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/dwc2/hcd.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/dwc2/hcd.c
@@ -5236,7 +5236,7 @@ int dwc2_hcd_init(struct dwc2_hsotg *hsotg)
res = platform_get_resource(pdev, IORESOURCE_MEM, 0);
if (!res) {
retval = -EINVAL;
- goto error1;
+ goto error2;
}
hcd->rsrc_start = res->start;
hcd->rsrc_len = resource_size(res);
diff --git a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ether.c b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ether.c
index 1b3e674e6330..2fe91f120bb1 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ether.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ether.c
@@ -772,9 +772,13 @@ struct eth_dev *gether_setup_name(struct usb_gadget *g,
dev->qmult = qmult;
snprintf(net->name, sizeof(net->name), "%s%%d", netname);
- if (get_ether_addr(dev_addr, net->dev_addr))
+ if (get_ether_addr(dev_addr, net->dev_addr)) {
+ net->addr_assign_type = NET_ADDR_RANDOM;
dev_warn(&g->dev,
"using random %s ethernet address\n", "self");
+ } else {
+ net->addr_assign_type = NET_ADDR_SET;
+ }
if (get_ether_addr(host_addr, dev->host_mac))
dev_warn(&g->dev,
"using random %s ethernet address\n", "host");
@@ -831,6 +835,9 @@ struct net_device *gether_setup_name_default(const char *netname)
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->tx_reqs);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->rx_reqs);
+ /* by default we always have a random MAC address */
+ net->addr_assign_type = NET_ADDR_RANDOM;
+
skb_queue_head_init(&dev->rx_frames);
/* network device setup */
@@ -868,7 +875,6 @@ int gether_register_netdev(struct net_device *net)
g = dev->gadget;
memcpy(net->dev_addr, dev->dev_mac, ETH_ALEN);
- net->addr_assign_type = NET_ADDR_RANDOM;
status = register_netdev(net);
if (status < 0) {
@@ -908,6 +914,7 @@ int gether_set_dev_addr(struct net_device *net, const char *dev_addr)
if (get_ether_addr(dev_addr, new_addr))
return -EINVAL;
memcpy(dev->dev_mac, new_addr, ETH_ALEN);
+ net->addr_assign_type = NET_ADDR_SET;
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(gether_set_dev_addr);
diff --git a/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/lpc32xx_udc.c b/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/lpc32xx_udc.c
index cf56819f16e4..f7735d5ac6be 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/lpc32xx_udc.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/lpc32xx_udc.c
@@ -3021,6 +3021,7 @@ static int lpc32xx_udc_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
}
udc->isp1301_i2c_client = isp1301_get_client(isp1301_node);
+ of_node_put(isp1301_node);
if (!udc->isp1301_i2c_client) {
retval = -EPROBE_DEFER;
goto phy_fail;
diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/io_ti.c b/drivers/usb/serial/io_ti.c
index 6d1d6efa3055..a4421e1a6c07 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/serial/io_ti.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/serial/io_ti.c
@@ -168,6 +168,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id edgeport_2port_id_table[] = {
{ USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_ION, ION_DEVICE_ID_TI_EDGEPORT_8S) },
{ USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_ION, ION_DEVICE_ID_TI_EDGEPORT_416) },
{ USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_ION, ION_DEVICE_ID_TI_EDGEPORT_416B) },
+ { USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_ION, ION_DEVICE_ID_E5805A) },
{ }
};
@@ -206,6 +207,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id id_table_combined[] = {
{ USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_ION, ION_DEVICE_ID_TI_EDGEPORT_8S) },
{ USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_ION, ION_DEVICE_ID_TI_EDGEPORT_416) },
{ USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_ION, ION_DEVICE_ID_TI_EDGEPORT_416B) },
+ { USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_ION, ION_DEVICE_ID_E5805A) },
{ }
};
diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/io_usbvend.h b/drivers/usb/serial/io_usbvend.h
index c38e87ac5ea9..7ca5ca49adff 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/serial/io_usbvend.h
+++ b/drivers/usb/serial/io_usbvend.h
@@ -212,6 +212,7 @@
//
// Definitions for other product IDs
#define ION_DEVICE_ID_MT4X56USB 0x1403 // OEM device
+#define ION_DEVICE_ID_E5805A 0x1A01 // OEM device (rebranded Edgeport/4)
#define GENERATION_ID_FROM_USB_PRODUCT_ID(ProductId) \
diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/option.c b/drivers/usb/serial/option.c
index 427a38ab198b..4f99818ca70e 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/serial/option.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/serial/option.c
@@ -432,6 +432,8 @@ static void option_instat_callback(struct urb *urb);
#define CINTERION_PRODUCT_CLS8 0x00b0
#define CINTERION_PRODUCT_MV31_MBIM 0x00b3
#define CINTERION_PRODUCT_MV31_RMNET 0x00b7
+#define CINTERION_PRODUCT_MV31_2_MBIM 0x00b8
+#define CINTERION_PRODUCT_MV31_2_RMNET 0x00b9
#define CINTERION_PRODUCT_MV32_WA 0x00f1
#define CINTERION_PRODUCT_MV32_WB 0x00f2
@@ -1979,6 +1981,10 @@ static const struct usb_device_id option_ids[] = {
.driver_info = RSVD(3)},
{ USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(CINTERION_VENDOR_ID, CINTERION_PRODUCT_MV31_RMNET, 0xff),
.driver_info = RSVD(0)},
+ { USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(CINTERION_VENDOR_ID, CINTERION_PRODUCT_MV31_2_MBIM, 0xff),
+ .driver_info = RSVD(3)},
+ { USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(CINTERION_VENDOR_ID, CINTERION_PRODUCT_MV31_2_RMNET, 0xff),
+ .driver_info = RSVD(0)},
{ USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(CINTERION_VENDOR_ID, CINTERION_PRODUCT_MV32_WA, 0xff),
.driver_info = RSVD(3)},
{ USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(CINTERION_VENDOR_ID, CINTERION_PRODUCT_MV32_WB, 0xff),
diff --git a/drivers/virtio/virtio_mmio.c b/drivers/virtio/virtio_mmio.c
index 4cd9ea5c75be..c69c755bf553 100644
--- a/drivers/virtio/virtio_mmio.c
+++ b/drivers/virtio/virtio_mmio.c
@@ -663,6 +663,7 @@ static int vm_cmdline_set(const char *device,
if (!vm_cmdline_parent_registered) {
err = device_register(&vm_cmdline_parent);
if (err) {
+ put_device(&vm_cmdline_parent);
pr_err("Failed to register parent device!\n");
return err;
}
diff --git a/drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_common.c b/drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_common.c
index b7cc63f556ee..40618ccffeb8 100644
--- a/drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_common.c
+++ b/drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_common.c
@@ -257,8 +257,7 @@ void vp_del_vqs(struct virtio_device *vdev)
if (vp_dev->msix_affinity_masks) {
for (i = 0; i < vp_dev->msix_vectors; i++)
- if (vp_dev->msix_affinity_masks[i])
- free_cpumask_var(vp_dev->msix_affinity_masks[i]);
+ free_cpumask_var(vp_dev->msix_affinity_masks[i]);
}
if (vp_dev->msix_enabled) {
diff --git a/fs/9p/vfs_inode_dotl.c b/fs/9p/vfs_inode_dotl.c
index a950a927a626..c94e0748fc32 100644
--- a/fs/9p/vfs_inode_dotl.c
+++ b/fs/9p/vfs_inode_dotl.c
@@ -656,14 +656,10 @@ v9fs_stat2inode_dotl(struct p9_stat_dotl *stat, struct inode *inode,
if (stat->st_result_mask & P9_STATS_NLINK)
set_nlink(inode, stat->st_nlink);
if (stat->st_result_mask & P9_STATS_MODE) {
- inode->i_mode = stat->st_mode;
- if ((S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode)) ||
- (S_ISCHR(inode->i_mode)))
- init_special_inode(inode, inode->i_mode,
- inode->i_rdev);
+ mode = stat->st_mode & S_IALLUGO;
+ mode |= inode->i_mode & ~S_IALLUGO;
+ inode->i_mode = mode;
}
- if (stat->st_result_mask & P9_STATS_RDEV)
- inode->i_rdev = new_decode_dev(stat->st_rdev);
if (!(flags & V9FS_STAT2INODE_KEEP_ISIZE) &&
stat->st_result_mask & P9_STATS_SIZE)
v9fs_i_size_write(inode, stat->st_size);
diff --git a/fs/ext4/mballoc.c b/fs/ext4/mballoc.c
index db8243627b08..4ea4fe92eb8c 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/mballoc.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/mballoc.c
@@ -3170,6 +3170,15 @@ ext4_mb_normalize_request(struct ext4_allocation_context *ac,
size = size >> bsbits;
start = start_off >> bsbits;
+ /*
+ * For tiny groups (smaller than 8MB) the chosen allocation
+ * alignment may be larger than group size. Make sure the
+ * alignment does not move allocation to a different group which
+ * makes mballoc fail assertions later.
+ */
+ start = max(start, rounddown(ac->ac_o_ex.fe_logical,
+ (ext4_lblk_t)EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(ac->ac_sb)));
+
/* don't cover already allocated blocks in selected range */
if (ar->pleft && start <= ar->lleft) {
size -= ar->lleft + 1 - start;
diff --git a/fs/ext4/namei.c b/fs/ext4/namei.c
index 621271c2989b..5f8599419150 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/namei.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/namei.c
@@ -1743,7 +1743,8 @@ static struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *do_split(handle_t *handle, struct inode *dir,
struct dx_hash_info *hinfo)
{
unsigned blocksize = dir->i_sb->s_blocksize;
- unsigned count, continued;
+ unsigned continued;
+ int count;
struct buffer_head *bh2;
ext4_lblk_t newblock;
u32 hash2;
diff --git a/fs/ext4/resize.c b/fs/ext4/resize.c
index 5f954620efbf..d37493b39ab9 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/resize.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/resize.c
@@ -52,6 +52,16 @@ int ext4_resize_begin(struct super_block *sb)
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE))
return -EPERM;
+ /*
+ * If the reserved GDT blocks is non-zero, the resize_inode feature
+ * should always be set.
+ */
+ if (EXT4_SB(sb)->s_es->s_reserved_gdt_blocks &&
+ !ext4_has_feature_resize_inode(sb)) {
+ ext4_error(sb, "resize_inode disabled but reserved GDT blocks non-zero");
+ return -EFSCORRUPTED;
+ }
+
/*
* If we are not using the primary superblock/GDT copy don't resize,
* because the user tools have no way of handling this. Probably a
diff --git a/fs/nfs/pnfs.c b/fs/nfs/pnfs.c
index a7d638bfb46b..cfb1fe5dfb1e 100644
--- a/fs/nfs/pnfs.c
+++ b/fs/nfs/pnfs.c
@@ -2045,6 +2045,12 @@ pnfs_update_layout(struct inode *ino,
case -ERECALLCONFLICT:
case -EAGAIN:
break;
+ case -ENODATA:
+ /* The server returned NFS4ERR_LAYOUTUNAVAILABLE */
+ pnfs_layout_set_fail_bit(
+ lo, pnfs_iomode_to_fail_bit(iomode));
+ lseg = NULL;
+ goto out_put_layout_hdr;
default:
if (!nfs_error_is_fatal(PTR_ERR(lseg))) {
pnfs_layout_clear_fail_bit(lo, pnfs_iomode_to_fail_bit(iomode));
diff --git a/include/crypto/blake2s.h b/include/crypto/blake2s.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..d439496fa6ba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/crypto/blake2s.h
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR MIT */
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@...c4.com>. All Rights Reserved.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _CRYPTO_BLAKE2S_H
+#define _CRYPTO_BLAKE2S_H
+
+#include <linux/bug.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+
+enum blake2s_lengths {
+ BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE = 64,
+ BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE = 32,
+ BLAKE2S_KEY_SIZE = 32,
+
+ BLAKE2S_128_HASH_SIZE = 16,
+ BLAKE2S_160_HASH_SIZE = 20,
+ BLAKE2S_224_HASH_SIZE = 28,
+ BLAKE2S_256_HASH_SIZE = 32,
+};
+
+struct blake2s_state {
+ u32 h[8];
+ u32 t[2];
+ u32 f[2];
+ u8 buf[BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ unsigned int buflen;
+ unsigned int outlen;
+};
+
+enum blake2s_iv {
+ BLAKE2S_IV0 = 0x6A09E667UL,
+ BLAKE2S_IV1 = 0xBB67AE85UL,
+ BLAKE2S_IV2 = 0x3C6EF372UL,
+ BLAKE2S_IV3 = 0xA54FF53AUL,
+ BLAKE2S_IV4 = 0x510E527FUL,
+ BLAKE2S_IV5 = 0x9B05688CUL,
+ BLAKE2S_IV6 = 0x1F83D9ABUL,
+ BLAKE2S_IV7 = 0x5BE0CD19UL,
+};
+
+void blake2s_update(struct blake2s_state *state, const u8 *in, size_t inlen);
+void blake2s_final(struct blake2s_state *state, u8 *out);
+
+static inline void blake2s_init_param(struct blake2s_state *state,
+ const u32 param)
+{
+ *state = (struct blake2s_state){{
+ BLAKE2S_IV0 ^ param,
+ BLAKE2S_IV1,
+ BLAKE2S_IV2,
+ BLAKE2S_IV3,
+ BLAKE2S_IV4,
+ BLAKE2S_IV5,
+ BLAKE2S_IV6,
+ BLAKE2S_IV7,
+ }};
+}
+
+static inline void blake2s_init(struct blake2s_state *state,
+ const size_t outlen)
+{
+ blake2s_init_param(state, 0x01010000 | outlen);
+ state->outlen = outlen;
+}
+
+static inline void blake2s_init_key(struct blake2s_state *state,
+ const size_t outlen, const void *key,
+ const size_t keylen)
+{
+ WARN_ON(IS_ENABLED(DEBUG) && (!outlen || outlen > BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE ||
+ !key || !keylen || keylen > BLAKE2S_KEY_SIZE));
+
+ blake2s_init_param(state, 0x01010000 | keylen << 8 | outlen);
+ memcpy(state->buf, key, keylen);
+ state->buflen = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ state->outlen = outlen;
+}
+
+static inline void blake2s(u8 *out, const u8 *in, const u8 *key,
+ const size_t outlen, const size_t inlen,
+ const size_t keylen)
+{
+ struct blake2s_state state;
+
+ WARN_ON(IS_ENABLED(DEBUG) && ((!in && inlen > 0) || !out || !outlen ||
+ outlen > BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE || keylen > BLAKE2S_KEY_SIZE ||
+ (!key && keylen)));
+
+ if (keylen)
+ blake2s_init_key(&state, outlen, key, keylen);
+ else
+ blake2s_init(&state, outlen);
+
+ blake2s_update(&state, in, inlen);
+ blake2s_final(&state, out);
+}
+
+#endif /* _CRYPTO_BLAKE2S_H */
diff --git a/include/crypto/chacha20.h b/include/crypto/chacha20.h
index f76302d99e2b..3dd5ab189543 100644
--- a/include/crypto/chacha20.h
+++ b/include/crypto/chacha20.h
@@ -24,4 +24,19 @@ int crypto_chacha20_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
unsigned int keysize);
int crypto_chacha20_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req);
+enum chacha_constants { /* expand 32-byte k */
+ CHACHA_CONSTANT_EXPA = 0x61707865U,
+ CHACHA_CONSTANT_ND_3 = 0x3320646eU,
+ CHACHA_CONSTANT_2_BY = 0x79622d32U,
+ CHACHA_CONSTANT_TE_K = 0x6b206574U
+};
+
+static inline void chacha_init_consts(u32 *state)
+{
+ state[0] = CHACHA_CONSTANT_EXPA;
+ state[1] = CHACHA_CONSTANT_ND_3;
+ state[2] = CHACHA_CONSTANT_2_BY;
+ state[3] = CHACHA_CONSTANT_TE_K;
+}
+
#endif
diff --git a/include/crypto/drbg.h b/include/crypto/drbg.h
index 3fb581bf3b87..a6c3b8e7deb6 100644
--- a/include/crypto/drbg.h
+++ b/include/crypto/drbg.h
@@ -105,6 +105,12 @@ struct drbg_test_data {
struct drbg_string *testentropy; /* TEST PARAMETER: test entropy */
};
+enum drbg_seed_state {
+ DRBG_SEED_STATE_UNSEEDED,
+ DRBG_SEED_STATE_PARTIAL, /* Seeded with !rng_is_initialized() */
+ DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL,
+};
+
struct drbg_state {
struct mutex drbg_mutex; /* lock around DRBG */
unsigned char *V; /* internal state 10.1.1.1 1a) */
@@ -127,14 +133,14 @@ struct drbg_state {
struct crypto_wait ctr_wait; /* CTR mode async wait obj */
struct scatterlist sg_in, sg_out; /* CTR mode SGLs */
- bool seeded; /* DRBG fully seeded? */
+ enum drbg_seed_state seeded; /* DRBG fully seeded? */
bool pr; /* Prediction resistance enabled? */
- struct work_struct seed_work; /* asynchronous seeding support */
+ bool fips_primed; /* Continuous test primed? */
+ unsigned char *prev; /* FIPS 140-2 continuous test value */
struct crypto_rng *jent;
const struct drbg_state_ops *d_ops;
const struct drbg_core *core;
struct drbg_string test_data;
- struct random_ready_callback random_ready;
};
static inline __u8 drbg_statelen(struct drbg_state *drbg)
@@ -182,11 +188,7 @@ static inline size_t drbg_max_addtl(struct drbg_state *drbg)
static inline size_t drbg_max_requests(struct drbg_state *drbg)
{
/* SP800-90A requires 2**48 maximum requests before reseeding */
-#if (__BITS_PER_LONG == 32)
- return SIZE_MAX;
-#else
- return (1UL<<48);
-#endif
+ return (1<<20);
}
/*
diff --git a/include/crypto/internal/blake2s.h b/include/crypto/internal/blake2s.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..3ba066845b69
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/crypto/internal/blake2s.h
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR MIT */
+
+#ifndef _CRYPTO_INTERNAL_BLAKE2S_H
+#define _CRYPTO_INTERNAL_BLAKE2S_H
+
+#include <crypto/blake2s.h>
+
+void blake2s_compress_generic(struct blake2s_state *state,const u8 *block,
+ size_t nblocks, const u32 inc);
+
+void blake2s_compress_arch(struct blake2s_state *state,const u8 *block,
+ size_t nblocks, const u32 inc);
+
+static inline void blake2s_set_lastblock(struct blake2s_state *state)
+{
+ state->f[0] = -1;
+}
+
+#endif /* _CRYPTO_INTERNAL_BLAKE2S_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/cpuhotplug.h b/include/linux/cpuhotplug.h
index b51da879d7be..60efd9810d53 100644
--- a/include/linux/cpuhotplug.h
+++ b/include/linux/cpuhotplug.h
@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ enum cpuhp_state {
CPUHP_LUSTRE_CFS_DEAD,
CPUHP_AP_ARM_CACHE_B15_RAC_DEAD,
CPUHP_PADATA_DEAD,
+ CPUHP_RANDOM_PREPARE,
CPUHP_WORKQUEUE_PREP,
CPUHP_POWER_NUMA_PREPARE,
CPUHP_HRTIMERS_PREPARE,
@@ -171,6 +172,7 @@ enum cpuhp_state {
CPUHP_AP_PERF_POWERPC_THREAD_IMC_ONLINE,
CPUHP_AP_WATCHDOG_ONLINE,
CPUHP_AP_WORKQUEUE_ONLINE,
+ CPUHP_AP_RANDOM_ONLINE,
CPUHP_AP_RCUTREE_ONLINE,
CPUHP_AP_BASE_CACHEINFO_ONLINE,
CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN,
diff --git a/include/linux/hw_random.h b/include/linux/hw_random.h
index bee0827766a3..31587f36c06e 100644
--- a/include/linux/hw_random.h
+++ b/include/linux/hw_random.h
@@ -59,7 +59,5 @@ extern int devm_hwrng_register(struct device *dev, struct hwrng *rng);
/** Unregister a Hardware Random Number Generator driver. */
extern void hwrng_unregister(struct hwrng *rng);
extern void devm_hwrng_unregister(struct device *dve, struct hwrng *rng);
-/** Feed random bits into the pool. */
-extern void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const char *buffer, size_t count, size_t entropy);
#endif /* LINUX_HWRANDOM_H_ */
diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
index c736c677b876..26a5fba22664 100644
--- a/include/linux/mm.h
+++ b/include/linux/mm.h
@@ -2308,6 +2308,8 @@ extern int install_special_mapping(struct mm_struct *mm,
unsigned long addr, unsigned long len,
unsigned long flags, struct page **pages);
+unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range);
+
extern unsigned long get_unmapped_area(struct file *, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long);
extern unsigned long mmap_region(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
diff --git a/include/linux/prandom.h b/include/linux/prandom.h
index e20339c78a84..709e8e69fb39 100644
--- a/include/linux/prandom.h
+++ b/include/linux/prandom.h
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/percpu.h>
+#include <linux/siphash.h>
u32 prandom_u32(void);
void prandom_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes);
@@ -21,15 +22,10 @@ void prandom_reseed_late(void);
* The core SipHash round function. Each line can be executed in
* parallel given enough CPU resources.
