Message-Id: <166108894555172@kroah.com>
Date:   Sun, 21 Aug 2022 15:35:45 +0200
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, akpm@...ux-foundation.org,
        torvalds@...ux-foundation.org, stable@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     lwn@....net, jslaby@...e.cz,
        Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: Linux 5.19.3

diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index e2edc38ce52c..8595916561f3 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
 VERSION = 5
 PATCHLEVEL = 19
-SUBLEVEL = 2
+SUBLEVEL = 3
 EXTRAVERSION =
 NAME = Superb Owl
 
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c
index 9ec34690e255..5ed6a585f21f 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c
@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@
 #include <linux/kexec.h>
 #include <linux/pe.h>
 #include <linux/string.h>
-#include <linux/verification.h>
 #include <asm/byteorder.h>
 #include <asm/cpufeature.h>
 #include <asm/image.h>
@@ -130,18 +129,10 @@ static void *image_load(struct kimage *image,
 	return NULL;
 }
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_IMAGE_VERIFY_SIG
-static int image_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
-{
-	return verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len, NULL,
-				       VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE);
-}
-#endif
-
 const struct kexec_file_ops kexec_image_ops = {
 	.probe = image_probe,
 	.load = image_load,
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_IMAGE_VERIFY_SIG
-	.verify_sig = image_verify_sig,
+	.verify_sig = kexec_kernel_verify_pe_sig,
 #endif
 };
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
index 170d0fd68b1f..f299b48f9c9f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
@@ -17,7 +17,6 @@
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
 #include <linux/efi.h>
-#include <linux/verification.h>
 
 #include <asm/bootparam.h>
 #include <asm/setup.h>
@@ -528,28 +527,11 @@ static int bzImage64_cleanup(void *loader_data)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG
-static int bzImage64_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
-{
-	int ret;
-
-	ret = verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len,
-				      VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING,
-				      VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE);
-	if (ret == -ENOKEY && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING)) {
-		ret = verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len,
-					      VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
-					      VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE);
-	}
-	return ret;
-}
-#endif
-
 const struct kexec_file_ops kexec_bzImage64_ops = {
 	.probe = bzImage64_probe,
 	.load = bzImage64_load,
 	.cleanup = bzImage64_cleanup,
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG
-	.verify_sig = bzImage64_verify_sig,
+	.verify_sig = kexec_kernel_verify_pe_sig,
 #endif
 };
diff --git a/drivers/tee/tee_shm.c b/drivers/tee/tee_shm.c
index f2b1bcefcadd..1175f3a46859 100644
--- a/drivers/tee/tee_shm.c
+++ b/drivers/tee/tee_shm.c
@@ -326,6 +326,9 @@ struct tee_shm *tee_shm_register_user_buf(struct tee_context *ctx,
 	void *ret;
 	int id;
 
+	if (!access_ok((void __user *)addr, length))
+		return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
+
 	mutex_lock(&teedev->mutex);
 	id = idr_alloc(&teedev->idr, NULL, 1, 0, GFP_KERNEL);
 	mutex_unlock(&teedev->mutex);
diff --git a/fs/btrfs/raid56.c b/fs/btrfs/raid56.c
index 13e0bb0479e6..93975e3d5070 100644
--- a/fs/btrfs/raid56.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/raid56.c
@@ -403,6 +403,9 @@ static void merge_rbio(struct btrfs_raid_bio *dest,
 {
 	bio_list_merge(&dest->bio_list, &victim->bio_list);
 	dest->bio_list_bytes += victim->bio_list_bytes;
+	/* Also inherit the bitmaps from @victim. */
+	bitmap_or(dest->dbitmap, victim->dbitmap, dest->dbitmap,
+		  dest->stripe_nsectors);
 	dest->generic_bio_cnt += victim->generic_bio_cnt;
 	bio_list_init(&victim->bio_list);
 }
@@ -944,6 +947,12 @@ static void rbio_orig_end_io(struct btrfs_raid_bio *rbio, blk_status_t err)
 
 	if (rbio->generic_bio_cnt)
 		btrfs_bio_counter_sub(rbio->bioc->fs_info, rbio->generic_bio_cnt);
+	/*
+	 * Clear the data bitmap, as the rbio may be cached for later usage.
+	 * do this before before unlock_stripe() so there will be no new bio
+	 * for this bio.
+	 */
+	bitmap_clear(rbio->dbitmap, 0, rbio->stripe_nsectors);
 
 	/*
 	 * At this moment, rbio->bio_list is empty, however since rbio does not
@@ -1294,6 +1303,9 @@ static noinline void finish_rmw(struct btrfs_raid_bio *rbio)
 	else
 		BUG();
 
