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Message-Id: <20220831120324.4477-1-yin31149@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 31 Aug 2022 20:03:25 +0800
From: Hawkins Jiawei <yin31149@...il.com>
To: dan.carpenter@...cle.com
Cc: 18801353760@....com, akpm@...ux-foundation.org, anton@...era.com,
chenxiaosong2@...wei.com, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-ntfs-dev@...ts.sourceforge.net,
syzbot+5f8dcabe4a3b2c51c607@...kaller.appspotmail.com,
syzkaller-bugs@...glegroups.com, yin31149@...il.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/3] ntfs: fix out-of-bounds read in ntfs_attr_find()
On Wed, 31 Aug 2022 at 19:08, Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@...cle.com> wrote:
>
> On Wed, Aug 31, 2022 at 10:43:36AM +0800, Hawkins Jiawei wrote:
> > Kernel will iterates over ATTR_RECORDs in mft record in ntfs_attr_find().
> > To ensure access on these ATTR_RECORDs are within bounds, kernel will
> > do some checking during iteration.
> >
> > The problem is that during checking whether ATTR_RECORD's name is within
> > bounds, kernel will dereferences the ATTR_RECORD name_offset field,
> > before checking this ATTR_RECORD strcture is within bounds. This problem
> > may result out-of-bounds read in ntfs_attr_find(), reported by
> > Syzkaller:
> >
> > ==================================================================
> > BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ntfs_attr_find+0xc02/0xce0 fs/ntfs/attrib.c:597
> > Read of size 2 at addr ffff88807e352009 by task syz-executor153/3607
> >
> > [...]
> > Call Trace:
> > <TASK>
> > __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
> > dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 lib/dump_stack.c:106
> > print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:317 [inline]
> > print_report.cold+0x2ba/0x719 mm/kasan/report.c:433
> > kasan_report+0xb1/0x1e0 mm/kasan/report.c:495
> > ntfs_attr_find+0xc02/0xce0 fs/ntfs/attrib.c:597
> > ntfs_attr_lookup+0x1056/0x2070 fs/ntfs/attrib.c:1193
> > ntfs_read_inode_mount+0x89a/0x2580 fs/ntfs/inode.c:1845
> > ntfs_fill_super+0x1799/0x9320 fs/ntfs/super.c:2854
> > mount_bdev+0x34d/0x410 fs/super.c:1400
> > legacy_get_tree+0x105/0x220 fs/fs_context.c:610
> > vfs_get_tree+0x89/0x2f0 fs/super.c:1530
> > do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:3040 [inline]
> > path_mount+0x1326/0x1e20 fs/namespace.c:3370
> > do_mount fs/namespace.c:3383 [inline]
> > __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3591 [inline]
> > __se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3568 [inline]
> > __x64_sys_mount+0x27f/0x300 fs/namespace.c:3568
> > do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
> > do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
> > entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
> > [...]
> > </TASK>
> >
> > The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
> > page:ffffea0001f8d400 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x7e350
> > head:ffffea0001f8d400 order:3 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0
> > flags: 0xfff00000010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
> > raw: 00fff00000010200 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 ffff888011842140
> > raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000040004 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
> > page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
> > Memory state around the buggy address:
> > ffff88807e351f00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
> > ffff88807e351f80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
> > >ffff88807e352000: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
> > ^
> > ffff88807e352080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
> > ffff88807e352100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
> > ==================================================================
> >
> > This patch solves it by moving the ATTR_RECORD strcture's bounds
> > checking earlier, then checking whether ATTR_RECORD's name
> > is within bounds. What's more, this patch also add some comments
> > to improve its maintainability.
> >
> > Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+5f8dcabe4a3b2c51c607@...kaller.appspotmail.com
> > Signed-off-by: chenxiaosong (A) <chenxiaosong2@...wei.com>
> > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/1636796c-c85e-7f47-e96f-e074fee3c7d3@huawei.com/
> > Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@...cle.com>
> > Link: https://groups.google.com/g/syzkaller-bugs/c/t_XdeKPGTR4/m/LECAuIGcBgAJ
> > Signed-off-by: Hawkins Jiawei <yin31149@...il.com>
> > ---
> > fs/ntfs/attrib.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++----
> > 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/fs/ntfs/attrib.c b/fs/ntfs/attrib.c
> > index 52615e6090e1..904734e34507 100644
> > --- a/fs/ntfs/attrib.c
> > +++ b/fs/ntfs/attrib.c
> > @@ -594,11 +594,23 @@ static int ntfs_attr_find(const ATTR_TYPE type, const ntfschar *name,
> > for (;; a = (ATTR_RECORD*)((u8*)a + le32_to_cpu(a->length))) {
> > u8 *mrec_end = (u8 *)ctx->mrec +
> > le32_to_cpu(ctx->mrec->bytes_allocated);
> > - u8 *name_end = (u8 *)a + le16_to_cpu(a->name_offset) +
> > - a->name_length * sizeof(ntfschar);
> > - if ((u8*)a < (u8*)ctx->mrec || (u8*)a > mrec_end ||
> > - name_end > mrec_end)
> > + u8 *name_end, *arec_head_end;
> > +
> > + /* check for wrap around */
> > + if ((u8 *)a < (u8 *)ctx->mrec)
> > + break;
> > +
> > + /* check whether Attribute Record Header is within bounds */
> > + arec_head_end = (u8 *)a + sizeof(ATTR_RECORD);
> > + if (arec_head_end < (u8 *)a || arec_head_end > mrec_end)
>
> This works but I feel like it would be more natural to just check if
> a was valid and if a + sizeof(ATTR_RECORD) was also valid.
>
> if (a > mrec_end || (u8 *)a + sizeof(ATTR_RECORD) > mrec_end)
Hi Dan,
Thanks for your suggestion.
This looks more natural than original patch, yet I wonder if there may
be an overflow?
To be more specific, if "a" and "mrec_end" is large enough, it seems that
some fields of "a" may be out-of-bounds and also bypass this check because
of the overflow.(Please correct me if I am wrong)
> But what you have also works so if you want to go with that then that's
> fine.
>
> regards,
> dan carpenter
>
> > break;
> > +
> > + /* check whether ATTR_RECORD's name is within bounds */
> > + name_end = (u8 *)a + le16_to_cpu(a->name_offset) +
> > + a->name_length * sizeof(ntfschar);
> > + if (name_end > mrec_end)
> > + break;
> > +
> > ctx->attr = a;
> > if (unlikely(le32_to_cpu(a->type) > le32_to_cpu(type) ||
> > a->type == AT_END))
>
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