*/
-#define PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3) ( \
- v0 += v1, v1 = rol64(v1, 13), v2 += v3, v3 = rol64(v3, 16), \
- v1 ^= v0, v0 = rol64(v0, 32), v3 ^= v2, \
- v0 += v3, v3 = rol64(v3, 21), v2 += v1, v1 = rol64(v1, 17), \
- v3 ^= v0, v1 ^= v2, v2 = rol64(v2, 32) \
-)
+#define PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3) SIPHASH_PERMUTATION(v0, v1, v2, v3)
-#define PRND_K0 (0x736f6d6570736575 ^ 0x6c7967656e657261)
-#define PRND_K1 (0x646f72616e646f6d ^ 0x7465646279746573)
+#define PRND_K0 (SIPHASH_CONST_0 ^ SIPHASH_CONST_2)
+#define PRND_K1 (SIPHASH_CONST_1 ^ SIPHASH_CONST_3)
#elif BITS_PER_LONG == 32
/*
@@ -37,14 +33,9 @@ void prandom_reseed_late(void);
* This is weaker, but 32-bit machines are not used for high-traffic
* applications, so there is less output for an attacker to analyze.
*/
-#define PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3) ( \
- v0 += v1, v1 = rol32(v1, 5), v2 += v3, v3 = rol32(v3, 8), \
- v1 ^= v0, v0 = rol32(v0, 16), v3 ^= v2, \
- v0 += v3, v3 = rol32(v3, 7), v2 += v1, v1 = rol32(v1, 13), \
- v3 ^= v0, v1 ^= v2, v2 = rol32(v2, 16) \
-)
-#define PRND_K0 0x6c796765
-#define PRND_K1 0x74656462
+#define PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3) HSIPHASH_PERMUTATION(v0, v1, v2, v3)
+#define PRND_K0 (HSIPHASH_CONST_0 ^ HSIPHASH_CONST_2)
+#define PRND_K1 (HSIPHASH_CONST_1 ^ HSIPHASH_CONST_3)
#else
#error Unsupported BITS_PER_LONG
diff --git a/include/linux/random.h b/include/linux/random.h
index 37209b3b22ae..3feafab498ad 100644
--- a/include/linux/random.h
+++ b/include/linux/random.h
@@ -1,50 +1,35 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
-/*
- * include/linux/random.h
- *
- * Include file for the random number generator.
- */
+
#ifndef _LINUX_RANDOM_H
#define _LINUX_RANDOM_H
+#include <linux/bug.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/list.h>
#include <linux/once.h>
#include <uapi/linux/random.h>
-struct random_ready_callback {
- struct list_head list;
- void (*func)(struct random_ready_callback *rdy);
- struct module *owner;
-};
+struct notifier_block;
-extern void add_device_randomness(const void *, unsigned int);
+void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len);
+void __init add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len);
+void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
+ unsigned int value) __latent_entropy;
+void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) __latent_entropy;
+void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len, size_t entropy);
-#if defined(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY) && !defined(__CHECKER__)
+#if defined(LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN) && !defined(__CHECKER__)
static inline void add_latent_entropy(void)
{
- add_device_randomness((const void *)&latent_entropy,
- sizeof(latent_entropy));
+ add_device_randomness((const void *)&latent_entropy, sizeof(latent_entropy));
}
#else
-static inline void add_latent_entropy(void) {}
-#endif
-
-extern void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
- unsigned int value) __latent_entropy;
-extern void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags) __latent_entropy;
-
-extern void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);
-extern int wait_for_random_bytes(void);
-extern bool rng_is_initialized(void);
-extern int add_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy);
-extern void del_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy);
-extern int __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes);
-
-#ifndef MODULE
-extern const struct file_operations random_fops, urandom_fops;
+static inline void add_latent_entropy(void) { }
#endif
+void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t len);
+size_t __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, size_t len);
u32 get_random_u32(void);
u64 get_random_u64(void);
static inline unsigned int get_random_int(void)
@@ -76,36 +61,38 @@ static inline unsigned long get_random_long(void)
static inline unsigned long get_random_canary(void)
{
- unsigned long val = get_random_long();
-
- return val & CANARY_MASK;
+ return get_random_long() & CANARY_MASK;
}
+int __init random_init(const char *command_line);
+bool rng_is_initialized(void);
+int wait_for_random_bytes(void);
+int register_random_ready_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb);
+int unregister_random_ready_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb);
+
/* Calls wait_for_random_bytes() and then calls get_random_bytes(buf, nbytes).
* Returns the result of the call to wait_for_random_bytes. */
-static inline int get_random_bytes_wait(void *buf, int nbytes)
+static inline int get_random_bytes_wait(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
{
int ret = wait_for_random_bytes();
get_random_bytes(buf, nbytes);
return ret;
}
-#define declare_get_random_var_wait(var) \
- static inline int get_random_ ## var ## _wait(var *out) { \
+#define declare_get_random_var_wait(name, ret_type) \
+ static inline int get_random_ ## name ## _wait(ret_type *out) { \
int ret = wait_for_random_bytes(); \
if (unlikely(ret)) \
return ret; \
- *out = get_random_ ## var(); \
+ *out = get_random_ ## name(); \
return 0; \
}
-declare_get_random_var_wait(u32)
-declare_get_random_var_wait(u64)
-declare_get_random_var_wait(int)
-declare_get_random_var_wait(long)
+declare_get_random_var_wait(u32, u32)
+declare_get_random_var_wait(u64, u32)
+declare_get_random_var_wait(int, unsigned int)
+declare_get_random_var_wait(long, unsigned long)
#undef declare_get_random_var
-unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range);
-
/*
* This is designed to be standalone for just prandom
* users, but for now we include it from <linux/random.h>
@@ -116,30 +103,39 @@ unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range);
#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM
# include <asm/archrandom.h>
#else
-static inline bool arch_get_random_long(unsigned long *v)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-static inline bool arch_get_random_int(unsigned int *v)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-static inline bool arch_has_random(void)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-static inline bool arch_get_random_seed_long(unsigned long *v)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-static inline bool arch_get_random_seed_int(unsigned int *v)
+static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_long(unsigned long *v) { return false; }
+static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_int(unsigned int *v) { return false; }
+static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_long(unsigned long *v) { return false; }
+static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_int(unsigned int *v) { return false; }
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Called from the boot CPU during startup; not valid to call once
+ * secondary CPUs are up and preemption is possible.
+ */
+#ifndef arch_get_random_seed_long_early
+static inline bool __init arch_get_random_seed_long_early(unsigned long *v)
{
- return 0;
+ WARN_ON(system_state != SYSTEM_BOOTING);
+ return arch_get_random_seed_long(v);
}
-static inline bool arch_has_random_seed(void)
+#endif
+
+#ifndef arch_get_random_long_early
+static inline bool __init arch_get_random_long_early(unsigned long *v)
{
- return 0;
+ WARN_ON(system_state != SYSTEM_BOOTING);
+ return arch_get_random_long(v);
}
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+int random_prepare_cpu(unsigned int cpu);
+int random_online_cpu(unsigned int cpu);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef MODULE
+extern const struct file_operations random_fops, urandom_fops;
+#endif
+
#endif /* _LINUX_RANDOM_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/siphash.h b/include/linux/siphash.h
index 0cda61855d90..0bb5ecd507be 100644
--- a/include/linux/siphash.h
+++ b/include/linux/siphash.h
@@ -136,4 +136,32 @@ static inline u32 hsiphash(const void *data, size_t len,
return ___hsiphash_aligned(data, len, key);
}
+/*
+ * These macros expose the raw SipHash and HalfSipHash permutations.
+ * Do not use them directly! If you think you have a use for them,
+ * be sure to CC the maintainer of this file explaining why.
+ */
+
+#define SIPHASH_PERMUTATION(a, b, c, d) ( \
+ (a) += (b), (b) = rol64((b), 13), (b) ^= (a), (a) = rol64((a), 32), \
+ (c) += (d), (d) = rol64((d), 16), (d) ^= (c), \
+ (a) += (d), (d) = rol64((d), 21), (d) ^= (a), \
+ (c) += (b), (b) = rol64((b), 17), (b) ^= (c), (c) = rol64((c), 32))
+
+#define SIPHASH_CONST_0 0x736f6d6570736575ULL
+#define SIPHASH_CONST_1 0x646f72616e646f6dULL
+#define SIPHASH_CONST_2 0x6c7967656e657261ULL
+#define SIPHASH_CONST_3 0x7465646279746573ULL
+
+#define HSIPHASH_PERMUTATION(a, b, c, d) ( \
+ (a) += (b), (b) = rol32((b), 5), (b) ^= (a), (a) = rol32((a), 16), \
+ (c) += (d), (d) = rol32((d), 8), (d) ^= (c), \
+ (a) += (d), (d) = rol32((d), 7), (d) ^= (a), \
+ (c) += (b), (b) = rol32((b), 13), (b) ^= (c), (c) = rol32((c), 16))
+
+#define HSIPHASH_CONST_0 0U
+#define HSIPHASH_CONST_1 0U
+#define HSIPHASH_CONST_2 0x6c796765U
+#define HSIPHASH_CONST_3 0x74656462U
+
#endif /* _LINUX_SIPHASH_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/timex.h b/include/linux/timex.h
index 39c25dbebfe8..c7616cfb48d2 100644
--- a/include/linux/timex.h
+++ b/include/linux/timex.h
@@ -62,6 +62,8 @@
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/param.h>
+unsigned long random_get_entropy_fallback(void);
+
#include <asm/timex.h>
#ifndef random_get_entropy
@@ -74,8 +76,14 @@
*
* By default we use get_cycles() for this purpose, but individual
* architectures may override this in their asm/timex.h header file.
+ * If a given arch does not have get_cycles(), then we fallback to
+ * using random_get_entropy_fallback().
*/
-#define random_get_entropy() get_cycles()
+#ifdef get_cycles
+#define random_get_entropy() ((unsigned long)get_cycles())
+#else
+#define random_get_entropy() random_get_entropy_fallback()
+#endif
#endif
/*
diff --git a/include/trace/events/random.h b/include/trace/events/random.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 0560dfc33f1c..000000000000
--- a/include/trace/events/random.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,316 +0,0 @@
-/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
-#undef TRACE_SYSTEM
-#define TRACE_SYSTEM random
-
-#if !defined(_TRACE_RANDOM_H) || defined(TRACE_HEADER_MULTI_READ)
-#define _TRACE_RANDOM_H
-
-#include <linux/writeback.h>
-#include <linux/tracepoint.h>
-
-TRACE_EVENT(add_device_randomness,
- TP_PROTO(int bytes, unsigned long IP),
-
- TP_ARGS(bytes, IP),
-
- TP_STRUCT__entry(
- __field( int, bytes )
- __field(unsigned long, IP )
- ),
-
- TP_fast_assign(
- __entry->bytes = bytes;
- __entry->IP = IP;
- ),
-
- TP_printk("bytes %d caller %pS",
- __entry->bytes, (void *)__entry->IP)
-);
-
-DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(random__mix_pool_bytes,
- TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int bytes, unsigned long IP),
-
- TP_ARGS(pool_name, bytes, IP),
-
- TP_STRUCT__entry(
- __field( const char *, pool_name )
- __field( int, bytes )
- __field(unsigned long, IP )
- ),
-
- TP_fast_assign(
- __entry->pool_name = pool_name;
- __entry->bytes = bytes;
- __entry->IP = IP;
- ),
-
- TP_printk("%s pool: bytes %d caller %pS",
- __entry->pool_name, __entry->bytes, (void *)__entry->IP)
-);
-
-DEFINE_EVENT(random__mix_pool_bytes, mix_pool_bytes,
- TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int bytes, unsigned long IP),
-
- TP_ARGS(pool_name, bytes, IP)
-);
-
-DEFINE_EVENT(random__mix_pool_bytes, mix_pool_bytes_nolock,
- TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int bytes, unsigned long IP),
-
- TP_ARGS(pool_name, bytes, IP)
-);
-
-TRACE_EVENT(credit_entropy_bits,
- TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int bits, int entropy_count,
- int entropy_total, unsigned long IP),
-
- TP_ARGS(pool_name, bits, entropy_count, entropy_total, IP),
-
- TP_STRUCT__entry(
- __field( const char *, pool_name )
- __field( int, bits )
- __field( int, entropy_count )
- __field( int, entropy_total )
- __field(unsigned long, IP )
- ),
-
- TP_fast_assign(
- __entry->pool_name = pool_name;
- __entry->bits = bits;
- __entry->entropy_count = entropy_count;
- __entry->entropy_total = entropy_total;
- __entry->IP = IP;
- ),
-
- TP_printk("%s pool: bits %d entropy_count %d entropy_total %d "
- "caller %pS", __entry->pool_name, __entry->bits,
- __entry->entropy_count, __entry->entropy_total,
- (void *)__entry->IP)
-);
-
-TRACE_EVENT(push_to_pool,
- TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int pool_bits, int input_bits),
-
- TP_ARGS(pool_name, pool_bits, input_bits),
-
- TP_STRUCT__entry(
- __field( const char *, pool_name )
- __field( int, pool_bits )
- __field( int, input_bits )
- ),
-
- TP_fast_assign(
- __entry->pool_name = pool_name;
- __entry->pool_bits = pool_bits;
- __entry->input_bits = input_bits;
- ),
-
- TP_printk("%s: pool_bits %d input_pool_bits %d",
- __entry->pool_name, __entry->pool_bits,
- __entry->input_bits)
-);
-
-TRACE_EVENT(debit_entropy,
- TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int debit_bits),
-
- TP_ARGS(pool_name, debit_bits),
-
- TP_STRUCT__entry(
- __field( const char *, pool_name )
- __field( int, debit_bits )
- ),
-
- TP_fast_assign(
- __entry->pool_name = pool_name;
- __entry->debit_bits = debit_bits;
- ),
-
- TP_printk("%s: debit_bits %d", __entry->pool_name,
- __entry->debit_bits)
-);
-
-TRACE_EVENT(add_input_randomness,
- TP_PROTO(int input_bits),
-
- TP_ARGS(input_bits),
-
- TP_STRUCT__entry(
- __field( int, input_bits )
- ),
-
- TP_fast_assign(
- __entry->input_bits = input_bits;
- ),
-
- TP_printk("input_pool_bits %d", __entry->input_bits)
-);
-
-TRACE_EVENT(add_disk_randomness,
- TP_PROTO(dev_t dev, int input_bits),
-
- TP_ARGS(dev, input_bits),
-
- TP_STRUCT__entry(
- __field( dev_t, dev )
- __field( int, input_bits )
- ),
-
- TP_fast_assign(
- __entry->dev = dev;
- __entry->input_bits = input_bits;
- ),
-
- TP_printk("dev %d,%d input_pool_bits %d", MAJOR(__entry->dev),
- MINOR(__entry->dev), __entry->input_bits)
-);
-
-TRACE_EVENT(xfer_secondary_pool,
- TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int xfer_bits, int request_bits,
- int pool_entropy, int input_entropy),
-
- TP_ARGS(pool_name, xfer_bits, request_bits, pool_entropy,
- input_entropy),
-
- TP_STRUCT__entry(
- __field( const char *, pool_name )
- __field( int, xfer_bits )
- __field( int, request_bits )
- __field( int, pool_entropy )
- __field( int, input_entropy )
- ),
-
- TP_fast_assign(
- __entry->pool_name = pool_name;
- __entry->xfer_bits = xfer_bits;
- __entry->request_bits = request_bits;
- __entry->pool_entropy = pool_entropy;
- __entry->input_entropy = input_entropy;
- ),
-
- TP_printk("pool %s xfer_bits %d request_bits %d pool_entropy %d "
- "input_entropy %d", __entry->pool_name, __entry->xfer_bits,
- __entry->request_bits, __entry->pool_entropy,
- __entry->input_entropy)
-);
-
-DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(random__get_random_bytes,
- TP_PROTO(int nbytes, unsigned long IP),
-
- TP_ARGS(nbytes, IP),
-
- TP_STRUCT__entry(
- __field( int, nbytes )
- __field(unsigned long, IP )
- ),
-
- TP_fast_assign(
- __entry->nbytes = nbytes;
- __entry->IP = IP;
- ),
-
- TP_printk("nbytes %d caller %pS", __entry->nbytes, (void *)__entry->IP)
-);
-
-DEFINE_EVENT(random__get_random_bytes, get_random_bytes,
- TP_PROTO(int nbytes, unsigned long IP),
-
- TP_ARGS(nbytes, IP)
-);
-
-DEFINE_EVENT(random__get_random_bytes, get_random_bytes_arch,
- TP_PROTO(int nbytes, unsigned long IP),
-
- TP_ARGS(nbytes, IP)
-);
-
-DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(random__extract_entropy,
- TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int nbytes, int entropy_count,
- unsigned long IP),
-
- TP_ARGS(pool_name, nbytes, entropy_count, IP),
-
- TP_STRUCT__entry(
- __field( const char *, pool_name )
- __field( int, nbytes )
- __field( int, entropy_count )
- __field(unsigned long, IP )
- ),
-
- TP_fast_assign(
- __entry->pool_name = pool_name;
- __entry->nbytes = nbytes;
- __entry->entropy_count = entropy_count;
- __entry->IP = IP;
- ),
-
- TP_printk("%s pool: nbytes %d entropy_count %d caller %pS",
- __entry->pool_name, __entry->nbytes, __entry->entropy_count,
- (void *)__entry->IP)
-);
-
-
-DEFINE_EVENT(random__extract_entropy, extract_entropy,
- TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int nbytes, int entropy_count,
- unsigned long IP),
-
- TP_ARGS(pool_name, nbytes, entropy_count, IP)
-);
-
-DEFINE_EVENT(random__extract_entropy, extract_entropy_user,
- TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int nbytes, int entropy_count,
- unsigned long IP),
-
- TP_ARGS(pool_name, nbytes, entropy_count, IP)
-);
-
-TRACE_EVENT(random_read,
- TP_PROTO(int got_bits, int need_bits, int pool_left, int input_left),
-
- TP_ARGS(got_bits, need_bits, pool_left, input_left),
-
- TP_STRUCT__entry(
- __field( int, got_bits )
- __field( int, need_bits )
- __field( int, pool_left )
- __field( int, input_left )
- ),
-
- TP_fast_assign(
- __entry->got_bits = got_bits;
- __entry->need_bits = need_bits;
- __entry->pool_left = pool_left;
- __entry->input_left = input_left;
- ),
-
- TP_printk("got_bits %d still_needed_bits %d "
- "blocking_pool_entropy_left %d input_entropy_left %d",
- __entry->got_bits, __entry->got_bits, __entry->pool_left,
- __entry->input_left)
-);
-
-TRACE_EVENT(urandom_read,
- TP_PROTO(int got_bits, int pool_left, int input_left),
-
- TP_ARGS(got_bits, pool_left, input_left),
-
- TP_STRUCT__entry(
- __field( int, got_bits )
- __field( int, pool_left )
- __field( int, input_left )
- ),
-
- TP_fast_assign(
- __entry->got_bits = got_bits;
- __entry->pool_left = pool_left;
- __entry->input_left = input_left;
- ),
-
- TP_printk("got_bits %d nonblocking_pool_entropy_left %d "
- "input_entropy_left %d", __entry->got_bits,
- __entry->pool_left, __entry->input_left)
-);
-
-#endif /* _TRACE_RANDOM_H */
-
-/* This part must be outside protection */
-#include <trace/define_trace.h>
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/random.h b/include/uapi/linux/random.h
index 26ee91300e3e..dcc1b3e6106f 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/random.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/random.h
@@ -48,9 +48,11 @@ struct rand_pool_info {
* Flags for getrandom(2)
*
* GRND_NONBLOCK Don't block and return EAGAIN instead
- * GRND_RANDOM Use the /dev/random pool instead of /dev/urandom
+ * GRND_RANDOM No effect
+ * GRND_INSECURE Return non-cryptographic random bytes
*/
#define GRND_NONBLOCK 0x0001
#define GRND_RANDOM 0x0002
+#define GRND_INSECURE 0x0004
#endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_RANDOM_H */
diff --git a/init/main.c b/init/main.c
index 272ec131211c..489a5aa7ba53 100644
--- a/init/main.c
+++ b/init/main.c
@@ -549,13 +549,6 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init start_kernel(void)
page_address_init();
pr_notice("%s", linux_banner);
setup_arch(&command_line);
- /*
- * Set up the the initial canary and entropy after arch
- * and after adding latent and command line entropy.
