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Message-Id: <20220719114630.574536484@linuxfoundation.org>
Date: Tue, 19 Jul 2022 13:53:36 +0200
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
stable@...r.kernel.org, Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@...zon.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 5.10 043/112] sysctl: Fix data races in proc_douintvec().
From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@...zon.com>
[ Upstream commit 4762b532ec9539755aab61445d5da6e1926ccb99 ]
A sysctl variable is accessed concurrently, and there is always a chance
of data-race. So, all readers and writers need some basic protection to
avoid load/store-tearing.
This patch changes proc_douintvec() to use READ_ONCE() and WRITE_ONCE()
internally to fix data-races on the sysctl side. For now, proc_douintvec()
itself is tolerant to a data-race, but we still need to add annotations on
the other subsystem's side.
Fixes: e7d316a02f68 ("sysctl: handle error writing UINT_MAX to u32 fields")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@...zon.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org>
---
kernel/sysctl.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
index 81657b13bd53..30681afbdb70 100644
--- a/kernel/sysctl.c
+++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
@@ -583,9 +583,9 @@ static int do_proc_douintvec_conv(unsigned long *lvalp,
if (write) {
if (*lvalp > UINT_MAX)
return -EINVAL;
- *valp = *lvalp;
+ WRITE_ONCE(*valp, *lvalp);
} else {
- unsigned int val = *valp;
+ unsigned int val = READ_ONCE(*valp);
*lvalp = (unsigned long)val;
}
return 0;
--
2.35.1
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