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Message-ID: <20220810093741.GE862421@chaop.bj.intel.com>
Date:   Wed, 10 Aug 2022 17:37:41 +0800
From:   Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@...ux.intel.com>
To:     David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>
Cc:     kvm@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-mm@...ck.org, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-api@...r.kernel.org, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
        qemu-devel@...gnu.org, linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
        Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
        Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
        Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@...cent.com>,
        Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>,
        Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        x86@...nel.org, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        Hugh Dickins <hughd@...gle.com>,
        Jeff Layton <jlayton@...nel.org>,
        "J . Bruce Fields" <bfields@...ldses.org>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>, Mike Rapoport <rppt@...nel.org>,
        Steven Price <steven.price@....com>,
        "Maciej S . Szmigiero" <mail@...iej.szmigiero.name>,
        Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>,
        Vishal Annapurve <vannapurve@...gle.com>,
        Yu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@...ux.intel.com>,
        "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
        luto@...nel.org, jun.nakajima@...el.com, dave.hansen@...el.com,
        ak@...ux.intel.com, aarcange@...hat.com, ddutile@...hat.com,
        dhildenb@...hat.com, Quentin Perret <qperret@...gle.com>,
        Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>, mhocko@...e.com,
        Muchun Song <songmuchun@...edance.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 05/14] mm/memfd: Introduce MFD_INACCESSIBLE flag

On Fri, Aug 05, 2022 at 03:28:50PM +0200, David Hildenbrand wrote:
> On 06.07.22 10:20, Chao Peng wrote:
> > Introduce a new memfd_create() flag indicating the content of the
> > created memfd is inaccessible from userspace through ordinary MMU
> > access (e.g., read/write/mmap). However, the file content can be
> > accessed via a different mechanism (e.g. KVM MMU) indirectly.
> > 
> > It provides semantics required for KVM guest private memory support
> > that a file descriptor with this flag set is going to be used as the
> > source of guest memory in confidential computing environments such
> > as Intel TDX/AMD SEV but may not be accessible from host userspace.
> > 
> > The flag can not coexist with MFD_ALLOW_SEALING, future sealing is
> > also impossible for a memfd created with this flag.
> 
> It's kind of weird to have it that way. Why should the user have to
> care? It's the notifier requirement to have that, no?
> 
> Why can't we handle that when register a notifier? If anything is
> already mapped, fail registering the notifier if the notifier has these
> demands. If registering succeeds, block it internally.
> 
> Or what am I missing? We might not need the memfile set flag semantics
> eventually and would not have to expose such a flag to user space.

This makes sense if doable. The major concern was: is there a reliable
way to detect this (already mapped) at the time of memslot registering.

Chao
> 
> -- 
> Thanks,
> 
> David / dhildenb
> 

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