- */
- add_latent_entropy();
- add_device_randomness(command_line, strlen(command_line));
- boot_init_stack_canary();
mm_init_cpumask(&init_mm);
setup_command_line(command_line);
setup_nr_cpu_ids();
@@ -641,6 +634,17 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init start_kernel(void)
softirq_init();
timekeeping_init();
time_init();
+
+ /*
+ * For best initial stack canary entropy, prepare it after:
+ * - setup_arch() for any UEFI RNG entropy and boot cmdline access
+ * - timekeeping_init() for ktime entropy used in random_init()
+ * - time_init() for making random_get_entropy() work on some platforms
+ * - random_init() to initialize the RNG from from early entropy sources
+ */
+ random_init(command_line);
+ boot_init_stack_canary();
+
perf_event_init();
profile_init();
call_function_init();
diff --git a/kernel/cpu.c b/kernel/cpu.c
index d6fd362afc81..c9ca190ec034 100644
--- a/kernel/cpu.c
+++ b/kernel/cpu.c
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/percpu-rwsem.h>
#include <linux/cpuset.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
#include <trace/events/power.h>
#define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
@@ -1404,6 +1405,11 @@ static struct cpuhp_step cpuhp_hp_states[] = {
.startup.single = perf_event_init_cpu,
.teardown.single = perf_event_exit_cpu,
},
+ [CPUHP_RANDOM_PREPARE] = {
+ .name = "random:prepare",
+ .startup.single = random_prepare_cpu,
+ .teardown.single = NULL,
+ },
[CPUHP_WORKQUEUE_PREP] = {
.name = "workqueue:prepare",
.startup.single = workqueue_prepare_cpu,
@@ -1520,6 +1526,11 @@ static struct cpuhp_step cpuhp_hp_states[] = {
.startup.single = workqueue_online_cpu,
.teardown.single = workqueue_offline_cpu,
},
+ [CPUHP_AP_RANDOM_ONLINE] = {
+ .name = "random:online",
+ .startup.single = random_online_cpu,
+ .teardown.single = NULL,
+ },
[CPUHP_AP_RCUTREE_ONLINE] = {
.name = "RCU/tree:online",
.startup.single = rcutree_online_cpu,
diff --git a/kernel/irq/handle.c b/kernel/irq/handle.c
index 38554bc35375..e2f7afcb1ae6 100644
--- a/kernel/irq/handle.c
+++ b/kernel/irq/handle.c
@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ irqreturn_t handle_irq_event_percpu(struct irq_desc *desc)
retval = __handle_irq_event_percpu(desc, &flags);
- add_interrupt_randomness(desc->irq_data.irq, flags);
+ add_interrupt_randomness(desc->irq_data.irq);
if (!noirqdebug)
note_interrupt(desc, retval);
diff --git a/kernel/time/timekeeping.c b/kernel/time/timekeeping.c
index f246818e35db..087f71183c3f 100644
--- a/kernel/time/timekeeping.c
+++ b/kernel/time/timekeeping.c
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
#include <linux/clocksource.h>
#include <linux/jiffies.h>
#include <linux/time.h>
+#include <linux/timex.h>
#include <linux/tick.h>
#include <linux/stop_machine.h>
#include <linux/pvclock_gtod.h>
@@ -2308,6 +2309,20 @@ static int timekeeping_validate_timex(const struct timex *txc)
return 0;
}
+/**
+ * random_get_entropy_fallback - Returns the raw clock source value,
+ * used by random.c for platforms with no valid random_get_entropy().
+ */
+unsigned long random_get_entropy_fallback(void)
+{
+ struct tk_read_base *tkr = &tk_core.timekeeper.tkr_mono;
+ struct clocksource *clock = READ_ONCE(tkr->clock);
+
+ if (unlikely(timekeeping_suspended || !clock))
+ return 0;
+ return clock->read(clock);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(random_get_entropy_fallback);
/**
* do_adjtimex() - Accessor function to NTP __do_adjtimex function
diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.debug b/lib/Kconfig.debug
index 621859a453f8..9a4277034c64 100644
--- a/lib/Kconfig.debug
+++ b/lib/Kconfig.debug
@@ -1277,8 +1277,7 @@ config WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM
so architecture maintainers really need to do what they can
to get the CRNG seeded sooner after the system is booted.
However, since users cannot do anything actionable to
- address this, by default the kernel will issue only a single
- warning for the first use of unseeded randomness.
+ address this, by default this option is disabled.
Say Y here if you want to receive warnings for all uses of
unseeded randomness. This will be of use primarily for
diff --git a/lib/Makefile b/lib/Makefile
index 1d7a705d7207..e08544c509a8 100644
--- a/lib/Makefile
+++ b/lib/Makefile
@@ -283,3 +283,5 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_LIB_LSHRDI3) += lshrdi3.o
obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_LIB_MULDI3) += muldi3.o
obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_LIB_CMPDI2) += cmpdi2.o
obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_LIB_UCMPDI2) += ucmpdi2.o
+
+obj-y += crypto/
diff --git a/lib/crypto/Makefile b/lib/crypto/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..d0bca68618f0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/crypto/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+obj-y += libblake2s.o
+libblake2s-y += blake2s.o blake2s-generic.o
+ifneq ($(CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_DISABLE_TESTS),y)
+libblake2s-y += blake2s-selftest.o
+endif
diff --git a/lib/crypto/blake2s-generic.c b/lib/crypto/blake2s-generic.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..04ff8df24513
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/crypto/blake2s-generic.c
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR MIT
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@...c4.com>. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * This is an implementation of the BLAKE2s hash and PRF functions.
+ *
+ * Information: https://blake2.net/
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <crypto/internal/blake2s.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/bug.h>
+#include <asm/unaligned.h>
+
+static const u8 blake2s_sigma[10][16] = {
+ { 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 },
+ { 14, 10, 4, 8, 9, 15, 13, 6, 1, 12, 0, 2, 11, 7, 5, 3 },
+ { 11, 8, 12, 0, 5, 2, 15, 13, 10, 14, 3, 6, 7, 1, 9, 4 },
+ { 7, 9, 3, 1, 13, 12, 11, 14, 2, 6, 5, 10, 4, 0, 15, 8 },
+ { 9, 0, 5, 7, 2, 4, 10, 15, 14, 1, 11, 12, 6, 8, 3, 13 },
+ { 2, 12, 6, 10, 0, 11, 8, 3, 4, 13, 7, 5, 15, 14, 1, 9 },
+ { 12, 5, 1, 15, 14, 13, 4, 10, 0, 7, 6, 3, 9, 2, 8, 11 },
+ { 13, 11, 7, 14, 12, 1, 3, 9, 5, 0, 15, 4, 8, 6, 2, 10 },
+ { 6, 15, 14, 9, 11, 3, 0, 8, 12, 2, 13, 7, 1, 4, 10, 5 },
+ { 10, 2, 8, 4, 7, 6, 1, 5, 15, 11, 9, 14, 3, 12, 13, 0 },
+};
+
+static inline void blake2s_increment_counter(struct blake2s_state *state,
+ const u32 inc)
+{
+ state->t[0] += inc;
+ state->t[1] += (state->t[0] < inc);
+}
+
+void blake2s_compress_generic(struct blake2s_state *state,const u8 *block,
+ size_t nblocks, const u32 inc)
+{
+ u32 m[16];
+ u32 v[16];
+ int i;
+
+ WARN_ON(IS_ENABLED(DEBUG) &&
+ (nblocks > 1 && inc != BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE));
+
+ while (nblocks > 0) {
+ blake2s_increment_counter(state, inc);
+ memcpy(m, block, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ le32_to_cpu_array(m, ARRAY_SIZE(m));
+ memcpy(v, state->h, 32);
+ v[ 8] = BLAKE2S_IV0;
+ v[ 9] = BLAKE2S_IV1;
+ v[10] = BLAKE2S_IV2;
+ v[11] = BLAKE2S_IV3;
+ v[12] = BLAKE2S_IV4 ^ state->t[0];
+ v[13] = BLAKE2S_IV5 ^ state->t[1];
+ v[14] = BLAKE2S_IV6 ^ state->f[0];
+ v[15] = BLAKE2S_IV7 ^ state->f[1];
+
+#define G(r, i, a, b, c, d) do { \
+ a += b + m[blake2s_sigma[r][2 * i + 0]]; \
+ d = ror32(d ^ a, 16); \
+ c += d; \
+ b = ror32(b ^ c, 12); \
+ a += b + m[blake2s_sigma[r][2 * i + 1]]; \
+ d = ror32(d ^ a, 8); \
+ c += d; \
+ b = ror32(b ^ c, 7); \
+} while (0)
+
+#define ROUND(r) do { \
+ G(r, 0, v[0], v[ 4], v[ 8], v[12]); \
+ G(r, 1, v[1], v[ 5], v[ 9], v[13]); \
+ G(r, 2, v[2], v[ 6], v[10], v[14]); \
+ G(r, 3, v[3], v[ 7], v[11], v[15]); \
+ G(r, 4, v[0], v[ 5], v[10], v[15]); \
+ G(r, 5, v[1], v[ 6], v[11], v[12]); \
+ G(r, 6, v[2], v[ 7], v[ 8], v[13]); \
+ G(r, 7, v[3], v[ 4], v[ 9], v[14]); \
+} while (0)
+ ROUND(0);
+ ROUND(1);
+ ROUND(2);
+ ROUND(3);
+ ROUND(4);
+ ROUND(5);
+ ROUND(6);
+ ROUND(7);
+ ROUND(8);
+ ROUND(9);
+
+#undef G
+#undef ROUND
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; ++i)
+ state->h[i] ^= v[i] ^ v[i + 8];
+
+ block += BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ --nblocks;
+ }
+}
+
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(blake2s_compress_generic);
+
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("BLAKE2s hash function");
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@...c4.com>");
diff --git a/lib/crypto/blake2s-selftest.c b/lib/crypto/blake2s-selftest.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..7a9edc96dddd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/crypto/blake2s-selftest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,591 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR MIT
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@...c4.com>. All Rights Reserved.
+ */
+
+#include <crypto/blake2s.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+
+/*
+ * blake2s_testvecs[] generated with the program below (using libb2-dev and
+ * libssl-dev [OpenSSL])
+ *
+ * #include <blake2.h>
+ * #include <stdint.h>
+ * #include <stdio.h>
+ *
+ * #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ *
+ * #define BLAKE2S_TESTVEC_COUNT 256
+ *
+ * static void print_vec(const uint8_t vec[], int len)
+ * {
+ * int i;
+ *
+ * printf(" { ");
+ * for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+ * if (i && (i % 12) == 0)
+ * printf("\n ");
+ * printf("0x%02x, ", vec[i]);
+ * }
+ * printf("},\n");
+ * }
+ *
+ * int main(void)
+ * {
+ * uint8_t key[BLAKE2S_KEYBYTES];
+ * uint8_t buf[BLAKE2S_TESTVEC_COUNT];
+ * uint8_t hash[BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES];
+ * int i, j;
+ *
+ * key[0] = key[1] = 1;
+ * for (i = 2; i < BLAKE2S_KEYBYTES; ++i)
+ * key[i] = key[i - 2] + key[i - 1];
+ *
+ * for (i = 0; i < BLAKE2S_TESTVEC_COUNT; ++i)
+ * buf[i] = (uint8_t)i;
+ *
+ * printf("static const u8 blake2s_testvecs[][BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE] __initconst = {\n");
