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Message-ID: <Yvznmu5oHv0ZDN2w@kernel.org>
Date: Wed, 17 Aug 2022 10:05:30 -0300
From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@...nel.org>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@...el.com>,
Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@...cle.com>,
Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@...rix.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>,
Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@...ux.intel.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Ian Rogers <irogers@...gle.com>, Jiri Olsa <jolsa@...nel.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>,
Namhyung Kim <namhyung@...nel.org>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@....com>,
Wyes Karny <wyes.karny@....com>
Subject: [PATCH FYI 1/1] tools headers cpufeatures: Sync with the kernel
sources
tldr; Just FYI, I'm carrying this on the perf tools tree.
- Arnaldo
Full explanation:
There used to be no copies, with tools/ code using kernel headers
directly. From time to time tools/perf/ broke due to legitimate kernel
hacking. At some point Linus complained about such direct usage. Then we
adopted the current model.
The way these headers are used in perf are not restricted to just
including them to compile something.
There are sometimes used in scripts that convert defines into string
tables, etc, so some change may break one of these scripts, or new MSRs
may use some different #define pattern, etc.
E.g.:
$ ls -1 tools/perf/trace/beauty/*.sh | head -5
tools/perf/trace/beauty/arch_errno_names.sh
tools/perf/trace/beauty/drm_ioctl.sh
tools/perf/trace/beauty/fadvise.sh
tools/perf/trace/beauty/fsconfig.sh
tools/perf/trace/beauty/fsmount.sh
$
$ tools/perf/trace/beauty/fadvise.sh
static const char *fadvise_advices[] = {
[0] = "NORMAL",
[1] = "RANDOM",
[2] = "SEQUENTIAL",
[3] = "WILLNEED",
[4] = "DONTNEED",
[5] = "NOREUSE",
};
$
The tools/perf/check-headers.sh script, part of the tools/ build
process, points out changes in the original files.
So its important not to touch the copies in tools/ when doing changes in
the original kernel headers, that will be done later, when
check-headers.sh inform about the change to the perf tools hackers.
---
To pick the changes from:
2b1299322016731d ("x86/speculation: Add RSB VM Exit protections")
28a99e95f55c6185 ("x86/amd: Use IBPB for firmware calls")
4ad3278df6fe2b08 ("x86/speculation: Disable RRSBA behavior")
26aae8ccbc197223 ("x86/cpu/amd: Enumerate BTC_NO")
9756bba28470722d ("x86/speculation: Fill RSB on vmexit for IBRS")
3ebc170068885b6f ("x86/bugs: Add retbleed=ibpb")
2dbb887e875b1de3 ("x86/entry: Add kernel IBRS implementation")
6b80b59b35557065 ("x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability")
a149180fbcf336e9 ("x86: Add magic AMD return-thunk")
15e67227c49a5783 ("x86: Undo return-thunk damage")
a883d624aed463c8 ("x86/cpufeatures: Move RETPOLINE flags to word 11")
aae99a7c9ab371b2 ("x86/cpufeatures: Introduce x2AVIC CPUID bit")
6f33a9daff9f0790 ("x86: Fix comment for X86_FEATURE_ZEN")
51802186158c74a0 ("x86/speculation/mmio: Enumerate Processor MMIO Stale Data bug")
This only causes these perf files to be rebuilt:
CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memcpy-x86-64-asm.o
CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memset-x86-64-asm.o
And addresses this perf build warning:
Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h'
diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@...el.com>
Cc: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@...cle.com>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@...rix.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>
Cc: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@...gle.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@...nel.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@...nel.org>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
Cc: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
Cc: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@....com>
Cc: Wyes Karny <wyes.karny@....com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@...hat.com>
---
tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 6 ++++--
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index 8323ac5b7eee5172..235dc85c91c3e372 100644
--- a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -219,7 +219,7 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_IBRS ( 7*32+25) /* Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */
#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB ( 7*32+26) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
#define X86_FEATURE_STIBP ( 7*32+27) /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
-#define X86_FEATURE_ZEN ( 7*32+28) /* "" CPU is AMD family 0x17 or above (Zen) */
+#define X86_FEATURE_ZEN (7*32+28) /* "" CPU based on Zen microarchitecture */
#define X86_FEATURE_L1TF_PTEINV ( 7*32+29) /* "" L1TF workaround PTE inversion */
#define X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED ( 7*32+30) /* Enhanced IBRS */
#define X86_FEATURE_MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL ( 7*32+31) /* "" MSR IA32_FEAT_CTL configured */
@@ -303,7 +303,7 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK (11*32+14) /* "" Use REturn THUNK */
#define X86_FEATURE_UNRET (11*32+15) /* "" AMD BTB untrain return */
#define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB_FW (11*32+16) /* "" Use IBPB during runtime firmware calls */
-#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE (11*32+17) /* "" Fill RSB on VM-Exit when EIBRS is enabled */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE (11*32+17) /* "" Fill RSB on VM exit when EIBRS is enabled */
/* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:1 (EAX), word 12 */
#define X86_FEATURE_AVX_VNNI (12*32+ 4) /* AVX VNNI instructions */
@@ -354,6 +354,7 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_AVIC (15*32+13) /* Virtual Interrupt Controller */
#define X86_FEATURE_V_VMSAVE_VMLOAD (15*32+15) /* Virtual VMSAVE VMLOAD */
#define X86_FEATURE_VGIF (15*32+16) /* Virtual GIF */
+#define X86_FEATURE_X2AVIC (15*32+18) /* Virtual x2apic */
#define X86_FEATURE_V_SPEC_CTRL (15*32+20) /* Virtual SPEC_CTRL */
#define X86_FEATURE_SVME_ADDR_CHK (15*32+28) /* "" SVME addr check */
@@ -457,5 +458,6 @@
#define X86_BUG_SRBDS X86_BUG(24) /* CPU may leak RNG bits if not mitigated */
#define X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA X86_BUG(25) /* CPU is affected by Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities */
#define X86_BUG_RETBLEED X86_BUG(26) /* CPU is affected by RETBleed */
+#define X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB X86_BUG(27) /* EIBRS is vulnerable to Post Barrier RSB Predictions */
#endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */
--
2.37.1
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