linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v1 1/5] KVM: arm64: Enable ring-based dirty memory tracking

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Message-ID: <YwVEoM1pj2MPCELp@xz-m1.local>
Date:   Tue, 23 Aug 2022 17:20:32 -0400
From:   Peter Xu <peterx@...hat.com>
To:     Marc Zyngier <maz@...nel.org>
Cc:     Gavin Shan <gshan@...hat.com>, kvmarm@...ts.cs.columbia.edu,
        linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org, pbonzini@...hat.com,
        corbet@....net, james.morse@....com, alexandru.elisei@....com,
        suzuki.poulose@....com, oliver.upton@...ux.dev,
        catalin.marinas@....com, will@...nel.org, shuah@...nel.org,
        seanjc@...gle.com, drjones@...hat.com, dmatlack@...gle.com,
        bgardon@...gle.com, ricarkol@...gle.com, zhenyzha@...hat.com,
        shan.gavin@...il.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 1/5] KVM: arm64: Enable ring-based dirty memory
 tracking

On Tue, Aug 23, 2022 at 08:17:03PM +0100, Marc Zyngier wrote:
> I don't think we really need this check on the hot path. All we need
> is to make the request sticky until userspace gets their act together
> and consumes elements in the ring. Something like:
> 
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c
> index 986cee6fbc7f..e8ed5e1af159 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c
> @@ -747,6 +747,14 @@ static int check_vcpu_requests(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>  
>  		if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_SUSPEND, vcpu))
>  			return kvm_vcpu_suspend(vcpu);
> +
> +		if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_RING_SOFT_FULL, vcpu) &&
> +		    kvm_dirty_ring_soft_full(vcpu)) {
> +			kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_RING_SOFT_FULL, vcpu);
> +			vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_DIRTY_RING_FULL;
> +			trace_kvm_dirty_ring_exit(vcpu);
> +			return 0;
> +		}
>  	}
>  
>  	return 1;

Right, this seems working.  We can also use kvm_test_request() here.

> 
> 
> However, I'm a bit concerned by the reset side of things. It iterates
> over the vcpus and expects the view of each ring to be consistent,
> even if userspace is hacking at it from another CPU. For example, I
> can't see what guarantees that the kernel observes the writes from
> userspace in the order they are being performed (the documentation
> provides no requirements other than "it must collect the dirty GFNs in
> sequence", which doesn't mean much from an ordering perspective).
> 
> I can see that working on a strongly ordered architecture, but on
> something as relaxed as ARM, the CPUs may^Wwill aggressively reorder
> stuff that isn't explicitly ordered. I have the feeling that a CAS
> operation on both sides would be enough, but someone who actually
> understands how this works should have a look...

I definitely don't think I 100% understand all the ordering things since
they're complicated.. but my understanding is that the reset procedure
didn't need memory barrier (unlike pushing, where we have explicit wmb),
because we assumed the userapp is not hostile so logically it should only
modify the flags which is a 32bit field, assuming atomicity guaranteed.

IIRC we used to discuss similar questions on "what if the user is hostile
and wants to hack the process by messing up with the ring", and our
conclusion was as long as the process wouldn't mess up anything outside
itself it should be okay. E.g. It should not be able to either cause the
host to misfunction, or trigger kernel warnings in dmesg, etc..

Thanks,

-- 
Peter Xu