lists.openwall.net   lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  linux-hardening  linux-cve-announce  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
 
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <d11cd7921859c9b24db304107caa0fc2deb780e3.camel@nxp.com>
Date:   Wed, 3 Aug 2022 11:07:54 +0000
From:   Olivier Masse <olivier.masse@....com>
To:     "brian.starkey@....com" <brian.starkey@....com>
CC:     "sumit.semwal@...aro.org" <sumit.semwal@...aro.org>,
        "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linaro-mm-sig@...ts.linaro.org" <linaro-mm-sig@...ts.linaro.org>,
        "christian.koenig@....com" <christian.koenig@....com>,
        "linux-media@...r.kernel.org" <linux-media@...r.kernel.org>,
        "nd@....com" <nd@....com>,
        Clément Faure <clement.faure@....com>,
        "dri-devel@...ts.freedesktop.org" <dri-devel@...ts.freedesktop.org>,
        "benjamin.gaignard@...labora.com" <benjamin.gaignard@...labora.com>
Subject: Re: [EXT] Re: [PATCH 3/5] dma-buf: heaps: add Linaro secure dmabuf
 heap support

Hi Brian,

Thanks for your comments, please find my reply below.

On mar., 2022-08-02 at 15:39 +0100, Brian Starkey wrote:
> Caution: EXT Email
> 
> Hi Olivier,
> 
> Some comments below as I mentioned off-list.
> 
> One additional point: some devices need to know if a buffer is
> protected, so that they can configure registers appropriately to make
> use of that protected buffer. There was previously a discussion about
> adding a flag to a dma_buf to indicate that it is allocated from
> protected memory[1].
> 
> [1] 
> https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Flists.freedesktop.org%2Farchives%2Fdri-devel%2F2019-September%2F238059.html&amp;data=05%7C01%7Colivier.masse%40nxp.com%7C64e0ce1952ac4e926a8208da7494d0bb%7C686ea1d3bc2b4c6fa92cd99c5c301635%7C0%7C0%7C637950479760002497%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=bmlw9uLeGtn%2F7JliZ07nSm6XDEzEqdwn4mBQHIVnma0%3D&amp;reserved=0
> 
> 

Interesting, could we introduce is_protected 1-bit flag into struct
dma_buf ?
struct dma_buf_ops.map_dma_buf and struct dma_buf_ops.unmap_dma_buf
could become optional for such buffer ?

