| lists.openwall.net | lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC | |
|
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
| ||
|
Message-ID: <20220705001344.euyapepzjhrz5sid@black.fi.intel.com>
Date: Tue, 5 Jul 2022 03:13:44 +0300
From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
"Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@...radead.org>,
the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@...nel.org>,
"kcc@...gle.com" <kcc@...gle.com>,
"ryabinin.a.a@...il.com" <ryabinin.a.a@...il.com>,
"andreyknvl@...il.com" <andreyknvl@...il.com>,
"glider@...gle.com" <glider@...gle.com>,
"dvyukov@...gle.com" <dvyukov@...gle.com>,
"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@...il.com>, Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
Rick P Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>,
linux-mm@...ck.org,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCHv3 5/8] x86/uaccess: Provide untagged_addr() and remove
tags before address check
On Wed, Jun 29, 2022 at 07:38:20PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>
>
> On Tue, Jun 28, 2022, at 5:42 PM, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> > On Tue, Jun 28, 2022 at 04:40:48PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> >> On 6/10/22 07:35, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> >> > untagged_addr() is a helper used by the core-mm to strip tag bits and
> >> > get the address to the canonical shape. In only handles userspace
> >> > addresses. The untagging mask is stored in mmu_context and will be set
> >> > on enabling LAM for the process.
> >> >
> >> > The tags must not be included into check whether it's okay to access the
> >> > userspace address.
> >> >
> >> > Strip tags in access_ok().
> >>
> >> What is the intended behavior for an access that spans a tag boundary?
> >
> > You mean if 'addr' passed to access_ok() is below 47- or 56-bit but 'addr'
> > + 'size' overflows into tags? If is not valid access and the current
> > implementation works correctly.
> >
> >> Also, at the risk of a potentially silly question, why do we need to strip
> >> the tag before access_ok()? With LAM, every valid tagged user address is
> >> also a valid untagged address, right? (There is no particular need to
> >> enforce the actual value of TASK_SIZE_MAX on *access*, just on mmap.)
> >>
> >> IOW, wouldn't it be sufficient, and probably better than what we have now,
> >> to just check that the entire range has the high bit clear?
> >
> > No. We do things to addresses on kernel side beyond dereferencing them.
> > Like comparing addresses have to make sense. find_vma() has to find
> > relevant mapping and so on.
>
> I think you’re misunderstanding me. Of course things like find_vma()
> need to untag the address. (But things like munmap, IMO, ought not
> accept tagged addresses.)
>
> But I’m not talking about that at all. I’m asking why we need to untag
> an address for access_ok. In the bad old days, access_ok checked that a
> range was below a *variable* cutoff. But set_fs() is gone, and I don’t
> think this is needed any more.
>
> With some off-the-cuff bit hackery, I think it ought to be sufficient to
> calculate addr+len and fail if the overflow or sign bits get set. If LAM
> is off, we could calculate addr | len and fail if either of the top two
> bits is set, but LAM may not let us get away with that. The general
> point being that, on x86 (as long as we ignore AMD’s LAM-like feature)
> an address is a user address if the top bit is clear. Whether that
> address is canonical or not or will translate or not is a separate
> issue. (And making this change would require allowing uaccess to #GP,
> which requires some care.)
>
> What do you think?
I think it can work. Below is my first take on this. It is raw and
requires more work.
You talk about access_ok(), but I also checked what has to be done in
get_user()/put_user() path. Not sure it is a good idea (but it seems
work).
The basic idea is to OR start and end of the range and check that MSB is
clear.
I reworked array_index_mask_nospec() thing to make the address all-ones if
it is ouside of the user range. It should work to stop speculation as well
as making it zero as we do now.
The patch as it is breaks 32-bit. It has to be handled separately.
Any comments?
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
index 803241dfc473..53c6f86b036f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -45,6 +45,12 @@ static inline bool pagefault_disabled(void);
#define untagged_ptr(mm, ptr) (ptr)
#endif
+#define __access_ok(ptr, size) \
+({ \
+ unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)(ptr); \
+ !((addr | (size) | addr + (size)) >> (BITS_PER_LONG - 1)); \
+})
+
/**
* access_ok - Checks if a user space pointer is valid
* @addr: User space pointer to start of block to check
@@ -62,10 +68,10 @@ static inline bool pagefault_disabled(void);
* Return: true (nonzero) if the memory block may be valid, false (zero)
* if it is definitely invalid.
