linux-kernel - [PATCH -next v3 2/2] powerpc: add support for syscall stack randomization

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Message-ID: <20220701082435.126596-3-xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Date:   Fri, 1 Jul 2022 16:24:35 +0800
From:   Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@...wei.com>
To:     <mpe@...erman.id.au>, <benh@...nel.crashing.org>,
        <paulus@...ba.org>, <npiggin@...il.com>,
        <christophe.leroy@...roup.eu>, <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        <mark.rutland@....com>
CC:     <linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org>, <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        <linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH -next v3 2/2] powerpc: add support for syscall stack randomization

Add support for adding a random offset to the stack while handling
syscalls. This patch uses mftb() instead of get_random_int() for better
performance.

In order to avoid unconditional stack canaries on syscall entry (due to
the use of alloca()), also disable stack protector to avoid triggering
needless checks and slowing down the entry path. As there is no general
way to control stack protector coverage with a function attribute, this
must be disabled at the compilation unit level.

Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@...wei.com>
---
 arch/powerpc/Kconfig          |  1 +
 arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile  |  7 +++++++
 arch/powerpc/kernel/syscall.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++++-
 3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
index c2ce2e60c8f0..a402b97abc9c 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
@@ -195,6 +195,7 @@ config PPC
 	select HAVE_ARCH_KASAN			if PPC_RADIX_MMU
 	select HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_VMALLOC		if HAVE_ARCH_KASAN
 	select HAVE_ARCH_KFENCE			if PPC_BOOK3S_32 || PPC_8xx || 40x
+	select HAVE_ARCH_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET
 	select HAVE_ARCH_KGDB
 	select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS
 	select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS	if COMPAT
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile b/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile
index ecfd333b95d1..c29a58ea6e31 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile
@@ -53,6 +53,13 @@ CFLAGS_cputable.o += -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING
 CFLAGS_btext.o += -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING
 endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET
+# Remove stack protector to avoid triggering unneeded stack canary
+# checks due to randomize_kstack_offset.
+CFLAGS_REMOVE_syscall.o = -fstack-protector -fstack-protector-strong
+CFLAGS_syscall.o += -fno-stack-protector
+#endif
+
 obj-y				:= cputable.o syscalls.o \
 				   irq.o align.o signal_$(BITS).o pmc.o vdso.o \
 				   process.o systbl.o idle.o \
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/syscall.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/syscall.c
index 4d5689eeaf25..9a30fe0d3a93 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/syscall.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/syscall.c
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 
 #include <linux/compat.h>
 #include <linux/context_tracking.h>
+#include <linux/randomize_kstack.h>
 
 #include <asm/interrupt.h>
 #include <asm/kup.h>
@@ -18,10 +19,12 @@ notrace long system_call_exception(long r3, long r4, long r5,
 				   long r6, long r7, long r8,
 				   unsigned long r0, struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
+	long ret;
 	syscall_fn f;
 
 	kuap_lock();
 
+	add_random_kstack_offset();
 	regs->orig_gpr3 = r3;
 
 	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PPC_IRQ_SOFT_MASK_DEBUG))
@@ -169,5 +172,19 @@ notrace long system_call_exception(long r3, long r4, long r5,
 		f = (void *)sys_call_table[r0];
 	}
 
-	return f(r3, r4, r5, r6, r7, r8);
+	ret = f(r3, r4, r5, r6, r7, r8);
+	/*
+	 * Ultimately, this value will get limited by KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX(),
+	 * so the maximum stack offset is 1k bytes(10 bits).
+	 *
+	 * The actual entropy will be further reduced by the compiler when
+	 * applying stack alignment constraints: the powerpc architecture
+	 * may have two kinds of stack alignment(16-bytes and 8-bytes).
+	 *
+	 * So the resulting 6 or 7 bits of entropy is seen in SP[9:4] or SP[9:3].
+	 *
+	 */
+	choose_random_kstack_offset(mftb());
+
+	return ret;
 }
-- 
2.17.1