linux-kernel - [PATCH v3 3/3] mm/slub: extend redzone check to cover extra allocated kmalloc space than requested

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-Id: <20220727071042.8796-4-feng.tang@intel.com>
Date:   Wed, 27 Jul 2022 15:10:42 +0800
From:   Feng Tang <feng.tang@...el.com>
To:     Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>,
        Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux.com>,
        Pekka Enberg <penberg@...nel.org>,
        David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
        Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@....com>,
        Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@...ux.dev>,
        Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@...il.com>, linux-mm@...ck.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
        Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@....com>,
        John Garry <john.garry@...wei.com>,
        Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@...wei.com>,
        Feng Tang <feng.tang@...el.com>
Subject: [PATCH v3 3/3] mm/slub: extend redzone check to cover extra allocated kmalloc space than requested

kmalloc will round up the request size to a fixed size (mostly power
of 2), so there could be a extra space than what is requested, whose
size is the actual buffer size minus original request size.

To better detect out of bound access or abuse of this space, add
redzone sanity check for it.

And in current kernel, some kmalloc user already knows the existence
of the space and utilizes it after calling 'ksize()' to know the real
size of the allocated buffer. So we skip the sanity check for objects
which have been called with ksize(), as treating them as legitimate
users.

Suggested-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>
Signed-off-by: Feng Tang <feng.tang@...el.com>
---
 mm/slub.c | 52 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 49 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
index 946919066a4b..added2653bb0 100644
--- a/mm/slub.c
+++ b/mm/slub.c
@@ -836,6 +836,11 @@ static inline void set_orig_size(struct kmem_cache *s,
 	*(unsigned int *)p = orig_size;
 }
 
+static inline void skip_orig_size_check(struct kmem_cache *s, const void *object)
+{
+	set_orig_size(s, (void *)object, s->object_size);
+}
+
 static unsigned int get_orig_size(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object)
 {
 	void *p = kasan_reset_tag(object);
@@ -967,13 +972,35 @@ static __printf(3, 4) void slab_err(struct kmem_cache *s, struct slab *slab,
 static void init_object(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, u8 val)
 {
 	u8 *p = kasan_reset_tag(object);
+	unsigned int orig_size = s->object_size;
 
-	if (s->flags & SLAB_RED_ZONE)
+	if (s->flags & SLAB_RED_ZONE) {
 		memset(p - s->red_left_pad, val, s->red_left_pad);
 
+		if (slub_debug_orig_size(s) && val == SLUB_RED_ACTIVE) {
+			unsigned int zone_start;
+
+			orig_size = get_orig_size(s, object);
+			zone_start = orig_size;
+
+			if (!freeptr_outside_object(s))
+				zone_start = max_t(unsigned int, orig_size,
+						s->offset + sizeof(void *));
+
+			/*
+			 * Redzone the extra allocated space by kmalloc
+			 * than requested.
+			 */
+			if (zone_start < s->object_size)
+				memset(p + zone_start, val,
+					s->object_size - zone_start);
+		}
+
+	}
+
 	if (s->flags & __OBJECT_POISON) {
-		memset(p, POISON_FREE, s->object_size - 1);
-		p[s->object_size - 1] = POISON_END;
+		memset(p, POISON_FREE, orig_size - 1);
+		p[orig_size - 1] = POISON_END;
 	}
 
 	if (s->flags & SLAB_RED_ZONE)
@@ -1120,6 +1147,7 @@ static int check_object(struct kmem_cache *s, struct slab *slab,
 {
 	u8 *p = object;
 	u8 *endobject = object + s->object_size;
+	unsigned int orig_size;
 
 	if (s->flags & SLAB_RED_ZONE) {
 		if (!check_bytes_and_report(s, slab, object, "Left Redzone",
@@ -1129,6 +1157,20 @@ static int check_object(struct kmem_cache *s, struct slab *slab,
 		if (!check_bytes_and_report(s, slab, object, "Right Redzone",
 			endobject, val, s->inuse - s->object_size))
 			return 0;
+
+		if (slub_debug_orig_size(s) && val == SLUB_RED_ACTIVE) {
+			orig_size = get_orig_size(s, object);
+
+			if (!freeptr_outside_object(s))
+				orig_size = max_t(unsigned int, orig_size,
+						s->offset + sizeof(void *));
+			if (s->object_size > orig_size  &&
+				!check_bytes_and_report(s, slab, object,
+					"kmalloc Redzone", p + orig_size,
+					val, s->object_size - orig_size)) {
+				return 0;
+			}
+		}
 	} else {
 		if ((s->flags & SLAB_POISON) && s->object_size < s->inuse) {
 			check_bytes_and_report(s, slab, p, "Alignment padding",
@@ -4588,6 +4630,10 @@ size_t __ksize(const void *object)
 	if (unlikely(!folio_test_slab(folio)))
 		return folio_size(folio);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG
+	skip_orig_size_check(folio_slab(folio)->slab_cache, object);
+#endif
+
 	return slab_ksize(folio_slab(folio)->slab_cache);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__ksize);
-- 
2.27.0