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Message-ID: <20220817115638.2etj6ruuutjurgjv@wittgenstein>
Date: Wed, 17 Aug 2022 13:56:38 +0200
From: Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>
To: 天赐张 <zhangtianci.1997@...edance.com>
Cc: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@...il.com>,
Miklos Szeredi <miklos@...redi.hu>,
overlayfs <linux-unionfs@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-kernel <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Jiachen Zhang <zhangjiachen.jaycee@...edance.com>
Subject: Re: [External] Re: [PATCH] ovl: Do not override fsuid and fsgid in
ovl_link()
On Wed, Aug 17, 2022 at 07:36:44PM +0800, 天赐张 wrote:
> On Wed, Aug 17, 2022 at 6:29 PM Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org> wrote:
> >
> > On Wed, Aug 17, 2022 at 12:27:27PM +0200, Christian Brauner wrote:
> > > On Wed, Aug 17, 2022 at 12:55:22PM +0300, Amir Goldstein wrote:
> > > > On Wed, Aug 17, 2022 at 12:53 PM Amir Goldstein <amir73il@...il.com> wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > On Wed, Aug 17, 2022 at 12:11 PM 天赐张 <zhangtianci.1997@...edance.com> wrote:
> > > > > >
> > > > > > On Wed, Aug 17, 2022 at 3:36 PM Amir Goldstein <amir73il@...il.com> wrote:
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > On Wed, Aug 17, 2022 at 6:49 AM Zhang Tianci
> > > > > > > <zhangtianci.1997@...edance.com> wrote:
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > ovl_link() did not create a new inode after commit
> > > > > > > > 51f7e52dc943 ("ovl: share inode for hard link"), so
> > > > > > > > in ovl_create_or_link() we should not override cred's
> > > > > > > > fsuid and fsgid when called by ovl_link().
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Zhang Tianci <zhangtianci.1997@...edance.com>
> > > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Jiachen Zhang <zhangjiachen.jaycee@...edance.com>
> > > > > > > > ---
> > > > > > > > fs/overlayfs/dir.c | 4 ++--
> > > > > > > > 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/dir.c b/fs/overlayfs/dir.c
> > > > > > > > index 6b03457f72bb..568d338032db 100644
> > > > > > > > --- a/fs/overlayfs/dir.c
> > > > > > > > +++ b/fs/overlayfs/dir.c
> > > > > > > > @@ -595,9 +595,9 @@ static int ovl_create_or_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
> > > > > > > > err = -ENOMEM;
> > > > > > > > override_cred = prepare_creds();
> > > > > > > > if (override_cred) {
> > > > > > > > - override_cred->fsuid = inode->i_uid;
> > > > > > > > - override_cred->fsgid = inode->i_gid;
> > > > > > > > if (!attr->hardlink) {
> > > > > > > > + override_cred->fsuid = inode->i_uid;
> > > > > > > > + override_cred->fsgid = inode->i_gid;
> > > > > > > > err = security_dentry_create_files_as(dentry,
> > > > > > > > attr->mode, &dentry->d_name, old_cred,
> > > > > > > > override_cred);
> > > > > > > > --
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > This change looks incorrect.
> > > > > > > Unless I am missing something, fsuid/fsgid still need to
> > > > > > > be overridden for calling link() on underlying fs.
> > > > > > > What made you do this change?
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Thanks,
> > > > > > > Amir.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Hi Amir,
> > > > > >
> > > > > > I ran into an error when I tested overlay on fuse:
> > > > > > $ mkdir /lower /fuse /merge
> > > > > > $ mount -t fuse /fuse
> > > > > > $ mkdir /fuse/upper /fuse/work
> > > > > > $ mount -t overlay /merge -o lowerdir=/lower,upperdir=/fuse/upper,workdir=work
> > > > > > $ touch /merge/file
> > > > > > $ chown bin.bin /merge/file // the file's caller becomes "bin"
> > > > > > $ ln /merge/file /merge/lnkfile
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Then I got an error(EACCES) because fuse daemon checks the link()'s
> > > > > > caller is "bin", it denied this request.
> > > > > > I browsed the changing history of ovl_link(). There are two key commits:
> > > > > > The first is commit bb0d2b8ad296 ("ovl: fix sgid on directory") which
> > > > > > overrides the cred's fsuid/fsgid using the new inode. The new inode's
> > > > > > owner is initialized by inode_init_owner(), and inode->fsuid is
> > > > > > assigned to the current user. So the override fsuid becomes the
> > > > > > current user. We know link() is actually modifying the directory, so
> > > > > > the caller must have the MAY_WRITE permission on the directory. The
> > > > > > current caller may should have this permission. I think this is
> > > > > > acceptable to use the caller's fsuid(But I still feel a little
> > > > > > conflicted with the overlay's design).
> > > > > > The second is commit 51f7e52dc943 ("ovl: share inode for hard link")
> > > > > > which removed the inode creation in ovl_link(). This commit move
> > > > > > inode_init_owner() into ovl_create_object(), so the ovl_link() just
> > > > > > give the old inode to ovl_create_or_link(). Then the override fsuid
> > > > > > becomes the old inode's fsuid, neither the caller nor the overlay's
> > > > > > creator! So I think this is incorrect.