> On Tue, Aug 02, 2022 at 11:58:41AM +0200, Olivier Masse wrote:
> > add Linaro secure heap bindings: linaro,secure-heap
> > use genalloc to allocate/free buffer from buffer pool.
> > buffer pool info is from dts.
> > use sg_table instore the allocated memory info, the length of
> > sg_table is 1.
> > implement secure_heap_buf_ops to implement buffer share in
> > difference device:
> > 1. Userspace passes this fd to all drivers it wants this buffer
> > to share with: First the filedescriptor is converted to a &dma_buf
> > using
> > dma_buf_get(). Then the buffer is attached to the device using
> > dma_buf_attach().
> > 2. Once the buffer is attached to all devices userspace can
> > initiate DMA
> > access to the shared buffer. In the kernel this is done by calling
> > dma_buf_map_attachment()
> > 3. get sg_table with dma_buf_map_attachment in difference device.
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Olivier Masse <olivier.masse@....com>
> > ---
> >  drivers/dma-buf/heaps/Kconfig       |  21 +-
> >  drivers/dma-buf/heaps/Makefile      |   1 +
> >  drivers/dma-buf/heaps/secure_heap.c | 588
> > ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> >  3 files changed, 606 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> >  create mode 100644 drivers/dma-buf/heaps/secure_heap.c
> > 
> > diff --git a/drivers/dma-buf/heaps/Kconfig b/drivers/dma-
> > buf/heaps/Kconfig
> > index 6a33193a7b3e..b2406932192e 100644
> > --- a/drivers/dma-buf/heaps/Kconfig
> > +++ b/drivers/dma-buf/heaps/Kconfig
> > @@ -1,8 +1,12 @@
> > -config DMABUF_HEAPS_DEFERRED_FREE
> > -     tristate
> > +menuconfig DMABUF_HEAPS_DEFERRED_FREE
> > +     bool "DMA-BUF heaps deferred-free library"
> > +     help
> > +       Choose this option to enable the DMA-BUF heaps deferred-
> > free library.
> > 
> > -config DMABUF_HEAPS_PAGE_POOL
> > -     tristate
> > +menuconfig DMABUF_HEAPS_PAGE_POOL
> > +     bool "DMA-BUF heaps page-pool library"
> > +     help
> > +       Choose this option to enable the DMA-BUF heaps page-pool
> > library.
> > 
> >  config DMABUF_HEAPS_SYSTEM
> >       bool "DMA-BUF System Heap"
> > @@ -26,3 +30,12 @@ config DMABUF_HEAPS_DSP
> >            Choose this option to enable the dsp dmabuf heap. The
> > dsp heap
> >            is allocated by gen allocater. it's allocated according
> > the dts.
> >            If in doubt, say Y.
> > +
> > +config DMABUF_HEAPS_SECURE
> > +     tristate "DMA-BUF Secure Heap"
> > +     depends on DMABUF_HEAPS && DMABUF_HEAPS_DEFERRED_FREE
> > +     help
> > +       Choose this option to enable the secure dmabuf heap. The
> > secure heap
> > +       pools are defined according to the DT. Heaps are allocated
> > +       in the pools using gen allocater.
> > +       If in doubt, say Y.
> > diff --git a/drivers/dma-buf/heaps/Makefile b/drivers/dma-
> > buf/heaps/Makefile
> > index e70722ea615e..08f6aa5919d1 100644
> > --- a/drivers/dma-buf/heaps/Makefile
> > +++ b/drivers/dma-buf/heaps/Makefile
> > @@ -4,3 +4,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_DMABUF_HEAPS_PAGE_POOL)  +=
> > page_pool.o
> >  obj-$(CONFIG_DMABUF_HEAPS_SYSTEM)    += system_heap.o
> >  obj-$(CONFIG_DMABUF_HEAPS_CMA)               += cma_heap.o
> >  obj-$(CONFIG_DMABUF_HEAPS_DSP)          += dsp_heap.o
> > +obj-$(CONFIG_DMABUF_HEAPS_SECURE)    += secure_heap.o
> > diff --git a/drivers/dma-buf/heaps/secure_heap.c b/drivers/dma-
> > buf/heaps/secure_heap.c
> > new file mode 100644
> > index 000000000000..31aac5d050b4
> > --- /dev/null
> > +++ b/drivers/dma-buf/heaps/secure_heap.c
> > @@ -0,0 +1,588 @@
> > +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> > +/*
> > + * DMABUF secure heap exporter
> > + *
> > + * Copyright 2021 NXP.
> > + */
> > +
> > +#include <linux/dma-buf.h>
> > +#include <linux/dma-heap.h>
> > +#include <linux/dma-mapping.h>
> > +#include <linux/err.h>
> > +#include <linux/genalloc.h>
> > +#include <linux/highmem.h>
> > +#include <linux/mm.h>
> > +#include <linux/module.h>
> > +#include <linux/of.h>
> > +#include <linux/of_fdt.h>
> > +#include <linux/of_reserved_mem.h>
> > +#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
> > +#include <linux/slab.h>
> > +#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
> > +
> > +#include "deferred-free-helper.h"
> > +#include "page_pool.h"
> > +
> > +#define MAX_SECURE_HEAP 2
> > +#define MAX_HEAP_NAME_LEN 32
> > +
> > +struct secure_heap_buffer {
> > +     struct dma_heap *heap;
> > +     struct list_head attachments;
> > +     struct mutex lock;
> > +     unsigned long len;
> > +     struct sg_table sg_table;
> > +     int vmap_cnt;
> > +     struct deferred_freelist_item deferred_free;
> > +     void *vaddr;
> > +     bool uncached;
> > +};
> > +
> > +struct dma_heap_attachment {
> > +     struct device *dev;
> > +     struct sg_table *table;
> > +     struct list_head list;
> > +     bool no_map;
> > +     bool mapped;
> > +     bool uncached;
> > +};
> 
> I think dma_heap_attachment should have a more specific name,
> otherwise it looks like some generic part of the dma_heap framework.

