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Date:   Wed, 31 Aug 2022 11:19:07 +0800
From:   Shung-Hsi Yu <shung-hsi.yu@...e.com>
To:     bpf@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     "Alexei Starovoitov" <ast@...nel.org>,
        "Daniel Borkmann" <daniel@...earbox.net>,
        "John Fastabend" <john.fastabend@...il.com>,
        Shung-Hsi Yu <shung-hsi.yu@...e.com>
Subject: [RFC bpf-next 2/2] proof for the safe usage of tnum_in()

This commit is not meant to be merged, merely as a display of proof
about the claims in previous commit that tnum_in() can be trusted when
used in the following form:

- tnum_in(tnum_const(), ...)
- tnum_in(tnum_range(0, 2**n - 1), ...)
- tnum_in(tnum_range(2**n, 2**(n+1) - 1), ...)

Note that this only proves that tnum_in() can be trusted when it returns
true, and proof nothing about whether it's trustworthy or not when it
returns false; the latter is still being worked on.

Signed-off-by: Shung-Hsi Yu <shung-hsi.yu@...e.com>
---
 tnum_in.py | 158 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 158 insertions(+)
 create mode 100755 tnum_in.py

diff --git a/tnum_in.py b/tnum_in.py
new file mode 100755
index 000000000000..e4567bda51c4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tnum_in.py
@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+#
+# A proof on the property of tnum_in(tnum_range(a, b), ...) using the Z3
+# theorem prover
+#
+# Requires the z3 Python module (aka Z3Py), which can be installed with the
+# command `pip3 install z3-solver`
+#
+from uuid import uuid4
+from z3 import And, BitVec, BitVecs, BitVecVal, Extract, If, Implies, Or, ULE, UGT, ZeroExt, prove
+
+
+class Tnum:
+    """A model of tristate number use in Linux kernel's BPF verifier.
+
+    Largely based on the "Sound, Precise, and Fast Abstract Interpretation with
+    Tristate Numbers" paper <https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.05398>.
+    """
+    SIZE = 64
+    def __init__(self, val=None, mask=None):
+        uid = uuid4() # Ensure that the BitVec are uniq, required by the Z3 solver
+        self.val = BitVec(f'Tnum-val-{uid}', bv=Tnum.SIZE) if val is None else val
+        self.mask = BitVec(f'Tnum-mask-{uid}', bv=Tnum.SIZE) if mask is None else mask
+
+    def contains(self, bitvec):
+        # Mask out the unknown bits, if what left is that same as value, then
+        # this that integer is represented by this tnum
+        return (~self.mask & bitvec) == self.val
+
+    def wellformed(self):
+        # Bit cannot be set in both val and mask, such tnum is not valid
+        return self.val & self.mask == BitVecVal(0, bv=Tnum.SIZE)
+
+
+def is_power_of_2(n):
+    return And(n != 0, n & (n-1) == 0)
+
+
+def fls64(bv):
+    size = Tnum.SIZE
+    num = BitVecVal(0, bv=Tnum.SIZE)
+    while size > 1:
+        half_size = size // 2
+        h = Extract(size - 1, half_size, bv)
+        bv = If(
+            h != 0,
+            h,
+            Extract(half_size - 1, 0, bv),
+        )
+        num += If(h != 0, BitVecVal(half_size, bv=Tnum.SIZE), BitVecVal(0, bv=Tnum.SIZE))
+        size = half_size
+
+    assert(size == 1) # Size is now 1
+    num += If(bv != 0, BitVecVal(1, bv=Tnum.SIZE), BitVecVal(0, bv=Tnum.SIZE))
+    return num
+
+
+def tnum_range(min_, max_): # Don't shadow built-in min & max
+    """tnum_range() implementation modeling what's found in the Linux Kernel"""
+    chi = min_ ^ max_
+    bits = fls64(chi)
+    delta = (BitVecVal(1, bv=Tnum.SIZE) << bits) - 1
+    too_large = UGT(bits, BitVecVal(Tnum.SIZE - 1, bv=Tnum.SIZE))
+
+    val = If(
+        too_large,
+        BitVecVal(0, bv=Tnum.SIZE),
+        min_ & ~delta,
+    )
+    mask = If(
+        too_large,
+        BitVecVal(-1, bv=Tnum.SIZE),
+        delta,
+    )
+    return Tnum(val=val, mask=mask)
+
+
+def tnum_in(a, b):
+    """tnum_in() implementation modeling what's found in the Linux Kernel"""
+    return If(
+        (b.mask & ~a.mask) != 0,
+        False,
+        a.val == (b.val & ~a.mask),
+    )
+
+
+# a, b, and x are integers which could be of any value
+a, b, x = BitVecs('a b x', bv=Tnum.SIZE)
+assumptions = []
+
+t = tnum_range(a, b) # Any possible range we could get out of tnum_range()
+assumptions += [
+    ULE(a, b), # a <= b
+]
+
+st = Tnum() # The second argument can be any tnum
+assumptions += [
+    st.wellformed(), # As long as it is a valid one
+    st.contains(x), # And contains the number x (that could be any integers)
+]
+
+condition = [
+    # When tnum_in() returns true
+    tnum_in(t, st) == True,
+]
+
+print("""\
+Trying to proof that tnum_in(tnum_range(a,b), ...) can always be trusted when
+it returns true...
+""")
+prove(
+    Implies(
+        # When using tnum_in(tnum_range(a, b), ...)
+        And(assumptions + condition),
+        # Try to prove that we can always trust it when it returns true
+        # That is, all number that the second argument can represent (i.e. x) is
+        # inclusively between a and b
+        And(ULE(a, x), ULE(x, b)),
+    )
+)
+print("")
+
+# Additional constrains, namely that the first argument need to be in the form of either
+#   tnum_const()
+# or
+#   tnum_range(0, 2**n - 1)
+# or
+#   tnum_range(2**n, 2**(n+1) - 1)
+additional_assumptions = [
+    Or(
+        a == b, # since a == b, tnum_range(a, b) == tnum_const()
+        And(a == 0, is_power_of_2(b + 1)), # b is 2**n - 1
+        And(is_power_of_2(a), b == (a << 1) - 1) # a is 2**n and b is 2**(n+1) - 1
+    ),
+]
+
+print("""\
+Trying to proof that tnum_in(tnum_range(a,b), ...) can always be trusted when
+it returns true, again, but with constrains on a and b, namely the first
+argument of tnum_in() must be in one of the following forms:
+- tnum_in(tnum_const(), ...)
+- tnum_in(tnum_range(0, 2**n - 1), ...)
+- tnum_in(tnum_range(2**n, 2**(n+1) - 1), ...)
+""")
+prove(
+    Implies(
+        # When tnum_in() is used in the form of
+        #   tnum_in(tnum_const(), ...)
+        # or
+        #   tnum_in(tnum_range(0, 2**n - 1), ...)
+        # or
+        #   tnum_in(tnum_range(2**n, 2**(n+1) - 1), ...)
+        And(assumptions + additional_assumptions + condition),
+        # Try to prove that we can always trust it when it returns true when the additional
+        # contrains above is inplace
+        And(ULE(a, x), ULE(x, b)),
+    )
+)
-- 
2.37.2

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