linux-kernel - [PATCH 5.10 81/84] xen/arm: Fix race in RB-tree based P2M accounting

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Message-Id: <20220705115617.683179375@linuxfoundation.org>
Date:   Tue,  5 Jul 2022 13:58:44 +0200
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org,
        Oleksandr Tyshchenko <oleksandr_tyshchenko@...m.com>,
        Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@...nel.org>,
        Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>
Subject: [PATCH 5.10 81/84] xen/arm: Fix race in RB-tree based P2M accounting

From: Oleksandr Tyshchenko <oleksandr_tyshchenko@...m.com>

commit b75cd218274e01d026dc5240e86fdeb44bbed0c8 upstream.

During the PV driver life cycle the mappings are added to
the RB-tree by set_foreign_p2m_mapping(), which is called from
gnttab_map_refs() and are removed by clear_foreign_p2m_mapping()
which is called from gnttab_unmap_refs(). As both functions end
up calling __set_phys_to_machine_multi() which updates the RB-tree,
this function can be called concurrently.

There is already a "p2m_lock" to protect against concurrent accesses,
but the problem is that the first read of "phys_to_mach.rb_node"
in __set_phys_to_machine_multi() is not covered by it, so this might
lead to the incorrect mappings update (removing in our case) in RB-tree.

In my environment the related issue happens rarely and only when
PV net backend is running, the xen_add_phys_to_mach_entry() claims
that it cannot add new pfn <-> mfn mapping to the tree since it is
already exists which results in a failure when mapping foreign pages.

But there might be other bad consequences related to the non-protected
root reads such use-after-free, etc.

While at it, also fix the similar usage in __pfn_to_mfn(), so
initialize "struct rb_node *n" with the "p2m_lock" held in both
functions to avoid possible bad consequences.

This is CVE-2022-33744 / XSA-406.

Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Tyshchenko <oleksandr_tyshchenko@...m.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@...nel.org>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/arm/xen/p2m.c |    6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/arm/xen/p2m.c
+++ b/arch/arm/xen/p2m.c
@@ -62,11 +62,12 @@ out:

 unsigned long __pfn_to_mfn(unsigned long pfn)
 {
-	struct rb_node *n = phys_to_mach.rb_node;
+	struct rb_node *n;
 	struct xen_p2m_entry *entry;
 	unsigned long irqflags;

 	read_lock_irqsave(&p2m_lock, irqflags);
+	n = phys_to_mach.rb_node;
 	while (n) {
 		entry = rb_entry(n, struct xen_p2m_entry, rbnode_phys);
 		if (entry->pfn <= pfn &&
@@ -153,10 +154,11 @@ bool __set_phys_to_machine_multi(unsigne
 	int rc;
 	unsigned long irqflags;
 	struct xen_p2m_entry *p2m_entry;
-	struct rb_node *n = phys_to_mach.rb_node;
+	struct rb_node *n;

 	if (mfn == INVALID_P2M_ENTRY) {
 		write_lock_irqsave(&p2m_lock, irqflags);
+		n = phys_to_mach.rb_node;
 		while (n) {
 			p2m_entry = rb_entry(n, struct xen_p2m_entry, rbnode_phys);
 			if (p2m_entry->pfn <= pfn &&