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Message-Id: <20220823152108.v2.4.I32591db064b6cdc91850d777f363c9d05c985b39@changeid>
Date: Tue, 23 Aug 2022 15:25:20 -0700
From: Evan Green <evgreen@...omium.org>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: gwendal@...omium.org, Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>,
Matthew Garrett <mgarrett@...ora.tech>, jarkko@...nel.org,
zohar@...ux.ibm.com, linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>, apronin@...omium.org,
dlunev@...gle.com, rjw@...ysocki.net, linux-pm@...r.kernel.org,
corbet@....net, jejb@...ux.ibm.com,
Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@...gle.com>,
Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...gle.com>,
Evan Green <evgreen@...omium.org>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v2 04/10] security: keys: trusted: Allow storage of PCR values in creation data
From: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@...gle.com>
When TPMs generate keys, they can also generate some information
describing the state of the PCRs at creation time. This data can then
later be certified by the TPM, allowing verification of the PCR values.
This allows us to determine the state of the system at the time a key
was generated. Add an additional argument to the trusted key creation
options, allowing the user to provide the set of PCRs that should have
their values incorporated into the creation data.
From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...gle.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...gle.com>
Signed-off-by: Evan Green <evgreen@...omium.org>
---
Matthew's original version of this patch is at:
https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/12096503/
(no changes since v1)
.../security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst | 4 +++
include/keys/trusted-type.h | 1 +
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 9 +++++++
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++--
4 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
index 0bfb4c33974890..dc9e11bb4824da 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
+++ b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
@@ -199,6 +199,10 @@ Usage::
policyhandle= handle to an authorization policy session that defines the
same policy and with the same hash algorithm as was used to
seal the key.
+ creationpcrs= hex integer representing the set of PCR values to be
+ included in the PCR creation data. The bit corresponding
+ to each PCR should be 1 to be included, 0 to be ignored.
+ TPM2 only.
"keyctl print" returns an ascii hex copy of the sealed key, which is in standard
TPM_STORED_DATA format. The key length for new keys are always in bytes.
diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h
index 209086fed240a5..8523d41507b2a4 100644
--- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h
+++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ struct trusted_key_options {
uint32_t policydigest_len;
unsigned char policydigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
uint32_t policyhandle;
+ uint32_t creation_pcrs;
};
struct trusted_key_ops {
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
index aa108bea6739b3..2975827c01bec0 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
@@ -713,6 +713,7 @@ enum {
Opt_hash,
Opt_policydigest,
Opt_policyhandle,
+ Opt_creationpcrs,
};
static const match_table_t key_tokens = {
@@ -725,6 +726,7 @@ static const match_table_t key_tokens = {
{Opt_hash, "hash=%s"},
{Opt_policydigest, "policydigest=%s"},
{Opt_policyhandle, "policyhandle=%s"},
+ {Opt_creationpcrs, "creationpcrs=%s"},
{Opt_err, NULL}
};
@@ -858,6 +860,13 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
return -EINVAL;
opt->policyhandle = handle;
break;
+ case Opt_creationpcrs:
+ if (!tpm2)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ res = kstrtoint(args[0].from, 16, &opt->creation_pcrs);
+ if (res < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
index 1f166d4fa307a9..1d1470b880ca01 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
@@ -389,7 +389,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
struct tpm_buf buf;
u32 hash;
u32 flags;
- int i;
+ int i, j;
int rc;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tpm2_hash_map); i++) {
@@ -458,7 +458,28 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0);
/* creation PCR */
- tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 0);
+ if (options->creation_pcrs) {
+ /* One bank */
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 1);
+ /* Which bank to use */
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, hash);
+ /* Length of the PCR bitmask */
+ tpm_buf_append_u8(&buf, 3);
+ /* PCR bitmask */
+ for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
+ char tmp = 0;
+
+ for (j = 0; j < 8; j++) {
+ char bit = (i * 8) + j;
+
+ if (options->creation_pcrs & (1 << bit))
+ tmp |= (1 << j);
+ }
+ tpm_buf_append_u8(&buf, tmp);
+ }
+ } else {
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 0);
+ }
if (buf.flags & TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW) {
rc = -E2BIG;
--
2.31.0
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