> > > > > > I think the link() should be like unlink(), overlay fs should just use
> > > > > > the creator cred to do underlying fs's operations.
> > > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > I see. The reproducer and explanation belong in the commit message.
> > > > >
> > > > > Your argument makes sense to me, but CC Christian to make
> > > > > sure I am not missing anything related to ACLs and what not.
> > > >
> > > > Once again with correct email address...
> > >
> > > So we have:
> > >
> > > ovl_create_object()
> > > -> ovl_override_creds(ovl_sb)
> > > -> ovl_new_inode()
> > > -> inode_init_owner()
> > > {
> > > inode->i_uid = current_fsuid();
> > > inode->i_gid = current_fsgid();
>
> In inode_init_owner(), the inode->i_gid may inherit from parent dir.
> And this is the main purpose of the commit bb0d2b8ad296 ("ovl: fix
> sgid on directory").
>
> > > }
> > > -> ovl_create_or_link(inode, ...)
> > > -> prepare_creds() // Copy of caller's creds
> >
> > s/caller's/creator's/
> >
> > > {
> > > override_creds->fsuid = inode->i_uid;
> > > override_creds->fsgid = inode->i_gid;
> > > }
> > > -> revert_creds()
> > >
> > > which afaict means that the mounter's credentials are used apart from
> > > the fs{g,u}id which is taken from inode->i_{g,u}id which should
> > > correspond to current_fs{g,u}id().
> > >
> > > The commit that is pointed out in the patch
> > > 51f7e52dc943 ("ovl: share inode for hard link")
> > > seems to have broken that assumption.
> > >
> > > Given that the intention was to use the creator's creds _with the
> > > caller's fs{g,u}id_ wouldn't it make more sense to simply ensure that
> > > the caller's fs{g,u}id are always used instead of using the full
> > > creator's creds just for the link operation? So something like this
> > > (untested):
> > >
> > > diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/dir.c b/fs/overlayfs/dir.c
> > > index 6b03457f72bb..4a3ee16a6d70 100644
> > > --- a/fs/overlayfs/dir.c
> > > +++ b/fs/overlayfs/dir.c
> > > @@ -575,6 +575,9 @@ static int ovl_create_or_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
> > > const struct cred *old_cred;
> > > struct cred *override_cred;
> > > struct dentry *parent = dentry->d_parent;
> > > + /* Retrieve caller's fs{g,u}id before we override creds below. */
> > > + kuid_t caller_fsuid = current_fsuid();
> > > + kgid_t caller_fsgid = current_fsgid();
> > >
> > > err = ovl_copy_up(parent);
> > > if (err)
> > > @@ -595,8 +598,8 @@ static int ovl_create_or_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
> > > err = -ENOMEM;
> > > override_cred = prepare_creds();
> > > if (override_cred) {
> > > - override_cred->fsuid = inode->i_uid;
> > > - override_cred->fsgid = inode->i_gid;
> > > + override_cred->fsuid = caller_fsuid;
> > > + override_cred->fsgid = caller_fsgid;
>
> So the override_cred->fsgid should be inode->i_gid if the inode is a new inode.
>
> > > if (!attr->hardlink) {
> > > err = security_dentry_create_files_as(dentry,
> > > attr->mode, &dentry->d_name, old_cred,
>
> So your meaning should be like this:
>
> diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/dir.c b/fs/overlayfs/dir.c
> index 6b03457f72bb..9aead6ddc071 100644
> --- a/fs/overlayfs/dir.c
> +++ b/fs/overlayfs/dir.c
> @@ -575,6 +575,8 @@ static int ovl_create_or_link(struct dentry
> *dentry, struct inode *inode,
> const struct cred *old_cred;
> struct cred *override_cred;
> struct dentry *parent = dentry->d_parent;
> + kuid_t caller_fsuid = current_fsuid();
> + kgid_t caller_fsgid = current_fsgid();
>
> err = ovl_copy_up(parent);
> if (err)
> @@ -595,9 +597,9 @@ static int ovl_create_or_link(struct dentry
> *dentry, struct inode *inode,
> err = -ENOMEM;
> override_cred = prepare_creds();
> if (override_cred) {
> - override_cred->fsuid = inode->i_uid;
> - override_cred->fsgid = inode->i_gid;
> if (!attr->hardlink) {
> + override_cred->fsuid = inode->i_uid;
> + override_cred->fsgid = inode->i_gid;
> err = security_dentry_create_files_as(dentry,
> attr->mode, &dentry->d_name, old_cred,
> override_cred);
> @@ -605,6 +607,9 @@ static int ovl_create_or_link(struct dentry
> *dentry, struct inode *inode,
> put_cred(override_cred);
> goto out_revert_creds;
> }
> + } else {
> + override_cred->fsuid = caller_fsuid;
> + override_cred->fsgid = caller_fsgid;
> }
> put_cred(override_creds(override_cred));
> put_cred(override_cred);
Hah, wait. I had a pretty obvious braino when I did that. I forgot to
account for setgid handling in inode_init_owner(). Let me take another
close look...
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