ok, how about secure_heap_attachment which sound more logical ?

> 
> > +
> > +struct secure_heap_info {
> > +     struct gen_pool *pool;
> > +
> > +     bool no_map;
> > +};
> > +
> > +struct rmem_secure {
> > +     phys_addr_t base;
> > +     phys_addr_t size;
> > +
> > +     char name[MAX_HEAP_NAME_LEN];
> > +
> > +     bool no_map;
> > +};
> > +
> > +static struct rmem_secure secure_data[MAX_SECURE_HEAP] = {0};
> > +static unsigned int secure_data_count;
> > +
> > +static struct sg_table *dup_sg_table(struct sg_table *table)
> > +{
> > +     struct sg_table *new_table;
> > +     int ret, i;
> > +     struct scatterlist *sg, *new_sg;
> > +
> > +     new_table = kzalloc(sizeof(*new_table), GFP_KERNEL);
> > +     if (!new_table)
> > +             return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
> > +
> > +     ret = sg_alloc_table(new_table, table->orig_nents,
> > GFP_KERNEL);
> > +     if (ret) {
> > +             kfree(new_table);
> > +             return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
> > +     }
> > +
> > +     new_sg = new_table->sgl;
> > +     for_each_sgtable_sg(table, sg, i) {
> > +             sg_set_page(new_sg, sg_page(sg), sg->length, sg-
> > >offset);
> > +             new_sg->dma_address = sg->dma_address;
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_NEED_SG_DMA_LENGTH
> > +             new_sg->dma_length = sg->dma_length;
> > +#endif
> > +             new_sg = sg_next(new_sg);
> > +     }
> > +
> > +     return new_table;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static int secure_heap_attach(struct dma_buf *dmabuf,
> > +                           struct dma_buf_attachment *attachment)
> > +{
> > +     struct secure_heap_buffer *buffer = dmabuf->priv;
> > +     struct secure_heap_info *info = dma_heap_get_drvdata(buffer-
> > >heap);
> > +     struct dma_heap_attachment *a;
> > +     struct sg_table *table;
> > +
> > +     a = kzalloc(sizeof(*a), GFP_KERNEL);
> > +     if (!a)
> > +             return -ENOMEM;
> > +
> > +     table = dup_sg_table(&buffer->sg_table);
> > +     if (IS_ERR(table)) {
> > +             kfree(a);
> > +             return -ENOMEM;
> > +     }
> > +
> > +     a->table = table;
> > +     a->dev = attachment->dev;
> > +     INIT_LIST_HEAD(&a->list);
> > +     a->no_map = info->no_map;
> > +     a->mapped = false;
> > +     a->uncached = buffer->uncached;
> > +     attachment->priv = a;
> > +
> > +     mutex_lock(&buffer->lock);
> > +     list_add(&a->list, &buffer->attachments);
> > +     mutex_unlock(&buffer->lock);
> > +
> > +     return 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static void secure_heap_detach(struct dma_buf *dmabuf,
> > +                            struct dma_buf_attachment *attachment)
> > +{
> > +     struct secure_heap_buffer *buffer = dmabuf->priv;
> > +     struct dma_heap_attachment *a = attachment->priv;
> > +
> > +     mutex_lock(&buffer->lock);
> > +     list_del(&a->list);
> > +     mutex_unlock(&buffer->lock);
> > +
> > +     sg_free_table(a->table);
> > +     kfree(a->table);
> > +     kfree(a);
> > +}
> > +
> > +static struct sg_table *secure_heap_map_dma_buf(struct
> > dma_buf_attachment *attachment,
> > +                                             enum
> > dma_data_direction direction)
> > +{
> > +     struct dma_heap_attachment *a = attachment->priv;
> > +     struct sg_table *table = a->table;
> > +     int attr = 0;
> > +     int ret;
> > +
> > +     if (!a->no_map) {
> 
> This looks strange - you're expecting this driver to be used on
> regions with no-map set, but if no-map _is_ set, you don't allow the
> dma_buf to get mapped to any devices. Doesn't that mean that these
> buffers can never actually be used?