+ *
+ * for (i = 0; i < BLAKE2S_TESTVEC_COUNT; ++i) {
+ * int outlen = 1 + i % BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES;
+ * int keylen = (13 * i) % (BLAKE2S_KEYBYTES + 1);
+ *
+ * blake2s(hash, buf, key + BLAKE2S_KEYBYTES - keylen, outlen, i,
+ * keylen);
+ * print_vec(hash, outlen);
+ * }
+ * printf("};\n\n");
+ *
+ * return 0;
+ *}
+ */
+static const u8 blake2s_testvecs[][BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE] __initconst = {
+ { 0xa1, },
+ { 0x7c, 0x89, },
+ { 0x74, 0x0e, 0xd4, },
+ { 0x47, 0x0c, 0x21, 0x15, },
+ { 0x18, 0xd6, 0x9c, 0xa6, 0xc4, },
+ { 0x13, 0x5d, 0x16, 0x63, 0x2e, 0xf9, },
+ { 0x2c, 0xb5, 0x04, 0xb7, 0x99, 0xe2, 0x73, },
+ { 0x9a, 0x0f, 0xd2, 0x39, 0xd6, 0x68, 0x1b, 0x92, },
+ { 0xc8, 0xde, 0x7a, 0xea, 0x2f, 0xf4, 0xd2, 0xe3, 0x2b, },
+ { 0x5b, 0xf9, 0x43, 0x52, 0x0c, 0x12, 0xba, 0xb5, 0x93, 0x9f, },
+ { 0xc6, 0x2c, 0x4e, 0x80, 0xfc, 0x32, 0x5b, 0x33, 0xb8, 0xb8, 0x0a, },
+ { 0xa7, 0x5c, 0xfd, 0x3a, 0xcc, 0xbf, 0x90, 0xca, 0xb7, 0x97, 0xde, 0xd8, },
+ { 0x66, 0xca, 0x3c, 0xc4, 0x19, 0xef, 0x92, 0x66, 0x3f, 0x21, 0x8f, 0xda,
+ 0xb7, },
+ { 0xba, 0xe5, 0xbb, 0x30, 0x25, 0x94, 0x6d, 0xc3, 0x89, 0x09, 0xc4, 0x25,
+ 0x52, 0x3e, },
+ { 0xa2, 0xef, 0x0e, 0x52, 0x0b, 0x5f, 0xa2, 0x01, 0x6d, 0x0a, 0x25, 0xbc,
+ 0x57, 0xe2, 0x27, },
+ { 0x4f, 0xe0, 0xf9, 0x52, 0x12, 0xda, 0x84, 0xb7, 0xab, 0xae, 0xb0, 0xa6,
+ 0x47, 0x2a, 0xc7, 0xf5, },
+ { 0x56, 0xe7, 0xa8, 0x1c, 0x4c, 0xca, 0xed, 0x90, 0x31, 0xec, 0x87, 0x43,
+ 0xe7, 0x72, 0x08, 0xec, 0xbe, },
+ { 0x7e, 0xdf, 0x80, 0x1c, 0x93, 0x33, 0xfd, 0x53, 0x44, 0xba, 0xfd, 0x96,
+ 0xe1, 0xbb, 0xb5, 0x65, 0xa5, 0x00, },
+ { 0xec, 0x6b, 0xed, 0xf7, 0x7b, 0x62, 0x1d, 0x7d, 0xf4, 0x82, 0xf3, 0x1e,
+ 0x18, 0xff, 0x2b, 0xc4, 0x06, 0x20, 0x2a, },
+ { 0x74, 0x98, 0xd7, 0x68, 0x63, 0xed, 0x87, 0xe4, 0x5d, 0x8d, 0x9e, 0x1d,
+ 0xfd, 0x2a, 0xbb, 0x86, 0xac, 0xe9, 0x2a, 0x89, },
+ { 0x89, 0xc3, 0x88, 0xce, 0x2b, 0x33, 0x1e, 0x10, 0xd1, 0x37, 0x20, 0x86,
+ 0x28, 0x43, 0x70, 0xd9, 0xfb, 0x96, 0xd9, 0xb5, 0xd3, },
+ { 0xcb, 0x56, 0x74, 0x41, 0x8d, 0x80, 0x01, 0x9a, 0x6b, 0x38, 0xe1, 0x41,
+ 0xad, 0x9c, 0x62, 0x74, 0xce, 0x35, 0xd5, 0x6c, 0x89, 0x6e, },
+ { 0x79, 0xaf, 0x94, 0x59, 0x99, 0x26, 0xe1, 0xc9, 0x34, 0xfe, 0x7c, 0x22,
+ 0xf7, 0x43, 0xd7, 0x65, 0xd4, 0x48, 0x18, 0xac, 0x3d, 0xfd, 0x93, },
+ { 0x85, 0x0d, 0xff, 0xb8, 0x3e, 0x87, 0x41, 0xb0, 0x95, 0xd3, 0x3d, 0x00,
+ 0x47, 0x55, 0x9e, 0xd2, 0x69, 0xea, 0xbf, 0xe9, 0x7a, 0x2d, 0x61, 0x45, },
+ { 0x03, 0xe0, 0x85, 0xec, 0x54, 0xb5, 0x16, 0x53, 0xa8, 0xc4, 0x71, 0xe9,
+ 0x6a, 0xe7, 0xcb, 0xc4, 0x15, 0x02, 0xfc, 0x34, 0xa4, 0xa4, 0x28, 0x13,
+ 0xd1, },
+ { 0xe3, 0x34, 0x4b, 0xe1, 0xd0, 0x4b, 0x55, 0x61, 0x8f, 0xc0, 0x24, 0x05,
+ 0xe6, 0xe0, 0x3d, 0x70, 0x24, 0x4d, 0xda, 0xb8, 0x91, 0x05, 0x29, 0x07,
+ 0x01, 0x3e, },
+ { 0x61, 0xff, 0x01, 0x72, 0xb1, 0x4d, 0xf6, 0xfe, 0xd1, 0xd1, 0x08, 0x74,
+ 0xe6, 0x91, 0x44, 0xeb, 0x61, 0xda, 0x40, 0xaf, 0xfc, 0x8c, 0x91, 0x6b,
+ 0xec, 0x13, 0xed, },
+ { 0xd4, 0x40, 0xd2, 0xa0, 0x7f, 0xc1, 0x58, 0x0c, 0x85, 0xa0, 0x86, 0xc7,
+ 0x86, 0xb9, 0x61, 0xc9, 0xea, 0x19, 0x86, 0x1f, 0xab, 0x07, 0xce, 0x37,
+ 0x72, 0x67, 0x09, 0xfc, },
+ { 0x9e, 0xf8, 0x18, 0x67, 0x93, 0x10, 0x9b, 0x39, 0x75, 0xe8, 0x8b, 0x38,
+ 0x82, 0x7d, 0xb8, 0xb7, 0xa5, 0xaf, 0xe6, 0x6a, 0x22, 0x5e, 0x1f, 0x9c,
+ 0x95, 0x29, 0x19, 0xf2, 0x4b, },
+ { 0xc8, 0x62, 0x25, 0xf5, 0x98, 0xc9, 0xea, 0xe5, 0x29, 0x3a, 0xd3, 0x22,
+ 0xeb, 0xeb, 0x07, 0x7c, 0x15, 0x07, 0xee, 0x15, 0x61, 0xbb, 0x05, 0x30,
+ 0x99, 0x7f, 0x11, 0xf6, 0x0a, 0x1d, },
+ { 0x68, 0x70, 0xf7, 0x90, 0xa1, 0x8b, 0x1f, 0x0f, 0xbb, 0xce, 0xd2, 0x0e,
+ 0x33, 0x1f, 0x7f, 0xa9, 0x78, 0xa8, 0xa6, 0x81, 0x66, 0xab, 0x8d, 0xcd,
+ 0x58, 0x55, 0x3a, 0x0b, 0x7a, 0xdb, 0xb5, },
+ { 0xdd, 0x35, 0xd2, 0xb4, 0xf6, 0xc7, 0xea, 0xab, 0x64, 0x24, 0x4e, 0xfe,
+ 0xe5, 0x3d, 0x4e, 0x95, 0x8b, 0x6d, 0x6c, 0xbc, 0xb0, 0xf8, 0x88, 0x61,
+ 0x09, 0xb7, 0x78, 0xa3, 0x31, 0xfe, 0xd9, 0x2f, },
+ { 0x0a, },
+ { 0x6e, 0xd4, },
+ { 0x64, 0xe9, 0xd1, },
+ { 0x30, 0xdd, 0x71, 0xef, },
+ { 0x11, 0xb5, 0x0c, 0x87, 0xc9, },
+ { 0x06, 0x1c, 0x6d, 0x04, 0x82, 0xd0, },
+ { 0x5c, 0x42, 0x0b, 0xee, 0xc5, 0x9c, 0xb2, },
+ { 0xe8, 0x29, 0xd6, 0xb4, 0x5d, 0xf7, 0x2b, 0x93, },
+ { 0x18, 0xca, 0x27, 0x72, 0x43, 0x39, 0x16, 0xbc, 0x6a, },
+ { 0x39, 0x8f, 0xfd, 0x64, 0xf5, 0x57, 0x23, 0xb0, 0x45, 0xf8, },
+ { 0xbb, 0x3a, 0x78, 0x6b, 0x02, 0x1d, 0x0b, 0x16, 0xe3, 0xb2, 0x9a, },
+ { 0xb8, 0xb4, 0x0b, 0xe5, 0xd4, 0x1d, 0x0d, 0x85, 0x49, 0x91, 0x35, 0xfa, },
+ { 0x6d, 0x48, 0x2a, 0x0c, 0x42, 0x08, 0xbd, 0xa9, 0x78, 0x6f, 0x18, 0xaf,
+ 0xe2, },
+ { 0x10, 0x45, 0xd4, 0x58, 0x88, 0xec, 0x4e, 0x1e, 0xf6, 0x14, 0x92, 0x64,
+ 0x7e, 0xb0, },
+ { 0x8b, 0x0b, 0x95, 0xee, 0x92, 0xc6, 0x3b, 0x91, 0xf1, 0x1e, 0xeb, 0x51,
+ 0x98, 0x0a, 0x8d, },
+ { 0xa3, 0x50, 0x4d, 0xa5, 0x1d, 0x03, 0x68, 0xe9, 0x57, 0x78, 0xd6, 0x04,
+ 0xf1, 0xc3, 0x94, 0xd8, },
+ { 0xb8, 0x66, 0x6e, 0xdd, 0x46, 0x15, 0xae, 0x3d, 0x83, 0x7e, 0xcf, 0xe7,
+ 0x2c, 0xe8, 0x8f, 0xc7, 0x34, },
+ { 0x2e, 0xc0, 0x1f, 0x29, 0xea, 0xf6, 0xb9, 0xe2, 0xc2, 0x93, 0xeb, 0x41,
+ 0x0d, 0xf0, 0x0a, 0x13, 0x0e, 0xa2, },
+ { 0x71, 0xb8, 0x33, 0xa9, 0x1b, 0xac, 0xf1, 0xb5, 0x42, 0x8f, 0x5e, 0x81,
+ 0x34, 0x43, 0xb7, 0xa4, 0x18, 0x5c, 0x47, },
+ { 0xda, 0x45, 0xb8, 0x2e, 0x82, 0x1e, 0xc0, 0x59, 0x77, 0x9d, 0xfa, 0xb4,
+ 0x1c, 0x5e, 0xa0, 0x2b, 0x33, 0x96, 0x5a, 0x58, },
+ { 0xe3, 0x09, 0x05, 0xa9, 0xeb, 0x48, 0x13, 0xad, 0x71, 0x88, 0x81, 0x9a,
+ 0x3e, 0x2c, 0xe1, 0x23, 0x99, 0x13, 0x35, 0x9f, 0xb5, },
+ { 0xb7, 0x86, 0x2d, 0x16, 0xe1, 0x04, 0x00, 0x47, 0x47, 0x61, 0x31, 0xfb,
+ 0x14, 0xac, 0xd8, 0xe9, 0xe3, 0x49, 0xbd, 0xf7, 0x9c, 0x3f, },
+ { 0x7f, 0xd9, 0x95, 0xa8, 0xa7, 0xa0, 0xcc, 0xba, 0xef, 0xb1, 0x0a, 0xa9,
+ 0x21, 0x62, 0x08, 0x0f, 0x1b, 0xff, 0x7b, 0x9d, 0xae, 0xb2, 0x95, },
+ { 0x85, 0x99, 0xea, 0x33, 0xe0, 0x56, 0xff, 0x13, 0xc6, 0x61, 0x8c, 0xf9,
+ 0x57, 0x05, 0x03, 0x11, 0xf9, 0xfb, 0x3a, 0xf7, 0xce, 0xbb, 0x52, 0x30, },
+ { 0xb2, 0x72, 0x9c, 0xf8, 0x77, 0x4e, 0x8f, 0x6b, 0x01, 0x6c, 0xff, 0x4e,
+ 0x4f, 0x02, 0xd2, 0xbc, 0xeb, 0x51, 0x28, 0x99, 0x50, 0xab, 0xc4, 0x42,
+ 0xe3, },
+ { 0x8b, 0x0a, 0xb5, 0x90, 0x8f, 0xf5, 0x7b, 0xdd, 0xba, 0x47, 0x37, 0xc9,
+ 0x2a, 0xd5, 0x4b, 0x25, 0x08, 0x8b, 0x02, 0x17, 0xa7, 0x9e, 0x6b, 0x6e,
+ 0xe3, 0x90, },
+ { 0x90, 0xdd, 0xf7, 0x75, 0xa7, 0xa3, 0x99, 0x5e, 0x5b, 0x7d, 0x75, 0xc3,
+ 0x39, 0x6b, 0xa0, 0xe2, 0x44, 0x53, 0xb1, 0x9e, 0xc8, 0xf1, 0x77, 0x10,
+ 0x58, 0x06, 0x9a, },
+ { 0x99, 0x52, 0xf0, 0x49, 0xa8, 0x8c, 0xec, 0xa6, 0x97, 0x32, 0x13, 0xb5,
+ 0xf7, 0xa3, 0x8e, 0xfb, 0x4b, 0x59, 0x31, 0x3d, 0x01, 0x59, 0x98, 0x5d,
+ 0x53, 0x03, 0x1a, 0x39, },
+ { 0x9f, 0xe0, 0xc2, 0xe5, 0x5d, 0x93, 0xd6, 0x9b, 0x47, 0x8f, 0x9b, 0xe0,
+ 0x26, 0x35, 0x84, 0x20, 0x1d, 0xc5, 0x53, 0x10, 0x0f, 0x22, 0xb9, 0xb5,
+ 0xd4, 0x36, 0xb1, 0xac, 0x73, },
+ { 0x30, 0x32, 0x20, 0x3b, 0x10, 0x28, 0xec, 0x1f, 0x4f, 0x9b, 0x47, 0x59,
+ 0xeb, 0x7b, 0xee, 0x45, 0xfb, 0x0c, 0x49, 0xd8, 0x3d, 0x69, 0xbd, 0x90,
+ 0x2c, 0xf0, 0x9e, 0x8d, 0xbf, 0xd5, },
+ { 0x2a, 0x37, 0x73, 0x7f, 0xf9, 0x96, 0x19, 0xaa, 0x25, 0xd8, 0x13, 0x28,
+ 0x01, 0x29, 0x89, 0xdf, 0x6e, 0x0c, 0x9b, 0x43, 0x44, 0x51, 0xe9, 0x75,
+ 0x26, 0x0c, 0xb7, 0x87, 0x66, 0x0b, 0x5f, },
+ { 0x23, 0xdf, 0x96, 0x68, 0x91, 0x86, 0xd0, 0x93, 0x55, 0x33, 0x24, 0xf6,
+ 0xba, 0x08, 0x75, 0x5b, 0x59, 0x11, 0x69, 0xb8, 0xb9, 0xe5, 0x2c, 0x77,
+ 0x02, 0xf6, 0x47, 0xee, 0x81, 0xdd, 0xb9, 0x06, },
+ { 0x9d, },
+ { 0x9d, 0x7d, },
+ { 0xfd, 0xc3, 0xda, },
+ { 0xe8, 0x82, 0xcd, 0x21, },
+ { 0xc3, 0x1d, 0x42, 0x4c, 0x74, },
+ { 0xe9, 0xda, 0xf1, 0xa2, 0xe5, 0x7c, },
+ { 0x52, 0xb8, 0x6f, 0x81, 0x5c, 0x3a, 0x4c, },
+ { 0x5b, 0x39, 0x26, 0xfc, 0x92, 0x5e, 0xe0, 0x49, },
+ { 0x59, 0xe4, 0x7c, 0x93, 0x1c, 0xf9, 0x28, 0x93, 0xde, },
+ { 0xde, 0xdf, 0xb2, 0x43, 0x61, 0x0b, 0x86, 0x16, 0x4c, 0x2e, },
+ { 0x14, 0x8f, 0x75, 0x51, 0xaf, 0xb9, 0xee, 0x51, 0x5a, 0xae, 0x23, },
+ { 0x43, 0x5f, 0x50, 0xd5, 0x70, 0xb0, 0x5b, 0x87, 0xf5, 0xd9, 0xb3, 0x6d, },
+ { 0x66, 0x0a, 0x64, 0x93, 0x79, 0x71, 0x94, 0x40, 0xb7, 0x68, 0x2d, 0xd3,
+ 0x63, },
+ { 0x15, 0x00, 0xc4, 0x0c, 0x7d, 0x1b, 0x10, 0xa9, 0x73, 0x1b, 0x90, 0x6f,
+ 0xe6, 0xa9, },
+ { 0x34, 0x75, 0xf3, 0x86, 0x8f, 0x56, 0xcf, 0x2a, 0x0a, 0xf2, 0x62, 0x0a,
+ 0xf6, 0x0e, 0x20, },
+ { 0xb1, 0xde, 0xc9, 0xf5, 0xdb, 0xf3, 0x2f, 0x4c, 0xd6, 0x41, 0x7d, 0x39,
+ 0x18, 0x3e, 0xc7, 0xc3, },
+ { 0xc5, 0x89, 0xb2, 0xf8, 0xb8, 0xc0, 0xa3, 0xb9, 0x3b, 0x10, 0x6d, 0x7c,
+ 0x92, 0xfc, 0x7f, 0x34, 0x41, },
+ { 0xc4, 0xd8, 0xef, 0xba, 0xef, 0xd2, 0xaa, 0xc5, 0x6c, 0x8e, 0x3e, 0xbb,
+ 0x12, 0xfc, 0x0f, 0x72, 0xbf, 0x0f, },
+ { 0xdd, 0x91, 0xd1, 0x15, 0x9e, 0x7d, 0xf8, 0xc1, 0xb9, 0x14, 0x63, 0x96,
+ 0xb5, 0xcb, 0x83, 0x1d, 0x35, 0x1c, 0xec, },
+ { 0xa9, 0xf8, 0x52, 0xc9, 0x67, 0x76, 0x2b, 0xad, 0xfb, 0xd8, 0x3a, 0xa6,
+ 0x74, 0x02, 0xae, 0xb8, 0x25, 0x2c, 0x63, 0x49, },
+ { 0x77, 0x1f, 0x66, 0x70, 0xfd, 0x50, 0x29, 0xaa, 0xeb, 0xdc, 0xee, 0xba,
+ 0x75, 0x98, 0xdc, 0x93, 0x12, 0x3f, 0xdc, 0x7c, 0x38, },
+ { 0xe2, 0xe1, 0x89, 0x5c, 0x37, 0x38, 0x6a, 0xa3, 0x40, 0xac, 0x3f, 0xb0,
+ 0xca, 0xfc, 0xa7, 0xf3, 0xea, 0xf9, 0x0f, 0x5d, 0x8e, 0x39, },
+ { 0x0f, 0x67, 0xc8, 0x38, 0x01, 0xb1, 0xb7, 0xb8, 0xa2, 0xe7, 0x0a, 0x6d,
+ 0xd2, 0x63, 0x69, 0x9e, 0xcc, 0xf0, 0xf2, 0xbe, 0x9b, 0x98, 0xdd, },
+ { 0x13, 0xe1, 0x36, 0x30, 0xfe, 0xc6, 0x01, 0x8a, 0xa1, 0x63, 0x96, 0x59,
+ 0xc2, 0xa9, 0x68, 0x3f, 0x58, 0xd4, 0x19, 0x0c, 0x40, 0xf3, 0xde, 0x02, },
+ { 0xa3, 0x9e, 0xce, 0xda, 0x42, 0xee, 0x8c, 0x6c, 0x5a, 0x7d, 0xdc, 0x89,
+ 0x02, 0x77, 0xdd, 0xe7, 0x95, 0xbb, 0xff, 0x0d, 0xa4, 0xb5, 0x38, 0x1e,
+ 0xaf, },
+ { 0x9a, 0xf6, 0xb5, 0x9a, 0x4f, 0xa9, 0x4f, 0x2c, 0x35, 0x3c, 0x24, 0xdc,
+ 0x97, 0x6f, 0xd9, 0xa1, 0x7d, 0x1a, 0x85, 0x0b, 0xf5, 0xda, 0x2e, 0xe7,
+ 0xb1, 0x1d, },
+ { 0x84, 0x1e, 0x8e, 0x3d, 0x45, 0xa5, 0xf2, 0x27, 0xf3, 0x31, 0xfe, 0xb9,
+ 0xfb, 0xc5, 0x45, 0x99, 0x99, 0xdd, 0x93, 0x43, 0x02, 0xee, 0x58, 0xaf,
+ 0xee, 0x6a, 0xbe, },
+ { 0x07, 0x2f, 0xc0, 0xa2, 0x04, 0xc4, 0xab, 0x7c, 0x26, 0xbb, 0xa8, 0xd8,
