Message-Id: <8aa5fe0bd8b2e79634440087c32a5d32b4dbe1af.1659854790.git.isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
Date:   Sun,  7 Aug 2022 15:01:17 -0700
From:   isaku.yamahata@...el.com
To:     kvm@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     isaku.yamahata@...el.com, isaku.yamahata@...il.com,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>, erdemaktas@...gle.com,
        Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
        Sagi Shahar <sagis@...gle.com>
Subject: [PATCH v8 032/103] KVM: x86/mmu: Allow non-zero value for non-present SPTE

From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>

For TD guest, the current way to emulate MMIO doesn't work any more, as KVM
is not able to access the private memory of TD guest and do the emulation.
Instead, TD guest expects to receive #VE when it accesses the MMIO and then
it can explicitly makes hypercall to KVM to get the expected information.

To achieve this, the TDX module always enables "EPT-violation #VE" in the
VMCS control.  And accordingly, KVM needs to configure the MMIO spte to
trigger EPT violation (instead of misconfiguration) and at the same time,
also clear the "suppress #VE" bit so the TD guest can get the #VE instead
of causing actual EPT violation to KVM.

In order for KVM to be able to have chance to set up the correct SPTE for
MMIO for TD guest, the default non-present SPTE must have the "suppress
guest accesses the MMIO.

Also, when TD guest accesses the actual shared memory, it should continue
to trigger EPT violation to the KVM instead of receiving the #VE (the TDX
module guarantees KVM will receive EPT violation for private memory
access).  This means for the shared memory, the SPTE also must have the
"suppress #VE" bit set for the non-present SPTE.

Add support to allow a non-zero value for the non-present SPTE (i.e. when
the page table is firstly allocated, and when the SPTE is zapped) to allow
setting "suppress #VE" bit for the non-present SPTE.

Introduce a new macro SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE to be the "suppress #VE" bit.
Unconditionally set the "suppress #VE" bit (which is bit 63) for both AMD
and Intel as: 1) AMD hardware doesn't use this bit; 2) for normal VMX
guest, KVM never enables the "EPT-violation #VE" in VMCS control and
"suppress #VE" bit is ignored by hardware.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@...el.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h     |  1 +
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c         | 77 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h |  3 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c        |  4 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h        | 28 ++++++++++++-
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c     | 23 ++++++----
 6 files changed, 119 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
index c371ef695fcc..6231ef005a50 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
@@ -511,6 +511,7 @@ enum vmcs_field {
 #define VMX_EPT_IPAT_BIT    			(1ull << 6)
 #define VMX_EPT_ACCESS_BIT			(1ull << 8)
 #define VMX_EPT_DIRTY_BIT			(1ull << 9)
+#define VMX_EPT_SUPPRESS_VE_BIT			(1ull << 63)
 #define VMX_EPT_RWX_MASK                        (VMX_EPT_READABLE_MASK |       \
 						 VMX_EPT_WRITABLE_MASK |       \
 						 VMX_EPT_EXECUTABLE_MASK)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
index 3e1317325e1f..216708a433e7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
@@ -538,9 +538,9 @@ static u64 mmu_spte_clear_track_bits(struct kvm *kvm, u64 *sptep)
 
 	if (!is_shadow_present_pte(old_spte) ||
 	    !spte_has_volatile_bits(old_spte))
-		__update_clear_spte_fast(sptep, 0ull);
+		__update_clear_spte_fast(sptep, SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE);
 	else
-		old_spte = __update_clear_spte_slow(sptep, 0ull);
+		old_spte = __update_clear_spte_slow(sptep, SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE);
 
 	if (!is_shadow_present_pte(old_spte))
 		return old_spte;
@@ -574,7 +574,7 @@ static u64 mmu_spte_clear_track_bits(struct kvm *kvm, u64 *sptep)
  */
 static void mmu_spte_clear_no_track(u64 *sptep)
 {
-	__update_clear_spte_fast(sptep, 0ull);
+	__update_clear_spte_fast(sptep, SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE);
 }
 