if no-map is not set, map_dma_buf is mapping the buffer.

> 
> > +             if (a->uncached)
> > +                     attr = DMA_ATTR_SKIP_CPU_SYNC;
> > +
> 
> If the CPU can never touch these buffers, is cached vs uncached
> meaningful?

indeed, but as dma_buf_ops.map_dma_buf is mandatory, this flag as well
as no-map were introduce to manage uncached mapped buffer.

to simplify everything, secure-heap could get rid of no-map and
uncached flags and set an is_protected flag in dma_buf ?


> If the TEE touches the buffers from the CPU then perhaps the TEE
> would
> need to do cache maintenance, but I'd expect that to be managed in
> the
> TEE.

yes, if needed cache maintenance should be done in TA.

> 
> > +             ret = dma_map_sgtable(attachment->dev, table,
> > direction, attr);
> > +             if (ret)
> > +                     return ERR_PTR(ret);
> > +
> > +             a->mapped = true;
> > +     }
> > +
> > +     return table;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static void secure_heap_unmap_dma_buf(struct dma_buf_attachment
> > *attachment,
> > +                                   struct sg_table *table,
> > +                                   enum dma_data_direction
> > direction)
> > +{
> > +     struct dma_heap_attachment *a = attachment->priv;
> > +     int attr = 0;
> > +
> > +     if (!a->no_map) {
> > +             if (a->uncached)
> > +                     attr = DMA_ATTR_SKIP_CPU_SYNC;
> > +
> > +             a->mapped = false;
> > +             dma_unmap_sgtable(attachment->dev, table, direction,
> > attr);
> > +     }
> > +}
> > +
> > +static int secure_heap_dma_buf_begin_cpu_access(struct dma_buf
> > *dmabuf,
> > +                                             enum
> > dma_data_direction direction)
> 
> If the firewall is preventing CPU accesses, then shouldn't
> begin_cpu_access and end_cpu_access either fail or be a no-op?

true, both of them are optional and could be removed.