+	/* We should have at least one data sector. */
+	ASSERT(bitmap_weight(rbio->dbitmap, rbio->stripe_nsectors));
+
 	/* at this point we either have a full stripe,
 	 * or we've read the full stripe from the drive.
 	 * recalculate the parity and write the new results.
@@ -1368,6 +1380,10 @@ static noinline void finish_rmw(struct btrfs_raid_bio *rbio)
 		for (sectornr = 0; sectornr < rbio->stripe_nsectors; sectornr++) {
 			struct sector_ptr *sector;
 
+			/* This vertical stripe has no data, skip it. */
+			if (!test_bit(sectornr, rbio->dbitmap))
+				continue;
+
 			if (stripe < rbio->nr_data) {
 				sector = sector_in_rbio(rbio, stripe, sectornr, 1);
 				if (!sector)
@@ -1394,6 +1410,10 @@ static noinline void finish_rmw(struct btrfs_raid_bio *rbio)
 		for (sectornr = 0; sectornr < rbio->stripe_nsectors; sectornr++) {
 			struct sector_ptr *sector;
 
+			/* This vertical stripe has no data, skip it. */
+			if (!test_bit(sectornr, rbio->dbitmap))
+				continue;
+
 			if (stripe < rbio->nr_data) {
 				sector = sector_in_rbio(rbio, stripe, sectornr, 1);
 				if (!sector)
@@ -1845,6 +1865,33 @@ static void btrfs_raid_unplug(struct blk_plug_cb *cb, bool from_schedule)
 	run_plug(plug);
 }
 
+/* Add the original bio into rbio->bio_list, and update rbio::dbitmap. */
+static void rbio_add_bio(struct btrfs_raid_bio *rbio, struct bio *orig_bio)
+{
+	const struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info = rbio->bioc->fs_info;
+	const u64 orig_logical = orig_bio->bi_iter.bi_sector << SECTOR_SHIFT;
+	const u64 full_stripe_start = rbio->bioc->raid_map[0];
+	const u32 orig_len = orig_bio->bi_iter.bi_size;
+	const u32 sectorsize = fs_info->sectorsize;
+	u64 cur_logical;
+
+	ASSERT(orig_logical >= full_stripe_start &&
+	       orig_logical + orig_len <= full_stripe_start +
+	       rbio->nr_data * rbio->stripe_len);
+
+	bio_list_add(&rbio->bio_list, orig_bio);
+	rbio->bio_list_bytes += orig_bio->bi_iter.bi_size;
+
+	/* Update the dbitmap. */
+	for (cur_logical = orig_logical; cur_logical < orig_logical + orig_len;
+	     cur_logical += sectorsize) {
+		int bit = ((u32)(cur_logical - full_stripe_start) >>
+			   fs_info->sectorsize_bits) % rbio->stripe_nsectors;
+
+		set_bit(bit, rbio->dbitmap);
+	}
+}
+
 /*
  * our main entry point for writes from the rest of the FS.
  */
@@ -1861,9 +1908,8 @@ int raid56_parity_write(struct bio *bio, struct btrfs_io_context *bioc, u32 stri
 		btrfs_put_bioc(bioc);
 		return PTR_ERR(rbio);
 	}
-	bio_list_add(&rbio->bio_list, bio);
-	rbio->bio_list_bytes = bio->bi_iter.bi_size;
 	rbio->operation = BTRFS_RBIO_WRITE;
+	rbio_add_bio(rbio, bio);
 
 	btrfs_bio_counter_inc_noblocked(fs_info);
 	rbio->generic_bio_cnt = 1;
@@ -2172,9 +2218,12 @@ static int __raid56_parity_recover(struct btrfs_raid_bio *rbio)
 	atomic_set(&rbio->error, 0);
 
 	/*
-	 * read everything that hasn't failed.  Thanks to the
-	 * stripe cache, it is possible that some or all of these
-	 * pages are going to be uptodate.
+	 * Read everything that hasn't failed. However this time we will
+	 * not trust any cached sector.
+	 * As we may read out some stale data but higher layer is not reading
+	 * that stale part.
+	 *
+	 * So here we always re-read everything in recovery path.
 	 */
 	for (stripe = 0; stripe < rbio->real_stripes; stripe++) {
 		if (rbio->faila == stripe || rbio->failb == stripe) {
@@ -2185,13 +2234,7 @@ static int __raid56_parity_recover(struct btrfs_raid_bio *rbio)
 		for (sectornr = 0; sectornr < rbio->stripe_nsectors; sectornr++) {
 			struct sector_ptr *sector;
 
