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Message-ID: <Yw/eEufm/QpKg5Pq@ZenIV>
Date: Wed, 31 Aug 2022 23:17:54 +0100
From: Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>
To: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@...glemail.com>
Cc: selinux@...r.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-arch@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 1/2] fs/xattr: add *at family syscalls
[linux-arch Cc'd for ABI-related stuff]
On Tue, Aug 30, 2022 at 05:28:39PM +0200, Christian Göttsche wrote:
> Add the four syscalls setxattrat(), getxattrat(), listxattrat() and
> removexattrat() to enable extended attribute operations via file
> descriptors. This can be used from userspace to avoid race conditions,
> especially on security related extended attributes, like SELinux labels
> ("security.selinux") via setfiles(8).
>
> Use the do_{name}at() pattern from fs/open.c.
> Use a single flag parameter for extended attribute flags (currently
> XATTR_CREATE and XATTR_REPLACE) and *at() flags to not exceed six
> syscall arguments in setxattrat().
I've no problems with the patchset aside of the flags part;
however, note that XATTR_CREATE and XATTR_REPLACE are actually exposed
to the network - the values are passed to nfsd by clients.
See nfsd4_decode_setxattr() and
BUILD_BUG_ON(XATTR_CREATE != SETXATTR4_CREATE);
BUILD_BUG_ON(XATTR_REPLACE != SETXATTR4_REPLACE);
in encode_setxattr() on the client side.
Makes me really nervous about constraints like that. Sure,
AT_... flags you are using are in the second octet and these are in
the lowest one, but...
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