> 
> > +{
> > +     struct secure_heap_buffer *buffer = dmabuf->priv;
> > +     struct dma_heap_attachment *a;
> > +
> > +     mutex_lock(&buffer->lock);
> > +
> > +     if (buffer->vmap_cnt)
> > +             invalidate_kernel_vmap_range(buffer->vaddr, buffer-
> > >len);
> > +
> > +     if (!buffer->uncached) {
> > +             list_for_each_entry(a, &buffer->attachments, list) {
> > +                     if (!a->mapped)
> > +                             continue;
> > +                     dma_sync_sgtable_for_cpu(a->dev, a->table,
> > direction);
> > +             }
> > +     }
> > +     mutex_unlock(&buffer->lock);
> > +
> > +     return 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static int secure_heap_dma_buf_end_cpu_access(struct dma_buf
> > *dmabuf,
> > +                                           enum dma_data_direction
> > direction)
> > +{
> > +     struct secure_heap_buffer *buffer = dmabuf->priv;
> > +     struct dma_heap_attachment *a;
> > +
> > +     mutex_lock(&buffer->lock);
> > +
> > +     if (buffer->vmap_cnt)
> > +             flush_kernel_vmap_range(buffer->vaddr, buffer->len);
> > +
> > +     if (!buffer->uncached) {
> > +             list_for_each_entry(a, &buffer->attachments, list) {
> > +                     if (!a->mapped)
> > +                             continue;
> > +                     dma_sync_sgtable_for_device(a->dev, a->table, 
> > direction);
> > +             }
> > +     }
> > +     mutex_unlock(&buffer->lock);
> > +
> > +     return 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static int secure_heap_mmap(struct dma_buf *dmabuf, struct
> > vm_area_struct *vma)
> > +{
> > +     struct secure_heap_buffer *buffer = dmabuf->priv;
> > +     struct sg_table *table = &buffer->sg_table;
> > +     unsigned long addr = vma->vm_start;
> > +     struct sg_page_iter piter;
> > +     int ret;
> > +
> > +     if (buffer->uncached)
> > +             vma->vm_page_prot = pgprot_writecombine(vma-
> > >vm_page_prot);
> > +
> > +     for_each_sgtable_page(table, &piter, vma->vm_pgoff) {
> > +             struct page *page = sg_page_iter_page(&piter);
> > +
> > +             ret = remap_pfn_range(vma, addr, page_to_pfn(page),
> > PAGE_SIZE,
> > +                                   vma->vm_page_prot);
> 
> If the CPU can't touch these buffers, what would they be mapped to
> userspace for?

again, let's remove this optional ops.

> 
> > +             if (ret)
> > +                     return ret;
> > +             addr += PAGE_SIZE;
> > +     }
> > +     return 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static void *secure_heap_do_vmap(struct secure_heap_buffer
> > *buffer)
> > +{
> > +     struct sg_table *table = &buffer->sg_table;
> > +     int npages = PAGE_ALIGN(buffer->len) / PAGE_SIZE;
> > +     struct page **pages = vmalloc(sizeof(struct page *) *
> > npages);
> > +     struct page **tmp = pages;
> > +     struct sg_page_iter piter;
> > +     pgprot_t pgprot = PAGE_KERNEL;
> > +     void *vaddr;
> > +
> > +     if (!pages)
> > +             return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
> > +
> > +     if (buffer->uncached)
> > +             pgprot = pgprot_writecombine(PAGE_KERNEL);
> > +
> > +     for_each_sgtable_page(table, &piter, 0) {
> > +             WARN_ON(tmp - pages >= npages);
> > +             *tmp++ = sg_page_iter_page(&piter);
> > +     }
> > +
> > +     vaddr = vmap(pages, npages, VM_MAP, pgprot);
> > +     vfree(pages);
> 
> Similar to above, if the CPU can't touch these buffers, what would be
> the point of mapping them to the kernel?

indeed, useless code.

> 
> > +
> > +     if (!vaddr)
> > +             return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
> > +
> > +     return vaddr;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static int secure_heap_vmap(struct dma_buf *dmabuf, struct
> > dma_buf_map *map)
> > +{
> > +     struct secure_heap_buffer *buffer = dmabuf->priv;
> > +     void *vaddr;
> > +     int ret = 0;
> > +
> > +     mutex_lock(&buffer->lock);
> > +     if (buffer->vmap_cnt) {
> > +             buffer->vmap_cnt++;
> > +             goto out;
> > +     }
> > +
> > +     vaddr = secure_heap_do_vmap(buffer);
> > +     if (IS_ERR(vaddr)) {
> > +             ret = PTR_ERR(vaddr);
> > +             goto out;
> > +     }
> > +
> > +     buffer->vaddr = vaddr;
> > +     buffer->vmap_cnt++;
> > +     dma_buf_map_set_vaddr(map, buffer->vaddr);
> > +out:
> > +     mutex_unlock(&buffer->lock);
> > +
> > +     return ret;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static void secure_heap_vunmap(struct dma_buf *dmabuf, struct
> > dma_buf_map *map)
> > +{
> > +     struct secure_heap_buffer *buffer = dmabuf->priv;
> > +
> > +     mutex_lock(&buffer->lock);
> > +     if (!--buffer->vmap_cnt) {
> > +             vunmap(buffer->vaddr);
> > +             buffer->vaddr = NULL;
> > +     }
> > +     mutex_unlock(&buffer->lock);
> > +     dma_buf_map_clear(map);
> > +}
> > +
> > +static void secure_heap_zero_buffer(struct secure_heap_buffer
> > *buffer)
> > +{
> > +     struct sg_table *sgt = &buffer->sg_table;
> > +     struct sg_page_iter piter;
> > +     struct page *p;
> > +     void *vaddr;
> > +
> > +     for_each_sgtable_page(sgt, &piter, 0) {
> > +             p = sg_page_iter_page(&piter);
> > +             vaddr = kmap_atomic(p);
> > +             memset(vaddr, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
> 
> How can you do memset on the buffer if the firewall is preventing CPU
> accesses?
> 