-			/*
-			 * the rmw code may have already read this
-			 * page in
-			 */
 			sector = rbio_stripe_sector(rbio, stripe, sectornr);
-			if (sector->uptodate)
-				continue;
 
 			ret = rbio_add_io_sector(rbio, &bio_list, sector,
 						 stripe, sectornr, rbio->stripe_len,
@@ -2268,8 +2311,7 @@ int raid56_parity_recover(struct bio *bio, struct btrfs_io_context *bioc,
 	}
 
 	rbio->operation = BTRFS_RBIO_READ_REBUILD;
-	bio_list_add(&rbio->bio_list, bio);
-	rbio->bio_list_bytes = bio->bi_iter.bi_size;
+	rbio_add_bio(rbio, bio);
 
 	rbio->faila = find_logical_bio_stripe(rbio, bio);
 	if (rbio->faila == -1) {
diff --git a/include/linux/kexec.h b/include/linux/kexec.h
index 6e7510f39368..bf24e7fce1fc 100644
--- a/include/linux/kexec.h
+++ b/include/linux/kexec.h
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
 #include <asm/io.h>
 
 #include <uapi/linux/kexec.h>
+#include <linux/verification.h>
 
 /* Location of a reserved region to hold the crash kernel.
  */
@@ -212,6 +213,12 @@ static inline void *arch_kexec_kernel_image_load(struct kimage *image)
 }
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
+#ifdef CONFIG_SIGNED_PE_FILE_VERIFICATION
+int kexec_kernel_verify_pe_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len);
+#endif
+#endif
+
 extern int kexec_add_buffer(struct kexec_buf *kbuf);
 int kexec_locate_mem_hole(struct kexec_buf *kbuf);
 
diff --git a/kernel/kexec_file.c b/kernel/kexec_file.c
index 6dc1294c90fc..a7b411c22f19 100644
--- a/kernel/kexec_file.c
+++ b/kernel/kexec_file.c
@@ -123,6 +123,23 @@ void kimage_file_post_load_cleanup(struct kimage *image)
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
+#ifdef CONFIG_SIGNED_PE_FILE_VERIFICATION
+int kexec_kernel_verify_pe_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len,
+				      VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING,
+				      VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE);
+	if (ret == -ENOKEY && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING)) {
+		ret = verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len,
+					      VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
+					      VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE);
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+#endif
+
 static int kexec_image_verify_sig(struct kimage *image, void *buf,
 				  unsigned long buf_len)
 {
diff --git a/mm/kfence/core.c b/mm/kfence/core.c
index 6aff49f6b79e..4b5e5a3d3a63 100644
--- a/mm/kfence/core.c
+++ b/mm/kfence/core.c
@@ -603,6 +603,14 @@ static unsigned long kfence_init_pool(void)
 		addr += 2 * PAGE_SIZE;
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * The pool is live and will never be deallocated from this point on.
+	 * Remove the pool object from the kmemleak object tree, as it would
+	 * otherwise overlap with allocations returned by kfence_alloc(), which
+	 * are registered with kmemleak through the slab post-alloc hook.
+	 */
+	kmemleak_free(__kfence_pool);
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -615,16 +623,8 @@ static bool __init kfence_init_pool_early(void)
 
 	addr = kfence_init_pool();
 
-	if (!addr) {
-		/*
-		 * The pool is live and will never be deallocated from this point on.
-		 * Ignore the pool object from the kmemleak phys object tree, as it would
-		 * otherwise overlap with allocations returned by kfence_alloc(), which
-		 * are registered with kmemleak through the slab post-alloc hook.
-		 */
-		kmemleak_ignore_phys(__pa(__kfence_pool));
+	if (!addr)
 		return true;
-	}
 
 	/*
 	 * Only release unprotected pages, and do not try to go back and change
diff --git a/net/sched/cls_route.c b/net/sched/cls_route.c
index 3f935cbbaff6..48712bc51bda 100644
--- a/net/sched/cls_route.c
+++ b/net/sched/cls_route.c
@@ -424,6 +424,11 @@ static int route4_set_parms(struct net *net, struct tcf_proto *tp,
 			return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
+	if (!nhandle) {
+		NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Replacing with handle of 0 is invalid");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
 	h1 = to_hash(nhandle);
 	b = rtnl_dereference(head->table[h1]);
 	if (!b) {
@@ -477,6 +482,11 @@ static int route4_change(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *in_skb,
 	int err;
 	bool new = true;
 
+	if (!handle) {
+		NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Creating with handle of 0 is invalid");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
 	if (opt == NULL)
 		return handle ? -EINVAL : 0;
 

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