 static u64 mmu_spte_get_lockless(u64 *sptep)
@@ -642,6 +642,55 @@ static void walk_shadow_page_lockless_end(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	}
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+static inline void kvm_init_shadow_page(void *page)
+{
+	int ign;
+
+	/*
+	 * AMD: "suppress #VE" bit is ignored
+	 * Intel non-TD(VMX): "suppress #VE" bit is ignored because
+	 *   EPT_VIOLATION_VE isn't set.
+	 * guest TD: TDX module sets EPT_VIOLATION_VE
+	 *   conventional SEPT: "suppress #VE" bit must be set to get EPT violation
+	 *   private SEPT: "suppress #VE" bit is ignored.  CPU doesn't walk it
+	 *
+	 * For simplicity, unconditionally initialize SPET to set "suppress #VE".
+	 */
+	asm volatile ("rep stosq\n\t"
+		      : "=c"(ign), "=D"(page)
+		      : "a"(SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE), "c"(4096/8), "D"(page)
+		      : "memory"
+	);
+}
+
+static int mmu_topup_shadow_page_cache(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache *mc = &vcpu->arch.mmu_shadow_page_cache;
+	int start, end, i, r;
+
+	start = kvm_mmu_memory_cache_nr_free_objects(mc);
+	r = kvm_mmu_topup_memory_cache(mc, PT64_ROOT_MAX_LEVEL);
+
+	/*
+	 * Note, topup may have allocated objects even if it failed to allocate
+	 * the minimum number of objects required to make forward progress _at
+	 * this time_.  Initialize newly allocated objects even on failure, as
+	 * userspace can free memory and rerun the vCPU in response to -ENOMEM.
+	 */
+	end = kvm_mmu_memory_cache_nr_free_objects(mc);
+	for (i = start; i < end; i++)
+		kvm_init_shadow_page(mc->objects[i]);
+	return r;
+}
+#else
+static int mmu_topup_shadow_page_cache(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return kvm_mmu_topup_memory_cache(vcpu->arch.mmu_shadow_page_cache,
+					  PT64_ROOT_MAX_LEVEL);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
+
 static int mmu_topup_memory_caches(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool maybe_indirect)
 {
 	int r;
@@ -651,8 +700,7 @@ static int mmu_topup_memory_caches(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool maybe_indirect)
 				       1 + PT64_ROOT_MAX_LEVEL + PTE_PREFETCH_NUM);
 	if (r)
 		return r;
-	r = kvm_mmu_topup_memory_cache(&vcpu->arch.mmu_shadow_page_cache,
-				       PT64_ROOT_MAX_LEVEL);
+	r = mmu_topup_shadow_page_cache(vcpu);
 	if (r)
 		return r;
 	if (maybe_indirect) {
@@ -5815,7 +5863,24 @@ int kvm_mmu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	vcpu->arch.mmu_page_header_cache.kmem_cache = mmu_page_header_cache;
 	vcpu->arch.mmu_page_header_cache.gfp_zero = __GFP_ZERO;
 
-	vcpu->arch.mmu_shadow_page_cache.gfp_zero = __GFP_ZERO;
+	/*
+	 * When X86_64, initial SEPT entries are initialized with
+	 * SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE.  Otherwise zeroed.  See
+	 * mmu_topup_shadow_page_cache().
+	 *
+	 * Shared EPTEs need to be initialized with SUPPRESS_VE=1, otherwise
+	 * not-present EPT violations would be reflected into the guest by
+	 * hardware as #VE exceptions.  This is handled by initializing page
+	 * allocations via kvm_init_shadow_page() during cache topup.
+	 * In that case, telling the page allocation to zero-initialize the page
+	 * would be wasted effort.
+	 *
+	 * The initialization is harmless for S-EPT entries because KVM's copy
+	 * of the S-EPT isn't consumed by hardware, and because under the hood
+	 * S-EPT entries should never #VE.
+	 */
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(X86_64))
+		vcpu->arch.mmu_shadow_page_cache.gfp_zero = __GFP_ZERO;
 
 	vcpu->arch.mmu = &vcpu->arch.root_mmu;
 	vcpu->arch.walk_mmu = &vcpu->arch.root_mmu;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
index f5958071220c..fe1e973dfb33 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
@@ -1036,7 +1036,8 @@ static int FNAME(sync_page)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
 		gpa_t pte_gpa;
 		gfn_t gfn;
 
-		if (!sp->spt[i])
+		/* spt[i] has initial value of shadow page table allocation */
+		if (sp->spt[i] != SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE)
 			continue;
 
 		pte_gpa = first_pte_gpa + i * sizeof(pt_element_t);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c
index 7314d27d57a4..24cba35570ae 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c
@@ -391,7 +391,9 @@ void kvm_mmu_set_ept_masks(bool has_ad_bits, bool has_exec_only)
 	shadow_dirty_mask	= has_ad_bits ? VMX_EPT_DIRTY_BIT : 0ull;
 	shadow_nx_mask		= 0ull;
 	shadow_x_mask		= VMX_EPT_EXECUTABLE_MASK;
-	shadow_present_mask	= has_exec_only ? 0ull : VMX_EPT_READABLE_MASK;
+	/* VMX_EPT_SUPPRESS_VE_BIT is needed for W or X violation. */
+	shadow_present_mask	=
+		(has_exec_only ? 0ull : VMX_EPT_READABLE_MASK) | VMX_EPT_SUPPRESS_VE_BIT;
 	/*
 	 * EPT overrides the host MTRRs, and so KVM must program the desired
 	 * memtype directly into the SPTEs.  Note, this mask is just the mask
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h
index cabe3fbb4f39..30f456e59e58 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h
@@ -136,6 +136,19 @@ static_assert(MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_BITS == 8 && MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_BITS == 11);
 
 #define MMIO_SPTE_GEN_MASK		GENMASK_ULL(MMIO_SPTE_GEN_LOW_BITS + MMIO_SPTE_GEN_HIGH_BITS - 1, 0)
 