+ 0xe3, 0x1c, 0x75, 0x15, 0x64, 0x5d, 0x02, 0x6a, 0xf0, 0x86, 0xe9, 0xcd,
+ 0x5c, 0xef, 0xa3, 0x25, },
+ { 0x2f, 0x3b, 0x1f, 0xb5, 0x91, 0x8f, 0x86, 0xe0, 0xdc, 0x31, 0x48, 0xb6,
+ 0xa1, 0x8c, 0xfd, 0x75, 0xbb, 0x7d, 0x3d, 0xc1, 0xf0, 0x10, 0x9a, 0xd8,
+ 0x4b, 0x0e, 0xe3, 0x94, 0x9f, },
+ { 0x29, 0xbb, 0x8f, 0x6c, 0xd1, 0xf2, 0xb6, 0xaf, 0xe5, 0xe3, 0x2d, 0xdc,
+ 0x6f, 0xa4, 0x53, 0x88, 0xd8, 0xcf, 0x4d, 0x45, 0x42, 0x62, 0xdb, 0xdf,
+ 0xf8, 0x45, 0xc2, 0x13, 0xec, 0x35, },
+ { 0x06, 0x3c, 0xe3, 0x2c, 0x15, 0xc6, 0x43, 0x03, 0x81, 0xfb, 0x08, 0x76,
+ 0x33, 0xcb, 0x02, 0xc1, 0xba, 0x33, 0xe5, 0xe0, 0xd1, 0x92, 0xa8, 0x46,
+ 0x28, 0x3f, 0x3e, 0x9d, 0x2c, 0x44, 0x54, },
+ { 0xea, 0xbb, 0x96, 0xf8, 0xd1, 0x8b, 0x04, 0x11, 0x40, 0x78, 0x42, 0x02,
+ 0x19, 0xd1, 0xbc, 0x65, 0x92, 0xd3, 0xc3, 0xd6, 0xd9, 0x19, 0xe7, 0xc3,
+ 0x40, 0x97, 0xbd, 0xd4, 0xed, 0xfa, 0x5e, 0x28, },
+ { 0x02, },
+ { 0x52, 0xa8, },
+ { 0x38, 0x25, 0x0d, },
+ { 0xe3, 0x04, 0xd4, 0x92, },
+ { 0x97, 0xdb, 0xf7, 0x81, 0xca, },
+ { 0x8a, 0x56, 0x9d, 0x62, 0x56, 0xcc, },
+ { 0xa1, 0x8e, 0x3c, 0x72, 0x8f, 0x63, 0x03, },
+ { 0xf7, 0xf3, 0x39, 0x09, 0x0a, 0xa1, 0xbb, 0x23, },
+ { 0x6b, 0x03, 0xc0, 0xe9, 0xd9, 0x83, 0x05, 0x22, 0x01, },
+ { 0x1b, 0x4b, 0xf5, 0xd6, 0x4f, 0x05, 0x75, 0x91, 0x4c, 0x7f, },
+ { 0x4c, 0x8c, 0x25, 0x20, 0x21, 0xcb, 0xc2, 0x4b, 0x3a, 0x5b, 0x8d, },
+ { 0x56, 0xe2, 0x77, 0xa0, 0xb6, 0x9f, 0x81, 0xec, 0x83, 0x75, 0xc4, 0xf9, },
+ { 0x71, 0x70, 0x0f, 0xad, 0x4d, 0x35, 0x81, 0x9d, 0x88, 0x69, 0xf9, 0xaa,
+ 0xd3, },
+ { 0x50, 0x6e, 0x86, 0x6e, 0x43, 0xc0, 0xc2, 0x44, 0xc2, 0xe2, 0xa0, 0x1c,
+ 0xb7, 0x9a, },
+ { 0xe4, 0x7e, 0x72, 0xc6, 0x12, 0x8e, 0x7c, 0xfc, 0xbd, 0xe2, 0x08, 0x31,
+ 0x3d, 0x47, 0x3d, },
+ { 0x08, 0x97, 0x5b, 0x80, 0xae, 0xc4, 0x1d, 0x50, 0x77, 0xdf, 0x1f, 0xd0,
+ 0x24, 0xf0, 0x17, 0xc0, },
+ { 0x01, 0xb6, 0x29, 0xf4, 0xaf, 0x78, 0x5f, 0xb6, 0x91, 0xdd, 0x76, 0x76,
+ 0xd2, 0xfd, 0x0c, 0x47, 0x40, },
+ { 0xa1, 0xd8, 0x09, 0x97, 0x7a, 0xa6, 0xc8, 0x94, 0xf6, 0x91, 0x7b, 0xae,
+ 0x2b, 0x9f, 0x0d, 0x83, 0x48, 0xf7, },
+ { 0x12, 0xd5, 0x53, 0x7d, 0x9a, 0xb0, 0xbe, 0xd9, 0xed, 0xe9, 0x9e, 0xee,
+ 0x61, 0x5b, 0x42, 0xf2, 0xc0, 0x73, 0xc0, },
+ { 0xd5, 0x77, 0xd6, 0x5c, 0x6e, 0xa5, 0x69, 0x2b, 0x3b, 0x8c, 0xd6, 0x7d,
+ 0x1d, 0xbe, 0x2c, 0xa1, 0x02, 0x21, 0xcd, 0x29, },
+ { 0xa4, 0x98, 0x80, 0xca, 0x22, 0xcf, 0x6a, 0xab, 0x5e, 0x40, 0x0d, 0x61,
+ 0x08, 0x21, 0xef, 0xc0, 0x6c, 0x52, 0xb4, 0xb0, 0x53, },
+ { 0xbf, 0xaf, 0x8f, 0x3b, 0x7a, 0x97, 0x33, 0xe5, 0xca, 0x07, 0x37, 0xfd,
+ 0x15, 0xdf, 0xce, 0x26, 0x2a, 0xb1, 0xa7, 0x0b, 0xb3, 0xac, },
+ { 0x16, 0x22, 0xe1, 0xbc, 0x99, 0x4e, 0x01, 0xf0, 0xfa, 0xff, 0x8f, 0xa5,
+ 0x0c, 0x61, 0xb0, 0xad, 0xcc, 0xb1, 0xe1, 0x21, 0x46, 0xfa, 0x2e, },
+ { 0x11, 0x5b, 0x0b, 0x2b, 0xe6, 0x14, 0xc1, 0xd5, 0x4d, 0x71, 0x5e, 0x17,
+ 0xea, 0x23, 0xdd, 0x6c, 0xbd, 0x1d, 0xbe, 0x12, 0x1b, 0xee, 0x4c, 0x1a, },
+ { 0x40, 0x88, 0x22, 0xf3, 0x20, 0x6c, 0xed, 0xe1, 0x36, 0x34, 0x62, 0x2c,
+ 0x98, 0x83, 0x52, 0xe2, 0x25, 0xee, 0xe9, 0xf5, 0xe1, 0x17, 0xf0, 0x5c,
+ 0xae, },
+ { 0xc3, 0x76, 0x37, 0xde, 0x95, 0x8c, 0xca, 0x2b, 0x0c, 0x23, 0xe7, 0xb5,
+ 0x38, 0x70, 0x61, 0xcc, 0xff, 0xd3, 0x95, 0x7b, 0xf3, 0xff, 0x1f, 0x9d,
+ 0x59, 0x00, },
+ { 0x0c, 0x19, 0x52, 0x05, 0x22, 0x53, 0xcb, 0x48, 0xd7, 0x10, 0x0e, 0x7e,
+ 0x14, 0x69, 0xb5, 0xa2, 0x92, 0x43, 0xa3, 0x9e, 0x4b, 0x8f, 0x51, 0x2c,
+ 0x5a, 0x2c, 0x3b, },
+ { 0xe1, 0x9d, 0x70, 0x70, 0x28, 0xec, 0x86, 0x40, 0x55, 0x33, 0x56, 0xda,
+ 0x88, 0xca, 0xee, 0xc8, 0x6a, 0x20, 0xb1, 0xe5, 0x3d, 0x57, 0xf8, 0x3c,
+ 0x10, 0x07, 0x2a, 0xc4, },
+ { 0x0b, 0xae, 0xf1, 0xc4, 0x79, 0xee, 0x1b, 0x3d, 0x27, 0x35, 0x8d, 0x14,
+ 0xd6, 0xae, 0x4e, 0x3c, 0xe9, 0x53, 0x50, 0xb5, 0xcc, 0x0c, 0xf7, 0xdf,
+ 0xee, 0xa1, 0x74, 0xd6, 0x71, },
+ { 0xe6, 0xa4, 0xf4, 0x99, 0x98, 0xb9, 0x80, 0xea, 0x96, 0x7f, 0x4f, 0x33,
+ 0xcf, 0x74, 0x25, 0x6f, 0x17, 0x6c, 0xbf, 0xf5, 0x5c, 0x38, 0xd0, 0xff,
+ 0x96, 0xcb, 0x13, 0xf9, 0xdf, 0xfd, },
+ { 0xbe, 0x92, 0xeb, 0xba, 0x44, 0x2c, 0x24, 0x74, 0xd4, 0x03, 0x27, 0x3c,
+ 0x5d, 0x5b, 0x03, 0x30, 0x87, 0x63, 0x69, 0xe0, 0xb8, 0x94, 0xf4, 0x44,
+ 0x7e, 0xad, 0xcd, 0x20, 0x12, 0x16, 0x79, },
+ { 0x30, 0xf1, 0xc4, 0x8e, 0x05, 0x90, 0x2a, 0x97, 0x63, 0x94, 0x46, 0xff,
+ 0xce, 0xd8, 0x67, 0xa7, 0xac, 0x33, 0x8c, 0x95, 0xb7, 0xcd, 0xa3, 0x23,
+ 0x98, 0x9d, 0x76, 0x6c, 0x9d, 0xa8, 0xd6, 0x8a, },
+ { 0xbe, },
+ { 0x17, 0x6c, },
+ { 0x1a, 0x42, 0x4f, },
+ { 0xba, 0xaf, 0xb7, 0x65, },
+ { 0xc2, 0x63, 0x43, 0x6a, 0xea, },
+ { 0xe4, 0x4d, 0xad, 0xf2, 0x0b, 0x02, },
+ { 0x04, 0xc7, 0xc4, 0x7f, 0xa9, 0x2b, 0xce, },
+ { 0x66, 0xf6, 0x67, 0xcb, 0x03, 0x53, 0xc8, 0xf1, },
+ { 0x56, 0xa3, 0x60, 0x78, 0xc9, 0x5f, 0x70, 0x1b, 0x5e, },
+ { 0x99, 0xff, 0x81, 0x7c, 0x13, 0x3c, 0x29, 0x79, 0x4b, 0x65, },
+ { 0x51, 0x10, 0x50, 0x93, 0x01, 0x93, 0xb7, 0x01, 0xc9, 0x18, 0xb7, },
+ { 0x8e, 0x3c, 0x42, 0x1e, 0x5e, 0x7d, 0xc1, 0x50, 0x70, 0x1f, 0x00, 0x98, },
+ { 0x5f, 0xd9, 0x9b, 0xc8, 0xd7, 0xb2, 0x72, 0x62, 0x1a, 0x1e, 0xba, 0x92,
+ 0xe9, },
+ { 0x70, 0x2b, 0xba, 0xfe, 0xad, 0x5d, 0x96, 0x3f, 0x27, 0xc2, 0x41, 0x6d,
+ 0xc4, 0xb3, },
+ { 0xae, 0xe0, 0xd5, 0xd4, 0xc7, 0xae, 0x15, 0x5e, 0xdc, 0xdd, 0x33, 0x60,
+ 0xd7, 0xd3, 0x5e, },
+ { 0x79, 0x8e, 0xbc, 0x9e, 0x20, 0xb9, 0x19, 0x4b, 0x63, 0x80, 0xf3, 0x16,
+ 0xaf, 0x39, 0xbd, 0x92, },
+ { 0xc2, 0x0e, 0x85, 0xa0, 0x0b, 0x9a, 0xb0, 0xec, 0xde, 0x38, 0xd3, 0x10,
+ 0xd9, 0xa7, 0x66, 0x27, 0xcf, },
+ { 0x0e, 0x3b, 0x75, 0x80, 0x67, 0x14, 0x0c, 0x02, 0x90, 0xd6, 0xb3, 0x02,
+ 0x81, 0xf6, 0xa6, 0x87, 0xce, 0x58, },
+ { 0x79, 0xb5, 0xe9, 0x5d, 0x52, 0x4d, 0xf7, 0x59, 0xf4, 0x2e, 0x27, 0xdd,
+ 0xb3, 0xed, 0x57, 0x5b, 0x82, 0xea, 0x6f, },
+ { 0xa2, 0x97, 0xf5, 0x80, 0x02, 0x3d, 0xde, 0xa3, 0xf9, 0xf6, 0xab, 0xe3,
+ 0x57, 0x63, 0x7b, 0x9b, 0x10, 0x42, 0x6f, 0xf2, },
+ { 0x12, 0x7a, 0xfc, 0xb7, 0x67, 0x06, 0x0c, 0x78, 0x1a, 0xfe, 0x88, 0x4f,
+ 0xc6, 0xac, 0x52, 0x96, 0x64, 0x28, 0x97, 0x84, 0x06, },
+ { 0xc5, 0x04, 0x44, 0x6b, 0xb2, 0xa5, 0xa4, 0x66, 0xe1, 0x76, 0xa2, 0x51,
+ 0xf9, 0x59, 0x69, 0x97, 0x56, 0x0b, 0xbf, 0x50, 0xb3, 0x34, },
+ { 0x21, 0x32, 0x6b, 0x42, 0xb5, 0xed, 0x71, 0x8d, 0xf7, 0x5a, 0x35, 0xe3,
+ 0x90, 0xe2, 0xee, 0xaa, 0x89, 0xf6, 0xc9, 0x9c, 0x4d, 0x73, 0xf4, },
+ { 0x4c, 0xa6, 0x09, 0xf4, 0x48, 0xe7, 0x46, 0xbc, 0x49, 0xfc, 0xe5, 0xda,
+ 0xd1, 0x87, 0x13, 0x17, 0x4c, 0x59, 0x71, 0x26, 0x5b, 0x2c, 0x42, 0xb7, },
+ { 0x13, 0x63, 0xf3, 0x40, 0x02, 0xe5, 0xa3, 0x3a, 0x5e, 0x8e, 0xf8, 0xb6,
+ 0x8a, 0x49, 0x60, 0x76, 0x34, 0x72, 0x94, 0x73, 0xf6, 0xd9, 0x21, 0x6a,
+ 0x26, },
+ { 0xdf, 0x75, 0x16, 0x10, 0x1b, 0x5e, 0x81, 0xc3, 0xc8, 0xde, 0x34, 0x24,
+ 0xb0, 0x98, 0xeb, 0x1b, 0x8f, 0xa1, 0x9b, 0x05, 0xee, 0xa5, 0xe9, 0x35,
+ 0xf4, 0x1d, },
+ { 0xcd, 0x21, 0x93, 0x6e, 0x5b, 0xa0, 0x26, 0x2b, 0x21, 0x0e, 0xa0, 0xb9,
+ 0x1c, 0xb5, 0xbb, 0xb8, 0xf8, 0x1e, 0xff, 0x5c, 0xa8, 0xf9, 0x39, 0x46,
+ 0x4e, 0x29, 0x26, },
+ { 0x73, 0x7f, 0x0e, 0x3b, 0x0b, 0x5c, 0xf9, 0x60, 0xaa, 0x88, 0xa1, 0x09,
+ 0xb1, 0x5d, 0x38, 0x7b, 0x86, 0x8f, 0x13, 0x7a, 0x8d, 0x72, 0x7a, 0x98,
+ 0x1a, 0x5b, 0xff, 0xc9, },
+ { 0xd3, 0x3c, 0x61, 0x71, 0x44, 0x7e, 0x31, 0x74, 0x98, 0x9d, 0x9a, 0xd2,
+ 0x27, 0xf3, 0x46, 0x43, 0x42, 0x51, 0xd0, 0x5f, 0xe9, 0x1c, 0x5c, 0x69,
+ 0xbf, 0xf6, 0xbe, 0x3c, 0x40, },
+ { 0x31, 0x99, 0x31, 0x9f, 0xaa, 0x43, 0x2e, 0x77, 0x3e, 0x74, 0x26, 0x31,
+ 0x5e, 0x61, 0xf1, 0x87, 0xe2, 0xeb, 0x9b, 0xcd, 0xd0, 0x3a, 0xee, 0x20,
+ 0x7e, 0x10, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x7e, 0xfa, },
+ { 0xa4, 0x27, 0x80, 0x67, 0x81, 0x2a, 0xa7, 0x62, 0xf7, 0x6e, 0xda, 0xd4,
+ 0x5c, 0x39, 0x74, 0xad, 0x7e, 0xbe, 0xad, 0xa5, 0x84, 0x7f, 0xa9, 0x30,
+ 0x5d, 0xdb, 0xe2, 0x05, 0x43, 0xf7, 0x1b, },
+ { 0x0b, 0x37, 0xd8, 0x02, 0xe1, 0x83, 0xd6, 0x80, 0xf2, 0x35, 0xc2, 0xb0,
+ 0x37, 0xef, 0xef, 0x5e, 0x43, 0x93, 0xf0, 0x49, 0x45, 0x0a, 0xef, 0xb5,
+ 0x76, 0x70, 0x12, 0x44, 0xc4, 0xdb, 0xf5, 0x7a, },
+ { 0x1f, },
+ { 0x82, 0x60, },
+ { 0xcc, 0xe3, 0x08, },
+ { 0x56, 0x17, 0xe4, 0x59, },
+ { 0xe2, 0xd7, 0x9e, 0xc4, 0x4c, },
+ { 0xb2, 0xad, 0xd3, 0x78, 0x58, 0x5a, },
+ { 0xce, 0x43, 0xb4, 0x02, 0x96, 0xab, 0x3c, },
+ { 0xe6, 0x05, 0x1a, 0x73, 0x22, 0x32, 0xbb, 0x77, },
+ { 0x23, 0xe7, 0xda, 0xfe, 0x2c, 0xef, 0x8c, 0x22, 0xec, },
+ { 0xe9, 0x8e, 0x55, 0x38, 0xd1, 0xd7, 0x35, 0x23, 0x98, 0xc7, },
+ { 0xb5, 0x81, 0x1a, 0xe5, 0xb5, 0xa5, 0xd9, 0x4d, 0xca, 0x41, 0xe7, },
+ { 0x41, 0x16, 0x16, 0x95, 0x8d, 0x9e, 0x0c, 0xea, 0x8c, 0x71, 0x9a, 0xc1, },
+ { 0x7c, 0x33, 0xc0, 0xa4, 0x00, 0x62, 0xea, 0x60, 0x67, 0xe4, 0x20, 0xbc,
+ 0x5b, },
+ { 0xdb, 0xb1, 0xdc, 0xfd, 0x08, 0xc0, 0xde, 0x82, 0xd1, 0xde, 0x38, 0xc0,
+ 0x90, 0x48, },
+ { 0x37, 0x18, 0x2e, 0x0d, 0x61, 0xaa, 0x61, 0xd7, 0x86, 0x20, 0x16, 0x60,
+ 0x04, 0xd9, 0xd5, },
+ { 0xb0, 0xcf, 0x2c, 0x4c, 0x5e, 0x5b, 0x4f, 0x2a, 0x23, 0x25, 0x58, 0x47,
+ 0xe5, 0x31, 0x06, 0x70, },
+ { 0x91, 0xa0, 0xa3, 0x86, 0x4e, 0xe0, 0x72, 0x38, 0x06, 0x67, 0x59, 0x5c,
+ 0x70, 0x25, 0xdb, 0x33, 0x27, },
+ { 0x44, 0x58, 0x66, 0xb8, 0x58, 0xc7, 0x13, 0xed, 0x4c, 0xc0, 0xf4, 0x9a,
+ 0x1e, 0x67, 0x75, 0x33, 0xb6, 0xb8, },
+ { 0x7f, 0x98, 0x4a, 0x8e, 0x50, 0xa2, 0x5c, 0xcd, 0x59, 0xde, 0x72, 0xb3,
+ 0x9d, 0xc3, 0x09, 0x8a, 0xab, 0x56, 0xf1, },
+ { 0x80, 0x96, 0x49, 0x1a, 0x59, 0xa2, 0xc5, 0xd5, 0xa7, 0x20, 0x8a, 0xb7,
+ 0x27, 0x62, 0x84, 0x43, 0xc6, 0xe1, 0x1b, 0x5d, },
+ { 0x6b, 0xb7, 0x2b, 0x26, 0x62, 0x14, 0x70, 0x19, 0x3d, 0x4d, 0xac, 0xac,
+ 0x63, 0x58, 0x5e, 0x94, 0xb5, 0xb7, 0xe8, 0xe8, 0xa2, },
+ { 0x20, 0xa8, 0xc0, 0xfd, 0x63, 0x3d, 0x6e, 0x98, 0xcf, 0x0c, 0x49, 0x98,
+ 0xe4, 0x5a, 0xfe, 0x8c, 0xaa, 0x70, 0x82, 0x1c, 0x7b, 0x74, },
+ { 0xc8, 0xe8, 0xdd, 0xdf, 0x69, 0x30, 0x01, 0xc2, 0x0f, 0x7e, 0x2f, 0x11,
+ 0xcc, 0x3e, 0x17, 0xa5, 0x69, 0x40, 0x3f, 0x0e, 0x79, 0x7f, 0xcf, },
+ { 0xdb, 0x61, 0xc0, 0xe2, 0x2e, 0x49, 0x07, 0x31, 0x1d, 0x91, 0x42, 0x8a,
+ 0xfc, 0x5e, 0xd3, 0xf8, 0x56, 0x1f, 0x2b, 0x73, 0xfd, 0x9f, 0xb2, 0x8e, },
+ { 0x0c, 0x89, 0x55, 0x0c, 0x1f, 0x59, 0x2c, 0x9d, 0x1b, 0x29, 0x1d, 0x41,
+ 0x1d, 0xe6, 0x47, 0x8f, 0x8c, 0x2b, 0xea, 0x8f, 0xf0, 0xff, 0x21, 0x70,