yes, useless if we set a secure flag to prevent driver from mapping
allocated buffer.

> > +             kunmap_atomic(vaddr);
> > +     }
> > +}
> > +
> > +static void secure_heap_buf_free(struct deferred_freelist_item
> > *item,
> > +                              enum df_reason reason)
> > +{
> > +     struct secure_heap_buffer *buffer;
> > +     struct secure_heap_info *info;
> > +     struct sg_table *table;
> > +     struct scatterlist *sg;
> > +     int i;
> > +
> > +     buffer = container_of(item, struct secure_heap_buffer,
> > deferred_free);
> > +     info = dma_heap_get_drvdata(buffer->heap);
> > +
> > +     if (!info->no_map) {
> > +             // Zero the buffer pages before adding back to the
> > pool
> > +             if (reason == DF_NORMAL)
> > +                     secure_heap_zero_buffer(buffer);
> > +     }
> > +
> > +     table = &buffer->sg_table;
> > +     for_each_sg(table->sgl, sg, table->nents, i)
> > +             gen_pool_free(info->pool, sg_dma_address(sg),
> > sg_dma_len(sg));
> > +
> > +     sg_free_table(table);
> > +     kfree(buffer);
> > +}
> > +
> > +static void secure_heap_dma_buf_release(struct dma_buf *dmabuf)
> > +{
> > +     struct secure_heap_buffer *buffer = dmabuf->priv;
> > +     int npages = PAGE_ALIGN(buffer->len) / PAGE_SIZE;
> > +
> > +     deferred_free(&buffer->deferred_free, secure_heap_buf_free,
> > npages);
> > +}
> > +
> > +static const struct dma_buf_ops secure_heap_buf_ops = {
> > +     .attach = secure_heap_attach,
> > +     .detach = secure_heap_detach,
> > +     .map_dma_buf = secure_heap_map_dma_buf,
> > +     .unmap_dma_buf = secure_heap_unmap_dma_buf,
> > +     .begin_cpu_access = secure_heap_dma_buf_begin_cpu_access,
> > +     .end_cpu_access = secure_heap_dma_buf_end_cpu_access,
> > +     .mmap = secure_heap_mmap,
> > +     .vmap = secure_heap_vmap,
> > +     .vunmap = secure_heap_vunmap,
> > +     .release = secure_heap_dma_buf_release,
> > +};
> > +
> > +static struct dma_buf *secure_heap_do_allocate(struct dma_heap
> > *heap,
> > +                                            unsigned long len,
> > +                                            unsigned long
> > fd_flags,
> > +                                            unsigned long
> > heap_flags,
> > +                                            bool uncached)
> > +{
> > +     struct secure_heap_buffer *buffer;
> > +     struct secure_heap_info *info = dma_heap_get_drvdata(heap);
> > +     DEFINE_DMA_BUF_EXPORT_INFO(exp_info);
> > +     unsigned long size = roundup(len, PAGE_SIZE);
> > +     struct dma_buf *dmabuf;
> > +     struct sg_table *table;
> > +     int ret = -ENOMEM;
> > +     unsigned long phy_addr;
> > +
> > +     buffer = kzalloc(sizeof(*buffer), GFP_KERNEL);
> > +     if (!buffer)
> > +             return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
> > +
> > +     INIT_LIST_HEAD(&buffer->attachments);
> > +     mutex_init(&buffer->lock);
> > +     buffer->heap = heap;
> > +     buffer->len = size;
> > +     buffer->uncached = uncached;
> > +
> > +     phy_addr = gen_pool_alloc(info->pool, size);
> > +     if (!phy_addr)
> > +             goto free_buffer;
> > +
> > +     table = &buffer->sg_table;
> > +     if (sg_alloc_table(table, 1, GFP_KERNEL))
