| lists.openwall.net | lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC | |
|
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
| ||
|
Date: Thu, 18 Aug 2022 18:11:07 +0530
From: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@...aro.org>
To: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@...aro.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, op-tee@...ts.trustedfirmware.org,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...uxfoundation.org>,
stable@...r.kernel.org, Nimish Mishra <neelam.nimish@...il.com>,
Anirban Chakraborty <ch.anirban00727@...il.com>,
Debdeep Mukhopadhyay <debdeep.mukhopadhyay@...il.com>,
Jerome Forissier <jerome.forissier@...aro.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] tee: add overflow check in register_shm_helper()
Hi Jens,
On Thu, 18 Aug 2022 at 16:39, Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@...aro.org> wrote:
>
> With special lengths supplied by user space, register_shm_helper() has
> an integer overflow when calculating the number of pages covered by a
> supplied user space memory region. This causes
> internal_get_user_pages_fast() a helper function of
> pin_user_pages_fast() to do a NULL pointer dereference.
>
> [ 14.141620] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000010
> [ 14.142556] Mem abort info:
> [ 14.142829] ESR = 0x0000000096000044
> [ 14.143237] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
> [ 14.143742] SET = 0, FnV = 0
> [ 14.144052] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
> [ 14.144348] FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault
> [ 14.144767] Data abort info:
> [ 14.145053] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000044
> [ 14.145394] CM = 0, WnR = 1
> [ 14.145766] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=000000004278e000
> [ 14.146279] [0000000000000010] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000
> [ 14.147435] Internal error: Oops: 96000044 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
> [ 14.148026] Modules linked in:
> [ 14.148595] CPU: 1 PID: 173 Comm: optee_example_a Not tainted 5.19.0 #11
> [ 14.149204] Hardware name: QEMU QEMU Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
> [ 14.149832] pstate: 604000c5 (nZCv daIF +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
> [ 14.150481] pc : internal_get_user_pages_fast+0x474/0xa80
> [ 14.151640] lr : internal_get_user_pages_fast+0x404/0xa80
> [ 14.152408] sp : ffff80000a88bb30
> [ 14.152711] x29: ffff80000a88bb30 x28: 0000fffff836d000 x27: 0000fffff836e000
> [ 14.153580] x26: fffffc0000000000 x25: fffffc0000f4a1c0 x24: ffff00000289fb70
> [ 14.154634] x23: ffff000002702e08 x22: 0000000000040001 x21: ffff8000097eec60
> [ 14.155378] x20: 0000000000f4a1c0 x19: 00e800007d287f43 x18: 0000000000000000
> [ 14.156215] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000fffff836cfb0
> [ 14.157068] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
> [ 14.157747] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : 0000000000000000
> [ 14.158576] x8 : ffff00000276ec80 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 000000000000003f
> [ 14.159243] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : ffff000041ec4eac x3 : ffff000002774cb8
> [ 14.159977] x2 : 0000000000000004 x1 : 0000000000000010 x0 : 0000000000000000
> [ 14.160883] Call trace:
> [ 14.161166] internal_get_user_pages_fast+0x474/0xa80
> [ 14.161763] pin_user_pages_fast+0x24/0x4c
> [ 14.162227] register_shm_helper+0x194/0x330
> [ 14.162734] tee_shm_register_user_buf+0x78/0x120
> [ 14.163290] tee_ioctl+0xd0/0x11a0
> [ 14.163739] __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xa8/0xec
> [ 14.164227] invoke_syscall+0x48/0x114
> [ 14.164653] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x44/0xec
> [ 14.165130] do_el0_svc+0x2c/0xc0
> [ 14.165498] el0_svc+0x2c/0x84
> [ 14.165847] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x1ac/0x1b0
> [ 14.166258] el0t_64_sync+0x18c/0x190
> [ 14.166878] Code: 91002318 11000401 b900f7e1 f9403be1 (f820d839)
> [ 14.167666] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
>
> Fix this by adding an overflow check when calculating the end of the
> memory range. Also add an explicit call to access_ok() in
> tee_shm_register_user_buf() to catch an invalid user space address
> early.
>
> Fixes: 033ddf12bcf5 ("tee: add register user memory")
> Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
> Reported-by: Nimish Mishra <neelam.nimish@...il.com>
> Reported-by: Anirban Chakraborty <ch.anirban00727@...il.com>
> Reported-by: Debdeep Mukhopadhyay <debdeep.mukhopadhyay@...il.com>
> Suggested-by: Jerome Forissier <jerome.forissier@...aro.org>
> Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@...aro.org>
> ---
> drivers/tee/tee_shm.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++----
> 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
I can't see the v1 and neither a changelog for v2, so my comments
below may be duplicate.
> diff --git a/drivers/tee/tee_shm.c b/drivers/tee/tee_shm.c
> index f2b1bcefcadd..f71651021c8d 100644
> --- a/drivers/tee/tee_shm.c
> +++ b/drivers/tee/tee_shm.c
> @@ -231,15 +231,30 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tee_shm_alloc_priv_buf);
>
> static struct tee_shm *
> register_shm_helper(struct tee_context *ctx, unsigned long addr,
> - size_t length, u32 flags, int id)
> + unsigned long length, u32 flags, int id)
> {
> struct tee_device *teedev = ctx->teedev;
> + unsigned long end_addr;
> struct tee_shm *shm;
> unsigned long start;
> size_t num_pages;
> void *ret;
> int rc;
>
> + /* Check for overflows, this may be input from user space */
IMO, this bound checking should be part of the parent function (like
tee_shm_register_user_buf() in this case).
> + addr = untagged_addr(addr);
> + start = rounddown(addr, PAGE_SIZE);
> + if (check_add_overflow(addr, length, &end_addr))
> + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
Isn't this check redundant after access_ok()? AFAICS, access_ok()
should limit the upper bound to TASK_SIZE_MAX which should detect any
overflows.
> + end_addr = roundup(end_addr, PAGE_SIZE);
> + if (end_addr < start)
> + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
Ditto?
-Sumit
> + num_pages = (end_addr - start) / PAGE_SIZE;
> +
> + /* Error out early if no pages are to be registered */
> + if (!num_pages)
> + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
> +
> if (!tee_device_get(teedev))
> return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
>
> @@ -261,11 +276,8 @@ register_shm_helper(struct tee_context *ctx, unsigned long addr,
> shm->flags = flags;
> shm->ctx = ctx;
> shm->id = id;
> - addr = untagged_addr(addr);
> - start = rounddown(addr, PAGE_SIZE);
> shm->offset = addr - start;
> shm->size = length;
> - num_pages = (roundup(addr + length, PAGE_SIZE) - start) / PAGE_SIZE;
> shm->pages = kcalloc(num_pages, sizeof(*shm->pages), GFP_KERNEL);
> if (!shm->pages) {
> ret = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
> @@ -326,6 +338,9 @@ struct tee_shm *tee_shm_register_user_buf(struct tee_context *ctx,
> void *ret;
> int id;
>
> + if (!access_ok((void __user *)addr, length))
> + return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
> +
> mutex_lock(&teedev->mutex);
> id = idr_alloc(&teedev->idr, NULL, 1, 0, GFP_KERNEL);
> mutex_unlock(&teedev->mutex);
> --
> 2.31.1
>
Powered by blists - more mailing lists