linux-kernel - Re: [RFC PATCH 0/8] x86_64: Harden compressed kernel, part 1

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Message-ID: <e6e7fef1-0dff-ef72-8a17-8ecec89994ca@intel.com>
Date:   Mon, 1 Aug 2022 09:48:58 -0700
From:   Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>
To:     Evgeniy Baskov <baskov@...ras.ru>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
Cc:     Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>, x86@...nel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        Alexey Khoroshilov <khoroshilov@...ras.ru>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 0/8] x86_64: Harden compressed kernel, part 1

On 8/1/22 09:38, Evgeniy Baskov wrote:
> This is the first half of changes aimed to increase security of early
> boot code of compressed kernel for x86_64 by enforcing memory protection
> on page table level.

Could you share a little more background here?  Hardening is good, but
you _can_ have too much of a good thing.

Is this part of the boot cycle becoming a target for attackers in
trusted boot environments?  Do emerging confidential computing
technologies like SEV and TDX cause increased reliance on compressed
kernel security?

In other words, why is *THIS* important versus all the other patches
floating around out there?