> > +             goto free_pool;
> > +
> > +     sg_set_page(table->sgl, phys_to_page(phy_addr), size, 0);
> > +     sg_dma_address(table->sgl) = phy_addr;
> > +     sg_dma_len(table->sgl) = size;
> > +
> > +     /* create the dmabuf */
> > +     exp_info.exp_name = dma_heap_get_name(heap);
> > +     exp_info.ops = &secure_heap_buf_ops;
> > +     exp_info.size = buffer->len;
> > +     exp_info.flags = fd_flags;
> > +     exp_info.priv = buffer;
> > +     dmabuf = dma_buf_export(&exp_info);
> > +     if (IS_ERR(dmabuf)) {
> > +             ret = PTR_ERR(dmabuf);
> > +             goto free_pages;
> > +     }
> > +
> > +     return dmabuf;
> > +
> > +free_pages:
> > +     sg_free_table(table);
> > +
> > +free_pool:
> > +     gen_pool_free(info->pool, phy_addr, size);
> > +
> > +free_buffer:
> > +     mutex_destroy(&buffer->lock);
> > +     kfree(buffer);
> > +
> > +     return ERR_PTR(ret);
> > +}
> > +
> > +static struct dma_buf *secure_heap_allocate(struct dma_heap *heap,
> > +                                         unsigned long len,
> > +                                         unsigned long fd_flags,
> > +                                         unsigned long heap_flags)
> > +{
> > +     // use uncache buffer here by default
> > +     return secure_heap_do_allocate(heap, len, fd_flags,
> > heap_flags, true);
> > +     // use cache buffer
> > +     // return secure_heap_do_allocate(heap, len, fd_flags,
> > heap_flags, false);
> > +}
> > +
> > +static const struct dma_heap_ops secure_heap_ops = {
> > +     .allocate = secure_heap_allocate,
> > +};
> > +
> > +static int secure_heap_add(struct rmem_secure *rmem)
> > +{
> > +     struct dma_heap *secure_heap;
> > +     struct dma_heap_export_info exp_info;
> > +     struct secure_heap_info *info = NULL;
> > +     struct gen_pool *pool = NULL;
> > +     int ret = -EINVAL;
> > +
> > +     if (rmem->base == 0 || rmem->size == 0) {
> > +             pr_err("secure_data base or size is not correct\n");
> > +             goto error;
> > +     }
> > +
> > +     info = kzalloc(sizeof(*info), GFP_KERNEL);
> > +     if (!info) {
> > +             pr_err("dmabuf info allocation failed\n");
> > +             ret = -ENOMEM;
> > +             goto error;
> > +     }
> > +
> > +     pool = gen_pool_create(PAGE_SHIFT, -1);
> > +     if (!pool) {
> > +             pr_err("can't create gen pool\n");
> > +             ret = -ENOMEM;
> > +             goto error;
> > +     }
> > +
> > +     if (gen_pool_add(pool, rmem->base, rmem->size, -1) < 0) {
> > +             pr_err("failed to add memory into pool\n");
> > +             ret = -ENOMEM;
> > +             goto error;
> > +     }
> > +
> > +     info->pool = pool;
> > +     info->no_map = rmem->no_map;
> 
> This kind of heap probably can't work if the region doesn't have
> no-map, so I think it would make sense to enforce that no_map is set
> (or ignore regions without no-map in DT).

if no-map is not set, secure-heap could be used as a heap with
dynamically protected buffer from the TEE.
but I agree that this is adding too much complexity and could be
simplify a lot without this mapping consideration.

then no-map is probably not the perfect term to describe this heap.
is_s
ecure or is_protected would be better ?