+ 0x88, },
+ { 0x12, 0x18, 0x95, 0xa6, 0x59, 0xb1, 0x31, 0x24, 0x45, 0x67, 0x55, 0xa4,
+ 0x1a, 0x2d, 0x48, 0x67, 0x1b, 0x43, 0x88, 0x2d, 0x8e, 0xa0, 0x70, 0xb3,
+ 0xc6, 0xbb, },
+ { 0xe7, 0xb1, 0x1d, 0xb2, 0x76, 0x4d, 0x68, 0x68, 0x68, 0x23, 0x02, 0x55,
+ 0x3a, 0xe2, 0xe5, 0xd5, 0x4b, 0x43, 0xf9, 0x34, 0x77, 0x5c, 0xa1, 0xf5,
+ 0x55, 0xfd, 0x4f, },
+ { 0x8c, 0x87, 0x5a, 0x08, 0x3a, 0x73, 0xad, 0x61, 0xe1, 0xe7, 0x99, 0x7e,
+ 0xf0, 0x5d, 0xe9, 0x5d, 0x16, 0x43, 0x80, 0x2f, 0xd0, 0x66, 0x34, 0xe2,
+ 0x42, 0x64, 0x3b, 0x1a, },
+ { 0x39, 0xc1, 0x99, 0xcf, 0x22, 0xbf, 0x16, 0x8f, 0x9f, 0x80, 0x7f, 0x95,
+ 0x0a, 0x05, 0x67, 0x27, 0xe7, 0x15, 0xdf, 0x9d, 0xb2, 0xfe, 0x1c, 0xb5,
+ 0x1d, 0x60, 0x8f, 0x8a, 0x1d, },
+ { 0x9b, 0x6e, 0x08, 0x09, 0x06, 0x73, 0xab, 0x68, 0x02, 0x62, 0x1a, 0xe4,
+ 0xd4, 0xdf, 0xc7, 0x02, 0x4c, 0x6a, 0x5f, 0xfd, 0x23, 0xac, 0xae, 0x6d,
+ 0x43, 0xa4, 0x7a, 0x50, 0x60, 0x3c, },
+ { 0x1d, 0xb4, 0xc6, 0xe1, 0xb1, 0x4b, 0xe3, 0xf2, 0xe2, 0x1a, 0x73, 0x1b,
+ 0xa0, 0x92, 0xa7, 0xf5, 0xff, 0x8f, 0x8b, 0x5d, 0xdf, 0xa8, 0x04, 0xb3,
+ 0xb0, 0xf7, 0xcc, 0x12, 0xfa, 0x35, 0x46, },
+ { 0x49, 0x45, 0x97, 0x11, 0x0f, 0x1c, 0x60, 0x8e, 0xe8, 0x47, 0x30, 0xcf,
+ 0x60, 0xa8, 0x71, 0xc5, 0x1b, 0xe9, 0x39, 0x4d, 0x49, 0xb6, 0x12, 0x1f,
+ 0x24, 0xab, 0x37, 0xff, 0x83, 0xc2, 0xe1, 0x3a, },
+ { 0x60, },
+ { 0x24, 0x26, },
+ { 0x47, 0xeb, 0xc9, },
+ { 0x4a, 0xd0, 0xbc, 0xf0, },
+ { 0x8e, 0x2b, 0xc9, 0x85, 0x3c, },
+ { 0xa2, 0x07, 0x15, 0xb8, 0x12, 0x74, },
+ { 0x0f, 0xdb, 0x5b, 0x33, 0x69, 0xfe, 0x4b, },
+ { 0xa2, 0x86, 0x54, 0xf4, 0xfd, 0xb2, 0xd4, 0xe6, },
+ { 0xbb, 0x84, 0x78, 0x49, 0x27, 0x8e, 0x61, 0xda, 0x60, },
+ { 0x04, 0xc3, 0xcd, 0xaa, 0x8f, 0xa7, 0x03, 0xc9, 0xf9, 0xb6, },
+ { 0xf8, 0x27, 0x1d, 0x61, 0xdc, 0x21, 0x42, 0xdd, 0xad, 0x92, 0x40, },
+ { 0x12, 0x87, 0xdf, 0xc2, 0x41, 0x45, 0x5a, 0x36, 0x48, 0x5b, 0x51, 0x2b, },
+ { 0xbb, 0x37, 0x5d, 0x1f, 0xf1, 0x68, 0x7a, 0xc4, 0xa5, 0xd2, 0xa4, 0x91,
+ 0x8d, },
+ { 0x5b, 0x27, 0xd1, 0x04, 0x54, 0x52, 0x9f, 0xa3, 0x47, 0x86, 0x33, 0x33,
+ 0xbf, 0xa0, },
+ { 0xcf, 0x04, 0xea, 0xf8, 0x03, 0x2a, 0x43, 0xff, 0xa6, 0x68, 0x21, 0x4c,
+ 0xd5, 0x4b, 0xed, },
+ { 0xaf, 0xb8, 0xbc, 0x63, 0x0f, 0x18, 0x4d, 0xe2, 0x7a, 0xdd, 0x46, 0x44,
+ 0xc8, 0x24, 0x0a, 0xb7, },
+ { 0x3e, 0xdc, 0x36, 0xe4, 0x89, 0xb1, 0xfa, 0xc6, 0x40, 0x93, 0x2e, 0x75,
+ 0xb2, 0x15, 0xd1, 0xb1, 0x10, },
+ { 0x6c, 0xd8, 0x20, 0x3b, 0x82, 0x79, 0xf9, 0xc8, 0xbc, 0x9d, 0xe0, 0x35,
+ 0xbe, 0x1b, 0x49, 0x1a, 0xbc, 0x3a, },
+ { 0x78, 0x65, 0x2c, 0xbe, 0x35, 0x67, 0xdc, 0x78, 0xd4, 0x41, 0xf6, 0xc9,
+ 0xde, 0xde, 0x1f, 0x18, 0x13, 0x31, 0x11, },
+ { 0x8a, 0x7f, 0xb1, 0x33, 0x8f, 0x0c, 0x3c, 0x0a, 0x06, 0x61, 0xf0, 0x47,
+ 0x29, 0x1b, 0x29, 0xbc, 0x1c, 0x47, 0xef, 0x7a, },
+ { 0x65, 0x91, 0xf1, 0xe6, 0xb3, 0x96, 0xd3, 0x8c, 0xc2, 0x4a, 0x59, 0x35,
+ 0x72, 0x8e, 0x0b, 0x9a, 0x87, 0xca, 0x34, 0x7b, 0x63, },
+ { 0x5f, 0x08, 0x87, 0x80, 0x56, 0x25, 0x89, 0x77, 0x61, 0x8c, 0x64, 0xa1,
+ 0x59, 0x6d, 0x59, 0x62, 0xe8, 0x4a, 0xc8, 0x58, 0x99, 0xd1, },
+ { 0x23, 0x87, 0x1d, 0xed, 0x6f, 0xf2, 0x91, 0x90, 0xe2, 0xfe, 0x43, 0x21,
+ 0xaf, 0x97, 0xc6, 0xbc, 0xd7, 0x15, 0xc7, 0x2d, 0x08, 0x77, 0x91, },
+ { 0x90, 0x47, 0x9a, 0x9e, 0x3a, 0xdf, 0xf3, 0xc9, 0x4c, 0x1e, 0xa7, 0xd4,
+ 0x6a, 0x32, 0x90, 0xfe, 0xb7, 0xb6, 0x7b, 0xfa, 0x96, 0x61, 0xfb, 0xa4, },
+ { 0xb1, 0x67, 0x60, 0x45, 0xb0, 0x96, 0xc5, 0x15, 0x9f, 0x4d, 0x26, 0xd7,
+ 0x9d, 0xf1, 0xf5, 0x6d, 0x21, 0x00, 0x94, 0x31, 0x64, 0x94, 0xd3, 0xa7,
+ 0xd3, },
+ { 0x02, 0x3e, 0xaf, 0xf3, 0x79, 0x73, 0xa5, 0xf5, 0xcc, 0x7a, 0x7f, 0xfb,
+ 0x79, 0x2b, 0x85, 0x8c, 0x88, 0x72, 0x06, 0xbe, 0xfe, 0xaf, 0xc1, 0x16,
+ 0xa6, 0xd6, },
+ { 0x2a, 0xb0, 0x1a, 0xe5, 0xaa, 0x6e, 0xb3, 0xae, 0x53, 0x85, 0x33, 0x80,
+ 0x75, 0xae, 0x30, 0xe6, 0xb8, 0x72, 0x42, 0xf6, 0x25, 0x4f, 0x38, 0x88,
+ 0x55, 0xd1, 0xa9, },
+ { 0x90, 0xd8, 0x0c, 0xc0, 0x93, 0x4b, 0x4f, 0x9e, 0x65, 0x6c, 0xa1, 0x54,
+ 0xa6, 0xf6, 0x6e, 0xca, 0xd2, 0xbb, 0x7e, 0x6a, 0x1c, 0xd3, 0xce, 0x46,
+ 0xef, 0xb0, 0x00, 0x8d, },
+ { 0xed, 0x9c, 0x49, 0xcd, 0xc2, 0xde, 0x38, 0x0e, 0xe9, 0x98, 0x6c, 0xc8,
+ 0x90, 0x9e, 0x3c, 0xd4, 0xd3, 0xeb, 0x88, 0x32, 0xc7, 0x28, 0xe3, 0x94,
+ 0x1c, 0x9f, 0x8b, 0xf3, 0xcb, },
+ { 0xac, 0xe7, 0x92, 0x16, 0xb4, 0x14, 0xa0, 0xe4, 0x04, 0x79, 0xa2, 0xf4,
+ 0x31, 0xe6, 0x0c, 0x26, 0xdc, 0xbf, 0x2f, 0x69, 0x1b, 0x55, 0x94, 0x67,
+ 0xda, 0x0c, 0xd7, 0x32, 0x1f, 0xef, },
+ { 0x68, 0x63, 0x85, 0x57, 0x95, 0x9e, 0x42, 0x27, 0x41, 0x43, 0x42, 0x02,
+ 0xa5, 0x78, 0xa7, 0xc6, 0x43, 0xc1, 0x6a, 0xba, 0x70, 0x80, 0xcd, 0x04,
+ 0xb6, 0x78, 0x76, 0x29, 0xf3, 0xe8, 0xa0, },
+ { 0xe6, 0xac, 0x8d, 0x9d, 0xf0, 0xc0, 0xf7, 0xf7, 0xe3, 0x3e, 0x4e, 0x28,
+ 0x0f, 0x59, 0xb2, 0x67, 0x9e, 0x84, 0x34, 0x42, 0x96, 0x30, 0x2b, 0xca,
+ 0x49, 0xb6, 0xc5, 0x9a, 0x84, 0x59, 0xa7, 0x81, },
+ { 0x7e, },
+ { 0x1e, 0x21, },
+ { 0x26, 0xd3, 0xdd, },
+ { 0x2c, 0xd4, 0xb3, 0x3d, },
+ { 0x86, 0x7b, 0x76, 0x3c, 0xf0, },
+ { 0x12, 0xc3, 0x70, 0x1d, 0x55, 0x18, },
+ { 0x96, 0xc2, 0xbd, 0x61, 0x55, 0xf4, 0x24, },
+ { 0x20, 0x51, 0xf7, 0x86, 0x58, 0x8f, 0x07, 0x2a, },
+ { 0x93, 0x15, 0xa8, 0x1d, 0xda, 0x97, 0xee, 0x0e, 0x6c, },
+ { 0x39, 0x93, 0xdf, 0xd5, 0x0e, 0xca, 0xdc, 0x7a, 0x92, 0xce, },
+ { 0x60, 0xd5, 0xfd, 0xf5, 0x1b, 0x26, 0x82, 0x26, 0x73, 0x02, 0xbc, },
+ { 0x98, 0xf2, 0x34, 0xe1, 0xf5, 0xfb, 0x00, 0xac, 0x10, 0x4a, 0x38, 0x9f, },
+ { 0xda, 0x3a, 0x92, 0x8a, 0xd0, 0xcd, 0x12, 0xcd, 0x15, 0xbb, 0xab, 0x77,
+ 0x66, },
+ { 0xa2, 0x92, 0x1a, 0xe5, 0xca, 0x0c, 0x30, 0x75, 0xeb, 0xaf, 0x00, 0x31,
+ 0x55, 0x66, },
+ { 0x06, 0xea, 0xfd, 0x3e, 0x86, 0x38, 0x62, 0x4e, 0xa9, 0x12, 0xa4, 0x12,
+ 0x43, 0xbf, 0xa1, },
+ { 0xe4, 0x71, 0x7b, 0x94, 0xdb, 0xa0, 0xd2, 0xff, 0x9b, 0xeb, 0xad, 0x8e,
+ 0x95, 0x8a, 0xc5, 0xed, },
+ { 0x25, 0x5a, 0x77, 0x71, 0x41, 0x0e, 0x7a, 0xe9, 0xed, 0x0c, 0x10, 0xef,
+ 0xf6, 0x2b, 0x3a, 0xba, 0x60, },
+ { 0xee, 0xe2, 0xa3, 0x67, 0x64, 0x1d, 0xc6, 0x04, 0xc4, 0xe1, 0x68, 0xd2,
+ 0x6e, 0xd2, 0x91, 0x75, 0x53, 0x07, },
+ { 0xe0, 0xf6, 0x4d, 0x8f, 0x68, 0xfc, 0x06, 0x7e, 0x18, 0x79, 0x7f, 0x2b,
+ 0x6d, 0xef, 0x46, 0x7f, 0xab, 0xb2, 0xad, },
+ { 0x3d, 0x35, 0x88, 0x9f, 0x2e, 0xcf, 0x96, 0x45, 0x07, 0x60, 0x71, 0x94,
+ 0x00, 0x8d, 0xbf, 0xf4, 0xef, 0x46, 0x2e, 0x3c, },
+ { 0x43, 0xcf, 0x98, 0xf7, 0x2d, 0xf4, 0x17, 0xe7, 0x8c, 0x05, 0x2d, 0x9b,
+ 0x24, 0xfb, 0x4d, 0xea, 0x4a, 0xec, 0x01, 0x25, 0x29, },
+ { 0x8e, 0x73, 0x9a, 0x78, 0x11, 0xfe, 0x48, 0xa0, 0x3b, 0x1a, 0x26, 0xdf,
+ 0x25, 0xe9, 0x59, 0x1c, 0x70, 0x07, 0x9f, 0xdc, 0xa0, 0xa6, },
+ { 0xe8, 0x47, 0x71, 0xc7, 0x3e, 0xdf, 0xb5, 0x13, 0xb9, 0x85, 0x13, 0xa8,
+ 0x54, 0x47, 0x6e, 0x59, 0x96, 0x09, 0x13, 0x5f, 0x82, 0x16, 0x0b, },
+ { 0xfb, 0xc0, 0x8c, 0x03, 0x21, 0xb3, 0xc4, 0xb5, 0x43, 0x32, 0x6c, 0xea,
+ 0x7f, 0xa8, 0x43, 0x91, 0xe8, 0x4e, 0x3f, 0xbf, 0x45, 0x58, 0x6a, 0xa3, },
+ { 0x55, 0xf8, 0xf3, 0x00, 0x76, 0x09, 0xef, 0x69, 0x5d, 0xd2, 0x8a, 0xf2,
+ 0x65, 0xc3, 0xcb, 0x9b, 0x43, 0xfd, 0xb1, 0x7e, 0x7f, 0xa1, 0x94, 0xb0,
+ 0xd7, },
+ { 0xaa, 0x13, 0xc1, 0x51, 0x40, 0x6d, 0x8d, 0x4c, 0x0a, 0x95, 0x64, 0x7b,
+ 0xd1, 0x96, 0xb6, 0x56, 0xb4, 0x5b, 0xcf, 0xd6, 0xd9, 0x15, 0x97, 0xdd,
+ 0xb6, 0xef, },
+ { 0xaf, 0xb7, 0x36, 0xb0, 0x04, 0xdb, 0xd7, 0x9c, 0x9a, 0x44, 0xc4, 0xf6,
+ 0x1f, 0x12, 0x21, 0x2d, 0x59, 0x30, 0x54, 0xab, 0x27, 0x61, 0xa3, 0x57,
+ 0xef, 0xf8, 0x53, },
+ { 0x97, 0x34, 0x45, 0x3e, 0xce, 0x7c, 0x35, 0xa2, 0xda, 0x9f, 0x4b, 0x46,
+ 0x6c, 0x11, 0x67, 0xff, 0x2f, 0x76, 0x58, 0x15, 0x71, 0xfa, 0x44, 0x89,
+ 0x89, 0xfd, 0xf7, 0x99, },
+ { 0x1f, 0xb1, 0x62, 0xeb, 0x83, 0xc5, 0x9c, 0x89, 0xf9, 0x2c, 0xd2, 0x03,
+ 0x61, 0xbc, 0xbb, 0xa5, 0x74, 0x0e, 0x9b, 0x7e, 0x82, 0x3e, 0x70, 0x0a,
+ 0xa9, 0x8f, 0x2b, 0x59, 0xfb, },
+ { 0xf8, 0xca, 0x5e, 0x3a, 0x4f, 0x9e, 0x10, 0x69, 0x10, 0xd5, 0x4c, 0xeb,
+ 0x1a, 0x0f, 0x3c, 0x6a, 0x98, 0xf5, 0xb0, 0x97, 0x5b, 0x37, 0x2f, 0x0d,
+ 0xbd, 0x42, 0x4b, 0x69, 0xa1, 0x82, },
+ { 0x12, 0x8c, 0x6d, 0x52, 0x08, 0xef, 0x74, 0xb2, 0xe6, 0xaa, 0xd3, 0xb0,
+ 0x26, 0xb0, 0xd9, 0x94, 0xb6, 0x11, 0x45, 0x0e, 0x36, 0x71, 0x14, 0x2d,
+ 0x41, 0x8c, 0x21, 0x53, 0x31, 0xe9, 0x68, },
+ { 0xee, 0xea, 0x0d, 0x89, 0x47, 0x7e, 0x72, 0xd1, 0xd8, 0xce, 0x58, 0x4c,
+ 0x94, 0x1f, 0x0d, 0x51, 0x08, 0xa3, 0xb6, 0x3d, 0xe7, 0x82, 0x46, 0x92,
+ 0xd6, 0x98, 0x6b, 0x07, 0x10, 0x65, 0x52, 0x65, },
+};
+
+bool __init blake2s_selftest(void)
+{
+ u8 key[BLAKE2S_KEY_SIZE];
+ u8 buf[ARRAY_SIZE(blake2s_testvecs)];
+ u8 hash[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE];
+ struct blake2s_state state;
+ bool success = true;
+ int i, l;
+
+ key[0] = key[1] = 1;
+ for (i = 2; i < sizeof(key); ++i)
+ key[i] = key[i - 2] + key[i - 1];
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf); ++i)
+ buf[i] = (u8)i;
+
+ for (i = l = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(blake2s_testvecs); l = (l + 37) % ++i) {
+ int outlen = 1 + i % BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE;
+ int keylen = (13 * i) % (BLAKE2S_KEY_SIZE + 1);
+
+ blake2s(hash, buf, key + BLAKE2S_KEY_SIZE - keylen, outlen, i,
+ keylen);
+ if (memcmp(hash, blake2s_testvecs[i], outlen)) {
+ pr_err("blake2s self-test %d: FAIL\n", i + 1);
+ success = false;
+ }
+
+ if (!keylen)
+ blake2s_init(&state, outlen);
+ else
+ blake2s_init_key(&state, outlen,
+ key + BLAKE2S_KEY_SIZE - keylen,
+ keylen);
+
+ blake2s_update(&state, buf, l);
+ blake2s_update(&state, buf + l, i - l);
+ blake2s_final(&state, hash);
+ if (memcmp(hash, blake2s_testvecs[i], outlen)) {
+ pr_err("blake2s init/update/final self-test %d: FAIL\n",
+ i + 1);
+ success = false;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return success;
+}
diff --git a/lib/crypto/blake2s.c b/lib/crypto/blake2s.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..536fce87555b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/crypto/blake2s.c
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR MIT
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@...c4.com>. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * This is an implementation of the BLAKE2s hash and PRF functions.
