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Message-ID: <20220831202017.69838448@kernel.org>
Date: Wed, 31 Aug 2022 20:20:17 -0700
From: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@...filter.org>,
Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@...filter.org>,
Florian Westphal <fw@...len.de>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>,
Paolo Abeni <pabeni@...hat.com>,
syzbot <syzkaller@...glegroups.com>,
netfilter-devel@...r.kernel.org, coreteam@...filter.org,
netdev@...r.kernel.org, Yajun Deng <yajun.deng@...ux.dev>,
Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@...tkopp.net>,
Harshit Mogalapalli <harshit.m.mogalapalli@...cle.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] netlink: Bounds-check struct nlmsgerr creation
On Wed, 31 Aug 2022 20:06:10 -0700 Kees Cook wrote:
> For 32-bit systems, it might be possible to wrap lnmsgerr content
> lengths beyond SIZE_MAX. Explicitly test for all overflows, and mark the
> memcpy() as being unable to internally diagnose overflows.
>
> This also excludes netlink from the coming runtime bounds check on
> memcpy(), since it's an unusual case of open-coded sizing and
> allocation.
This one you gotta rebase we just rewrote the af_netlink
part last week :)
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