*/
-#define access_ok(addr, size) \
+#define access_ok(addr, size) \
({ \
WARN_ON_IN_IRQ(); \
- likely(__access_ok(untagged_addr(current->mm, addr), size)); \
+ likely(__access_ok(addr, size)); \
})
#include <asm-generic/access_ok.h>
@@ -150,13 +156,7 @@ extern int __get_user_bad(void);
* Return: zero on success, or -EFAULT on error.
* On error, the variable @x is set to zero.
*/
-#define get_user(x,ptr) \
-({ \
- __typeof__(*(ptr)) __user *__ptr_clean; \
- __ptr_clean = untagged_ptr(current->mm, ptr); \
- might_fault(); \
- do_get_user_call(get_user,x,__ptr_clean); \
-})
+#define get_user(x,ptr) ({ might_fault(); do_get_user_call(get_user,x,ptr); })
/**
* __get_user - Get a simple variable from user space, with less checking.
@@ -253,12 +253,7 @@ extern void __put_user_nocheck_8(void);
*
* Return: zero on success, or -EFAULT on error.
*/
-#define put_user(x, ptr) ({ \
- __typeof__(*(ptr)) __user *__ptr_clean; \
- __ptr_clean = untagged_ptr(current->mm, ptr); \
- might_fault(); \
- do_put_user_call(put_user,x,__ptr_clean); \
-})
+#define put_user(x, ptr) ({ might_fault(); do_put_user_call(put_user,x,ptr); })
/**
* __put_user - Write a simple value into user space, with less checking.
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/getuser.S b/arch/x86/lib/getuser.S
index b70d98d79a9d..e526ae6ff844 100644
--- a/arch/x86/lib/getuser.S
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/getuser.S
@@ -37,22 +37,13 @@
#define ASM_BARRIER_NOSPEC ALTERNATIVE "", "lfence", X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL
-#define LOAD_TASK_SIZE_MINUS_N(n) \
- ALTERNATIVE __stringify(mov $((1 << 47) - 4096 - (n)),%rdx), \
- __stringify(mov $((1 << 56) - 4096 - (n)),%rdx), X86_FEATURE_LA57
-#else
-#define LOAD_TASK_SIZE_MINUS_N(n) \
- mov $(TASK_SIZE_MAX - (n)),%_ASM_DX
-#endif
-
.text
SYM_FUNC_START(__get_user_1)
- LOAD_TASK_SIZE_MINUS_N(0)
- cmp %_ASM_DX,%_ASM_AX
- jae bad_get_user
- sbb %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_DX /* array_index_mask_nospec() */
- and %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_AX
+ mov %_ASM_AX, %_ASM_DX
+ shl $1, %_ASM_DX
+ jb bad_get_user
+ sbb %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_DX
+ or %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_AX
ASM_STAC
1: movzbl (%_ASM_AX),%edx
xor %eax,%eax
@@ -62,11 +53,13 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(__get_user_1)
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__get_user_1)
SYM_FUNC_START(__get_user_2)
- LOAD_TASK_SIZE_MINUS_N(1)
- cmp %_ASM_DX,%_ASM_AX
- jae bad_get_user
- sbb %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_DX /* array_index_mask_nospec() */
- and %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_AX
+ mov %_ASM_AX, %_ASM_DX
+ add $1, %_ASM_DX
+ or %_ASM_AX, %_ASM_DX
+ shl $1, %_ASM_DX
+ jb bad_get_user
+ sbb %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_DX
+ or %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_AX
ASM_STAC
2: movzwl (%_ASM_AX),%edx
xor %eax,%eax
@@ -76,11 +69,13 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(__get_user_2)
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__get_user_2)
SYM_FUNC_START(__get_user_4)
- LOAD_TASK_SIZE_MINUS_N(3)
- cmp %_ASM_DX,%_ASM_AX
- jae bad_get_user
- sbb %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_DX /* array_index_mask_nospec() */
- and %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_AX
+ mov %_ASM_AX, %_ASM_DX
+ add $3, %_ASM_DX
+ or %_ASM_AX, %_ASM_DX
+ shl $1, %_ASM_DX
+ jb bad_get_user
+ sbb %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_DX
+ or %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_AX
