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Message-Id: <20220801114134.688312217@linuxfoundation.org>
Date: Mon, 1 Aug 2022 13:46:29 +0200
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
stable@...r.kernel.org,
syzbot+9bd2b7adbd34b30b87e4@...kaller.appspotmail.com,
Mike Rapoport <rppt@...ux.ibm.com>,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>,
Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen@...gle.com>,
Jan Kara <jack@...e.cz>, Hillf Danton <hdanton@...a.com>,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Subject: [PATCH 5.15 05/69] secretmem: fix unhandled fault in truncate
From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@...ux.ibm.com>
commit 84ac013046ccc438af04b7acecd4d3ab84fe4bde upstream.
syzkaller reports the following issue:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff888021f7e005
PGD 11401067 P4D 11401067 PUD 11402067 PMD 21f7d063 PTE 800fffffde081060
Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
CPU: 0 PID: 3761 Comm: syz-executor281 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc4-syzkaller-00014-g941e3e791269 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:memset_erms+0x9/0x10 arch/x86/lib/memset_64.S:64
Code: c1 e9 03 40 0f b6 f6 48 b8 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 48 0f af c6 f3 48 ab 89 d1 f3 aa 4c 89 c8 c3 90 49 89 f9 40 88 f0 48 89 d1 <f3> aa 4c 89 c8 c3 90 49 89 fa 40 0f b6 ce 48 b8 01 01 01 01 01 01
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000329fa90 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000001000 RCX: 0000000000000ffb
RDX: 0000000000000ffb RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff888021f7e005
RBP: ffffea000087df80 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff888021f7e005
R10: ffffed10043efdff R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000005
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000001000 R15: 0000000000000ffb
FS: 00007fb29d8b2700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffff888021f7e005 CR3: 0000000026e7b000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
zero_user_segments include/linux/highmem.h:272 [inline]
folio_zero_range include/linux/highmem.h:428 [inline]
truncate_inode_partial_folio+0x76a/0xdf0 mm/truncate.c:237
truncate_inode_pages_range+0x83b/0x1530 mm/truncate.c:381
truncate_inode_pages mm/truncate.c:452 [inline]
truncate_pagecache+0x63/0x90 mm/truncate.c:753
simple_setattr+0xed/0x110 fs/libfs.c:535
secretmem_setattr+0xae/0xf0 mm/secretmem.c:170
notify_change+0xb8c/0x12b0 fs/attr.c:424
do_truncate+0x13c/0x200 fs/open.c:65
do_sys_ftruncate+0x536/0x730 fs/open.c:193
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
RIP: 0033:0x7fb29d900899
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 11 15 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fb29d8b2318 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000004d
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fb29d988408 RCX: 00007fb29d900899
RDX: 00007fb29d900899 RSI: 0000000000000005 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007fb29d988400 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fb29d98840c
R13: 00007ffca01a23bf R14: 00007fb29d8b2400 R15: 0000000000022000
</TASK>
Modules linked in:
CR2: ffff888021f7e005
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Eric Biggers suggested that this happens when
secretmem_setattr()->simple_setattr() races with secretmem_fault() so that
a page that is faulted in by secretmem_fault() (and thus removed from the
direct map) is zeroed by inode truncation right afterwards.
Use mapping->invalidate_lock to make secretmem_fault() and
secretmem_setattr() mutually exclusive.
[rppt@...ux.ibm.com: v3]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220714091337.412297-1-rppt@kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220707165650.248088-1-rppt@kernel.org
Reported-by: syzbot+9bd2b7adbd34b30b87e4@...kaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@...ux.ibm.com>
Suggested-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>
Reviewed-by: Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen@...gle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@...e.cz>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>
Cc: Hillf Danton <hdanton@...a.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>
Cc: <stable@...r.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
mm/secretmem.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
--- a/mm/secretmem.c
+++ b/mm/secretmem.c
@@ -55,22 +55,28 @@ static vm_fault_t secretmem_fault(struct
gfp_t gfp = vmf->gfp_mask;
unsigned long addr;
struct page *page;
+ vm_fault_t ret;
int err;
if (((loff_t)vmf->pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT) >= i_size_read(inode))
return vmf_error(-EINVAL);
+ filemap_invalidate_lock_shared(mapping);
+
retry:
page = find_lock_page(mapping, offset);
if (!page) {
page = alloc_page(gfp | __GFP_ZERO);
- if (!page)
- return VM_FAULT_OOM;
+ if (!page) {
+ ret = VM_FAULT_OOM;
+ goto out;
+ }
err = set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(page);
if (err) {
put_page(page);
- return vmf_error(err);
+ ret = vmf_error(err);
+ goto out;
}
__SetPageUptodate(page);
@@ -86,7 +92,8 @@ retry:
if (err == -EEXIST)
goto retry;
- return vmf_error(err);
+ ret = vmf_error(err);
+ goto out;
}
addr = (unsigned long)page_address(page);
@@ -94,7 +101,11 @@ retry:
}
vmf->page = page;
- return VM_FAULT_LOCKED;
+ ret = VM_FAULT_LOCKED;
+
+out:
+ filemap_invalidate_unlock_shared(mapping);
+ return ret;
}
static const struct vm_operations_struct secretmem_vm_ops = {
@@ -162,12 +173,20 @@ static int secretmem_setattr(struct user
struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
{
struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
+ struct address_space *mapping = inode->i_mapping;
unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
+ int ret;
+
+ filemap_invalidate_lock(mapping);
if ((ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) && inode->i_size)
- return -EINVAL;
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ else
+ ret = simple_setattr(mnt_userns, dentry, iattr);
+
+ filemap_invalidate_unlock(mapping);
- return simple_setattr(mnt_userns, dentry, iattr);
+ return ret;
}
static const struct inode_operations secretmem_iops = {
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