linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] vfs: bypass may_create_in_sticky check if task has CAP

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Message-ID: <4085e655f6f22ab185f14cfb6a0c5dee9f12b55e.camel@kernel.org>
Date:   Wed, 27 Jul 2022 09:29:37 -0400
From:   Jeff Layton <jlayton@...nel.org>
To:     Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>
Cc:     viro@...iv.linux.org.uk, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-nfs@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        Yongchen Yang <yoyang@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] vfs: bypass may_create_in_sticky check if task has
 CAP_FOWNER

On Wed, 2022-07-27 at 15:16 +0200, Christian Brauner wrote:
> On Wed, Jul 27, 2022 at 08:55:35AM -0400, Jeff Layton wrote:
> > On Wed, 2022-07-27 at 14:37 +0200, Christian Brauner wrote:
> > > On Wed, Jul 27, 2022 at 08:30:48AM -0400, Jeff Layton wrote:
> > > > NFS server is exporting a sticky directory (mode 01777) with root
> > > > squashing enabled. Client has protect_regular enabled and then tries to
> > > > open a file as root in that directory. File is created (with ownership
> > > > set to nobody:nobody) but the open syscall returns an error.
> > > > 
> > > > The problem is may_create_in_sticky, which rejects the open even though
> > > > the file has already been created/opened. Bypass the checks in
> > > > may_create_in_sticky if the task has CAP_FOWNER in the given namespace.
> > > > 
> > > > Link: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1976829
> > > > Reported-by: Yongchen Yang <yoyang@...hat.com>
> > > > Suggested-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>
> > > > Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@...nel.org>
> > > > ---
> > > >  fs/namei.c | 3 ++-
> > > >  1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> > > > 
> > > > diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
> > > > index 1f28d3f463c3..170c2396ba29 100644
> > > > --- a/fs/namei.c
> > > > +++ b/fs/namei.c
> > > > @@ -1230,7 +1230,8 @@ static int may_create_in_sticky(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
> > > >  	    (!sysctl_protected_regular && S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) ||
> > > >  	    likely(!(dir_mode & S_ISVTX)) ||
> > > >  	    uid_eq(i_uid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode), dir_uid) ||
> > > > -	    uid_eq(current_fsuid(), i_uid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode)))
> > > > +	    uid_eq(current_fsuid(), i_uid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode)) ||
> > > > +	    ns_capable(mnt_userns, CAP_FOWNER))
> > > >  		return 0;
> > > 
> > > Hm, no. You really want inode_owner_or_capable() here..
> > > You need to verify that you have a mapping for the inode->i_{g,u}id in
> > > question and that you're having CAP_FOWNER in the caller's userns.
> > > 
> > 
> > Ok, I should be able to make that change and test it out.
> > 
> > > I'm pretty sure we should also restrict this to the case were the caller
> > > actually created the file otherwise we introduce a potential issue where
> > > the caller is susceptible to data spoofing. For example, the file was
> > > created by another user racing the caller's O_CREAT.
> > 
> > That won't be sufficient to fix the testcase, I think. If a file already
> > exists in the sticky dir and is owned by nobody:nobody, do we really
> > want to prevent root from opening it? I wouldn't think so.
> 
> Afaict, the whole stick behind the protected_regular thing in
> may_create_in_sticky() thing is that you prevent scenarios where you can
> be tricked into opening a file that you didn't intend to with O_CREAT.
> 

Yuck. The proper way to get that protection is to use O_EXCL...

> That's specifically also a protection for root. So say root specifies
> O_CREAT but someone beats root to it and creates the file dumping
> malicious data in there. The uid_eq() requirement is supposed to prevent
> such attacks and it's a sysctl that userspace opted into.
> 
> We'd be relaxing that restriction quite a bit if we not just allow newly
> created but also pre-existing file to be opened even with the CAP_FOWNER
> requirement.
> 
> So the dd call should really fail if O_CREAT is passed but the file is
> pre-existing, imho. It's a different story if dd created that file and
> has CAP_FOWNER imho.

That's pretty nasty. So if I create a file as root in a sticky dir that
doesn't exist, and then close it and try to open it again it'll fail
with -EACCES? That's terribly confusing.

-- 
Jeff Layton <jlayton@...nel.org>