+ *
+ * Information: https://blake2.net/
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <crypto/internal/blake2s.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/bug.h>
+#include <asm/unaligned.h>
+
+bool blake2s_selftest(void);
+
+void blake2s_update(struct blake2s_state *state, const u8 *in, size_t inlen)
+{
+ const size_t fill = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE - state->buflen;
+
+ if (unlikely(!inlen))
+ return;
+ if (inlen > fill) {
+ memcpy(state->buf + state->buflen, in, fill);
+ blake2s_compress_generic(state, state->buf, 1,
+ BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ state->buflen = 0;
+ in += fill;
+ inlen -= fill;
+ }
+ if (inlen > BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+ const size_t nblocks = DIV_ROUND_UP(inlen, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ /* Hash one less (full) block than strictly possible */
+ blake2s_compress_generic(state, in, nblocks - 1,
+ BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ in += BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE * (nblocks - 1);
+ inlen -= BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE * (nblocks - 1);
+ }
+ memcpy(state->buf + state->buflen, in, inlen);
+ state->buflen += inlen;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(blake2s_update);
+
+void blake2s_final(struct blake2s_state *state, u8 *out)
+{
+ WARN_ON(IS_ENABLED(DEBUG) && !out);
+ blake2s_set_lastblock(state);
+ memset(state->buf + state->buflen, 0,
+ BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE - state->buflen); /* Padding */
+ blake2s_compress_generic(state, state->buf, 1, state->buflen);
+ cpu_to_le32_array(state->h, ARRAY_SIZE(state->h));
+ memcpy(out, state->h, state->outlen);
+ memzero_explicit(state, sizeof(*state));
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(blake2s_final);
+
+static int __init mod_init(void)
+{
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_DISABLE_TESTS) &&
+ WARN_ON(!blake2s_selftest()))
+ return -ENODEV;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void __exit mod_exit(void)
+{
+}
+
+module_init(mod_init);
+module_exit(mod_exit);
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("BLAKE2s hash function");
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@...c4.com>");
diff --git a/lib/random32.c b/lib/random32.c
index 9085b1172015..339624191b51 100644
--- a/lib/random32.c
+++ b/lib/random32.c
@@ -38,6 +38,9 @@
#include <linux/jiffies.h>
#include <linux/random.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/bitops.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/notifier.h>
#include <asm/unaligned.h>
/**
@@ -544,9 +547,11 @@ static void prandom_reseed(struct timer_list *unused)
* To avoid worrying about whether it's safe to delay that interrupt
* long enough to seed all CPUs, just schedule an immediate timer event.
*/
-static void prandom_timer_start(struct random_ready_callback *unused)
+static int prandom_timer_start(struct notifier_block *nb,
+ unsigned long action, void *data)
{
mod_timer(&seed_timer, jiffies);
+ return 0;
}
/*
@@ -555,13 +560,13 @@ static void prandom_timer_start(struct random_ready_callback *unused)
*/
static int __init prandom_init_late(void)
{
- static struct random_ready_callback random_ready = {
- .func = prandom_timer_start
+ static struct notifier_block random_ready = {
+ .notifier_call = prandom_timer_start
};
- int ret = add_random_ready_callback(&random_ready);
+ int ret = register_random_ready_notifier(&random_ready);
if (ret == -EALREADY) {
- prandom_timer_start(&random_ready);
+ prandom_timer_start(&random_ready, 0, NULL);
ret = 0;
}
return ret;
diff --git a/lib/sha1.c b/lib/sha1.c
index 1d96d2c02b82..bad46695476b 100644
--- a/lib/sha1.c
+++ b/lib/sha1.c
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/bitops.h>
#include <linux/cryptohash.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
#include <asm/unaligned.h>
/*
@@ -55,7 +56,8 @@
#define SHA_ROUND(t, input, fn, constant, A, B, C, D, E) do { \
__u32 TEMP = input(t); setW(t, TEMP); \
E += TEMP + rol32(A,5) + (fn) + (constant); \
- B = ror32(B, 2); } while (0)
+ B = ror32(B, 2); \
+ TEMP = E; E = D; D = C; C = B; B = A; A = TEMP; } while (0)
#define T_0_15(t, A, B, C, D, E) SHA_ROUND(t, SHA_SRC, (((C^D)&B)^D) , 0x5a827999, A, B, C, D, E )
#define T_16_19(t, A, B, C, D, E) SHA_ROUND(t, SHA_MIX, (((C^D)&B)^D) , 0x5a827999, A, B, C, D, E )
@@ -82,6 +84,7 @@
void sha_transform(__u32 *digest, const char *data, __u32 *array)
{
__u32 A, B, C, D, E;
+ unsigned int i = 0;
A = digest[0];
B = digest[1];
@@ -90,94 +93,24 @@ void sha_transform(__u32 *digest, const char *data, __u32 *array)
E = digest[4];
/* Round 1 - iterations 0-16 take their input from 'data' */
- T_0_15( 0, A, B, C, D, E);
- T_0_15( 1, E, A, B, C, D);
- T_0_15( 2, D, E, A, B, C);
- T_0_15( 3, C, D, E, A, B);
- T_0_15( 4, B, C, D, E, A);
- T_0_15( 5, A, B, C, D, E);
- T_0_15( 6, E, A, B, C, D);
- T_0_15( 7, D, E, A, B, C);
- T_0_15( 8, C, D, E, A, B);
- T_0_15( 9, B, C, D, E, A);
- T_0_15(10, A, B, C, D, E);
- T_0_15(11, E, A, B, C, D);
- T_0_15(12, D, E, A, B, C);
- T_0_15(13, C, D, E, A, B);
- T_0_15(14, B, C, D, E, A);
- T_0_15(15, A, B, C, D, E);
+ for (; i < 16; ++i)
+ T_0_15(i, A, B, C, D, E);
/* Round 1 - tail. Input from 512-bit mixing array */
- T_16_19(16, E, A, B, C, D);
- T_16_19(17, D, E, A, B, C);
- T_16_19(18, C, D, E, A, B);
- T_16_19(19, B, C, D, E, A);
+ for (; i < 20; ++i)
+ T_16_19(i, A, B, C, D, E);
/* Round 2 */
- T_20_39(20, A, B, C, D, E);
- T_20_39(21, E, A, B, C, D);
- T_20_39(22, D, E, A, B, C);
- T_20_39(23, C, D, E, A, B);
- T_20_39(24, B, C, D, E, A);
- T_20_39(25, A, B, C, D, E);
- T_20_39(26, E, A, B, C, D);
- T_20_39(27, D, E, A, B, C);
- T_20_39(28, C, D, E, A, B);
- T_20_39(29, B, C, D, E, A);
- T_20_39(30, A, B, C, D, E);
- T_20_39(31, E, A, B, C, D);
- T_20_39(32, D, E, A, B, C);
- T_20_39(33, C, D, E, A, B);
- T_20_39(34, B, C, D, E, A);
- T_20_39(35, A, B, C, D, E);
- T_20_39(36, E, A, B, C, D);
- T_20_39(37, D, E, A, B, C);
- T_20_39(38, C, D, E, A, B);
- T_20_39(39, B, C, D, E, A);
+ for (; i < 40; ++i)
+ T_20_39(i, A, B, C, D, E);
/* Round 3 */
- T_40_59(40, A, B, C, D, E);
- T_40_59(41, E, A, B, C, D);
- T_40_59(42, D, E, A, B, C);
- T_40_59(43, C, D, E, A, B);
- T_40_59(44, B, C, D, E, A);
- T_40_59(45, A, B, C, D, E);
- T_40_59(46, E, A, B, C, D);
- T_40_59(47, D, E, A, B, C);
- T_40_59(48, C, D, E, A, B);
- T_40_59(49, B, C, D, E, A);
- T_40_59(50, A, B, C, D, E);
- T_40_59(51, E, A, B, C, D);
- T_40_59(52, D, E, A, B, C);
- T_40_59(53, C, D, E, A, B);
- T_40_59(54, B, C, D, E, A);
- T_40_59(55, A, B, C, D, E);
- T_40_59(56, E, A, B, C, D);
- T_40_59(57, D, E, A, B, C);
- T_40_59(58, C, D, E, A, B);
- T_40_59(59, B, C, D, E, A);
+ for (; i < 60; ++i)
+ T_40_59(i, A, B, C, D, E);
/* Round 4 */
- T_60_79(60, A, B, C, D, E);
- T_60_79(61, E, A, B, C, D);
- T_60_79(62, D, E, A, B, C);
- T_60_79(63, C, D, E, A, B);
- T_60_79(64, B, C, D, E, A);
- T_60_79(65, A, B, C, D, E);
- T_60_79(66, E, A, B, C, D);
- T_60_79(67, D, E, A, B, C);
- T_60_79(68, C, D, E, A, B);
- T_60_79(69, B, C, D, E, A);
- T_60_79(70, A, B, C, D, E);
- T_60_79(71, E, A, B, C, D);
- T_60_79(72, D, E, A, B, C);
- T_60_79(73, C, D, E, A, B);
- T_60_79(74, B, C, D, E, A);
- T_60_79(75, A, B, C, D, E);
- T_60_79(76, E, A, B, C, D);
- T_60_79(77, D, E, A, B, C);
- T_60_79(78, C, D, E, A, B);
- T_60_79(79, B, C, D, E, A);
+ for (; i < 80; ++i)
+ T_60_79(i, A, B, C, D, E);
digest[0] += A;
digest[1] += B;
diff --git a/lib/siphash.c b/lib/siphash.c
index e632ee40aac1..5b34b5c83988 100644
--- a/lib/siphash.c
+++ b/lib/siphash.c
@@ -18,19 +18,13 @@
#include <asm/word-at-a-time.h>
#endif
-#define SIPROUND \
- do { \
- v0 += v1; v1 = rol64(v1, 13); v1 ^= v0; v0 = rol64(v0, 32); \
- v2 += v3; v3 = rol64(v3, 16); v3 ^= v2; \
- v0 += v3; v3 = rol64(v3, 21); v3 ^= v0; \
- v2 += v1; v1 = rol64(v1, 17); v1 ^= v2; v2 = rol64(v2, 32); \
- } while (0)
+#define SIPROUND SIPHASH_PERMUTATION(v0, v1, v2, v3)
#define PREAMBLE(len) \
- u64 v0 = 0x736f6d6570736575ULL; \
- u64 v1 = 0x646f72616e646f6dULL; \
- u64 v2 = 0x6c7967656e657261ULL; \
- u64 v3 = 0x7465646279746573ULL; \
+ u64 v0 = SIPHASH_CONST_0; \
+ u64 v1 = SIPHASH_CONST_1; \
+ u64 v2 = SIPHASH_CONST_2; \
+ u64 v3 = SIPHASH_CONST_3; \
u64 b = ((u64)(len)) << 56; \
v3 ^= key->key[1]; \
v2 ^= key->key[0]; \
@@ -389,19 +383,13 @@ u32 hsiphash_4u32(const u32 first, const u32 second, const u32 third,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(hsiphash_4u32);
#else
-#define HSIPROUND \
- do { \
- v0 += v1; v1 = rol32(v1, 5); v1 ^= v0; v0 = rol32(v0, 16); \
- v2 += v3; v3 = rol32(v3, 8); v3 ^= v2; \
- v0 += v3; v3 = rol32(v3, 7); v3 ^= v0; \
- v2 += v1; v1 = rol32(v1, 13); v1 ^= v2; v2 = rol32(v2, 16); \
- } while (0)
+#define HSIPROUND HSIPHASH_PERMUTATION(v0, v1, v2, v3)
#define HPREAMBLE(len) \
- u32 v0 = 0; \
- u32 v1 = 0; \
- u32 v2 = 0x6c796765U; \
- u32 v3 = 0x74656462U; \
+ u32 v0 = HSIPHASH_CONST_0; \
+ u32 v1 = HSIPHASH_CONST_1; \
+ u32 v2 = HSIPHASH_CONST_2; \
+ u32 v3 = HSIPHASH_CONST_3; \
u32 b = ((u32)(len)) << 24; \
v3 ^= key->key[1]; \
v2 ^= key->key[0]; \
diff --git a/lib/vsprintf.c b/lib/vsprintf.c
index c2619510636e..5e672480d3be 100644
--- a/lib/vsprintf.c
+++ b/lib/vsprintf.c
@@ -1700,14 +1700,16 @@ static void enable_ptr_key_workfn(struct work_struct *work)
static DECLARE_WORK(enable_ptr_key_work, enable_ptr_key_workfn);
-static void fill_random_ptr_key(struct random_ready_callback *unused)
+static int fill_random_ptr_key(struct notifier_block *nb,
+ unsigned long action, void *data)
{
/* This may be in an interrupt handler. */
queue_work(system_unbound_wq, &enable_ptr_key_work);
+ return 0;
}
-static struct random_ready_callback random_ready = {
- .func = fill_random_ptr_key
+static struct notifier_block random_ready = {
+ .notifier_call = fill_random_ptr_key
};
static int __init initialize_ptr_random(void)
@@ -1721,7 +1723,7 @@ static int __init initialize_ptr_random(void)
return 0;
}
- ret = add_random_ready_callback(&random_ready);
+ ret = register_random_ready_notifier(&random_ready);
if (!ret) {
return 0;
} else if (ret == -EALREADY) {
diff --git a/mm/util.c b/mm/util.c
index 621afcea2bfa..e63eeb95f0f0 100644
--- a/mm/util.c
+++ b/mm/util.c
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
#include <linux/hugetlb.h>
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
#include <linux/userfaultfd_k.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
#include <asm/sections.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
@@ -286,6 +287,38 @@ int vma_is_stack_for_current(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
return (vma->vm_start <= KSTK_ESP(t) && vma->vm_end >= KSTK_ESP(t));
}
+/**
+ * randomize_page - Generate a random, page aligned address
+ * @start: The smallest acceptable address the caller will take.
+ * @range: The size of the area, starting at @start, within which the
+ * random address must fall.
+ *
+ * If @start + @range would overflow, @range is capped.
+ *
+ * NOTE: Historical use of randomize_range, which this replaces, presumed that
+ * @start was already page aligned. We now align it regardless.
+ *
+ * Return: A page aligned address within [start, start + range). On error,
+ * @start is returned.
+ */
+unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range)
+{
+ if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(start)) {
+ range -= PAGE_ALIGN(start) - start;
+ start = PAGE_ALIGN(start);
+ }
+
+ if (start > ULONG_MAX - range)
+ range = ULONG_MAX - start;
+
+ range >>= PAGE_SHIFT;
+
+ if (range == 0)
+ return start;
+
+ return start + (get_random_long() % range << PAGE_SHIFT);
+}
+
#if defined(CONFIG_MMU) && !defined(HAVE_ARCH_PICK_MMAP_LAYOUT)
void arch_pick_mmap_layout(struct mm_struct *mm, struct rlimit *rlim_stack)
{
diff --git a/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c b/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c
index 0a8aec3f37cc..5295a579ec82 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c
@@ -718,12 +718,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(inet_unhash);
* Note that we use 32bit integers (vs RFC 'short integers')
* because 2^16 is not a multiple of num_ephemeral and this
* property might be used by clever attacker.
- * RFC claims using TABLE_LENGTH=10 buckets gives an improvement,
- * we use 256 instead to really give more isolation and
- * privacy, this only consumes 1 KB of kernel memory.
+ * RFC claims using TABLE_LENGTH=10 buckets gives an improvement, though
+ * attacks were since demonstrated, thus we use 65536 instead to really
+ * give more isolation and privacy, at the expense of 256kB of kernel
+ * memory.
*/
-#define INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT 8
-static u32 table_perturb[1 << INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT];
+#define INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT 16
+#define INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SIZE (1 << INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT)
+static u32 *table_perturb;
int __inet_hash_connect(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row,
struct sock *sk, u64 port_offset,
@@ -763,10 +765,11 @@ int __inet_hash_connect(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row,
if (likely(remaining > 1))
remaining &= ~1U;
- net_get_random_once(table_perturb, sizeof(table_perturb));
- index = hash_32(port_offset, INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT);
+ net_get_random_once(table_perturb,
+ INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SIZE * sizeof(*table_perturb));
+ index = port_offset & (INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SIZE - 1);
- offset = READ_ONCE(table_perturb[index]) + port_offset;
+ offset = READ_ONCE(table_perturb[index]) + (port_offset >> 32);
offset %= remaining;
/* In first pass we try ports of @low parity.
@@ -821,6 +824,12 @@ int __inet_hash_connect(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row,
return -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
ok:
+ /* Here we want to add a little bit of randomness to the next source
+ * port that will be chosen. We use a max() with a random here so that
+ * on low contention the randomness is maximal and on high contention
+ * it may be inexistent.
