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Message-ID: <c648aa7c-a49c-a7e2-6a05-d1dfe44b8fdb@schaufler-ca.com>
Date: Fri, 26 Aug 2022 10:11:42 -0700
From: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
To: Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
Cc: viro@...iv.linux.org.uk, Jeff Layton <jlayton@...nel.org>,
Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@...merspace.com>,
Anna Schumaker <anna@...nel.org>,
Scott Mayhew <smayhew@...hat.com>,
Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>, linux-nfs@...r.kernel.org,
selinux@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, dwysocha@...hat.com,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, casey@...aufler-ca.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4] vfs, security: Fix automount superblock LSM init
problem, preventing NFS sb sharing
On 8/26/2022 1:24 AM, Christian Brauner wrote:
> On Wed, Aug 24, 2022 at 11:09:50AM +0100, David Howells wrote:
>> When NFS superblocks are created by automounting, their LSM parameters
>> aren't set in the fs_context struct prior to sget_fc() being called,
>> leading to failure to match existing superblocks.
>>
>> Fix this by adding a new LSM hook to load fc->security for submount
>> creation when alloc_fs_context() is creating the fs_context for it.
>>
>> However, this uncovers a further bug: nfs_get_root() initialises the
>> superblock security manually by calling security_sb_set_mnt_opts() or
>> security_sb_clone_mnt_opts() - but then vfs_get_tree() calls
>> security_sb_set_mnt_opts(), which can lead to SELinux, at least,
>> complaining.
>>
>> Fix that by adding a flag to the fs_context that suppresses the
>> security_sb_set_mnt_opts() call in vfs_get_tree(). This can be set by NFS
>> when it sets the LSM context on the new superblock.
>>
>> The first bug leads to messages like the following appearing in dmesg:
>>
>> NFS: Cache volume key already in use (nfs,4.2,2,108,106a8c0,1,,,,100000,100000,2ee,3a98,1d4c,3a98,1)
>>
>> Changes
>> =======
>> ver #4)
>> - When doing a FOR_SUBMOUNT mount, don't set the root label in SELinux or
>> Smack.
>>
>> ver #3)
>> - Made LSM parameter extraction dependent on fc->purpose ==
>> FS_CONTEXT_FOR_SUBMOUNT. Shouldn't happen on FOR_RECONFIGURE.
>>
>> ver #2)
>> - Added Smack support
>> - Made LSM parameter extraction dependent on reference != NULL.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
>> Fixes: 9bc61ab18b1d ("vfs: Introduce fs_context, switch vfs_kern_mount() to it.")
>> Fixes: 779df6a5480f ("NFS: Ensure security label is set for root inode)
>> Tested-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@...nel.org>
>> cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@...merspace.com>
>> cc: Anna Schumaker <anna@...nel.org>
>> cc: Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>
>> cc: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@...hat.com>
>> cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@...nel.org>
>> cc: Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
>> cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
>> cc: linux-nfs@...r.kernel.org
>> cc: selinux@...r.kernel.org
>> cc: linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
>> cc: linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org
>> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/165962680944.3334508.6610023900349142034.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v1
>> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/165962729225.3357250.14350728846471527137.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v2
>> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/165970659095.2812394.6868894171102318796.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v3
>> ---
>>
>> fs/fs_context.c | 4 +++
>> fs/nfs/getroot.c | 1 +
>> fs/super.c | 10 +++++---
>> include/linux/fs_context.h | 1 +
>> include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 1 +
>> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 6 ++++-
>> include/linux/security.h | 6 +++++
>> security/security.c | 5 ++++