+/*
+ * non-present SPTE value for both VMX and SVM for TDP MMU.
+ * For SVM NPT, for non-present spte (bit 0 = 0), other bits are ignored.
+ * For VMX EPT, bit 63 is ignored if #VE is disabled.
+ *              bit 63 is #VE suppress if #VE is enabled.
+ */
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+#define SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE	BIT_ULL(63)
+static_assert(!(SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE & SPTE_MMU_PRESENT_MASK));
+#else
+#define SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE	0ULL
+#endif
+
 extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_host_writable_mask;
 extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_mmu_writable_mask;
 extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_nx_mask;
@@ -175,16 +188,27 @@ extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask;
  * non-present intermediate value. Other threads which encounter this value
  * should not modify the SPTE.
  *
+ * For X86_64 case, SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE, "suppress #VE" bit, is set because
+ * "EPT violation #VE" in the secondary VM execution control may be enabled.
+ * Because TDX module sets "EPT violation #VE" for TD, "suppress #VE" bit for
+ * the conventional EPT needs to be set.
+ *
  * Use a semi-arbitrary value that doesn't set RWX bits, i.e. is not-present on
  * bot AMD and Intel CPUs, and doesn't set PFN bits, i.e. doesn't create a L1TF
  * vulnerability.  Use only low bits to avoid 64-bit immediates.
  *
  * Only used by the TDP MMU.
  */
-#define REMOVED_SPTE	0x5a0ULL
+#define __REMOVED_SPTE	0x5a0ULL
 
 /* Removed SPTEs must not be misconstrued as shadow present PTEs. */
-static_assert(!(REMOVED_SPTE & SPTE_MMU_PRESENT_MASK));
+static_assert(!(__REMOVED_SPTE & SPTE_MMU_PRESENT_MASK));
+
+/*
+ * See above comment around __REMOVED_SPTE.  REMOVED_SPTE is the actual
+ * intermediate value set to the removed SPET.  it sets the "suppress #VE" bit.
+ */
+#define REMOVED_SPTE	(SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE | __REMOVED_SPTE)
 
 static inline bool is_removed_spte(u64 spte)
 {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
index bf2ccf9debca..af510dd31ebc 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c
@@ -682,8 +682,16 @@ static inline int tdp_mmu_zap_spte_atomic(struct kvm *kvm,
 	 * overwrite the special removed SPTE value. No bookkeeping is needed
 	 * here since the SPTE is going from non-present to non-present.  Use
 	 * the raw write helper to avoid an unnecessary check on volatile bits.
+	 *
+	 * Set non-present value to SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE, rather than 0.
+	 * It is because when TDX is enabled, TDX module always
+	 * enables "EPT-violation #VE", so KVM needs to set
+	 * "suppress #VE" bit in EPT table entries, in order to get
+	 * real EPT violation, rather than TDVMCALL.  KVM sets
+	 * SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE (which sets "suppress #VE" bit) so it
+	 * can be set when EPT table entries are zapped.
 	 */
-	__kvm_tdp_mmu_write_spte(iter->sptep, 0);
+	__kvm_tdp_mmu_write_spte(iter->sptep, SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE);
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -860,8 +868,8 @@ static void __tdp_mmu_zap_root(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *root,
 			continue;
 
 		if (!shared)
-			tdp_mmu_set_spte(kvm, &iter, 0);
-		else if (tdp_mmu_set_spte_atomic(kvm, &iter, 0))
+			tdp_mmu_set_spte(kvm, &iter, SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE);
+		else if (tdp_mmu_set_spte_atomic(kvm, &iter, SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE))
 			goto retry;
 	}
 }
@@ -917,8 +925,9 @@ bool kvm_tdp_mmu_zap_sp(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
 	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!is_shadow_present_pte(old_spte)))
 		return false;
 
-	__tdp_mmu_set_spte(kvm, kvm_mmu_page_as_id(sp), sp->ptep, old_spte, 0,
-			   sp->gfn, sp->role.level + 1, true, true);
+	__tdp_mmu_set_spte(kvm, kvm_mmu_page_as_id(sp), sp->ptep, old_spte,
+			   SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE, sp->gfn, sp->role.level + 1,
+			   true, true);
 
 	return true;
 }
@@ -952,7 +961,7 @@ static bool tdp_mmu_zap_leafs(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *root,
 		    !is_last_spte(iter.old_spte, iter.level))
 			continue;
 
-		tdp_mmu_set_spte(kvm, &iter, 0);
+		tdp_mmu_set_spte(kvm, &iter, SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE);
 		flush = true;
 	}
 
@@ -1316,7 +1325,7 @@ static bool set_spte_gfn(struct kvm *kvm, struct tdp_iter *iter,
 	 * invariant that the PFN of a present * leaf SPTE can never change.
 	 * See __handle_changed_spte().
 	 */
-	tdp_mmu_set_spte(kvm, iter, 0);
+	tdp_mmu_set_spte(kvm, iter, SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE);
 
 	if (!pte_write(range->pte)) {
 		new_spte = kvm_mmu_changed_pte_notifier_make_spte(iter->old_spte,
-- 
2.25.1

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