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Message-ID: <Ys2DobolHlrXP4/M@xz-m1.local>
Date: Tue, 12 Jul 2022 10:22:25 -0400
From: Peter Xu <peterx@...hat.com>
To: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@...hat.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>,
David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>,
Lokesh Gidra <lokeshgidra@...gle.com>, linux-mm@...ck.org,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, selinux@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Robert O'Callahan <roc@...llahan.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH RESEND] userfaultfd: open userfaultfds with O_RDONLY
On Fri, Jul 08, 2022 at 11:34:51AM +0200, Ondrej Mosnacek wrote:
> Since userfaultfd doesn't implement a write operation, it is more
> appropriate to open it read-only.
>
> When userfaultfds are opened read-write like it is now, and such fd is
> passed from one process to another, SELinux will check both read and
> write permissions for the target process, even though it can't actually
> do any write operation on the fd later.
>
> Inspired by the following bug report, which has hit the SELinux scenario
> described above:
> https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1974559
>
> Reported-by: Robert O'Callahan <roc@...llahan.org>
> Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6 ("userfaultfd: add new syscall to provide memory externalization")
> Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@...hat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@...hat.com>
--
Peter Xu
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