>> security/selinux/hooks.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++
>> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 54 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>> 10 files changed, 110 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/fs/fs_context.c b/fs/fs_context.c
>> index 24ce12f0db32..22248b8a88a8 100644
>> --- a/fs/fs_context.c
>> +++ b/fs/fs_context.c
>> @@ -282,6 +282,10 @@ static struct fs_context *alloc_fs_context(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
>> break;
>> }
>>
>> + ret = security_fs_context_init(fc, reference);
>> + if (ret < 0)
>> + goto err_fc;
>> +
>> /* TODO: Make all filesystems support this unconditionally */
>> init_fs_context = fc->fs_type->init_fs_context;
>> if (!init_fs_context)
>> diff --git a/fs/nfs/getroot.c b/fs/nfs/getroot.c
>> index 11ff2b2e060f..651bffb0067e 100644
>> --- a/fs/nfs/getroot.c
>> +++ b/fs/nfs/getroot.c
>> @@ -144,6 +144,7 @@ int nfs_get_root(struct super_block *s, struct fs_context *fc)
>> }
>> if (error)
>> goto error_splat_root;
>> + fc->lsm_set = true;
>> if (server->caps & NFS_CAP_SECURITY_LABEL &&
>> !(kflags_out & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS))
>> server->caps &= ~NFS_CAP_SECURITY_LABEL;
>> diff --git a/fs/super.c b/fs/super.c
>> index 734ed584a946..94666c0c92a4 100644
>> --- a/fs/super.c
>> +++ b/fs/super.c
>> @@ -1552,10 +1552,12 @@ int vfs_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
>> smp_wmb();
>> sb->s_flags |= SB_BORN;
>>
>> - error = security_sb_set_mnt_opts(sb, fc->security, 0, NULL);
>> - if (unlikely(error)) {
>> - fc_drop_locked(fc);
>> - return error;
>> + if (!(fc->lsm_set)) {
>> + error = security_sb_set_mnt_opts(sb, fc->security, 0, NULL);
>> + if (unlikely(error)) {
>> + fc_drop_locked(fc);
>> + return error;
>> + }
>> }
>>
>> /*
>> diff --git a/include/linux/fs_context.h b/include/linux/fs_context.h
>> index 13fa6f3df8e4..3876dd96bb20 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/fs_context.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/fs_context.h
>> @@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ struct fs_context {
>> bool need_free:1; /* Need to call ops->free() */
>> bool global:1; /* Goes into &init_user_ns */
>> bool oldapi:1; /* Coming from mount(2) */
>> + bool lsm_set:1; /* security_sb_set/clone_mnt_opts() already done */
>> };
>>
>> struct fs_context_operations {
>> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
>> index 806448173033..40ac14d772da 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
>> @@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bprm_creds_from_file, struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *f
>> LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bprm_check_security, struct linux_binprm *bprm)
>> LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, bprm_committing_creds, struct linux_binprm *bprm)
>> LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, bprm_committed_creds, struct linux_binprm *bprm)
>> +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, fs_context_init, struct fs_context *fc, struct dentry *reference)
>> LSM_HOOK(int, 0, fs_context_dup, struct fs_context *fc,
>> struct fs_context *src_sc)
>> LSM_HOOK(int, -ENOPARAM, fs_context_parse_param, struct fs_context *fc,
>> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
>> index 84a0d7e02176..aec42d6287b5 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
>> @@ -87,8 +87,12 @@
>> * Security hooks for mount using fs_context.
>> * [See also Documentation/filesystems/mount_api.rst]
>> *
>> + * @fs_context_init:
>> + * Initialise fc->security. This is initialised to NULL by the caller.
>> + * @fc indicates the new filesystem context.
>> + * @dentry indicates a reference for submount/remount
>> * @fs_context_dup:
>> - * Allocate and attach a security structure to sc->security. This pointer
>> + * Allocate and attach a security structure to fc->security. This pointer
>> * is initialised to NULL by the caller.
>> * @fc indicates the new filesystem context.
>> * @src_fc indicates the original filesystem context.
>> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
>> index 1bc362cb413f..e7dfe38df72d 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/security.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
>> @@ -291,6 +291,7 @@ int security_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file);
>> int security_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
>> void security_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
>> void security_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
>> +int security_fs_context_init(struct fs_context *fc, struct dentry *reference);
>> int security_fs_context_dup(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_context *src_fc);
>> int security_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *param);
>> int security_sb_alloc(struct super_block *sb);
>> @@ -622,6 +623,11 @@ static inline void security_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
>> {
>> }
>>
>> +static inline int security_fs_context_init(struct fs_context *fc,
>> + struct dentry *reference)
>> +{
>> + return 0;
>> +}
>> static inline int security_fs_context_dup(struct fs_context *fc,
>> struct fs_context *src_fc)
>> {
>> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
>> index 14d30fec8a00..7b677087c4eb 100644
>> --- a/security/security.c
>> +++ b/security/security.c
>> @@ -880,6 +880,11 @@ void security_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
>> call_void_hook(bprm_committed_creds, bprm);
>> }
>>
>> +int security_fs_context_init(struct fs_context *fc, struct dentry *reference)
>> +{
>> + return call_int_hook(fs_context_init, 0, fc, reference);
>> +}
>> +
>> int security_fs_context_dup(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_context *src_fc)
>> {
>> return call_int_hook(fs_context_dup, 0, fc, src_fc);
>> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
>> index 79573504783b..c09dcf6df2b6 100644
>> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
>> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
>> @@ -2765,6 +2765,32 @@ static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
>> FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
>> }
>>
>> +static int selinux_fs_context_init(struct fs_context *fc,
>> + struct dentry *reference)
>> +{
>> + const struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
>> + const struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
>> + struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts;
>> +
>> + if (fc->purpose == FS_CONTEXT_FOR_SUBMOUNT) {
>> + opts = kzalloc(sizeof(*opts), GFP_KERNEL);
>> + if (!opts)
>> + return -ENOMEM;
>> +
>> + root_isec = backing_inode_security(reference->d_sb->s_root);
>> + sbsec = selinux_superblock(reference->d_sb);
>> + if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT)
>> + opts->fscontext_sid = sbsec->sid;
>> + if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT)
>> + opts->context_sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
>> + if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT)
>> + opts->defcontext_sid = sbsec->def_sid;
>> + fc->security = opts;
>> + }
>> +
>> + return 0;
>> +}
>> +
>> static int selinux_fs_context_dup(struct fs_context *fc,
>> struct fs_context *src_fc)
>> {
>> @@ -7236,6 +7262,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>> /*
>> * PUT "CLONING" (ACCESSING + ALLOCATING) HOOKS HERE
>> */
>> + LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_init, selinux_fs_context_init),
>> LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_dup, selinux_fs_context_dup),
>> LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_parse_param, selinux_fs_context_parse_param),
>> LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_eat_lsm_opts, selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts),
>> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
>> index 001831458fa2..8665428481d3 100644
>> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
>> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
>> @@ -612,6 +612,59 @@ static int smack_add_opt(int token, const char *s, void **mnt_opts)
>> return -EINVAL;
>> }
>>
>> +/**
>> + * smack_fs_context_init - Initialise security data for a filesystem context
>> + * @fc: The filesystem context.
>> + * @reference: Reference dentry (automount/reconfigure) or NULL
>> + *
>> + * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error.
>> + */
>> +static int smack_fs_context_init(struct fs_context *fc,
>> + struct dentry *reference)
>> +{
>> + struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
>> + struct smack_mnt_opts *ctx;
>> + struct inode_smack *isp;
>> +
>> + ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), GFP_KERNEL);
>> + if (!ctx)
>> + return -ENOMEM;
>> + fc->security = ctx;
>> +
>> + if (fc->purpose == FS_CONTEXT_FOR_SUBMOUNT) {
>> + sbsp = smack_superblock(reference->d_sb);
>> + isp = smack_inode(reference->d_sb->s_root->d_inode);
>> +
>> + if (sbsp->smk_default) {
>> + ctx->fsdefault = kstrdup(sbsp->smk_default->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
>> + if (!ctx->fsdefault)
>> + return -ENOMEM;
>> + }
>> +
>> + if (sbsp->smk_floor) {
>> + ctx->fsfloor = kstrdup(sbsp->smk_floor->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
>> + if (!ctx->fsfloor)
>> + return -ENOMEM;
>> + }
>> +
>> + if (sbsp->smk_hat) {
>> + ctx->fshat = kstrdup(sbsp->smk_hat->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
>> + if (!ctx->fshat)
>> + return -ENOMEM;
>> + }
>> +
>> + if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE) {
>> + if (sbsp->smk_root) {
>> + ctx->fstransmute = kstrdup(sbsp->smk_root->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
>> + if (!ctx->fstransmute)
>> + return -ENOMEM;
> Just curious, how's freeing that worked for this case? Is all of that
> memory dropped in ops->free() somehow?
Yes, in the current implementation. However ...
The authors of this version of the mount code failed to look
especially closely at how Smack maintains label names. Once a
label name is used in the kernel it is kept on a list forever.
All the copies of smk_known here and in the rest of the mount
infrastructure are unnecessary and wasteful. The entire set of
Smack hooks that deal with mounting need to be reworked to remove
that waste. It's on my list of Smack cleanups, but I'd be happy
if someone else wanted a go at it.
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