linux-kernel - [PATCH 5.15 59/78] x86/speculation: Fix RSB filling with CONFIG

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Message-Id: <20220712183241.265719032@linuxfoundation.org>
Date:   Tue, 12 Jul 2022 20:39:29 +0200
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>,
        "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>,
        Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@...onical.com>
Subject: [PATCH 5.15 59/78] x86/speculation: Fix RSB filling with CONFIG_RETPOLINE=n

From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>

commit b2620facef4889fefcbf2e87284f34dcd4189bce upstream.

If a kernel is built with CONFIG_RETPOLINE=n, but the user still wants
to mitigate Spectre v2 using IBRS or eIBRS, the RSB filling will be
silently disabled.

There's nothing retpoline-specific about RSB buffer filling.  Remove the
CONFIG_RETPOLINE guards around it.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@...radead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@...onical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S            |    2 --
 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S            |    2 --
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h |    2 --
 3 files changed, 6 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
@@ -701,7 +701,6 @@ SYM_CODE_START(__switch_to_asm)
 	movl	%ebx, PER_CPU_VAR(__stack_chk_guard)
 #endif
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
 	/*
 	 * When switching from a shallower to a deeper call stack
 	 * the RSB may either underflow or use entries populated
@@ -710,7 +709,6 @@ SYM_CODE_START(__switch_to_asm)
 	 * speculative execution to prevent attack.
 	 */
 	FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %ebx, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW
-#endif
 
 	/* Restore flags or the incoming task to restore AC state. */
 	popfl
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -248,7 +248,6 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__switch_to_asm)
 	movq	%rbx, PER_CPU_VAR(fixed_percpu_data) + stack_canary_offset
 #endif
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
 	/*
 	 * When switching from a shallower to a deeper call stack
 	 * the RSB may either underflow or use entries populated
@@ -257,7 +256,6 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__switch_to_asm)
 	 * speculative execution to prevent attack.
 	 */
 	FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %r12, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW
-#endif
 
 	/* restore callee-saved registers */
 	popq	%r15
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -122,11 +122,9 @@
   * monstrosity above, manually.
   */
 .macro FILL_RETURN_BUFFER reg:req nr:req ftr:req
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
 	ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lskip_rsb_\@", "", \ftr
 	__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(\reg,\nr,%_ASM_SP)
 .Lskip_rsb_\@:
-#endif
 .endm
 
 /*