> 
> Cheers,
> -Brian
> 
> > +
> > +     exp_info.name = rmem->name;
> > +     exp_info.ops = &secure_heap_ops;
> > +     exp_info.priv = info;
> > +
> > +     secure_heap = dma_heap_add(&exp_info);
> > +     if (IS_ERR(secure_heap)) {
> > +             pr_err("dmabuf secure heap allocation failed\n");
> > +             ret = PTR_ERR(secure_heap);
> > +             goto error;
> > +     }
> > +
> > +     return 0;
> > +
> > +error:
> > +     kfree(info);
> > +     if (pool)
> > +             gen_pool_destroy(pool);
> > +
> > +     return ret;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static int secure_heap_create(void)
> > +{
> > +     unsigned int i;
> > +     int ret;
> > +
> > +     for (i = 0; i < secure_data_count; i++) {
> > +             ret = secure_heap_add(&secure_data[i]);
> > +             if (ret)
> > +                     return ret;
> > +     }
> > +     return 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static int rmem_secure_heap_device_init(struct reserved_mem *rmem,
> > +                                      struct device *dev)
> > +{
> > +     dev_set_drvdata(dev, rmem);
> > +     return 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static void rmem_secure_heap_device_release(struct reserved_mem
> > *rmem,
> > +                                      struct device *dev)
> > +{
> > +     dev_set_drvdata(dev, NULL);
> > +}
> > +
> > +static const struct reserved_mem_ops rmem_dma_ops = {
> > +     .device_init    = rmem_secure_heap_device_init,
> > +     .device_release = rmem_secure_heap_device_release,
> > +};
> > +
> > +static int __init rmem_secure_heap_setup(struct reserved_mem
> > *rmem)
> > +{
> > +     if (secure_data_count < MAX_SECURE_HEAP) {
> > +             int name_len = 0;
> > +             char *s = rmem->name;
> > +
> > +             secure_data[secure_data_count].base = rmem->base;
> > +             secure_data[secure_data_count].size = rmem->size;
> > +             secure_data[secure_data_count].no_map =
> > +                     (of_get_flat_dt_prop(rmem->fdt_node, "no-
> > map", NULL) != NULL);
> > +
> > +             while (name_len < MAX_HEAP_NAME_LEN) {
> > +                     if ((*s == '@') || (*s == '\0'))
> > +                             break;
> > +                     name_len++;
> > +                     s++;
> > +             }
> > +             if (name_len == MAX_HEAP_NAME_LEN)
> > +                     name_len--;
> > +
> > +             strncpy(secure_data[secure_data_count].name, rmem-
> > >name, name_len);
> > +
> > +             rmem->ops = &rmem_dma_ops;
> > +             pr_info("Reserved memory: DMA buf secure pool %s at
> > %pa, size %ld MiB\n",
> > +                     secure_data[secure_data_count].name,
> > +                     &rmem->base, (unsigned long)rmem->size /
> > SZ_1M);
> > +
> > +             secure_data_count++;
> > +             return 0;
> > +     }
> > +     WARN_ONCE(1, "Cannot handle more than %u secure heaps\n",
> > MAX_SECURE_HEAP);
> > +     return -EINVAL;
> > +}
> > +
> > +RESERVEDMEM_OF_DECLARE(secure_heap, "linaro,secure-heap",
> > rmem_secure_heap_setup);
> > +
> > +module_init(secure_heap_create);
> > +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
> > --
> > 2.25.0
> > 

Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Powered by Openwall GNU/*/Linux Powered by OpenVZ