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Date: Mon, 8 Aug 2022 15:16:16 -0400
From: Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
Cc: Frederick Lawler <fred@...udflare.com>, kpsingh@...nel.org,
revest@...omium.org, jackmanb@...omium.org, ast@...nel.org,
daniel@...earbox.net, andrii@...nel.org, kafai@...com,
songliubraving@...com, yhs@...com, john.fastabend@...il.com,
jmorris@...ei.org, serge@...lyn.com,
stephen.smalley.work@...il.com, eparis@...isplace.org,
shuah@...nel.org, brauner@...nel.org, casey@...aufler-ca.com,
bpf@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
selinux@...r.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
kernel-team@...udflare.com, cgzones@...glemail.com,
karl@...badwolfsecurity.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 0/4] Introduce security_create_user_ns()
On Mon, Aug 8, 2022 at 2:56 PM Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@...ssion.com> wrote:
> Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com> writes:
> > On Mon, Aug 1, 2022 at 10:56 PM Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@...ssion.com> wrote:
> >> Frederick Lawler <fred@...udflare.com> writes:
> >>
> >> > While creating a LSM BPF MAC policy to block user namespace creation, we
> >> > used the LSM cred_prepare hook because that is the closest hook to prevent
> >> > a call to create_user_ns().
> >>
> >> Re-nack for all of the same reasons.
> >> AKA This can only break the users of the user namespace.
> >>
> >> Nacked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
> >>
> >> You aren't fixing what your problem you are papering over it by denying
> >> access to the user namespace.
> >>
> >> Nack Nack Nack.
> >>
> >> Stop.
> >>
> >> Go back to the drawing board.
> >>
> >> Do not pass go.
> >>
> >> Do not collect $200.
> >
> > If you want us to take your comments seriously Eric, you need to
> > provide the list with some constructive feedback that would allow
> > Frederick to move forward with a solution to the use case that has
> > been proposed. You response above may be many things, but it is
> > certainly not that.
>
> I did provide constructive feedback. My feedback to his problem
> was to address the real problem of bugs in the kernel.
We've heard from several people who have use cases which require
adding LSM-level access controls and observability to user namespace
creation. This is the problem we are trying to solve here; if you do
not like the approach proposed in this patchset please suggest another
implementation that allows LSMs visibility into user namespace
creation.
--
paul-moore.com
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