+ */
+ i = max_t(int, i, (prandom_u32() & 7) * 2);
WRITE_ONCE(table_perturb[index], READ_ONCE(table_perturb[index]) + i + 2);
/* Head lock still held and bh's disabled */
@@ -890,6 +899,12 @@ void __init inet_hashinfo2_init(struct inet_hashinfo *h, const char *name,
INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&h->lhash2[i].head);
h->lhash2[i].count = 0;
}
+
+ /* this one is used for source ports of outgoing connections */
+ table_perturb = kmalloc_array(INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SIZE,
+ sizeof(*table_perturb), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!table_perturb)
+ panic("TCP: failed to alloc table_perturb");
}
int inet_ehash_locks_alloc(struct inet_hashinfo *hashinfo)
diff --git a/net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c b/net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c
index 2ff25c445b82..9dae10d8880c 100644
--- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c
+++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c
@@ -519,14 +519,15 @@ static int l2tp_ip6_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
struct ipcm6_cookie ipc6;
int addr_len = msg->msg_namelen;
int transhdrlen = 4; /* zero session-id */
- int ulen = len + transhdrlen;
+ int ulen;
int err;
/* Rough check on arithmetic overflow,
better check is made in ip6_append_data().
*/
- if (len > INT_MAX)
+ if (len > INT_MAX - transhdrlen)
return -EMSGSIZE;
+ ulen = len + transhdrlen;
/* Mirror BSD error message compatibility */
if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_OOB)
diff --git a/net/openvswitch/actions.c b/net/openvswitch/actions.c
index 8b75afe41284..091202b84b6e 100644
--- a/net/openvswitch/actions.c
+++ b/net/openvswitch/actions.c
@@ -443,6 +443,7 @@ static void set_ip_addr(struct sk_buff *skb, struct iphdr *nh,
update_ip_l4_checksum(skb, nh, *addr, new_addr);
csum_replace4(&nh->check, *addr, new_addr);
skb_clear_hash(skb);
+ ovs_ct_clear(skb, NULL);
*addr = new_addr;
}
@@ -490,6 +491,7 @@ static void set_ipv6_addr(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 l4_proto,
update_ipv6_checksum(skb, l4_proto, addr, new_addr);
skb_clear_hash(skb);
+ ovs_ct_clear(skb, NULL);
memcpy(addr, new_addr, sizeof(__be32[4]));
}
@@ -730,6 +732,7 @@ static int set_nsh(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sw_flow_key *flow_key,
static void set_tp_port(struct sk_buff *skb, __be16 *port,
__be16 new_port, __sum16 *check)
{
+ ovs_ct_clear(skb, NULL);
inet_proto_csum_replace2(check, skb, *port, new_port, false);
*port = new_port;
}
@@ -769,6 +772,7 @@ static int set_udp(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sw_flow_key *flow_key,
uh->dest = dst;
flow_key->tp.src = src;
flow_key->tp.dst = dst;
+ ovs_ct_clear(skb, NULL);
}
skb_clear_hash(skb);
@@ -831,6 +835,8 @@ static int set_sctp(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sw_flow_key *flow_key,
sh->checksum = old_csum ^ old_correct_csum ^ new_csum;
skb_clear_hash(skb);
+ ovs_ct_clear(skb, NULL);
+
flow_key->tp.src = sh->source;
flow_key->tp.dst = sh->dest;
diff --git a/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c b/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c
index fb13fcfedaf4..0777c8d416f1 100644
--- a/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c
+++ b/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c
@@ -1303,7 +1303,8 @@ int ovs_ct_clear(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sw_flow_key *key)
if (skb_nfct(skb)) {
nf_conntrack_put(skb_nfct(skb));
nf_ct_set(skb, NULL, IP_CT_UNTRACKED);
- ovs_ct_fill_key(skb, key);
+ if (key)
+ ovs_ct_fill_key(skb, key);
}
return 0;
diff --git a/net/openvswitch/flow_netlink.c b/net/openvswitch/flow_netlink.c
index 180f5feb7717..eba94cf3d2d0 100644
--- a/net/openvswitch/flow_netlink.c
+++ b/net/openvswitch/flow_netlink.c
@@ -2253,6 +2253,36 @@ static struct sw_flow_actions *nla_alloc_flow_actions(int size)
return sfa;
}
+static void ovs_nla_free_nested_actions(const struct nlattr *actions, int len);
+
+static void ovs_nla_free_clone_action(const struct nlattr *action)
+{
+ const struct nlattr *a = nla_data(action);
+ int rem = nla_len(action);
+
+ switch (nla_type(a)) {
+ case OVS_CLONE_ATTR_EXEC:
+ /* The real list of actions follows this attribute. */
+ a = nla_next(a, &rem);
+ ovs_nla_free_nested_actions(a, rem);
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+static void ovs_nla_free_sample_action(const struct nlattr *action)
+{
+ const struct nlattr *a = nla_data(action);
+ int rem = nla_len(action);
+
+ switch (nla_type(a)) {
+ case OVS_SAMPLE_ATTR_ARG:
+ /* The real list of actions follows this attribute. */
+ a = nla_next(a, &rem);
+ ovs_nla_free_nested_actions(a, rem);
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
static void ovs_nla_free_set_action(const struct nlattr *a)
{
const struct nlattr *ovs_key = nla_data(a);
@@ -2266,25 +2296,46 @@ static void ovs_nla_free_set_action(const struct nlattr *a)
}
}
-void ovs_nla_free_flow_actions(struct sw_flow_actions *sf_acts)
+static void ovs_nla_free_nested_actions(const struct nlattr *actions, int len)
{
const struct nlattr *a;
int rem;
- if (!sf_acts)
+ /* Whenever new actions are added, the need to update this
+ * function should be considered.
+ */
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(OVS_ACTION_ATTR_MAX != 20);
+
+ if (!actions)
return;
- nla_for_each_attr(a, sf_acts->actions, sf_acts->actions_len, rem) {
+ nla_for_each_attr(a, actions, len, rem) {
switch (nla_type(a)) {
- case OVS_ACTION_ATTR_SET:
- ovs_nla_free_set_action(a);
+ case OVS_ACTION_ATTR_CLONE:
+ ovs_nla_free_clone_action(a);
break;
+
case OVS_ACTION_ATTR_CT:
ovs_ct_free_action(a);
break;
+
+ case OVS_ACTION_ATTR_SAMPLE:
+ ovs_nla_free_sample_action(a);
+ break;
+
+ case OVS_ACTION_ATTR_SET:
+ ovs_nla_free_set_action(a);
+ break;
}
}
+}
+
+void ovs_nla_free_flow_actions(struct sw_flow_actions *sf_acts)
+{
+ if (!sf_acts)
+ return;
+ ovs_nla_free_nested_actions(sf_acts->actions, sf_acts->actions_len);
kfree(sf_acts);
}
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/rpc_rdma.c b/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/rpc_rdma.c
index 3d65a2bccfc7..7f9d8365c932 100644
--- a/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/rpc_rdma.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/rpc_rdma.c
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ static unsigned int rpcrdma_max_call_header_size(unsigned int maxsegs)
/* Maximum Read list size */
maxsegs += 2; /* segment for head and tail buffers */
- size = maxsegs * rpcrdma_readchunk_maxsz * sizeof(__be32);
+ size += maxsegs * rpcrdma_readchunk_maxsz * sizeof(__be32);
/* Minimal Read chunk size */
size += sizeof(__be32); /* segment count */
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ static unsigned int rpcrdma_max_reply_header_size(unsigned int maxsegs)
/* Maximum Write list size */
maxsegs += 2; /* segment for head and tail buffers */
- size = sizeof(__be32); /* segment count */
+ size += sizeof(__be32); /* segment count */
size += maxsegs * rpcrdma_segment_maxsz * sizeof(__be32);
size += sizeof(__be32); /* list discriminator */
diff --git a/scripts/faddr2line b/scripts/faddr2line
index 226c3f559dc5..2571caac3156 100755
--- a/scripts/faddr2line
+++ b/scripts/faddr2line
@@ -95,17 +95,25 @@ __faddr2line() {
local print_warnings=$4
local sym_name=${func_addr%+*}
- local offset=${func_addr#*+}
- offset=${offset%/*}
+ local func_offset=${func_addr#*+}
+ func_offset=${func_offset%/*}
local user_size=
+ local file_type
+ local is_vmlinux=0
[[ $func_addr =~ "/" ]] && user_size=${func_addr#*/}
- if [[ -z $sym_name ]] || [[ -z $offset ]] || [[ $sym_name = $func_addr ]]; then
+ if [[ -z $sym_name ]] || [[ -z $func_offset ]] || [[ $sym_name = $func_addr ]]; then
warn "bad func+offset $func_addr"
DONE=1
return
fi
+ # vmlinux uses absolute addresses in the section table rather than
+ # section offsets.
+ local file_type=$(${READELF} --file-header $objfile |
+ ${AWK} '$1 == "Type:" { print $2; exit }')
+ [[ $file_type = "EXEC" ]] && is_vmlinux=1
+
# Go through each of the object's symbols which match the func name.
# In rare cases there might be duplicates, in which case we print all
# matches.
@@ -114,9 +122,11 @@ __faddr2line() {
local sym_addr=0x${fields[1]}
local sym_elf_size=${fields[2]}
local sym_sec=${fields[6]}
+ local sec_size
+ local sec_name
# Get the section size:
- local sec_size=$(${READELF} --section-headers --wide $objfile |
+ sec_size=$(${READELF} --section-headers --wide $objfile |
sed 's/\[ /\[/' |
${AWK} -v sec=$sym_sec '$1 == "[" sec "]" { print "0x" $6; exit }')
@@ -126,6 +136,17 @@ __faddr2line() {
return
fi
+ # Get the section name:
+ sec_name=$(${READELF} --section-headers --wide $objfile |
+ sed 's/\[ /\[/' |
+ ${AWK} -v sec=$sym_sec '$1 == "[" sec "]" { print $2; exit }')
+
+ if [[ -z $sec_name ]]; then
+ warn "bad section name: section: $sym_sec"
+ DONE=1
+ return
+ fi
+
# Calculate the symbol size.
#
# Unfortunately we can't use the ELF size, because kallsyms
@@ -174,10 +195,10 @@ __faddr2line() {
sym_size=0x$(printf %x $sym_size)
- # Calculate the section address from user-supplied offset:
- local addr=$(($sym_addr + $offset))
+ # Calculate the address from user-supplied offset:
+ local addr=$(($sym_addr + $func_offset))
if [[ -z $addr ]] || [[ $addr = 0 ]]; then
- warn "bad address: $sym_addr + $offset"
+ warn "bad address: $sym_addr + $func_offset"
DONE=1
return
fi
@@ -191,9 +212,9 @@ __faddr2line() {
fi
# Make sure the provided offset is within the symbol's range:
- if [[ $offset -gt $sym_size ]]; then
+ if [[ $func_offset -gt $sym_size ]]; then
[[ $print_warnings = 1 ]] &&
- echo "skipping $sym_name address at $addr due to size mismatch ($offset > $sym_size)"
+ echo "skipping $sym_name address at $addr due to size mismatch ($func_offset > $sym_size)"
continue
fi
@@ -202,11 +223,13 @@ __faddr2line() {
[[ $FIRST = 0 ]] && echo
FIRST=0
- echo "$sym_name+$offset/$sym_size:"
+ echo "$sym_name+$func_offset/$sym_size:"
# Pass section address to addr2line and strip absolute paths
# from the output:
- local output=$(${ADDR2LINE} -fpie $objfile $addr | sed "s; $dir_prefix\(\./\)*; ;")
+ local args="--functions --pretty-print --inlines --exe=$objfile"
+ [[ $is_vmlinux = 0 ]] && args="$args --section=$sec_name"
+ local output=$(${ADDR2LINE} $args $addr | sed "s; $dir_prefix\(\./\)*; ;")
[[ -z $output ]] && continue
# Default output (non --list):
diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/cs42l52.c b/sound/soc/codecs/cs42l52.c
index 3d83c1be1292..de311299432b 100644
--- a/sound/soc/codecs/cs42l52.c
+++ b/sound/soc/codecs/cs42l52.c
@@ -141,7 +141,9 @@ static DECLARE_TLV_DB_SCALE(mic_tlv, 1600, 100, 0);
static DECLARE_TLV_DB_SCALE(pga_tlv, -600, 50, 0);
-static DECLARE_TLV_DB_SCALE(mix_tlv, -50, 50, 0);
+static DECLARE_TLV_DB_SCALE(pass_tlv, -6000, 50, 0);
+
+static DECLARE_TLV_DB_SCALE(mix_tlv, -5150, 50, 0);
static DECLARE_TLV_DB_SCALE(beep_tlv, -56, 200, 0);
@@ -355,7 +357,7 @@ static const struct snd_kcontrol_new cs42l52_snd_controls[] = {
CS42L52_SPKB_VOL, 0, 0x40, 0xC0, hl_tlv),
SOC_DOUBLE_R_SX_TLV("Bypass Volume", CS42L52_PASSTHRUA_VOL,
- CS42L52_PASSTHRUB_VOL, 0, 0x88, 0x90, pga_tlv),
+ CS42L52_PASSTHRUB_VOL, 0, 0x88, 0x90, pass_tlv),
SOC_DOUBLE("Bypass Mute", CS42L52_MISC_CTL, 4, 5, 1, 0),
@@ -368,7 +370,7 @@ static const struct snd_kcontrol_new cs42l52_snd_controls[] = {
CS42L52_ADCB_VOL, 0, 0xA0, 0x78, ipd_tlv),
SOC_DOUBLE_R_SX_TLV("ADC Mixer Volume",
CS42L52_ADCA_MIXER_VOL, CS42L52_ADCB_MIXER_VOL,
- 0, 0x19, 0x7F, ipd_tlv),
+ 0, 0x19, 0x7F, mix_tlv),
SOC_DOUBLE("ADC Switch", CS42L52_ADC_MISC_CTL, 0, 1, 1, 0),
diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/cs42l56.c b/sound/soc/codecs/cs42l56.c
index 04f89b751304..deaad703a7db 100644
--- a/sound/soc/codecs/cs42l56.c
+++ b/sound/soc/codecs/cs42l56.c
@@ -403,9 +403,9 @@ static const struct snd_kcontrol_new cs42l56_snd_controls[] = {
SOC_DOUBLE("ADC Boost Switch", CS42L56_GAIN_BIAS_CTL, 3, 2, 1, 1),
SOC_DOUBLE_R_SX_TLV("Headphone Volume", CS42L56_HPA_VOLUME,
- CS42L56_HPB_VOLUME, 0, 0x84, 0x48, hl_tlv),
+ CS42L56_HPB_VOLUME, 0, 0x44, 0x48, hl_tlv),
SOC_DOUBLE_R_SX_TLV("LineOut Volume", CS42L56_LOA_VOLUME,
- CS42L56_LOB_VOLUME, 0, 0x84, 0x48, hl_tlv),
+ CS42L56_LOB_VOLUME, 0, 0x44, 0x48, hl_tlv),
SOC_SINGLE_TLV("Bass Shelving Volume", CS42L56_TONE_CTL,
0, 0x00, 1, tone_tlv),
diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/cs53l30.c b/sound/soc/codecs/cs53l30.c
index 8995ea45b4ca..86e93904b001 100644
--- a/sound/soc/codecs/cs53l30.c
+++ b/sound/soc/codecs/cs53l30.c
@@ -351,22 +351,22 @@ static const struct snd_kcontrol_new cs53l30_snd_controls[] = {
SOC_ENUM("ADC2 NG Delay", adc2_ng_delay_enum),
SOC_SINGLE_SX_TLV("ADC1A PGA Volume",
- CS53L30_ADC1A_AFE_CTL, 0, 0x34, 0x18, pga_tlv),
+ CS53L30_ADC1A_AFE_CTL, 0, 0x34, 0x24, pga_tlv),
SOC_SINGLE_SX_TLV("ADC1B PGA Volume",
- CS53L30_ADC1B_AFE_CTL, 0, 0x34, 0x18, pga_tlv),
+ CS53L30_ADC1B_AFE_CTL, 0, 0x34, 0x24, pga_tlv),
SOC_SINGLE_SX_TLV("ADC2A PGA Volume",
- CS53L30_ADC2A_AFE_CTL, 0, 0x34, 0x18, pga_tlv),
+ CS53L30_ADC2A_AFE_CTL, 0, 0x34, 0x24, pga_tlv),
SOC_SINGLE_SX_TLV("ADC2B PGA Volume",
- CS53L30_ADC2B_AFE_CTL, 0, 0x34, 0x18, pga_tlv),
+ CS53L30_ADC2B_AFE_CTL, 0, 0x34, 0x24, pga_tlv),
SOC_SINGLE_SX_TLV("ADC1A Digital Volume",
- CS53L30_ADC1A_DIG_VOL, 0, 0xA0, 0x0C, dig_tlv),
+ CS53L30_ADC1A_DIG_VOL, 0, 0xA0, 0x6C, dig_tlv),
SOC_SINGLE_SX_TLV("ADC1B Digital Volume",
- CS53L30_ADC1B_DIG_VOL, 0, 0xA0, 0x0C, dig_tlv),
+ CS53L30_ADC1B_DIG_VOL, 0, 0xA0, 0x6C, dig_tlv),
SOC_SINGLE_SX_TLV("ADC2A Digital Volume",
- CS53L30_ADC2A_DIG_VOL, 0, 0xA0, 0x0C, dig_tlv),
+ CS53L30_ADC2A_DIG_VOL, 0, 0xA0, 0x6C, dig_tlv),
SOC_SINGLE_SX_TLV("ADC2B Digital Volume",
- CS53L30_ADC2B_DIG_VOL, 0, 0xA0, 0x0C, dig_tlv),
+ CS53L30_ADC2B_DIG_VOL, 0, 0xA0, 0x6C, dig_tlv),
};
static const struct snd_soc_dapm_widget cs53l30_dapm_widgets[] = {
diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/es8328.c b/sound/soc/codecs/es8328.c
index 3afa163f7652..dcb01889e177 100644
--- a/sound/soc/codecs/es8328.c
+++ b/sound/soc/codecs/es8328.c
@@ -165,13 +165,16 @@ static int es8328_put_deemph(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol,
if (deemph > 1)
return -EINVAL;
+ if (es8328->deemph == deemph)
+ return 0;
+
ret = es8328_set_deemph(component);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
es8328->deemph = deemph;
- return 0;
+ return 1;
}
diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/wm8962.c b/sound/soc/codecs/wm8962.c
index dde015fd70a4..3f75cb3209ff 100644
--- a/sound/soc/codecs/wm8962.c
+++ b/sound/soc/codecs/wm8962.c
@@ -3861,6 +3861,7 @@ static int wm8962_runtime_suspend(struct device *dev)
#endif
static const struct dev_pm_ops wm8962_pm = {
+ SET_SYSTEM_SLEEP_PM_OPS(pm_runtime_force_suspend, pm_runtime_force_resume)
SET_RUNTIME_PM_OPS(wm8962_runtime_suspend, wm8962_runtime_resume, NULL)
};
diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/wm_adsp.c b/sound/soc/codecs/wm_adsp.c
index 02c557e1f779..c5b0b56d9c94 100644
--- a/sound/soc/codecs/wm_adsp.c
+++ b/sound/soc/codecs/wm_adsp.c
@@ -697,7 +697,7 @@ int wm_adsp_fw_put(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol,
struct snd_soc_component *component = snd_soc_kcontrol_component(kcontrol);
struct soc_enum *e = (struct soc_enum *)kcontrol->private_value;
struct wm_adsp *dsp = snd_soc_component_get_drvdata(component);
- int ret = 0;
+ int ret = 1;
if (ucontrol->value.enumerated.item[0] == dsp[e->shift_l].fw)
return 0;
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