[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-Id: <20220823080055.382672506@linuxfoundation.org>
Date: Tue, 23 Aug 2022 10:23:29 +0200
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
stable@...r.kernel.org, Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@...wei.com>,
Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 4.14 048/229] selinux: Add boundary check in put_entry()
From: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@...wei.com>
[ Upstream commit 15ec76fb29be31df2bccb30fc09875274cba2776 ]
Just like next_entry(), boundary check is necessary to prevent memory
out-of-bound access.
Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@...wei.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org>
---
security/selinux/ss/policydb.h | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
index 215f8f30ac5a..2a479785ebd4 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
@@ -360,6 +360,8 @@ static inline int put_entry(const void *buf, size_t bytes, int num, struct polic
{
size_t len = bytes * num;
+ if (len > fp->len)
+ return -EINVAL;
memcpy(fp->data, buf, len);
fp->data += len;
fp->len -= len;
--
2.35.1
Powered by blists - more mailing lists