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Date: Wed, 06 Jul 2022 23:03:53 +0300 From: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@...hat.com> To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>, Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>, Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>, Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@...cent.com>, Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>, kvm@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Oliver Upton <oupton@...gle.com>, Peter Shier <pshier@...gle.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 00/21] KVM: x86: Event/exception fixes and cleanups On Wed, 2022-07-06 at 17:52 +0000, Sean Christopherson wrote: > On Wed, Jul 06, 2022, Jim Mattson wrote: > > On Wed, Jul 6, 2022 at 4:55 AM Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@...hat.com> wrote: > > > > > 1. Since #SMI is higher priority than the #MTF, that means that unless dual monitor treatment is used, > > > and the dual monitor handler figures out that #MTF was pending and re-injects it when it > > > VMRESUME's the 'host', the MTF gets lost, and there is no way for a normal hypervisor to > > > do anything about it. > > > > > > Or maybe pending MTF is saved to SMRAM somewhere. > > > > > > In case you will say that I am inventing this again, I am saying now that the above is > > > just a guess. > > > > This is covered in the SDM, volume 3, section 31.14.1: "Default > > Treatment of SMI Delivery:" > > > > The pseudocode above makes reference to the saving of VMX-critical > > state. This state consists of the following: > > (1) SS.DPL (the current privilege level); (2) RFLAGS.VM2; (3) the > > state of blocking by STI and by MOV SS (see > > Table 24-3 in Section 24.4.2); (4) the state of virtual-NMI blocking > > (only if the processor is in VMX non-root oper- > > ation and the “virtual NMIs” VM-execution control is 1); and (5) an > > indication of whether an MTF VM exit is pending > > (see Section 25.5.2). These data may be saved internal to the > > processor or in the VMCS region of the current > > VMCS. Processors that do not support SMI recognition while there is > > blocking by STI or by MOV SS need not save > > the state of such blocking. > > > > Saving VMX-critical state to SMRAM is not documented as an option. > > Hmm, I'm not entirely convinced that Intel doesn't interpret "internal to the > processor" as "undocumented SMRAM fields". But I could also be misremembering > the SMI flows. > > Regardless, I do like the idea of using vmcs12 instead of SMRAM. That would provide > some extra motivation for moving away from KVM's broken pseudo VM-Exit implementation. > For preserving pending MTF, I guess it makes sense to use vmcb12, especially since we own its format. Best regards, Maxim Levitsky
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