ASM_STAC
3: movl (%_ASM_AX),%edx
xor %eax,%eax
@@ -91,22 +86,26 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__get_user_4)
SYM_FUNC_START(__get_user_8)
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
- LOAD_TASK_SIZE_MINUS_N(7)
- cmp %_ASM_DX,%_ASM_AX
- jae bad_get_user
- sbb %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_DX /* array_index_mask_nospec() */
- and %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_AX
+ mov %_ASM_AX, %_ASM_DX
+ add $7, %_ASM_DX
+ or %_ASM_AX, %_ASM_DX
+ shl $1, %_ASM_DX
+ jb bad_get_user
+ sbb %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_DX
+ or %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_AX
ASM_STAC
4: movq (%_ASM_AX),%rdx
xor %eax,%eax
ASM_CLAC
RET
#else
- LOAD_TASK_SIZE_MINUS_N(7)
- cmp %_ASM_DX,%_ASM_AX
- jae bad_get_user_8
- sbb %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_DX /* array_index_mask_nospec() */
- and %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_AX
+ mov %_ASM_AX, %_ASM_DX
+ add $7, %_ASM_DX
+ or %_ASM_AX, %_ASM_DX
+ shl $1, %_ASM_DX
+ jb bad_get_user
+ sbb %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_DX
+ or %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_AX
ASM_STAC
4: movl (%_ASM_AX),%edx
5: movl 4(%_ASM_AX),%ecx
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/putuser.S b/arch/x86/lib/putuser.S
index b7dfd60243b7..eb7c4396cb1e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/lib/putuser.S
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/putuser.S
@@ -33,20 +33,11 @@
* as they get called from within inline assembly.
*/
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL
-#define LOAD_TASK_SIZE_MINUS_N(n) \
- ALTERNATIVE __stringify(mov $((1 << 47) - 4096 - (n)),%rbx), \
- __stringify(mov $((1 << 56) - 4096 - (n)),%rbx), X86_FEATURE_LA57
-#else
-#define LOAD_TASK_SIZE_MINUS_N(n) \
- mov $(TASK_SIZE_MAX - (n)),%_ASM_BX
-#endif
-
.text
SYM_FUNC_START(__put_user_1)
- LOAD_TASK_SIZE_MINUS_N(0)
- cmp %_ASM_BX,%_ASM_CX
- jae .Lbad_put_user
+ mov %_ASM_CX, %_ASM_BX
+ shl $1, %_ASM_BX
+ jb .Lbad_put_user
SYM_INNER_LABEL(__put_user_nocheck_1, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
ENDBR
ASM_STAC
@@ -59,9 +50,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__put_user_1)
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__put_user_nocheck_1)
SYM_FUNC_START(__put_user_2)
- LOAD_TASK_SIZE_MINUS_N(1)
- cmp %_ASM_BX,%_ASM_CX
- jae .Lbad_put_user
+ mov %_ASM_CX, %_ASM_BX
+ add $1, %_ASM_BX
+ or %_ASM_CX, %_ASM_BX
+ shl $1, %_ASM_BX
+ jb .Lbad_put_user
SYM_INNER_LABEL(__put_user_nocheck_2, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
ENDBR
ASM_STAC
@@ -74,9 +67,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__put_user_2)
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__put_user_nocheck_2)
SYM_FUNC_START(__put_user_4)
- LOAD_TASK_SIZE_MINUS_N(3)
- cmp %_ASM_BX,%_ASM_CX
- jae .Lbad_put_user
+ mov %_ASM_CX, %_ASM_BX
+ add $3, %_ASM_BX
+ or %_ASM_CX, %_ASM_BX
+ shl $1, %_ASM_BX
+ jb .Lbad_put_user
SYM_INNER_LABEL(__put_user_nocheck_4, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
ENDBR
ASM_STAC
@@ -89,9 +84,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__put_user_4)
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__put_user_nocheck_4)
SYM_FUNC_START(__put_user_8)
- LOAD_TASK_SIZE_MINUS_N(7)
- cmp %_ASM_BX,%_ASM_CX
- jae .Lbad_put_user
+ mov %_ASM_CX, %_ASM_BX
+ add $7, %_ASM_BX
+ or %_ASM_CX, %_ASM_BX
+ shl $1, %_ASM_BX
+ jb .Lbad_put_user
SYM_INNER_LABEL(__put_user_nocheck_8, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
ENDBR
ASM_STAC
--
Kirill A. Shutemov
Powered by blists - more mailing lists